The Shah Quotes

“in March 2000, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright offered an apology for the U.S. role in the August events. She offered carefully worded regrets for the fact that the United States had “played a significant role in orchestrating the overthrow of Iran’s popular Prime Minister” in 1953.”
― Abbas Milani, The Shah

“When the revolution aborted the project, the rulers of the United Arab Emirates realized the need for such a city and created in their kingdom the unfulfilled dream of the Shah. Today’s Dubai is the child of yesterday’s aborted Kish project.”
― Abbas Milani, The Shah

“برای ترقی خواهی صرفا تعارض با غرب و استعمار کافی نیست، دموکراسی و عدالت سیاسی و اجتماعی نیز جز ضروری و اجتناب ناپذیر ترقی خواهی دوران است. بدون دموکراسی ضدیت با غرب، چه بسا به پوششی برای اندیشه و عمل واپس گرای تاریخی بدل شود”
― Abbas Milani, The Shah

“خارجی ها همواره با تکیه به خود ما (ایرانیان)، امیال و اهداف خود را محقق می کنند و نقش خودمان در رقم زدن رخدادهای تاریخی مهم تر از تسکین کاذب برخاسته از تئوری توطئه است که ما را بی نقش و بی گناه و آن ها را قدر قدرت و گناهکار جلو می دهد”
― Abbas Milani, The Shah

“Qavam made two demands of the Shah before he would accept the job. The first was for the Shah to dissolve the Majlis, and the second was to allow the arrest of Kashani. The Shah refused both demands, but Qavam nonetheless accepted the task of forming a new government. It”
― Abbas Milani, The Shah

“When the British ploy to pressure the Shah into fast action on the dismissal of Mossadeq did not work, officials from Whitehall consulted Ann Lambton, by then a professor of Persian Studies in London and a sage on British foreign policy in Iran. Her advice was clear, categorical, and drastic: find a way to remove Mossadeq from power forcefully. He is a demagogue, she said, and the only way Britain would retain its influence in Iran would be through his removal. She also believed that the British government must ultimately handle this matter alone, as in her mind the United States had “neither the experience, nor the psychological” depth to understand Iran—a sentiment much shared in those days by British officials.44 She introduced government officials to Robin Zaehner, a professor-spy, who could help plan and implement her proposed coup against Mossadeq. If Zaehner was one of the British masters of conspiracy against Mossadeq, then the three Rashidian brothers were Zaehner’s chief instruments of mischief. No sooner had Mossadeq come to power than the brothers began to receive large funds from the British to “maintain their agents.” 45 In June 1951, when British efforts to convince the Shah to fire Mossadeq failed, they threatened to attack Iran and take over the oil region of the country: in the words of the Foreign Secretary, “to cow the insolent natives.” 46 The operation, aptly called “Buccaneer,” entailed sending a number of British warships to the waters off the coast of the oil-rich region of Khuzestan and authorized “the use of force, if necessary.” 47 Encouraged by the Truman administration’s strong opposition to the idea of a military solution, the Shah told the British Ambassador that “I will personally lead my soldiers into battle against you if you attack Iran.”
― Abbas Milani, The Shah

“When the British ploy to pressure the Shah into fast action on the dismissal of Mossadeq did not work, officials from Whitehall consulted Ann Lambton, by then a professor of Persian Studies in London and a sage on British foreign policy in Iran. Her advice was clear, categorical, and drastic: find a way to remove Mossadeq from power forcefully. He is a demagogue, she said, and the only way Britain would retain its influence in Iran would be through his removal. She”
― Abbas Milani, The Shah