Conflict Quotes
Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine―Understanding Modern Warfare Today
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David H. Petraeus1,421 ratings, 4.03 average rating, 174 reviews
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Conflict Quotes
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“A recurring theme of this book is that money spent on deterrence is seldom wasted, especially when considered against the costs incurred when the deterrence fails.”
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine―Understanding Modern Warfare Today
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine―Understanding Modern Warfare Today
“As the history of conflict demonstrates over the millennia, while morale is impossible to quantify, it is essential to victory.”
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
“War appears to be as old as Mankind, but peace is a modern invention.”
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
“America’s experience in Vietnam was costly and frustrating and, ultimately, unsustainable and unsuccessful. As early as 1965 then-Harvard Professor Henry Kissinger described it as trying to “build a nation in a divided society in the middle of a civil war.”2”
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
“One further notable feature of the campaign was the weapon commonly found in the hands of the rebels. The Russian-made Kalashnikov AK-47 was fast on its way to becoming the most ubiquitous weapon of revolutionaries across the globe. From its genesis, the cheap, competent Kalashnikov came to symbolize guerrilla struggle in the latter half of the twentieth century and beyond. It even appears on the flag of Mozambique. It is estimated that no fewer than 75 million AK-47s have been produced, with a further 25 million other types from the Kalashnikov family of weapons.109 Akehurst recalled that those tribesmen who defected tended to prefer to keep their AKs rather than switch to British semi-automatics or American Armalite M-16 rifles.”
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
“As Churchill observed during the Second World War, “There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.”
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
“The qualities of a successful military strategist will change from person to person, but there are a central few that all of them need. These include, above all else, strategic judgment, but also stamina, interpersonal skills and a feel for people; an ability to energize, inspire and motivate; the ability to communicate effectively orally and in writing; a degree of personal presence and charisma; a sincere love of servicemen and women; an ability to be tough when needed, but also compassionate when that is appropriate; fortitude in the face of adversity and the capacity to stay calm in the midst of chaos; an ability to deal with setbacks, missteps and mistakes; a sense of what leadership style is required to bring out the best in those immediately below, and also for the organization collectively. A great strategic leader also needs to be able to foresee how a conflict will end.”
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
“The abilities of the leaders at the top, and also those below that level, to understand the context and nature of the conflict and to get the big ideas – the strategy – right; to communicate those big ideas throughout the breadth and depth of a unit, a country, a coalition, the world; to oversee the implementation of the big ideas, providing example, energy, inspiration, determination and solid operational direction; and to determine how to refine and adjust the big ideas so that the leader can perform the four tasks again and again – these abilities are absolutely critical.”
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
“Artificial Intelligence, deep learning, natural language processing, computer vision, and other related characteristics: super-computing, eventually quantum-computing, and nano and bio technologies; advanced big-data analytics; and other emerging technologies are beginning to offer an entirely new way of war, and at command speeds hitherto unimaginable. The revolution in sensor and command and control technologies is matched and enabled by developments in long-range, hypersonic “intelligent” weaponry and new swarms of killing machines allied to a range of directed-energy weapons. Such a potentially revolutionary change in the character and conduct of war must necessarily impose entirely new ways of defense.”
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
“Moral forces are among the most important subjects in war.”
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
“Hybrid warfare particularly appeals to China and Russia, since they are much more able to control the information their populaces receive than are their Western adversaries. A 1999 book, Unrestricted Warfare, written by two People’s Liberation Army colonels suggests that militarily, technologically and economically weaker states can use unorthodox forms of warfare to defeat a materially superior enemy – and clearly they had the United States and NATO in mind. Rather than focusing on direct military confrontation, the weaker state might succeed against the dominant opponent by shifting the arena of conflict into economic, terrorist and even legal avenues as leverage to be used to undercut more traditional means of warfare. The subtitle of their book, Two Air Force Senior Colonels on Scenarios for War and the Operational Art in an Era of Globalization, notes a core truth of the early twenty-first century: an increasingly globalized world deepens reliance upon, and the interdependence of, nations, which in turn can be used as leverage to exploit, undermine and sabotage a dominant power.
The two colonels might not be happy with the lesson their book teaches Westerners, which is that no superpower can afford to be isolationist. One way to keep America great, therefore, is to stay firmly plugged into – and leading – the international system, as it has generally done impressively in leading the Western world’s response to the invasion of Ukraine. The siren voices of American isolationism inevitably lead to a weaker United States.”
