The Greatest Battles in History Quotes

“Despite all of these important drawbacks, the Americans still won the battle convincingly, thanks mostly to the killer blows struck by one weapons system: the US Dauntless dive bomber. When these bombers were used correctly in dive bombing attacks (instead of the gliding technique coming in across the horizon), they swamped the Japanese defenses at a crucial moment, attacking en masse.”
― Charles River Editors, The Greatest Battles in History: The Battle of Midway

“Midway was merely a convenient target chosen by Yamamoto to draw the Americans out, and both sides’ objectives were attritional attempts to degrade their opponents’ carrier units. Nevertheless, the result created space for the Americans to begin their cautious advance back across the Pacific. This started with Guadalcanal and proceeded along two axes. Nimitz would command the larger and predominantly naval effort across the central Pacific, and island fortresses such as Saipan and Iwo Jima would soon go down in military legend. To the south, General Douglas MacArthur led a campaign across New Guinea and the Philippines, with a more land-based focus. Notwithstanding that, it was off Leyte Gulf in the Philippines in October 1944 that the Imperial Japanese Navy suffered a fatal blow in the largest naval battle in history, during which four carriers and three battleships were lost.”
― Charles River Editors, The Greatest Battles in History: The Battle of Midway

“Despite their proximity to mainland Alaska and an important maritime route, the Japanese invasion of the Aleutians would not have the impact Japan hoped for. At best, it served as a deterrent against a U.S. thrust from that direction. While”
― Charles River Editors, The Greatest Battles in History: The Battle of Midway

“Ironically, the last aircraft carrier to sink as a result of the Battle of Midway was an American one. By the early afternoon on June 6, there was some optimism about the prospect of saving the Yorktown, as salvage crews had put out the fires and stabilised the vessel using pumps. The Yorktown was also surrounded by 6 protective destroyers as an escort. However, these destroyers failed to detect the Japanese submarine I-168, which crept to within easy torpedo range. In the middle of the afternoon on June 6, the submarine fired four torpedoes, two of which punched through the Yorktown’s hull, causing more extensive flooding. The third hit the destroyer Hammann, sinking the destroyer within three minutes and causing mass casualties. The fourth torpedo missed, and the I168 was chased off by the remaining American destroyers.”
― Charles River Editors, The Greatest Battles in History: The Battle of Midway

“In an episode characteristic of the U.S. tactical intelligence effort during Midway, the attacks on this modest force had repeatedly been reported as being against one or two “battleships”. It was only later in the evening that aerial photography confirmed the sunken vessel had been the heavy cruiser Mikuma, with her damaged sister ship Mogami getting away. The brave defense of this little force over two days, and the fact that three out of the four ships eventually made it back to port, stands testimony to the professionalism and abilities of the Imperial Japanese Navy.”
― Charles River Editors, The Greatest Battles in History: The Battle of Midway

“Meanwhile, in another example of the ineffectiveness of high altitude level bombing at sea, Hornet’s planes had to fly through a curtain of bombs dropped by the American Army Air Force itself. B-17’s had attempted to intervene yet again from their base on Hawaii, but like before, the B-17’s hit neither friend nor foe. ”
― Charles River Editors, The Greatest Battles in History: The Battle of Midway

“Unaware that they had launched another attack on the Yorktown, which they thought had already been badly damaged, the Japanese returned to the Hiryu thinking they had critically damaged or sunk a second U.S. carrier. Operating under this incorrect assumption, Nagumo believed the fight was still very much on. ”
― Charles River Editors, The Greatest Battles in History: The Battle of Midway

“The Wildcats tore into the Vals as they climbed prior to making their dives, and 11 of the 18 attacking dive bombers were shot down before they could even begin their bomb run. Others were knocked down by flak as they bore in on the Yorktown. It would not be enough to save the ship from damage, however. By 12:30, the Yorktown had taken three bomb hits, damaging the flight deck, starting a series of fires, and stopping her engines. At 12:38, Admiral Fletcher moved his command to the heavy cruiser Astoria. The returning Japanese pilots reported that they had left an American carrier ablaze and at least crippled. This would end up causing an important misunderstanding in the Japanese command. Less”
― Charles River Editors, The Greatest Battles in History: The Battle of Midway

“The steeper angle of a true dive bombing run (about 70 degrees) was far less vulnerable to flak and far more accurate. Japanese carriers had thin unarmored flight decks, and on board the ships there were hundreds of aircraft, many of them being refuelled and re-armed. All the factors were now aligned for a devastating attack. Yorktown’s”
― Charles River Editors, The Greatest Battles in History: The Battle of Midway

“This points to another problem the Japanese had: coordination of their immediate fleet defense was difficult. Unlike the Americans, they had no radar and therefore relied on visual contact for the identification of intruders. Second, their radio equipment was poor and often ignored by the pilots[5]. Third, the fighter pilots, while highly skilled, were imbued with bushido, the Japanese martial tradition that emphasised individual aggression rather than teamwork. None”
― Charles River Editors, The Greatest Battles in History: The Battle of Midway

