Status Updates From Stilwell and the American E...

“…American aims were democratic but in practice the executants opted for the old regime. In China the decision was not merely futile; it aligned America in popular eyes with the oppressor and landlord and tax collector, it disheartened the liberal forces and violently antagonized the future rulers. While many suspected that the effort was misguided, American policy could not readjust.”

“ Since the dissolution of wartime alliance with the Soviet Union, innate fear and hate of Communism reasserted itself in America. On that dark yeast, grudge, ambition and vindictiveness could feed, and demagogues grow fat. Hurley opened the journey toward the tawdry reign of terror soon to be imposed with such astonishing ease by Senator Joe McCarthy. The time of hysterics had arrived.”

“ The decision to continue that effort was determined by the new world alignment. No sooner was Fascism defeated than Communism loomed as the new enemy. The presence of Soviet armies in Manchuria and the prospect of their making common cause with the Chinese Communists was now America’s worry despite a formal accord reached by the Russians with Chiang Kai-shek. The dilemma in China sharpened.”

“[Chiang] promised that a formal invitation to visit China would be extended to Stilwell “as soon as the situation of the country becomes normal.”…Stilwell took it as a compliment that “my presence is not desired on the continent of Asia….Maybe CKS thinks I would start a revolution….I would like to do just that.” It was done without him. He was not to see China again.”

“ He was to have the satisfaction, he learned, of taking the formal surrender of the enemy, if not on the grounds of his own battle in Burma at least in the Ryukyus, and of attending the full ceremonial surrender of Japan scheduled for September 2 in Tokyo Bay.”

“ “SO IT IS OVER,” Stilwell recorded…Although it meant that the opportunity to command American troops in battle was gone for good, he shared the immense relief of everyone. No sensible man looked forward to the invasion of Japan. His first thought was for his youngest son just turned eighteen. “I am so thankful we don’t have to throw Ben into the pot,” he wrote to [his wife]”

“August 6 the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima…On August 9 a second bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. “Revolutionary all right. Human civilization approaching suicide rapidly….Russia plus the bomb should do the trick.” An unanticipated result of the bomb was to provide Japan with a face-saving reason for quick surrender and that development now followed more precipitately than foreseen.”

“…the atomic bomb was successfully but still secretly tested…July 17 to August 2 Truman and Churchill met with Stalin at the Potsdam Conference and summoned Japan to surrender unconditionally or face “prompt and utter destruction.” The ultimatum was rejected by Japan’s military rulers although civilian efforts to reach a negotiated peace through Russia had already been opened with the Emperor’s consent.”

“…MacArthur asked him if he would serve as his Chief of Staff. “Told him No, I fancied myself as a field commander.” MacArthur asked if he would be willing to take an army despite his four stars. Stilwell replied he would take a division to be with troops. “Pooh pooh,” said MacArthur, “if you would take an Army I would rather have you than anyone else I know.””

“The capture of Okinawa obviated the need for the China coast. It was expected that the Japanese army in east and south China would probably be withdrawn to hold the Yangtze valley or reinforce the home islands… No plans for a forced landing in China were drawn. That long-expected climax which had shimmered on the horizon throughout Stilwell’s years in China faded away.”

“…Manhattan Project was nearly ready for the first test…What would come of it was unknown nor did commanders in the field know of its existence…Okinawa had reached the mopping-up stage. The task of developing the island as a base and rehabilitating and preparing the Tenth Army for the ultimate battle remained. Stilwell found it a high-pressure 24-hours-a-day job hampered by a lack of coordination and drive.”

“… Stilwell started for home…At Guam…he learned that General Buckner had been killed by a shell on Okinawa. He sent a radio to MacArthur telling where he could be reached and continued eastward. On arriving in Honolulu, he found the hoped-for message: “Command Tenth Army. Return to Guam at once.” On June 23 Stilwell took over command of the Army he could expect to lead in the crowning attack on Japan.”

“ They were no compensation to Stilwell for missing action that was taking place elsewhere. He hated Washington which seemed to him “as big a pile of manure as Chungking was.” To Win he wrote, “Unless something active comes my way I am going to do what I told you (ask for a division) and put the onus on the W.D.” In the back of his mind was the hope of commanding the eventual landing on the China coast.”

“ On February 10, 1945, the belated Legion of Merit for “constancy of purpose and untiring zeal” was awarded to Stilwell along with the Oak Leaf cluster of the DSM in recognition of the “tremendous magnitude and complexity” of his achievement in opening the Road. As he pinned on the medals Secretary Stimson said he had never awarded any decorations that gave him more pleasure.”

