Part Four, Definitions through Prop 36

[Thomas]

Part Four of the Ethics addresses the human being's lack of power over the affects. From the start it is clear that in order to be truly free, one must obtain this power or else be subject to fortune: "For the man who is subject to affects is under the control, not of himself, but of fortune, in whose power he so greatly is that often, though he sets the better for himself, he is still forced to follow the worse."

The power of fortune seems at odds with Spinoza's earlier position in Part One that nothing is contingent -- everything is determined in God/Substance and could be no other way. But looking back at 1P33 where he says this, he qualifies contingency in an important way: he says that "a thing is called contingent only because of a defect of our knowledge."

Part Four deals largely with the nature of good and evil. What does Spinoza mean by these terms? It doesn't seem that they can be things in themselves, nor are they ideas abstracted from good and evil things in the world.

He gives us two definitions:

D1: By good I shall understand what we certainly know to be useful to us.

D2: By evil, however, I shall understand what we certainly know prevents us from being masters of some good.

Both definitions have at their core a common notion: certain knowledge. (My emphasis, because I think it's crucial.) I am reminded of the qualification in 1P33 -- a thing is contingent only because of a defect of knowledge.

So how do we obtain knowledge and get clear about good and evil? (And wouldn't that knowledge resolve all of our ethical dilemma?)

[Alexey]

From what I've read in this part, I've understood that good is what is according to Reason and evil is what is against it (as I understand it is god's reason). Not sure that it is correct at all, but if so, we can get this knowledge from understanding god's reason. Since for Spinoza god is nature, I think, it equals to understanding nature, its laws, etc. Something like that.

I'd appreciate being corrected.

[David]

Alexey wrote: "From what I've read in this part, I've understood that . . ."

That is pretty close to the understanding I am coming to. The interconnectedness of all things makes it tough to sum up. :)

1. Good and evil are not absolute but exist only relative to our perspective and understanding and are determined by what helps or hinders our to perseverance in striving to maintain or improve our well being, conatus,

2. Conatus must be accompanied by reason. Reason is byproduct of understanding God or Nature. This understanding includes knowledge of its physical laws, but more importantly, all of the propositions Spinoza has laid out for us, their meaning, and what they entail. This understanding and the resulting reason helps us live in alignment with nature which in turn benefits our conatus

My question is, what is the summum bonum of Spinoza's philosopy? Is it conatus or understanding of God or Nature?

[Thomas]

David wrote: "My question is, what is the summum bonum of Spinoza's philosopy? Is it conatus or understanding of God or Nature?."

I think you're both on the right track. The beauty of Spinoza's method is that every proposition follows from what precedes it, and sometimes clarifies what precedes it. (Or at least it seems to clarify things for me.)

There are two parts of Spinoza's definition of "good" -- what we can certainly know, and what is useful. What we can certainly know is somewhat limited by the finite nature of our bodies, but we still have access to "adequate" ideas (from Part 2, and more explicitly 2P40.) We can know some things certainly, and The Ethics up to this point is an explanation of what those things are and what they aren't.

The second part is what is "useful" to us. I'm a little less clear on that, but I'm leaning toward conatus as well. What is useful is whatever increases the force of our existence and allows us to express our nature in the most functional and active way possible. The result is a joyful existence. Whatever decreases our force of existence and drags us down, away from reason and toward destruction, is evil. Those things are affects and inadequate ideas, which are generally accompanied by "sadness".

So it's both, I think -- both conatus and an understanding of God/Nature. We improve or realize our "conatus", our human nature, with greater understanding of God/Nature.

But there is a hitch (my hitch, not Spinoza's): insofar as we are finite beings, we are always affected by things, and since the mind is an idea of the body, our minds are affected accordingly with "passions." I"m not sure Spinoza acknowledges this adulterated state of being as an expression of human nature however. He seems to have an ideal nature in mind, one that is entirely reasonable and, to my mind, not a reflection of how humans actually are. Which is fine, and this notion has a pedigree stretching back to Plato, but it still seems to me impossibly idealistic. Socrates' attempts to realize idealism usually (always?) end in aporia, a dead-end of sorts. Will Spinoza's application of reason to human nature finally succeed in the end?

[David]

The summum bonum appears to be knowledge of God per the last proposition of this section which declares it attainable by all, and he appears to qualify it for those who pursue virtue:

PROPOSITION 36 The highest good of those who pursue virtue is common to all, and all can equally enjoy it.

