One Continuous Fight Quotes

“If there is blame to be cast for the Army of the Potomac’s failure to destroy Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia on the north side of the Potomac River, much of that blame should be cast on Alfred Pleasonton.”
― Eric J. Wittenberg, One Continuous Fight: The Retreat from Gettysburg and the Pursuit of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, July 4–14, 1863

“Meade did not know his superiors and had not had the opportunity to hear their expectations of him directly from them as his predecessors had. This situation is rarely recognized or discussed in most studies of the Gettysburg Campaign.”
― Eric J. Wittenberg, One Continuous Fight: The Retreat from Gettysburg and the Pursuit of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, July 4–14, 1863

“By not massing his forces, Pleasonton let a golden opportunity slip through his fingers. The Army of the Potomac would never again enjoy the upper hand while Lee’s army remained north of the Potomac.”
― Eric J. Wittenberg, One Continuous Fight: The Retreat from Gettysburg and the Pursuit of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, July 4–14, 1863

“His decision to break off, however, left the critical ground between South Mountain and Hagerstown firmly in Confederate hands, meaning that Lee’s army would be able to concentrate there. In this, Kilpatrick inexplicably cost the Army of the Potomac the initiative that it never could regain.”
― Eric J. Wittenberg, One Continuous Fight: The Retreat from Gettysburg and the Pursuit of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, July 4–14, 1863

“The National Road, sometimes called the Cumberland Road because it originally terminated in Cumberland, Maryland, was the first Federal highway. It was built between 1811 and 1820 for some $7,000,000 to connect Baltimore with Ohio. It followed a route laid out by Gen. James Braddock’s pioneers during the French and Indian War and became an important line of commerce.”
― Eric J. Wittenberg, One Continuous Fight: The Retreat from Gettysburg and the Pursuit of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, July 4–14, 1863

“I wonder if Napoleon or even Robt. Lee were our commander this evening would they pursue a defeated army in this cautious, courteous way?”
― Eric J. Wittenberg, One Continuous Fight: The Retreat from Gettysburg and the Pursuit of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, July 4–14, 1863

“Meade recognized the perils of fighting for the various mountain gaps, which may help explain why his overall pursuit was so cautiously executed. His caution only increased when Sedgwick reported that the critical passes through South Mountain to the west of Fairfield were already too stoutly defended to assail.”
― Eric J. Wittenberg, One Continuous Fight: The Retreat from Gettysburg and the Pursuit of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, July 4–14, 1863

“Do not place confidence in that,” he warned Meade. “I have men in my Construction Corps who could construct bridges in forty-eight hours sufficient to pass that army, if they have no other material than such as they could gather from old buildings or from the woods, and it is not safe to assume that the enemy cannot do what we can.”
― Eric J. Wittenberg, One Continuous Fight: The Retreat from Gettysburg and the Pursuit of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, July 4–14, 1863

“By this point in the war Lee had become a master at outlining a course of action that was specific enough to obtain the necessary bureaucratic backing but vague enough to allow him maximum flexibility of action once underway.”
― Eric J. Wittenberg, One Continuous Fight: The Retreat from Gettysburg and the Pursuit of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, July 4–14, 1863