Lia’s Reviews > Heidegger's Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse and Authenticity in "Being and Time" > Status Update
Lia
is on page 6 of 342
H’s fundamental ontology marks a radical break w/ [expressivists]... Dasein is in principle never a finished thing, neither does it remain tragically unfinished or incomplete in the absence of properly expressive practices and institutions. Expression as such have no telos in anything like the wholeness of selfhood or character, nor is the self the kind of entity that can in principle ever be a finished whole.
— Mar 20, 2020 11:28PM
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Lia’s Previous Updates
Lia
is on page 72 of 342
Ok, I can see where T.C. is a bit harsh on Husserl, though I'm not totally sure if it's unwarranted
— Mar 21, 2020 12:34PM
Lia
is on page 68 of 342
Someone else said Taylor Carman is very cruel or harsh to Husserl in this book.
So far, what I'm getting is how badly Heidegger backstabbed Husserl.
— Mar 21, 2020 11:40AM
So far, what I'm getting is how badly Heidegger backstabbed Husserl.
Lia
is on page 6 of 342
On my account, Being and Time is an interpretive description of the conditions of interpretation, that is, the conditions of our ability to understand explicitly that and what entities, including ourselves, are.
— Mar 20, 2020 11:30PM
Lia
is on page 6 of 342
Heidegger’s point is neither to analyze propositional truth in some revisionary way nor simply to insist that entities must be given to us in order for our assertions to be true of them. Rather, the hermeneutic salience in which entities are revealed to us in discourse is itself a condition of the interpretability of assertions as true or false. Discourse is a hermeneutic condition of the truth of assertions.
— Mar 20, 2020 11:17PM
Lia
is on page 3 of 342
What are the conditions already internal to our understanding of the contents of our own minds, over and beyond the merely physiological conditions of conscious awareness, of which we may be utterly ignorant?
— Mar 20, 2020 07:25AM
Lia
is on page 3 of 342
transcendental questions inspiring Heidegger’s analytic:
What are the conditions informing our very idea of intentional phenomena as intentional?
What makes it possible for us even to conceive of anything like the theoretical attitudes involved in the explanatory strategies of science and common sense?
— Mar 20, 2020 07:25AM
What are the conditions informing our very idea of intentional phenomena as intentional?
What makes it possible for us even to conceive of anything like the theoretical attitudes involved in the explanatory strategies of science and common sense?
