On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century Quotes

“This is not to counsel complacency — the need for real plans remains — but to emphasize that the will and resolve to employ nuclear weapons are, at root, more important than precisely how they are postured and used. Artful planning and strong rhetoric are supplements to the basic reality of nuclear weapons, not substitutes of it. Nuclear weapons are, in their essence, weapons whose effectiveness stems from their immense destructiveness, a destructiveness that makes actions that prompt their use almost impossible to justify.”
― Jeffrey A. Larsen, On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century

“As Schlesinger pointed out, the quintessence of limited nuclear options is "selectivity," not counterforce. Practically speaking, this suggests that limited nuclear strikes should be directed, at least in the initial stage of a conflict, against targets isolated from both the enemy's populace, leadership redoubts, strategic forces and their enabling capabilities, and targets such as general purpose forces, especially those of relevance to the conventional war that would almost certainly accompany (or whose potential would shadow) such a limited nuclear conflict.”
― Jeffrey A. Larsen, On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century

“Battlefield use of tactical nuclear weapons could perhaps qualify as purely tactical. But limited nuclear war need not be confined to a battlefield. Limited nuclear strikes against other than clearly battlefield targets, such as those located in the rear, on the territory of an ally, or, particularly, in the homeland of an opponent, could well be regarded as strategic, even if restricted to warfighting, or counterforce, targets.”
― Jeffrey A. Larsen, On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century

“Limited wars were not to be considered lesser-included cases. The ability to deter, fight, and win in the least likely contingencies — total wars —did not necessarily ensure the ability to deter, fight, and win in the most likely contingencies — limited wars.”
― Jeffrey A. Larsen, On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century

“The (nuclear proliferation) optimists emphasized the constraints on further proliferation and anticipate a relatively benign proliferation future, due in large part to the success of initiatives to materially strengthen the nonproliferation regime, including the development of far-reaching norms and processes. Proliferation pessimists, on the other hand, are convinced that there are powerful incentives to acquire nuclear weapons, for purposes of political prestige, regional security, and getting more "bang from the buck" relative to the economics of building and sustaining large conventional forces.”
― Jeffrey A. Larsen, On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century