Certainty & Metaphysical Knowing

[[deleted user]]

Today my class read some essay on metaphysics. It concerns Kantian's idea of metaphysics. The thing is, it mentions that "there is some metaphysical kbnowledge that we can be certain of." I propose the question of this statement and my class can't think of any instance which will make this statement true.

Can you? There is no example in this very paper. (I don't know the author name but I can ask about it in my next class, in case you want to know)

Please forgive my grammar. I'm not native English.

[Tyler]

What do "metaphysical" and "certainty" mean, and what does it mean "to know"? It's definitions that make what looks like an easy question a hard one.

Kant establishes that we can know the appearance of something, if not the thing in its entirety. The "thing" is some aspect of reality, so there's your metaphysical tie-in. We accept reality because rejecting it would entail a contradiction, so we can know with certainty (not absolutely, but not tentatively, either) the phenomenal appearance of the thing which is the object of our apperception.

Therefore, we can be certain of the phenomenal appearance to us of any thing.

[[deleted user]]

Is it possible to say that Kant is wrong in a sense that we cannot know the appearance of something? I don't try to say that I don't believe in his statement, I do. It will be weird to believe that you cannot know at least the appearance of something. However, weird is not impossible, it it?

If there is a chance, no matter how small, say, only one possible world that we cannot know the apperance of anything. Then it dictates that we cannot propose such bold statement that we can know some metaphysical truth with certainty.

Of course, it is highly probable that my class misunderstand 'certainty' and construe is as neccessity or something like that.

P.S. This essay will be a lot clearer if it is kind enough to give some example so reader can know what exactly does it mean when it states the word 'certain'.

[Tyler]

You're right to distinguish between something we can know "certainly" and something we know absolutely, or "with necessity." I'm sure you will be able to find examples of both for your essay.

Since "knowing" entails a mental grasp of reality, a world of appearances we cannot know would make our world unreal. Sometimes people propose such things, conceding how odd or unlikely they might be.

Because we live in a contingent reality I cannot say with absolute certaintly that a world of unknowable appearances is impossible. That means it's logically possible.

But if someone wants to bring into a discussion an extraordinary but logically possible scenario, I would want to know why they're holding the logical possibility open. Sometimes they might be using it to make or support some other argument or line of reasoning, but if they're raising a logical possibility just for the sake of raising it, that doesn't place any obligation on the rest of us to consider it. Millions of logical possibilies cannot be ruled out, but neither do they demand our attention.

[K]

At first, I disagreed with Tyler's original approach. It critiques the syntax of the question rather than, what I assumed to be the question, examples of established metaphysics.

As I read on however, Teerabhat's response changed my perception of 'certainty' validating Tyler's response in my thoughts.

My interpretation of, "there is some metaphysical knowledge that we can be certain of." is of a collective acceptance of metaphysical ideas as truth. Truth as in hypothetical or proven neuroscience or psychology in the consciousness of our minds.

Through the lack of an example, I would now infer that the 'certainty' spoken of, is not synonymic with established fact.

[Mark]

I would only add that it is Kant we are looking at and that in general his 'certainty' when it comes to metaphysics is a very broad and loose use of terminology.

[Mark]

I meant that it would seem that way now as his ways of using the words are so different that there is a sense when reading him that truths are actually beliefs and beliefs are certain even though to us there seems to be a step or two missing there.

[Mark]

Unverified beliefs don't even qualify as true by Plato's low standards. I am not suggesting a verification principle but given the subject it is rather hard not to stray a little bit towards that.

[Alex]

It seems to me that certainty of just about anything, on a purely logical/philosophical line, is not possible. There are so many factors and possibilities and so many ways one can perceive and process any sort of information that it seems like statistically there is no way to stamp a thought or idea with certainty. As I'm sure most of you are, I am starting from skepticism (in order that when and if the truth may be found, it is the truth I can call my own).

