Status Updates From To Fight With Intrepidity: ...

This sounds about right. Rangers are not necessarily more effective in combat than well-trained, well-led, well-equipped regular infantry, but by dint of being specialized, flexible and highly motivated, are suitable for specialized missions that regular infantry may struggle to complete successfully without significant trainup time. [3/3]

resources, there may be some validity to that argument. The counterpoint to that argument, though, is that conventional infantry rarely operate under the greatest set of circumstances. Attrition and the routine tasks associated with traditional conventional warfare preclude these infantry units from devoting time and resources to more specialized operations of the type conducted by the Rangers." [2/N]

Lock seems to fundamentally agree with my conclusion that Rangers are not fundamentally better fighters than regular infantry: “There are those who will argue that there is nothing Rangers can do that cannot be done by good conventional infantry. Given the correct set of circumstances, such as full manning, continuity, adequate training [note that he does not say “specialized” training here], and proper [1/N]

[8/8] And since I'm on the subject: Don't let non-88Ms lead a wheeled vehicle convoy in combat. Just don't. This should have been in the SOP. Rangers have 88Ms in their TOE; they should have brought them and used them. Doing so might have vastly reduced casualties in the Lost Convoy (and just maybe made it not Lost, though that's not at all a sure thing), and would have made the emergency convoy effective.

[7/n] I feel he relied far too heavily on the QRF to extricate his men should anything go seriously wrong. It would seem that he never really considered the possibility of things going seriously wrong. Having some Bradleys in TF Ranger might have made a huge difference. He didn't have anyone prepared to air assault in as a reserve. And, again, he didn't coordinate plans with the QRF, which he could have chosen to do.

[6/n] Again, command and control was the major problem. Honestly, I feel that Howe, not Garrison or SECDEF Aspen, bears the brunt of the responsibility for this whole debacle, on several levels, but he (from what I can tell) suffered hardly a word of criticism, while Garrison took the fall.

The one thing Garrison could, and possibly should, have done differently was to have more reaction forces on hand.

[5/n]As for armor—the QRF had armor. Yes, it was Pakistani and Maylasian, but they had it. The main problem was the delays the coordination caused, but how many lives that time cost is a real question—arguably none ( Bowden p. 341. If this sort of rescue had been planned and coordinated in advance, with a unified multinational chain of command provided by Howe, the problems would have been minimal.

[4/n]—at least without inflicting mass civilian (i.e. non-combatant) casualties. Having more firepower on hand is always a good thing, and I'm the first to say that "limited warfare" is a terrible idea—and yes, this incident is definitely an example of this—but it's really questionable whether the Spectre would have been a good idea.

[3/n]He mentions as greater errors the lack of intel about the influx of RPGs, and the lack of armor and Spectre gunships. Intelligence is a bitch; it's easy to chalk things up to "intelligence failures." At least they weren't given wrong intel. As for the armor and gunships—Bowden makes a good case (p. 340) that the Spectres could have done little more than what the Little Birds were already doing

[2/n] would have brought the QRF into the planning phase, thus preventing the waste of a considerable amount of time spent on the behalf of the QRF planning and preparing for rescue operations that they were on the hook to execute but didn't have a clue about what was involved."

I couldn't agree more, except that I think it was the greatest, not the least, of the errors.

[1/n] "Operationally, there were a number of very critical errors, the least of which was the lack of a designated chain of command that included both Major Generals Montgomery and Garrison, which would have provided a unity of command between the senior commander of the QRF and the commander of Task Force Ranger. This unity of command—which was also lacking on the tactical level with Captains Miller and Steele—

[4/4] and he will just start to get used to the new unit, making new friends, when his school slot opens up. He may not want to leave. So putting him in the Regiment, getting trained in the ways of the Rangers, is the best way to go, even if it doesn't seem to make sense at first.

[3/N] So what does the prospective Ranger do if there are no current slots in Ranger School open? Does he sit around in holding? That's a terrible idea. He's doing no one any good, his skills and motivation deteriorate, and he's likely to take another assignment just to do something. Does he go to a regular unit and wait for a slot to open up? Also a bad idea; the new unit may not want to let him go,

[2/N]

It's not always possible for someone to go straight from Basic Training (technically OSUT) to Ranger School, Airborne training, or Air Assault training (if getting your Ranger tab is not required to join the Ranger battalions, I'm sure Airborne and Air Assault are not, but they're highly encouraged).

