Dimitri’s Reviews > Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War > Status Update

Tactical acumen aside, France was ill-equipped to meet the demands of industrial warfare, where the only answer to attrition was continuous replenishment of weapons in ever greater numbers.
The Soixante-Quinzes were firing themselves worn already at extreme ranges, while the occupation of the Briey bassin forced it to rely on expensive imports of coal & iron.

As early as mid-october, Joffre realised he had an old-fashioned SIEGE on his hands which required a different set of tools than his accustomed open warfare. Unfortunately he was too anxious to restore battlefield mobility to await the arrival of his siege train. By the time Neuve Chapelle made headlines in London, over 250.000 more poilus were hurled against the presently entrenched Germans all along the line.

the Leapfrog to the Sea (17/9-17/10) was done in French 40x8 cars , who could switch a corps in 5-6 days. The only disharmony to the rythm of the rails was the position of the BEF on the far left, close to the Channel harbours as was their preference. The Belgian Army joined them from Antwerp. In combination with the orderly retreat of the invaders, the lines were drawn.

"He who defends everything..." All this shifting to the left compromised Joffre's center&right, without the situation being "excellent". No mistake in war goes unpunished: the St.Michiel salient would feed the Verdun offensive & tease the Americans towards the Argonne forest. Meanwhile, the stand of Castelnau's 2nd army in the crucial week of 2-9/9 sealed the deal: the Germans retreated to the Aisne; dug in by 14/9.

The tight control along a 700km front of 5 armies & an allied expeditionary force was a cornerstone of the Marne w/1st contact at MEAUX (5/9) Kluck responded to Galiéni's flank attack by shuffling a corps north of the Marne, opening a gap between him&Bulow. The 5th French Army widened it & the BEF dove into it.

as August gave way to September, exhaustion reared its head. The German right wing was veering away from its planned axis of advance & skimmed of various detachments. Moltke issued as few orders as his 2 army commanders sent reports. By contrast, Joffre was constantly on the phone: retreat upon one's own lines of communication possesses this advantage

In his memoirs, "Desperate Frank" (Louis Franchet d'Espèrey) made the Marne repulse possible when he secured BEF participation for his own 5th & Galiéni's 6th Army. He'd historically reinforce it when Sir John French swallowed tears:
- Monsieur le Maréchal, c'est la France qui vous supplie!
- Damn it, I can't find the words. Tell him we'll do all we can !

In a twist on Antietam, a captured German map revealed their First Army's reorientation to the East of Paris. Amidst other reports, this did not immediately spur Joffre to order that famous flank attack, but it did plant a seed of "Kesselschlacht" plan in his mind. The German Army as a whole was sinking towards the Seine&Aube between Paris&Verdun. Joffre would spend most of the war hammering this Noyon salient flat.

The misidentified superior force of the Right Wing pushed the Battle of the Frontiers into retreat within a week. Joffre didn't loose his cool because he had adapted to Schlieffen's strategic surprise. He could wait to resume the Outrance with better infantry-artillery coordination... as soon as he had envelopped the entire Right Wing. The BEF's unsynchronised retreat from Mons to St.Quentin however taxed his left.

By 15 August Joffre started shifting forces left in recognition of the violation of Belgium NORTH of the Meuse, with Territorials extending the wing to the sea. The next day the BEF was called upon to mind the gap around Mons next to Lanzerac 5th Army. By then Liege fell and the Belgians were out of the fight, into their Antwerp redoubt. A fortress-studded line was marked, running from Amiens over Reims to Verdun.