Status Updates From My Experiences In The First...

"You should always have the interest of the individual soldier at heart, for he is the principal part of the machine upon which you are to rely to carry you to success. His morale must be kept up to the highest pitch. That moral is affected by his confidence in his officers, by a realizing sense that they are his example. They should really be an example in everything that personifies the true soldier..." (394).

"Human nature is the same whether it be regarded as affecting the actions of individuals or of nations. The subordination of a national undertaking of any kind to the authority of another nation can hardly be thought of except under the most pressing necessity" (378).

"The railroad station at Paris on the evening I met the Secretary presented a scene that was most pathetic. The terror-stricken crowds from the threatened villages and farms were fleeing they knew not whither, many of them for the second time during this war, from an enemy whose invasion of their country in days gone by had perhaps driven out their fathers and mothers before them" (359).

"It was depressing to think that ten months had elapsed since our entry into the war & we were just barely ready with one division of 25,000 men. With all our wealth, our manpower & our ability, this was the net result of our efforts up to the moment; all because our people had been deceived by a false & fatuous theory that it was unnecessary in time of peace to make even preliminary preparations for war" (334-5).

"...so faulty had been the training of the General Staff as members of a great directive group that both the individuals and the group lacked initiative and purpose for want of a clear conception of their tasks" (322).

"The winter of 1917-18 was the most severe of the war. The cold was at times so intense as to make the generally unheated houses, barns and lofts used as billets nearly uninhabitable. The gloom of short days and long nights in the isolated and largely depopulated French villages can hardly be described. The snow was unusually heavy in eastern France, and periodical thaws...greatly added to the hardships..." (315).

"In recommending an increase in the number of chaplains, my reason was that I regarded recognition of the value of religious influence among our troops during the war as of special importance. Many temptations confronted our soldiers abroad &...the presence, the example, & the counsel of chaplains of the right sort would exert an excellent moral effect, especially among men without experience away from home" (284).

"...we were occasioned much embarrassment in facing the Allies with such a poor showing of accomplishment...The War Department General Staff...must take the greater part of the blame...it has always been difficult for me to understand why our General Staff clung so long to the antiquated systems...which had guided its activities previous to our entry into the war" (278).

"...it was noticeable that the Allies were quick to criticize each other and allege inefficiency in case of reverses. In due time the British and French also suffered disastrous defeats and their armies were also open to criticism. Before the end of the war the records of reverses of the respective armies in the West were about a stand-off. Hasty criticisms are likely to be unjust" (262).

"The attack was made on a six-mile front & the British had the advantage from the outset. The sudden debouchent of the long line of tanks, closely followed by the infantry, all without the usual warning of a... artillery bombardment, completely surprised the Germans. The tanks broke wide gaps in the wire & subdued the machine gun nests, aiding the infantry through the defenses with a minimum of loss" (245).

"'At the present time there is not in this country any actual output of ammunition of the types mentioned. Non has been expected.' As the French contracts covered only a part of the amount deemed necessary, it was not understood why the Ordnance Department had done nothing" (222).

"...in my opinion there never had been real cooperation on the Western Front between the British and French, that when one was attacking the other was usually standing still, and that the Germans were thus left free to concentrate their reserves against the threatened point" (213).

"The demonstration at Riga by General von Hutier's army was convincing proof of the soundness of the plan and of the correctness of the doctrine of training for open warfare that we were so persistently following in France and so continuously trying to impress upon the War Department at home. It simply proved that nothing in the great war had changed this age-old principle of the art of war" (206).

"It appeared to be difficult for some of the bureaus of the War Department to think in terms of a world war and they naturally hesitated to make decisions on questions involving the large requirements in supply, construction, and material. If they had only realized the pressing necessity for early preparation and had accepted the views of the men on the spot, it would have saved time and patience" (183).

"One of the important duties of the Medical Department was the prevention and cure of venereal disease, which in all other wars had caused serious reductions in effectives...our efforts on the whole were remarkably successful. The percentage of ineffectives in our army from this cause was much lower than that of the Allies and surpassed any previous record in the history of wars" (177).

"It was by opinion that the victory could not be won by the costly process of attrition, but it must be won by driving the enemy out into the open and engaging him in a war of movement. Instruction in this kind of warfare was based upon individual and group initiative, resourcefulness and tactical judgment, which were also of great advantage in trench warfare" (152).