[1/N] "Many [of the junior enlisted Rangers] were not Ranger School graduates…"

When I first read this; I thought it was the stupidest idea ever. Why the fuck would you allow someone to serve in the Ranger battalions that had not graduated Ranger school? But then I considered the alternatives.

the resources necessary to win (I think that’s Clausewitz). When you go to war, either be willing to do whatever it takes to win—or don’t go. Otherwise, you get caught in a quagmire, like in Afghanistan or Iraq, or you end up coming home with your tail between your legs, as here—or both, as in Vietnam. [5/5]

but that we had lost 18 soldiers—and, far more importantly, had American servicemen dragged naked through the streets, a national humiliation—for no clear national purpose. Somalia had never wronged us; why were we there to begin with? This episode is an excellent illustration of the longstanding principle that America has repeatedly ignored: Don’t get involved in a fight you’re not willing to commit [4/x]

Second—on the other hand, he has a point. What he doesn’t mention, because it hadn’t happened when the book was written, is that this was one of the precipitating events for 9/11. Bin Laden saw that the U.S. ran scared from a mere eighteen deaths; he calculated that killing a few thousand would bring the nation to its knees. Of course, he miscalculated; the problem in Somalia was not that we lost 18 soldiers, [3/x]

a press conference).

A couple of things here. First, this implication from both Powell and Lock that Clinton overreacted is a bit specious, because it neglects to account for the fact that, as a nation, we have repudiated Vietnam. That’s exactly what we don’t want to repeat, so implying that Clinton was cowardly in comparison with what the American people were willing to accept in Vietnam rings hollow. [2/x]

“Despite the humiliation of having dead American soldiers publicly desecrated, despite the reports that Aidid had been struck a mortal blow…the President and his staff had lost the will to pursue anything further in Somalia. For President Clinton, eighteen obviously was a ‘large' number” (referencing Powell’s quote earlier in the book that eighteen dead soldiers in Vietnam would not even have warranted [1/x]

At that point the Pakistani tank drivers refused to go any farther, and so a detachment peeled off to continue to the crash site. It was this detachment that did not have enough space for all of the Rangers and Delta. The remainder only had to fight their way on foot for that five hundred meters—an arduous task to be sure, but hardly the trek on foot through the entire city that this book implies. [3/3]

But this is not what happened, according to Black Hawk Down and the documentary Black Hawk Down: The Untold Story. The main body of the convoy never made it onto Freedom road, and was waiting, as this book says on p. 551, "five hundred meters short of the American perimeter around Walcott's crash site." [2/X]

Error in the text: "Space within each vehicle had been fully utilized by force on the east in. Now, on the way out, there were an additional ninety-nine men to accommodate, some dead, many wounded." This makes LTC David look like an idiot for not thinking of what his primary mission was: Extracting the pinned-down men. [1/X]

Error in the text: "Flashing strobe lights were visible, identifying their location" (when the Rangers were awaiting pickup by 10th Mountain). According to Black Hawk Down, these were infrared strobe lights.

Error in the text: He says that the rescue convoy used blackout drive and therefore the drivers needed night vision goggles to drive. But blackout drive is designed to be used without NVGs. You don't use blackout drive lights with NVGs; you use no lights, as I'm sure they did.

So apparently the QRF actually made two attempts to reach the trapped Rangers, the first one, without armor, abortive. It's frustrating that Black Hawk Down makes no mention of this. Bowden, despite his seeming thoroughness, has not actually created the definitive history of this event. Disappointing.

Now this is interesting. Black Hawk Down doesn't describe what became of Struecker's convoy, so it's interesting to see what happened to it, and that it aided the Lost Convoy.

"While his Hummers could traverse the roadblock, the five-tons could not." Black Hawk Down says something similar, and I don't buy it. I buy that Struecker believed it, but not that it's the case. I find it hard to imagine any terrain that Humvees can handle that M923A2s (which I'm fairly sure these were) could not. This just goes to show what happens when you put non-truckers in charge of a convoy.

…forcing those behind to remain exposed."

Just this. Everybody thinks convoy ops are easy; anyone can drive a truck! Why do we need an MOS just for that? But it's not as simple as that. Drivers are trained as to what to do in different combat situations, as these Rangers are not. In this situation, the answer is: Drive like Hell. Do not stop unless necessary. Speed is your ally. [2/2]

"The vehicles of the convoy were beginning to prove more of a liability than an asset. Lightly armored and constantly forced to take on casualties, the vehicles made inviting targets. Worse yet, the Rangers were not trained for such a task. They were dismounted warriors and had little experience with convoy procedures. Their inexperience continually showed as they stopped at intersections or just beyond,… [1/2]