However. The other side of me sees all this processing of information and logical reasoning and just wants to read some poetry and drink coffee on a Sunday afternoon. And not worry or be scared about the impossibility of anything meaning anything. What I'm saying is that there seems to be, in most people, a part of them that holds out for hope and a want to live.

If the rabbit trail of no certainty (solipsism) is followed out logically the whole way, then life becomes, by definition, stripped of its importance and relevance. You can't even be certain of your senses, because they could be tricking you. Therefor there's no point to anything. My logical side of me gets here, and the other side says no, you want to live and find meaning and ultimately some kind of certainty.

[Duffy]

Solipsism isn't the endpoint of no certainty. Radical scepticism is. A solipsist could be sure of all sorts of things, just so long as he was also sure that all of those things originated with himself.

As for Kant, my guess is that he is talking about, at a minimum, the stuff that falls within his idea of a priori synthetic knowledge. This would include abstract knowledge about spatial and temporal relations. I'm not sure what else he means, but from my hazy recollection of the Critique of Pure Reason, this is the only metaphysical knowledge that he puts on really solid footing.

[Tom]

Here is an absolutely certain proposition in the metaphysical sense of which Kant intended: if there is an instance of knowledge then it is always the knowledge of an object known by a subject who knows it.

[Philip]

It's a long time since I read the Critique, but as I remember it one of Kant's central concerns is to criticise the notion of metaphysical truths rather than provide a bunch of them. He considered that the attempt to discover truths about the world via reason alone transgressed the bounds of sense (to use Strawson's phrase). Reasoning has to include input from perceptions, but if those perceptions are to count as experience then they need to be ordered by concepts. That's the point behind his famous phrase "thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind". And "thoughts without content" is what he considered metaphysics to be.

Leaving Kant aside, it should be noted that philosophy has failed to produce any uncontested metaphysical truths. For example, Descartes' "I think therefore I am" was undermined first by Hume and then (more radically) by Kant. The whole notion of the metaphysical "project" came under heavy fire in the 20th Century from (amongst others) Quine on the one hand and Wittgenstein on the other. Saul Kripke has attempted to revive the subject, but I think it would be fair to say that his philosophy is not universally accepted.

[Athens]

Hi Philip. I've spend most of my time on Plato, so was not aware that the "cogito ergo sum" had been undermined by Hume and Kant. Will look into that. Thanks for the commentary.

[Philip]

Hi Paul

Hume's basic criticism ran as follows: 1. All we know are objects of experience or sense data. 2. There is no object of experience that counts as the "self" or the Cartesian "I". 3. So rather than being the one thing we can be certain of, the "I" is at best a psychological construct. We do not know it (in what he considered to be the proper sense of "know").

Kant's criticism was a bit trickier (and help me out, Kantians, if I get this wrong) but it went like this. First, he distinguished between mere sense data (which he called "intuitions") and experience. Intuitions by themselves are just a blizzard of colours, shapes etc. They need to be ordered according to certain a priori rules (which he called "concepts") before we can do anything with them at all.

One of these rules is that perceptions must be unified both in the subject and in the object. That is to say, a perception must be had by someone (hence, unified in the subject) and it must be of something (hence, unified in the object). Otherwise, everything just collapses into a formless miasma.

So for Kant, pace Descartes, the cogito was not an incorrigibly known object but nor was it (pace Hume) simply a psychological convenience. It was one of the a priori necessary conditions of experience. It was a concept (or rule). Moreover, it could not stand alone while everything else was considered to be an illusion. The cogito, as a concept, only functioned as a condition of experience if there were things external to it that it perceived.

I hope this is helpful! ;)

[Tyler]

Hi Philip --

Yes, this looks correct to me, but I'm not a Kant scholar.

Generally, the argument in its modern form is that consciousness by definition must be consciousness of something. Thus, Cogito Ergo Sum means, at best, that, "I think. Therefore, there must be something out there to think about."

[Tyler]

Frank wrote: "Do you mean, modern form, as opposed to the Cartesian idea that 'I think, therefore there must be at least the activity of thinking', Tyler?"

