Status Updates From Imperial Twilight: The Opiu...

The George Staunton who spoke before the House of Commons on 7 april 1839 might seem difficult to reconcile with the scholar who had tried a lifetime to build a more respectful opinion of Chinese civilisation in Britain, but DEFENDING the war had always been a part of him as well, in the belief that the East India Company had kept the corrupt local authorities of Canton "in check".
(Now a role for a naval squadron)

Regular trade resumed after Napier's blustering attempt at gunboat diplomacy, without gunboats within range & without the diplomacy to follow established protocol through Canton merchants with Quing officials.
Jardine & Matheson did not give up so easily.

In essence, the 2nd coastal exploration of 1832 identified a wedge the Company could drive right through the firmament of China. A natural alliance of British trade interests & the multitude of Chinese merchants with their desire for free commerce, both of them set against the jealous government of the Manchus.

Most of the common Chinese people this missionary spoke to tough, didn't know much more than that Europe was a small country inhabited by a few merchants who speak different languages & who maintain themselves primarily by their commerce with China.

The strategy to crush the White Lotus rebellion by 1804 is compared to the "strategic hamlet" strategy of the U.S. in Vietnam: fence in the reliable farmers, turn the countryside into open season against rebels and the unreliable farmers feeding them.

Would a South African metaphor work here?