Status Updates From A Natural History of Negati...

Re: negative category mistakes. "Theory of relativity is blue". Meaningless or simply false? I think here too we could actually split this statement into two parts, which the main sentence does not exclude..."Theory of relativity" is blue vs. Theory of relativity is "blue". In the latter, we search attributes from the subject, former we search theory of relativity among blue things, and come up with a "false" answer.

Fregean presuppositionalist thesis results in a sentence like "Socrates is not" not having meaning because it would fail to refer to something that is. Yet to the presuppositionalist thesis itself presupposes that there can be a statement like "Socrates is not", because if "Socrates is" was true, "Socrates" would refer rather than fail to refer. Yet lot of the other language philosophy presented here was even worse.

Edellinen edellyttää että lauseet eivät ota selkeää objektia vaan adverbiaaliset objektikomplementit, ontologisesti referenttinä toimivat "tilat" eikä "oliot". Square of oppositionin mukaan Socrates is not as a dog kontraari olisi Socrates is as a dog, koska O muotoinen lausenegaatio erotetaan not-dog muodosta, niin Socrates is not a dog. Mutta tällöin (neg)as a dog vs. (pos)is a dog ovat vastakohtia, tila vs olio!

Mietityttää essiivin suhde aristoteeliseen terminegaatioon. Eli Socrates is not a dog --> Sokrates ei ole koira Socrates is a not-dog --> Sokrates ei ole koirana? Koska jälkimmäisen kuuluisi olla epätosi, jos Sokrates ei ookkaan olemassa. Ja oikeastaan jälkimmäisen lauseen negaation kohde on juuri -na, eli subjektin olemisen muoto, jolloin subjektin oleminen on oletettu. Eli Socrates is [but] not as a dog?

Hegel must've been heavily into Stoic logic, it would explain a lot.

It seems like a trend that analytic philosophy tends to ignore every problem by classifying them as properties of propositions. Seems to have started with Frege, at least in this cursory overview. Stoics also made the mistake of ossifying propositions so that Aristotle gave way to formal logic which hides all the important ontological questions and enables stuff like "all negation is actually just affirmation"

I mean; S is not P vs S is not-P is a different relation than S is not xP vs S is not-xP. Because it splits to: S is not "x"P, S is not x"P", S is "not-x" P and S is not-x"P".

"A may be neither B nor not-B" Doesn't this apply only to secondary predicates? Like "Socrates is not a log" "Socrates is a not-log" it doesn't apply, but following Aristotles style of example: "S is not a white log" "S is a not-white log" I guess that does show that the contradictory of term negation is not mere affirmation, but only limitedly if you group very different instances of predication together

Aristotle's table: contradiction presumes comparison between "Socrates is" and "Socrates is not" to distinguish it from immediate contrariety. Opposed to the transcendental, metaphysical defense of Law of Non-Contradiction (you cannot represent flux and empirical negation without identity), you can raise as an attack: you cant represent contradictory predicates without statements that lack predicates altogether