I didn't know that was the modern form. But an activity has to be an entity of some sort, so that's why I used the blunter "something."

Now I think I'm going to get in trouble with Hegel putting it that way. But in any case I hope it connects better with Hume and Kant.

[Philip]

Frank wrote: "I believe it is the activity of doubting ('thinking') that is unquestionable - not the contents of that doubt, but the doubting itself. From that truth, one can derive content, building up Descartes' world again."

A still more radical criticism of Descartes' position stems from Wittgenstein's "private language argument". This undermines Descartes' basic assumptions about concepts such as mind, thought and understanding. It suggests that someone in Descartes' position wouldn't be able to think at all or formulate his "thoughts" into any kind of language.

[Philip]

It's more radical than that: you couldn't be sure whether you were doubting or doing something different. Or nothing at all.

[Tyler]

And then, language is external to consciousness. If doubt is a concept requiring words to elucidate, there would be a problem.

[Philip]

Well, doubt - like all concepts - requires the possibility of expression. That's why it makes sense to say "My dog isn't sure if he wants to go for a walk or have his dinner" but not (joking aside) "that stone isn't sure whether it wants to fall off the ledge or stay where it is".

Descartes' problem is that he's conceived of "meaning" "thought", "understanding" (etc) as radically internal processes - any external expression of them is merely a sort of add-on extra. Wittgenstein's argument is that such a conception makes any kind of meaning impossible because there's no way of providing any standard of correctness.

All the same, you might think that Descartes could still say "I'm not sure if it's doubt or something else, but at least I'm sure something is happening". But of course the very same problem attaches itself to that statement as well.

[Tom]

This is a great discussion. Wittgenstein's (anti-)private language argument is a significant and needed challenge to Cartesian skepticism, doubt of representations of the 'external world'. But I have found Hegel to provide the best remedy to the latter, anticipating Wittgenstein's challenge. Hegel argues that Cartesian doubt, "negativity" in the Hegelian terminology or jargon, is a logically or conceptually necessary moment for mindedness to develop independence of thought, but of course such doubt or negation necessarily presupposes, as Wittgenstein rightly points out, a shared language and social world of some kind, thus mind must necessarily seek to find its way back to restoring the shared world after Cartesian skepticism, but now having won a greater sense of the freedom of reason. Hegel argues that this explains why modern, liberal thought recognizes and values freedom more than ancient philosophy did. At least that's the rhythm of Hegel's dialectical analysis of the history of philosophy.

[Philip]

I don't think Wittgenstein would've had much truck with absolute idealism, nor with Hegel's dialectical theory of history (he was more into Spengler).

Personally, although my knowledge of Hegel is scant (I've read a bit about him but nothing by him), I've always thought his work sounded as close to mysticism as to what we'd call "academic philosophy". Despite all its arguments and logic it's more dramatically compelling than rationally convincing. And his conception of mind (and its relation to being) is just as confused as Descartes'.

I do agree with him, however, that Kant's conception of mind is too passive. True, it orders intuitions into experience, but it doesn't participate in the world. However, I don't think that an idealist dialectical process of ever-expanding consciousness is the right way to put things straight.

[Tom]

Philip:

All this business about Hegel being 'mystical' is rubbish proffered by the horrible Anglo readings deriving from the early 20th-century reception, including the British Idealists and the Analytic rebels like Bertrand Russell, who was reacting against the British Idealists' version of Hegel, which was already a botch.

Anglos like Russell have tended to think anything, even reason as such, is 'mystical', if it doesn't reduce to some obvious utility or instrumentalism. This is not a sign of enlightened skepticism but rather a sign of narrow-mindedness, even ignorance I would argue, and deference to dogmas of modern, anti-philosophical scientism.