“ The American Government, by nature nervous of the new, was unable to summon the resolution to loosen its support of Chiang and risk his fall. Following the decision to uphold Hurley, the dissenting foreign service officers in fairness to the Ambassador were reassigned to other posts. The Communists drew the indicated conclusion that American policy was not coming their way.”

“ The Generalissimo was not that worried. Consistent American support made him feel stronger than he was and defeated its own purpose by assisting him to be adamant instead of moving him toward concessions. He underestimated the strength of the Communists and misunderstood his own situation because, as Stilwell had so often complained, no one told him the truth—or otherwise admitted it.”

“BY A BOLT OF LUCK into whose path Stilwell alertly stepped, he was to finish the war in the field as he hoped. In the first months after his return, however, his fate seemed to be a desk. Appointed commander of the Army Ground Forces in the United States on January 23, he had charge of training, but the job had no charm for him while combat mounted overseas.”

“ It was clear to Stilwell they wanted him out of the way and muzzled until after the election. That was his homecoming. The fear of what he might say appears exaggerated. Stilwell was prepared to obey the order not to talk, the more so as he had no desire to be shelved when the war was reaching its climax...”

“ Stilwell reached home shores…November 2, five days before the election, and was smuggled into Washington the next day...His wartime mission of little glory and no thanks was matched by his reception at home. There was no welcome appropriate to what Stimson called “the most difficult task assigned to any American in the entire war.” Stilwell was an embarrassment to his superiors…”

“ A Times editorial punctured the personality issue with respect to both Stilwell and Gauss. “It is scarcely conceivable that more tactful representatives, if tact was what they lacked, could have overcome the disorganization and corruption which have hamstrung the Chinese war effort.””

“News stories, editorials…contributed to what Joseph C. Harsch of CBS called “the bursting of a great illusion…the long-delayed washday for China’s dirty linen.” Asking the inevitable question, why the American public had not been informed, Thoburn Wiant of AP…said it was because Washington had kept on hoping it could clear up the mess but Stilwell’s recall was testimony that it could not.”

“ The front-page story appeared on October 31 before Stilwell arrived in the country. It declared that General Stilwell’s recall from China represented the “political triumph of a moribund anti-democratic regime” and had committed the United States to at least passive support of a government which had become “increasingly unpopular and distrusted in China.””

“ While no real doubt was felt in the President’s circle that he would defeat Dewey, the press predicted a close result and Roosevelt wanted as strong a mandate as he could get. No public announcement of Stilwell’s recall had yet been made and extraordinary precautions were taken to keep him out of the hands of the press.”

“ In Washington, with the campaign in its final week, Stilwell’s return was awaited with extreme nervousness. “I foresee an infinite amount of trouble,” Stimson wrote; “Stilwell’s success has made him very popular with the American people.” The election campaign had been in Roosevelt’s opinion “the dirtiest in history” and it was likely enough that a popular hero’s recall would provoke charges of skullduggery.”

“… the recall of General Stilwell was a kind of closing, the visible signal that a great endeavor was over. The effort had been made, and as some felt, wasted. If the man who had given it impetus and direction was gone, pulled out without ceremony or recognition, there seemed to many only futility in remaining.”

“ No formal leave-talking was allowed of the troops and road-builders and air crews who had accomplished the return through Burma under his command, and “that hurt.” He reached Delhi on October 24 and two days later, after 32 months of unslackened pursuit of the least attainable American goal of the war, he wrote the last entry of his mission: “Shoved off—last day in CBI.””

“Stilwell remained only 48 hours in Chungking after the notice of recall. The hurry and secrecy of his departure were at the orders of General Marshall who, with reason to fear Stilwell’s outspokenness, was anxious to bring him out of the theater and back to Washington before…the press fell upon him…Marshall hoped to avoid any blasts by Stilwell that might make it difficult to give him another major assignment.”

“ “THE AXE FALLS,” Stilwell learned on October 19, warned by an advance radio from Marshall. The President’s official reply followed, informing the Generalissimo that instructions had been issued “to recall General Stilwell from the theater immediately.”… Thus ended the command crisis and with it Stilwell’s mission.”

“ Roosevelt’s long-awaited reply…acceded to the recall only halfway…Stilwell would be relieved as Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek and of responsibility for Lend-Lease but would remain in command of the Chinese forces in Burma and Yunnan…no American would be named to command the Chinese armed forces because the ground situation in China had so deteriorated…”

“ As seen by Stilwell himself the issue was the combat effort of China. Insistently he repeated to Marshall that if Chiang Kai-shek had his way in this affair no further Chinese action in the war could be expected and future American effort in China would be wasted. If the Generalissimo succeeded both in dismissing Stilwell and keeping American aid and support he would be confirmed in intransigence.”