Proof To act from virtue is to act by the guidance of reason (Pr.24,IV), and whatever we endeavour to do in accordance with reason is to understand (Pr.26,IV). So (Pr.28,IV) the highest good of those who pursue virtue is to know God; that is (Pr.47,II and Sch.) a good that is common to all men and can be possessed equally by all men in so far as they are of the same nature.

I am having trouble separating all three things being equated here

PROPOSITION IV.24 To act in absolute conformity with virtue is nothing else in us but to {167} act, to live, to preserve one’s own being (these three mean the same) under the guidance of reason, on the basis of seeking one’s own advantage.

PROPOSITION IV.26 Whatever we endeavor according to reason is nothing else but to understand; and the mind, in so far as it exercises reason, judges nothing else to be to its advantage except what conduces to understanding.

PROPOSITION IV.28 The mind’s highest good is the knowledge of God, and the mind’s highest virtue is to know God.

Is it safe to assume what is the highest good for the mind is also the highest good for the body since they are synchronized parallel expressions of the same thing?

[David]

Thomas wrote: "The second part is what is "useful" to us. I'm a little less clear on that, but I'm leaning toward conatus as well."

I think you nailed the first part of good by tying it to the clarity and distinctness of ideas, reflecting the knowledge of things that are true and beneficial.

The second part of good relates to the utility of things in promoting our existence and well-being. I think Spinoza distinguishes between existence and well being although both seem to be expressions of conatus. The first is the basic drive to exist and continue existing; the second is a striving to improve and flourish.

Now I am reminding myself of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs and his grouping of his 5 stage model into two sets of needs, deficiency needs (physiological, safety, love/belonging, esteem) vs. growth needs (self-actualization).

[Thomas]

David wrote: "The summum bonum appears to be knowledge of God per the last proposition of this section which declares it attainable by all, and he appears to qualify it for those who pursue virtue:
PROPOSITION..."

What can it mean to know God? At 2P47 he claims not just that this is possible, but that "The human mind has an adequate knowledge of God's eternal and infinite essence." It's not a potential, it's a fact. This fact is in turn dependent on the notion that the idea of each singular body involves the essence of God. So the human mind knows each singular thing that exists, and therefore has an adequate idea of God's essence. This seems like a very bold claim.

[David]

Thomas wrote: "What can it mean to know God? At 2P47 he claims not just that this is possible, but that "The human mind has an adequate knowledge of God's eternal and infinite essence.""

Knowing God might seem like a daunting and impossible task, but remember that for Spinoza, knowing God is equivalent to an adequate knowledge of Nature (physical & logical). This perspective makes the concept more accessible and less intimidating, since we interact with and learn from nature every day.

The key term here is "adequate" knowledge. Adequate knowledge doesn't imply omniscience; instead, it refers to a level of understanding that is accessible and practically useful to all. It's about grasping essential truths, not knowing everything.

For example, consider learning to ride a bicycle. Initially, one only has a vague idea, i.e., inadequate knowledge, of how to balance and pedal, leading to wobbles and falls. With practice, both mind and body develop a clearer understanding of how to maintain balance, control speed, and navigate leading to the attainment of an adequate level knowledge. This doesn't mean one knows all the mechanics behind bicycles or the physics of cycling, or needs to, but one understands enough to enjoy the benefits of riding one with confidence and safety.

In this sense, Spinoza's bold claim that "The human mind has an adequate knowledge of God's eternal and infinite essence" suggests that everyone has the capacity to attain this level of understanding about the fundamental nature of reality. This adequate knowledge is a practical knowledge that is useful* in allowing us to enjoy the benefits of living in harmony with the natural world, which is what Spinoza means by knowing God.

*Spinoza defines human good in terms of its utility, or what is useful or beneficial to us.

[Thomas]

David wrote: "The key term here is "adequate" knowledge. Adequate knowledge doesn't imply omniscience; instead, it refers to a level of understanding that is accessible and practically useful to all. It's about grasping essential truths, not knowing everything.
"

I'm still a little fuzzy on what adequate knowledge is, particularly when applied to the infinite. To me it seem that since Substance itself is infinite, an adequate knowledge of its attributes, the extensible and mental, could be nothing less than omniscient. This is the "mind of God." As infinite, there is nothing to limit it. Spinoza often uses the "insofar as" qualifier to make a finite version of adequacy sound plausible, but I don't find this persuasive. As an example:

2P40: Whatever ideas follow in the mind from ideas which are adequate in the mind are also adequate.

Dem. This is evident. For when we say that an idea in the human mind follows from ideas which are adequate in it, we are saying nothing but that (by P11C) in the divine intellect there is an idea of which God is the cause, not insofar as he is infinite, nor insofar as he is affected with the ideas of a great many singular things, but insofar as he constitutes only the essence of the human mind.

