Dimitri’s Reviews > 1917: War, Peace, and Revolution > Status Update

The German counterattack at Cambrai certainly triggered a lot of debate about non-intervention by heavy artillery under corps command to help beleaguered divisions. In light of what would happen in March, the 55th division on the demarcation line between III & VII corps was a likely victim of what according to Travers was a lenient attitude reminiscent of the Somme & Passendaele.

Within 4 days the rains came. A pattern of monthly pauses developed. Polygon Wood & Broodseide in early september, Poelkapelle in early October. The superlative mutual experience of Passchendaele will always be "mud" and "shell slugging". Te battle didn't tie down extra troops to facilitate Russian or Italian attacks. The 'hopeless' 4th Army held against the entire BEF, with some units from recent Arras duty.

Passchendaele was supposed to be a Messines in reverse, but with no mines & no surprise; a brute attack out of the salient with twice the firepower of the Somme. Despite a civilian expert analysis of 18 years of meteorological data, the dry weather window was as underestimated as the resilience of a sevenfold concrete bunker line to a Somme 2.0 opening barrage.

Vague "limited offensives", waiting for the Americans to finish the job, isolating Germany by defeat of its coalition partner through "low-cost" victories in Greece or the crusader lands... A conference on 1 May 1917 saw no better proposition than to redirect shipping to food, but even that didn't carry enough weight. The notion that time ran against the Allies was reinforced. A Flanders offensive asap sounded best.

On the other hand, while Haig was confident to the point of hubris that he could deliver over a demoralized & hungry Heer before the leaves fall. in the wake of the Chemin Des Dames fiasco LLoyd George and Poincaré feared that further grand offensives might weaken the Allies fatally before 1918. A well-defined alternative seemed to lay beyond their imagination.

Passchendaele has deep & numerous roots. Some were nurtured by classic English geostrategy, which abhorred singular domination of the Channel coast by any European power. Others grew away from the grinding coalition battle on the Somme, to the light of a British solo effort that could deliver a rapid breakthrough. the U-boat crisis (2/17) made the concrete pens of Flotille Flandern even more alluring.

The scope of the Kerensky offensive was already dictated by food transport problems and rearmament shortages, while the morale had already plummeted to the point where even 'decent' units barely advanced beyond the preliminary bombardment. While the Bolsheviks were still just that, a political minority, but Soviets multiplied along with fraternization, Central Powers' propaganda circulation & foot desertions.

NO amount of analysis or preposition can make more of the Kerensky offensive than the doomed failiure that it was. In a reverse of Nivelle, the liberals of the provisional government pushed the army into a final offensive to secure a general or separate peace lest the Centrals strike first. At least it served Russian interests more than previous failures, which were more in tune with the Chantilly synchronization.

The political game to subjugate Haig had everyone's confidence. As long as Nivelle delivered on shedule & did not voice his fears over a German retreat... which happened, spoiling both his element of surprise and the Chantillyesque coordination with Russia & Italy. Pétain laconically countered his confusing reassurances to assorted allied representatives, at the Compiège conference on 6.4.17 with "In sum, what?".

Haig's philosophy for 1917 was to live up to the Chantilly agenda: synchronized offensives all around the Central Powers' "Ring of Iron" wth no excuses & hopefully no German surprises to upset the shedule. Thus he wanted to wait until May to link up with Russia and Italy, but Lloyd George, more impressed with Nivelle's sanguine, secured the war cabinet behind him at the Calais Conference (26-27/2) to speed things up.