Chinese intelligence operations Quotes

“The use of the “help China” recruitment approach has worked for other intelligence services besides the MSS. The former Soviet KGB adopted this recruitment method to manipulate persons of Chinese descent into conducting espionage against the PRC. The pitch was modified to convince the source that he or she would help the Chinese people, as opposed to the PRC government.13 Or else prospective agents would be persuaded that their cooperation would enhance China’s relations with the Soviet Union. What little success the Soviets enjoyed against the PRC was attributable to these recruitment techniques.”
― Nicholas Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations

“The MSS uses two main themes in recruiting foreign nationals of Chinese ancestry. First, it appeals to their perceived obligation to help the land of their heritage, thereby exploiting sentimental feelings of ethnic pride. Second, it implies that family members still in the PRC will receive unfavorable treatment unless the subjects cooperate. The latter approach is quite stressful for the subjects and a strong motivational factor in favor of compliance.”
― Nicholas Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations

“numbers of these operations that enable a portion of them to succeed. The number of clandestine intelligence operations conducted by the PRC overwhelms Western counterintelligence and law enforcement agencies. In addition, the PRC’s limited information objectives, focused on midlevel technology, puts much of its intelligence activity below Western governments’ threshold of concern.”
― Nicholas Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations

“In China recruitment operations against foreign nationals include diplomats and government officials as targets as well as academics, journalists, and businesspersons. The MSS recruits these people to conduct espionage against their home government, to influence events overseas on behalf of the PRC, or to provide business intelligence and restricted technology. The MSS and China’s Military Intelligence Department (MID) invite foreign scholars to lecture or attend conferences in the PRC under the guise of research associations or universities. All expenses for the visiting lecturer and his or her family frequently are paid for by the intelligence services. The visiting specialist is subjected to a demanding itinerary of lectures, meetings, travel, and social engagements. The purpose of this rigorous schedule is to wear down the prospective recruit’s physical and mental stamina. The visitor is encouraged to partake of alcohol as much as circumstances permit. The subject is then more approachable concerning personal and confidential matters. 2”
― Nicholas Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations

“Most Chinese clandestine collection activities are not sophisticated operations, but their numbers compensate for this weakness. To conduct espionage in the United States the MSS draws on the services of: 1,500 Chinese diplomats and commercial representatives 70 PRC establishments and offices 15,000 Chinese students arriving annually 10,000 representatives traveling in 2,700 delegations each year a large ethnic Chinese community2”
― Nicholas Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations

“the PRC has never developed (and it not likely to develop in the near future) the force projection capability needed to invade any nation outside Asia. For this reason its espionage operations go largely unchecked by U.S. officials and policymakers. The PRC does, however, aggressively conduct espionage against the United States and a number of other industrialized nations.”
― Nicholas Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations