Warships After Washington Quotes

“The lack of attention given to anti-submarine warfare is surprising as all five Washington navies were convinced, following the devastating U-boat campaign of 1917–18, that the submarine had now ‘come of age’ and was a threat to be taken seriously.”
― John Jordan, Warships After Washington: The Development of Five Major Fleers, 1922–1930

“the British and the Americans still viewed destroyers as ships which could be ‘thrown in’ against the enemy battle line without regard to consequences – in a word they were ‘expendable’.”
― John Jordan, Warships After Washington: The Development of Five Major Fleers, 1922–1930

“With the benefit of hindsight it is arguable that the Royal Navy would have had better value from the 15in-gun battlecruisers for which sketch designs were prepared in November 1921, and which were subsequently rejected in favour of the slow, heavily armoured 23-knot battleship.”
― John Jordan, Warships After Washington: The Development of Five Major Fleers, 1922–1930

“Hermes therefore serves to exemplify one of the Royal Navy’s key problems during the interwar period: without influential aviators in its ranks the navy was poorly placed to anticipate technical and tactical developments in aviation, and preferred to design ships in which seagoing qualities, protection and anti-aircraft capabilities took precedence over the size, capability and ease of operation of the air group.”
― John Jordan, Warships After Washington: The Development of Five Major Fleers, 1922–1930