God constitutes the essence of the human mind, but God as substance constitutes the essence of everything that exists, so this seems to be a distinction without a difference. How would one describe the essence of the human mind? For Spinoza the mind is an idea of the body, of which we have a very incomplete understanding. How can an idea of the body be adequate if our understanding is incomplete?

Can an adequate idea be partial? Is it possible to have an adequate idea of the whole without having one of its parts?

It is evident that man's essence is contained within God's essence, so it is part of it. But Spinoza's definition of an adequate idea is completely intrinsic. (2PD4) It doesn't even refer to an object... so how can there be an adequate idea of the body?

(In a cynical moment I might say that an adequate idea is anything produced by reason that springs from Spinoza's definitions. The Ethics is itself a compendium of adequate ideas for Spinoza.)

[David]

Thomas wrote: "How can an idea of the body be adequate if our understanding is incomplete?"

There are many examples show that even with incomplete knowledge, we can form adequate ideas that are true and useful. This adequacy is not about exhaustive or perfect knowledge but about having a clear and distinct understanding of certain truths that are sufficient for practical purposes.

Here is one. Understanding that regular physical activity strengthens muscles and improves overall health. While the biochemical processes involved in muscle growth and cardiovascular improvement are complex, an adequate idea of the benefits of exercise can still guide us in making healthier lifestyle choices.

Here is another. In Spinoza's terms, Newton's understanding of gravity would be considered an "adequate idea." Despite being later expanded upon by Einstein, Newton's law of universal gravitation provided a clear and distinct explanation of gravitational forces that is highly predictive and is still useful today.

I agree with the statement made in your cynical moment that "The Ethics is itself a compendium of adequate ideas for Spinoza.". More importantly, Spinoza himself would likely affirm this perspective, as he committed to this work of presenting clear and true ideas that align with his understanding of reason and nature.

[Thomas]

David wrote: "Here is one. Understanding that regular physical activity strengthens muscles and improves overall health. While the biochemical processes involved in muscle growth and cardiovascular improvement are complex, an adequate idea of the benefits of exercise can still guide us in making healthier lifestyle choices."

This is a great example since it goes to the heart of what Spinoza thinks "increases the body's power of acting." And it makes perfect sense based on both current medical theory and the experience of most people. But there's still an element of uncertainty involved because making healthy lifestyle choices is not a necessary condition for health. Other things, like genetics and environment come into play to determine good health, so making healthy lifestyle choices is only part of the puzzle. This makes it an inadequate cause. Inadequate ideas can still be true, but they lack certainty.

Adequate ideas all have their foundations in God-- Spinoza's absolute certainty that God involves the essence of the human mind and that this is the source of the adequate ideas. (If I'm reading 2P40 correctly.) I'm not sure what that means exactly, but God seems to be the source of certainty for Spinoza. The only adequate notions we can have are the ones that are derived by reason from prior adequate notions, and they all have a pedigree that goes back to God.

[David]

I think it is key to remember all ideas stem from god and they are only adequate or inadequate due to our degree of understanding them.

Spinoza's proposition II.40 says, Whatever ideas follow in the mind from ideas that are adequate in it are also adequate. I understand this to mean that if you start with a true and clear understanding (an adequate idea), any conclusions or ideas you logically draw from that starting point will also be true and clear, as long as you use sound reasoning. I.e., it seem to be the basic definition of validity, IF the premises are true (adequate), the conclusion will be true (adequate).

So the idea is that adequate ideas provide a an accurate understanding of the causes and principles behind things, leading to a clearer view of reality. This proposition emphasizes the importance of starting with well-founded, rational ideas to ensure the conclusions you reach are equally solid. It also seems Spinoza is justifying his own work.

II.40 is basically saying If the premises are true then the conclusion is true.
Premise 1: All humans are mortal. (true)
Premise 2: Socrates is a human. (true)
Conclusion: Socrates is mortal. (true)

It also explains why a false but valid argument must have at least one false premise.
Premise 1: All animals with wings can fly. (false)
Premise 2: Penguins have wings.
Conclusion: Therefore, penguins can fly. (not true)

[David]

My previous comment including birds and penguins got me thinking about animals bringing me to a notable omission in Spinoza's philosophy. I don't blame Spinoza, considering the prevailing view of his time was that reason distinguished humans from animals. However, animals also exhibit conatus, and their bodies seem to possess adequate knowledge, not without some reasoning skills, of the actions necessary for their survival and reproduction. While this knowledge may lack the depth that human reasoning, it seems sufficient for their purposes and one can hardly argue against the fact that the animal kingdom does live wholly in alignment with nature. Determining if this animal knowledge qualifies as adequate for a knowledge of God is much more complex, but it's an intriguing possibility since humans are animals too, and we did it.