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine―Understanding Modern Warfare Today
The two colonels might not be happy with the lesson their book teaches Westerners, which is that no superpower can afford to be isolationist. One way to keep America great, therefore, is to stay firmly plugged into – and leading – the international system, as it has generally done impressively in leading the Western world’s response to the invasion of Ukraine. The siren voices of American isolationism inevitably lead to a weaker United States.”
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine―Understanding Modern Warfare Today
“The Marines based their operational concepts on a superb doctrinal manual on small wars dating back to 1940, which stated, “In small wars, the goal is to gain decisive results with the least application of force and the consequent minimum loss of life. The end aim is the social, economic, and political development of the people subsequent to the military defeat of the enemy insurgent. In small wars, tolerance, sympathy, and kindness should be the keynote of our relationship with the mass of the population.”63”
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
“Dynamite in the hand of a child is not more dangerous than a strong policy weakly carried out.”
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
“Three men and a machine gun can stop a battalion of heroes,”
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
“The power to command has never meant the power to remain mysterious,”
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
“Leaders, some of whom are politicians in this book while others are soldiers, must be able to master four major tasks.2 Firstly, they need comprehensively to grasp the overall strategic situation in a conflict and craft the appropriate strategic approach – in essence, to get the big ideas right. Secondly, they must communicate those big ideas, the strategy, effectively throughout the breadth and depth of their organization and to all other stakeholders. Thirdly, they need to oversee the implementation of the big ideas, driving the execution of the campaign plan relentlessly and determinedly. Lastly, they have to determine how the big ideas need to be refined, adapted and augmented, so that they can perform the first three tasks again and again and again. The statesmen and soldiers who perform these four tasks properly are the exemplars who stand out from these pages. The witness of history demonstrates that exceptional strategic leadership is the one absolute prerequisite for success, but also that it is as rare as the black swan.”
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
“He had studied The Art of War by Sun Tzu, the Chinese theorist of war of c.550–500 BC, and learned the advantages of avoiding direct confrontations if a strategy of indirect maneuvering was preferable.”
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
“Akehurst was tremendously fortunate in having in Sultan Qaboos an unparalleled host for the counter-insurgency campaign. The new Sultan was utterly supportive of what Akehurst was trying to do, and brought statesmanlike qualities to the fight that saved his country from communist takeover. He compares very favorably with the host-nation leaders of the early twenty-first-century conflicts, such as Iraq’s Nouri al-Malaki or Afghan presidents Karzai and Ashraf Ghani. The only times that Qaboos frustrated Akehurst were during his occasional bouts of wariness of bad omens: the Sultan would refuse to embark on journeys or projects if his astrologers deemed them unpropitious. Nevertheless, Akehurst concluded that “It would have been folly to overrule the Commander-in-Chief’s premonitions.”110”
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
“Akehurst recalled “taking endless trouble” over the Firqats, not least because, as he put it, “tribesmen disbanded, disarmed or dismissed were potentially recruits for the enemy.”106 It was an important lesson, but one that coalition forces forgot regarding the defeated Iraqi Army in 2003.”
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
“Commanders have to remember that a lesson is not learned when it is identified, only when it has been incorporated in the big ideas, communicated effectively and actually implemented.”
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
“The professional expertise and training of a force, as well as the importance of a professional non-commissioned officer corps, must also be highlighted, as it is non-commissioned officers who are the standard bearers, standard enforcers and trainers at the critical small-unit level. Rigorous and demanding training will always be a vital component of combat readiness. So should be the intangible but critical element of initiative, especially of competent junior leaders empowered and encouraged to exercise initiative and acting in accordance with one of the admonitions in the counter-insurgency guidance issued during the Surge in Iraq: “In the absence of orders, figure out what they should have been and execute aggressively.”
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
“history’s”
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
“The War demonstrates the extent to which man is the key to the outcome of war,” wrote Michael Herzog. “The training and skill of the soldier, his motivation, the quality of the chain of command, initiative, courage and perseverance all underlie the War’s result far more than any weapons. Even in the era of technology, man still stands at the center of the picture.”50”
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
“In one instance, Ariel Sharon attacked after he had been expressly ordered to defend, but it was forgiven; as Dayan later said, “I prefer his pressures and initiatives tenfold to the hesitations and excuses of other divisional commanders . . . Better a noble steed you have to restrain than a lazy ox you have to beat.”
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
“A generation that has taken a thrashing,” Otto von Bismarck once said, “is always followed by one that deals out the thrashing.”
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
“Vietnam was thus one of the most tragic cases of successive strategic leaders not correctly performing the four tasks of strategic leadership – to get the big ideas right, to communicate them effectively, to oversee their implementation and to determine how to refine them and do it all again – at”
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
― Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine
