Daisy’s Reviews > Incompleteness: The Proof and Paradox of Kurt Gödel > Status Update
Daisy
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Gödel’s theorems don’t demonstrate the limits of the human mind, but rather the limits of computational models of the human mind (basically, models that reduce all thinking to rule-following). They don’t leave us stranded in postmodern uncertainty but rather negate a particular reductive theory of the mind.
— Jul 01, 2026 07:13AM
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Daisy
is on page 140 of 296
Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem states the incompleteness of any formal system rich enough to express arithmetic. So Gödel’s conclusion, you might suspect, has something to say about the feasibility (or lack thereof) of eliminating all intuitions from mathematics.
— Jul 06, 2026 10:30PM
Daisy
is on page 106 of 296
Wittgenstein’s exasperation with his disciples even in his native Vienna, his insistence that although he might sound like a positivist he decidedly was not one, revolves around the meaning of the closing proposition of his Tractatus, numbered simply 7, the severely fulminating (so like a prophet of old): Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen, or: Of what we cannot speak we must remain silent.
— Jul 05, 2026 12:00PM
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Jul 01, 2026 07:14AM
Gödel’s theorems, then, appear to be that rarest of rare creatures: mathematical truths that also address themselves—however ambiguously and controversially—to the central question of the humanities: what is involved in our being human?
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…Gödel's theorems are spectacular exceptions to this general rule ( re: metaquestions). They are at once mathematical and metamathematical. They have all the rigor of something that is a priori proved, and yet they establish a metaconclusion.