I wonder if this is what the peace of mind from living according to nature is like?

I think I could turn and live with animals,
they are so placid and self-contain’d,
I stand and look at them long and long.
They do not sweat and whine about their condition,
They do not lie awake in the dark and weep for their sins,
They do not make me sick discussing their duty to God,
Not one is dissatisfied, not one is demented with the mania of owning things,
Not one kneels to another, nor to his kind that lived thousands of years ago,
Not one is respectable or unhappy over the whole earth.
Whitman, Walt. Leaves of Grass (Modern Library Classics) (pp. 68-69). Random House Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

[Thomas]

For an animal living according to nature it also means being eaten by predators, or farmed and harvested by humans for food, or being pampered as a pet by a childless lady. (Sorry, a sudden affection overtook me.) That is the way of nature, and predators and pet owners are just doing what they do. At one point Spinoza says that he acknowledges that animals have sensations; he just doesn't care, because they have different natures than us. (p37) We can't know what they think or feel. So we do with them whatever is advantageous to us.

[David]

You have raised some good points, Here are some thoughts in response:

Humans as Part of the Animal Kingdom: Humans are animals and are part of nature and the natural cycle, and we should keep in mind that we can be prey to certain predators like large carnivores, hosts to parasites, etc. This fact underlines our inherent vulnerability and interconnectedness with other living beings, reminding us that we are not above nature but part of it.

Species-Dependent Standards of Good and Bad: I think your point illustrates how "good" and "bad" are truly relative and imply there are species-dependent standards of good and bad. What benefits one species may harm another, like how a successful hunt benefits a predator's conatus but detrimental for the individual prey's conatus. This perspective aligns with Spinoza's view that the concepts of good and bard are only constructs rather than absolute truths. In Spinoza's reality, actions are neither inherently good nor bad; they are simply judgements based on each species' conatus.

Spinoza's View on Human Use of Animals: Spinoza did acknowledge animals' sensations but made a clear distinction between humans and animals, primarily based on the capacity for reason. This distinction led him to justify the use of animals for human advantage, reflecting the views of his time. However, this stance can seem to conflict with the broader idea of living according to nature, especially if we interpret that to mean living in harmony with all beings. Then the ethical questions are raised: To what extent should humans impose their will on other species, does conatus alone drive good or bad judgement, or is a more nuanced judgement necessary? These questions are even more relevant today as we consider animal rights as well as reforms in animal husbandry.

[Thomas]

Great responses, and right on the mark as far as I can see. I find his attitude toward animals instructive because he doesn't have the kind of empathy that we have toward animals today. (Well, some of us anyway, for some animals). I suspect that he would find my vet bill the result of a profound affection. He's quite indifferent toward, or disinterested in feelings generally. But at the same time he would not sanction animal abuse, or factory farming, or any other practices which are not advantageous because they're harmful to human beings. Certainly he would have thought the way Native Americans hunted bison was different from the wholesale slaughter of the bison by colonists in the 19th century.

[David]

Thomas wrote: "What can it mean to know God? At 2P47 he claims not just that this is possible, but that "The human mind has an adequate knowledge of God's eternal and infinite essence." It's not a potential, it's a fact. . . .This seems like a very bold claim."

I think it is fair to say the Enlightenment thinkers were highly influenced by Spinoza's work. I started recalling echos from it in Thomas Paine's The Age of Reason which may shed some additional perspective on the topic.

It is only in the CREATION that all our ideas and conceptions of a word of God can unite. The creation speaketh an universal language, independently of human speech or human language, multiplied and various as they be. It is an ever existing original, which every man can read. It cannot be forged; it cannot be counterfeited; it cannot be lost; it cannot be altered; it cannot be suppressed. It does not depend upon the will of man whether it shall be published or not; it publishes itself from one end of the earth to the other. It preaches to all nations and to all worlds; and this word of God reveals to man all that is necessary for man to know of God.

Paine, Thomas. Thomas Paine: Collected Writings (LOA #76): Common Sense / The American Crisis / Rights of Man / The Age of Reason / pamphlets, articles, and letters (Library of America) (p. 687). Library of America. Kindle Edition.

Paine's assertion that creation itself is the unchangeable and universal expression of God and resonates strongly with Spinoza's view of God as the underlying unity of all existence. More importantly, a key implication of Spinoza's assertion that the human mind possesses adequate knowledge is that it removes the necessity for religious institutions to act as intermediaries between individuals and the divine.