“Arashi was ultimately unsuccessful in that mission, and it was this same destroyer which was spotted by McClusky. By following the destroyer, McClusky’s air group was effectively vectored straight to Nagumo’s fleet, which they sighted some half an hour later. Nimitz would later state that McClusky’s decision “decided the fate of our carrier task force and our forces at Midway...”
― Charles River Editors, The Greatest Battles in History: The Battle of Midway

“The organization of high-tempo air operations from carriers remains an extremely challenging proposition even today, but in June 1942, the Japanese were world leaders in this field. Their fleet carriers would typically hold about 90 aircraft, confined into a very tight space. There were two hangar decks, with lifts connecting them to the flight deck above. Japanese ground crews were very well trained, with the result that they could turn around aircraft much faster than their British or American counterparts. Nonetheless, these were crowded ships, and they were already coming under attack from the Midway-based American aircraft. Furthermore, in addition to switching armament for Nagumo’s reserve bomber force, the crews were maintaining a rotating force of covering fighters. There were always Zeros on deck waiting to take off, being refuelled, or just having landed. Hoisting heavy torpedoes into the bomb bays of the Kates was also a very skilled operation that only specialist torpedo armorers were able to undertake. In short, this was a recipe for delay and confusion, even given the superb quality of the Japanese ground crew, and as Nagumo changed his mind twice in the span of less than an hour, the issues the Japanese faced on the carriers were exacerbated. ”
― Charles River Editors, The Greatest Battles in History: The Battle of Midway

“There were two reasons for this. First, the Americans had finally received intelligence regarding the Japanese carrier fleet. Earlier that morning (at about 5:00 a.m.), reports from several patrolling flying boats came in, so by the time the Japanese carrier planes hit Midway, the base’s own bombers were airborne on their way to hit those same carriers. Second, the fully alerted base had picked up the incoming air attack on radar, and the Japanese planes had also been spotted by one of the PBY’s, enabling all of the defending fighters to be scrambled for defense.”
― Charles River Editors, The Greatest Battles in History: The Battle of Midway

“After the patrollers had located the Japanese force, 9 B-17 Flying Fortresses were dispatched from Midway, locating the convoy four hours later. The first blows of the battle were delivered in the form of 500 and 1,000 pound bombs from medium altitude heavy bombers, but despite wild claims from the air force, the raid was totally ineffectual.”
― Charles River Editors, The Greatest Battles in History: The Battle of Midway

“Early histories have often overstated the degree of intelligence detail available to the Americans at this stage. Fletcher rightly expected the Japanese carriers to be split into two strike forces, and that they would approach from the west or north, but he would later need to respond to a single carrier group approaching from the southwest. For their part, the Japanese knew that the American heavy units were not at Pearl Harbor, but it seems likely that Nagumo was not given specific confirmation of this.”
― Charles River Editors, The Greatest Battles in History: The Battle of Midway

“The Midway air base had been reinforced from Hawaii on the basis of the new intelligence.”
― Charles River Editors, The Greatest Battles in History: The Battle of Midway

“Unbeknownst to the Japanese, the main disadvantage Japan would have at Midway was the fact the U.S. could read their radio traffic. With the success of their codebreakers, Americans were able to understand Japan’s communications in the Pacific in the days leading up to the battle, and even when the routine issue of new Japanese code books meant that the Americans were once again in the dark, analysts working for the Navy in Hawaii were reasonably confident that as the Japanese units left port, Midway was their target and June 4 would be the date of their arrival.”
― Charles River Editors, The Greatest Battles in History: The Battle of Midway

“The Americans, Dutch and Australians had lost further vessels as well, notably at the battle of the Java Sea in February. As a result, when the summer of 1942 started, the only significant naval threat remaining to Japan in the Pacific was what remained of the American Pacific Fleet following the attack on Pearl Harbor, and some of those battleships had been pulled back to San Francisco. This fact was not known by Japan, but given their superiority in battleships, the Japanese were not overly concerned about the remnants of the American fleet either way. What had remained untouched by the attack on Pearl Harbor were the American carriers;”
― Charles River Editors, The Greatest Battles in History: The Battle of Midway

“Posted on the other side of the world, it was early on the morning of December 8 in the Philippines when Douglas MacArthur received news of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor hours earlier. With that, it could only be a matter of time before the Japanese attacked the Philippines. MacArthur’s air commander, Lewis Brereton, urged an immediate bombing raid against Formosa, but MacArthur dithered. Eventually, the heavy B-17 Flying Fortresses were scrambled for their own protection, only to be caught back on the ground refueling when the expected Japanese air raids hit mid-morning.”
― Charles River Editors, The Greatest Battles in History: The Battle of Midway

“while a Free Dutch administration still controlled Indonesia, despite Holland having been overrun by Japan’s German allies in 1940. Indonesia had oil and rubber, but exports to Japan had been suspended by the colonial government.”
― Charles River Editors, The Greatest Battles in History: The Battle of Midway