The Possibility of Altruism Quotes

“Suppose I shall be in Rome six weeks from now; then in six weeks, I shall have reason to speak Italian. If I regard this only as a dated reason, then, even granted my present ignorance of the language, I cannot conclude that I now have reason to enrol in an Italian course, since my reason for speaking Italian will not come into existence for six more weeks. I am forced instead to wait for its arrival, fatalistically, as for the onset of the effects of a drug—wait for it to galvanize me into action.”
― Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism

“then it becomes a detached whim,”
― Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism

“This is what makes it plausible to regard logic as a normative science.”
― Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism

“The general thesis to be defended concerning altruism is that one has a direct reason to promote the interests of others—a reason which does not depend on intermediate factors such as one’s own interests or one’s antecedent sentiments of sympathy and benevolence.”
― Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism

“Philosophers who believe that there is no room for rational assessment of the basic springs of motivation will tend to be internalists, but at the cost of abandoning claims to moral objectivity. One way to do this is to build motivational content into the meaning of ethical assertions by turning them into expressions of a”
― Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism

“1. The names ‘internalism’ and ‘externalism’ have been used to designate two views of the relation between ethics and motivation.1 Internalism is the view that the presence of a motivation for acting morally is guaranteed by the truth of ethical propositions themselves. On this view the motivation must be so tied to the truth, or meaning, of ethical statements that when in a particular case someone is (or perhaps merely believes that he is) morally required to do something, it follows that he has a motivation for doing it. Externalism holds, on the other hand, that the necessary motivation is not supplied by ethical principles and judgments themselves, and that an additional psychological sanction is required to motivate our compliance. Externalism is compatible with a variety of views about the motivation for being moral. It is even compatible with the view that such a motivation is always present—so long as its presence is not guaranteed by moral judgments themselves, but by something external to ethics.”
― Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism

“Internalism is the view that the presence of a motivation for acting morally is guaranteed by the truth of ethical propositions themselves.”
― Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism

“But this appears to involve radical changes in what is thought possible for psychology. Psychological investigation leading to ethical conclusions may require the reintroduction of metaphysics. One does not ordinarily expect to find in motivation theory any principles which lend themselves to interpretation as normative requirements on action. Motivation theory is automatically regarded as an empirical science; it is assumed that at best we may hope to discover the influences to which men are subject and the patterns into which their behaviour falls—perhaps even certain patterns and influences which are universal. But the suggestion that there must be motivational requirements on which to base ethical”
― Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism

“A satisfactory explanation must account for the motivational force appropriate to requirements on action. Psychology, specifically motivation theory, may therefore be the appropriate field in which to make progress in ethical theory.”
― Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism

“4. Denial that justification is the appropriate final defence of ethics suggests the familar view that the question ‘Why should I be moral?’ is senseless or in principle unanswerable. Strictly the suggestion is correct, but not in a sense which supports intuitionism. I believe that an explanation can be discovered for the basic principles of ethics, even though it is not a justification.”
― Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism

“3. I assume that a normative requirement on action must have correspondingly strict motivational backing.”
― Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism

“It is also natural to assume that the enterprise of justification should focus on these basic requirments, thus yielding an ethical system with cast iron motivational backing. But such a programme appears doomed from the start. For if we justify a requirement, it is in terms of a principle from which that requirement follows, perhaps with the aid of further conditions. But that principle must itself represent a requirement, or else what it is adduced to justify will not be one. Therefore any requirement which we set out to justify will not be ultimate. Something beyond justification is required.”
― Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism

“One can escape a rational requirement if one fails to meet its conditions in some way. One is then allowed to beg off, and the permissible grounds depend on the general principle from which the particular application of the requirement follows. That principle may in turn apply in virtue of a still more general principle plus further conditions, and if those conditions are not met, escape is again possible. But at some point the retreat must come to an end: one must reach a requirement (it need not be conditional, for it may have been the original one) from which it is not possible to escape by begging off. It is natural to suppose that principles of this sort must underlie ethics, if it exists. It is also natural to assume that the enterprise of justification should focus on these basic requirments, thus yielding an ethical system with cast iron motivational backing. But such a programme appears doomed from the start. For if we justify a requirement, it is in terms of a principle from which that requirement follows, perhaps with the aid of further conditions. But that principle must itself represent a requirement, or else what it is adduced to justify will not be one. Therefore any requirement which we set out to justify will not be ultimate. Something beyond justification is required. 3. I assume that a normative requirement on action must have correspondingly strict motivational backing. If ethics is to contain”
― Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism

“One can escape a rational requirement if one fails to meet its conditions in some way. One is then allowed to beg off, and the permissible grounds depend on the general principle from which the particular application of the requirement follows.”
― Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism

“The altruism which in my view underlies ethics is not to be confused with generalized affection for the human race. It is not a feeling.”
― Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism

“The view presented here is opposed not only to ethical relativism but to any demand that the claims of ethics appeal to our interests: either self-interest or the interest we may happen to take in other things and other persons.”
― Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism

“conceive ethics as a branch of psychology. My claims concern its foundation, or ultimate motivational basis.”
― Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism