Dimitri’s Reviews > How the War Was Won > Status Update

...Back then, there had been no clear objective & now there was no clear plan.
I disagree. Were limitations on “linear” support such a bad idea? For one thing, the British army’s concept of defense in depth had matured nicely along with German tactics. For another, stormtroopers and the follow-up infantry couldn’t keep swallowing strongpoints forever.

The German counterattack at Cambrai certainly triggered a lot of debate about non-intervention by heavy artillery under corps command to help beleaguered divisions. In light of what would happen in March, the 55th division on the demarcation line between III & VII corps was a likely victim of what according to Travers was a lenient attitude reminiscent of the Somme & Passendaele....

"From the POV of the future March offensive the German counterattack on 30/11 was actually the most significant aspect of the Cambrai battle since the BEF could've recognized that the opponent was using new tactics. Cambrai stalled in the center after 48 w/no significant reserves but "each level of command blaming the other; the further each level was away from the front line the less urgency there appeared to be"

"Yet cooperation between all the arms was not given top priority and was not enforced or was perhaps not even recognized as lacking by the higher command." His last remark reflects upon inadequate training before battle. His main source is J.F.C. Fuller, who drew 4 lessons for battle planning:
- a broad frontage
- a tank reserve
- there are limits to infantry penetration depth
- tanks cannot sweep villages solo

The scientific foundation for a " standing & lifting" barrage of counterbattery fire without previous registration is impressive, a combo of sound ranging & meteorology that took from Somme to Vimy to tune. With 10:1 in guns, tanks crushed lanes with lil loss. Surprise & Overwhelming artillery were the key at Cambrai.

Here we see earlier discussed strategies of "abundance" & "technology" melt perfectly. I think.

Cambrai was born out of 8 months of various tank schemes great & small, most of'em designed for Ypres. Byng (3rd Army) was in charge again, but without the Canadian corps which had given him Vimy. On the political level, Haig used the success at Cambrai to distract his critics, foremost Lloyd George.

Various sources show Haig aiming for that high ground as an artillery platform for 1918 offensives, or simply as part of the greater "Ridge Sweep" at Vimy, Messines etc. In absence of a clear goal, attrition was defended by numbers, hotly debated in press n' Parliament and by historians ever since.
Either way, the slogfest continued...

The chapter title 'paralysis of command' is telling for the second half of '17: "It is probably that in the later stages of Passchendaele, Haig didn't clearly know what he wanted." as in he cannot choose between a breakthrough or step by step approach at Passchendaele, which was important with the Gheluvelt ridge in front of your nose, especially on the right flank.

Most Haig critics will disagree. BREAKTHROUGH!!!

Perhaps British infantry tactics were comparatively rigid, yet the limits of infantry-artillery communication demanded a measure of rigidity. Plus, British infatry packed more mobile firepower to flank n'destroy strongpoints than in 1915-16.

Travers identifies 5 strategies if war debated among the BEF leaders.#2:
the Easterners were in the minority as a 4th option. Lastly Travers identifies a deeper debate, where the BEF creates separates formations for new weapons ex. tanks in a "machine gun corps, heavy section" while keeping the infantry mass behind rigid barrages. The Germans focused on rejuvinating tactics..I DISAGREE...