Hegel's philosophy aims to restore certain Aristotelian elements to modern philosophy of the human world (the Geisteswissenschaft as opposed to Naturwissenschaft) without which modern empiricism cannot make sense of human life. Aristotle was not a mystic, though he did argue for teleological factors in human development; Hegel likewise argues rationally for such, though modifying Aristotle in light of the modern, non-teleological understanding of nature. For Hegel, we may do without a telos of nature, but human beings cannot be understood without a telos of expression. To call this 'mystical' is simply to defer to the sheer dogma of modern scientism that mechanical reasons, ascertainable by a certain conception of naturalism, are the only legitimate, allowable reasons.

Hegel is a critic but ultimately a defender of modern Enlightenment rationality (contra postmodernism) and the modern ideal that individuals should be self-determining. To this Enlightenment ideal he fills in the missing recognition of the complex social and historical factors that are required for the ideal of self-determination to emerge. His philosophy provides a more rational explanation of the development of modernity -- the social world that values individual freedom of expression above all -- than any of the muddled empiricism and utilitarianism of the English or the muddled existentialism and pomo of the French.

There is finally a renaissance in English-speaking Hegel scholarship going on to correct the earlier reception dominated by Russell's and Popper's ungenerous reading. Among this group of scholars and philosophers I strongly recommend anything by Terry Pinkard and Robert Pippin. Pinkard is the English translator of a new edition of the Phenomenology of Spirit to be published in 2013 by Cambridge.

[Andrew]

I think that Descartes is right when he says that I can know about my own mind introspectively in a way that no one else can, owing to the fact that this knowledge is more immediate or direct than other types. While I don't think it is legitimate to treat introspections as CERTAIN, I do not think we can dispense with all 'subject talk' in theories for how we might come by certain knowledge. Unlike Kant, I think we can have intelligible, non conceptual, experience.

I also oppose Wittgenstein's private language argument (or Hegel's anticipation) on grounds that we possess a form of aesthetic or moral language that is intelligible ONLY through first-person consciousness. We often feel bored, and ARE bored in some sense, even before we can report it or somebody else points it out to us. We can have qualititative experience that is not conceptually interpretable in the present (while leaving the possibly open that it will be interpretable at a later date). What you know as 'blue' might not be equivalent to what I know as blue. Is my private 'knowledge' of blue really meaningless because it is useless or not shared, as Wittgenstein would have it?

[Mark]

I am just wondering about how the Wittgensteinian view of language is a criticism when for Wittgenstein there is language in internal consciousness which could be claimed to be DesCartes language as used as well. In which case there is no externality of language involved and therefore no reasonable objection from that angle of approach. It has been three years so corrections welcome if I'm mixing this up somehow.

[Philip]

Tom wrote: "Philip:

All this business about Hegel being 'mystical' is rubbish proffered by the horrible Anglo readings deriving from the early 20th-century reception, including the British Idealists and the A..."

Now, now! Just because Russell is against something doesn't mean it has to be right (though it's certainly tempting to take that line).

Seriously, though, are you really saying there's nothing mystical about Hegel's philosophy? Obviously, he's not some 19th Century shaman, but Absolute Idealism does sometimes come across as something out of the Upanishads.

Of course, Hegel isn't alone in having an undeclared mystical side. I think the same is just as true of Kant and (pace your assertion) Aristotle as well - don't forget, for Aristotle (and Plato) philosophy was ultimately a search for the divine. Even Russell's own philosophy was more mystical than he would've cared to admit - his whole approach to logic was deeply sublimated.

None of this is necessarily a criticism; I'm not using "mysticism" as a pejorative. But philosophy's debt to the mystical ought to be acknowledged.

[Philip]

Mark wrote: "for Wittgenstein there is language in internal consciousness which could be claimed to be DesCartes language"

You'll have to explain this a bit as it doesn't square with my understanding of Wittgenstein.

[Mark]

To go further and possibly as a clarification Wittgenstein believed that we could not separate ourselves from language. I have now just realised that it is 'I' (Terrible joke) who have misunderstood you as the two 'I's of Descartes would indicate just this separation.