Fountainhead of Jihad Quotes

“Abu Hafs was in Peshawar at the time, and recalls that the condition among the Arabs was extremely somber, as fighting had broken out inside Afghanistan between forces loyal to Hekmatyar and Sayyaf, respectively, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of Afghan mujahidin.”
― Vahid Brown, Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2012

“Abu’l-Walid was thus instrumental in presenting the Haqqanis and their struggle before an international Arabophone audience, a fact that no doubt played a role in the primacy of the Haqqani fronts as the destination of choice for the earliest of the Afghan Arab war volunteers.”
― Vahid Brown, Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2012

“Babar’s claim, then, raises the possibility that the Haqqanis benefited from US government aid much earlier than has previously been thought, and in the earliest phase of their militant activities.”
― Vahid Brown, Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2012

“All of these developments were concentrated in Kabul and their protagonists were literate, highly politicized, and hailed predominantly from the middle and upper classes of Afghan society. In contrast, an alternative form of organized Islamic opposition to the state emerged during the same period in the Pashtun highlands”
― Vahid Brown, Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2012

“While no doubt motivated by its conviction that Kashmir rightfully belonged with Pakistan, Arnold Fletcher notes that, in part, the October 1947 operation “was intended at once to arouse Moslem enthusiasm, block Pushtoon separatism, bring discredit to the Khudai Khidmatgaran, and hinder action by Afghanistan.”
― Vahid Brown, Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2012

“Pakistan’s “Islam over tribe” approach became a pillar of its policies on the frontier and has characterized its deep involvement in Afghanistan’s conflicts over the last thirty years, including its support for the Haqqani network.”
― Vahid Brown, Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2012

“[Bacha Saqqao] from the capital in 1929.”
― Vahid Brown, Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2012

“The generation of leaders of this network following in the wake of the Hadda Mullah’s death—centered in particular on one Haji Sahib Turangzai—became increasingly influenced by the teachings of the revivalist and anti-colonial Deobandi school of South Asian Sunni Islam, whose influence was rapidly spreading throughout the region during this same period.”
― Vahid Brown, Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2012

“Though thus marginal to the central political cultures of the two states, the Pashtun highlands were also the source of “most acts of antistate violence over the preceding hundred years or so,” to such an extent that “the Pakhtuns of the frontier were the kingmakers and breakers”5 within Afghanistan and were similarly troublesome to British rule in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—to say nothing of Islamabad since 2007.”
― Vahid Brown, Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2012

“Bangladesh’s war of independence,”
― Vahid Brown, Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2012

“For its part, the Haqqani network derives clear benefits from this triangle of relations. Its value as a “strategic asset” to Pakistan has proven so great that the latter has not taken any significant measures to restrict the Haqqani network’s activities or curtail its power, despite unrelenting pressure from the United States to do so.”
― Vahid Brown, Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2012

“The Pakistani state has repeatedly turned to the Haqqanis to negotiate on its behalf with the TTP and other Pakistani militants based in the tribal areas, negotiations that have resulted in a number of infamous peace accords that have effectively ceded sovereignty in parts of the tribal areas to the Haqqanis and their allies and have included in some cases the release of TTP leaders from Pakistani prisons. According to one source, Iran even turned to the Haqqani network when one of its diplomats was kidnapped in Peshawar, and the Haqqanis allegedly secured the release of the hostage in return for the release of a number of prominent al-Qa’ida members from Iranian custody.”
― Vahid Brown, Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2012

“The dynamics of this nexus are explored at length in Part II, but its contours can be grasped by briefly considering the Haqqanis’ triangle of relations with the Pakistani Taliban, the Pakistani military, and al-Qa’ida.”
― Vahid Brown, Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2012

“The title of our book was the name of a series of magazines published by the Haqqanis in the 1980s and 1990s, as well as a media “studio” that has been producing and distributing Haqqani propaganda videos in more recent years. It is, in other words, the Haqqanis’ brand.”
― Vahid Brown, Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2012