Classics and the Western Canon discussion
Spinoza - Ethics
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Part Two, Prop 20 to end of Part Two
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Great conversation starters! Let me pencil in my first free thoughts.
(1) Compared to your first sentence, I think I would have instinctively phrased the relationship idea-object the opposite way: idea and object completely depend on each other: by definition, an idea based on an object that doesn't exist, cannot be said to exist either. In relation to this:
(2) Ideas are modes of the affections of the substance, and as such, ultimately, they are modes of the substance; by definition, their truthfulness descends from their nature. We can still acknowledge as false an assumption we previously, mistakenly regarded as idea.
(3) I previously quoted Spinoza's letter to Boxel on freewill: we have the ultimate choice whether to do what is necessary. That which is necessary is determined; our choice and actions aren't. [Happiness is the result of awareness of our true nature and deliberate adhesion to it. Remember the stoic doctrine of assent?]
(1) Compared to your first sentence, I think I would have instinctively phrased the relationship idea-object the opposite way: idea and object completely depend on each other: by definition, an idea based on an object that doesn't exist, cannot be said to exist either. In relation to this:
(2) Ideas are modes of the affections of the substance, and as such, ultimately, they are modes of the substance; by definition, their truthfulness descends from their nature. We can still acknowledge as false an assumption we previously, mistakenly regarded as idea.
(3) I previously quoted Spinoza's letter to Boxel on freewill: we have the ultimate choice whether to do what is necessary. That which is necessary is determined; our choice and actions aren't. [Happiness is the result of awareness of our true nature and deliberate adhesion to it. Remember the stoic doctrine of assent?]
The propositions around there being no free will put a [new twist] on the end of an old story.Once upon a time, a scorpion wanted to cross a river but couldn't swim. It saw a frog nearby and asked for a ride on its back.
The frog was wary and said, "How do I know you won't sting me?"
The scorpion replied, "Because if I sting you, we'll both drown."
The frog thought this made sense and agreed to carry the scorpion. They started across the river, but halfway across, the scorpion stung the frog.
As they both started to sink, the frog asked, "Why did you sting me? Now we'll both drown."
The scorpion replied, "I couldn't help it. It's in my [God or] nature."
Which also explains why scorpions don't write books on ethics.
What is the "object" of an idea? Is an idea an assertion?
Sam wrote: "What is the "object" of an idea? Is an idea an assertion?"
Spinoza inherits Descartes' "gnoseological dualism": ideas and objects exist on two separate, parallel planes, and ideas never really reach the plane of objects (in colloquial terms). Spinoza defines ideas as modes of Thought, objects as modes of Extension. Unlike Descartes, Spinoza intends to prove that ideas *certainly* match their objects, because both descend from Substance. Among the infinite attributes (~expressions) of the same Substance, we find Thought and Extension, the only two the mind can know.
Spinoza inherits Descartes' "gnoseological dualism": ideas and objects exist on two separate, parallel planes, and ideas never really reach the plane of objects (in colloquial terms). Spinoza defines ideas as modes of Thought, objects as modes of Extension. Unlike Descartes, Spinoza intends to prove that ideas *certainly* match their objects, because both descend from Substance. Among the infinite attributes (~expressions) of the same Substance, we find Thought and Extension, the only two the mind can know.
Sam wrote: "What is the "object" of an idea? Is an idea an assertion?"If you are referring to:
PROPOSITION 21 This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind is united to the body.Spinoza is saying that just as the mind and the body are connected and interact with each other, ideas within the mind are also connected and interact with other ideas in a similar manner.
Some examples may help.
Mind and Body Connection:
Body: You touch a hot stove with your hand.
Mind: Your mind immediately becomes aware of the pain, and you perceive the sensation of heat and discomfort.
This shows how the state of the body (touching something hot) directly affects the mind (perceiving pain).
Ideas Within the Mind can connect to other ideas.
Idea 1: The idea of touching the stove.
Idea 2: The idea of feeling pain.
These two ideas are connected within the mind.
So it appears the object of an idea could be a physical object, an event, or another idea.
Sam wrote: "What is the "object" of an idea? Is an idea an assertion?"
When you ask a question and you get three different responses, you know you've asked a good question. Here's my take.
Spinoza is incredibly vague about what an idea is. He says it is a "concept of the mind which the mind forms because it is a thinking thing". That's it. And to me, "concept" is just another word for "idea." So that's not much help.
So I think we have to back up a little and ask what it is to be a thinking thing. Spinoza thinks that existence is expressed in two ways: as an extensible thing (the physical world) and as a thinking thing (the conceptual world). Both of these expressions are real. A cat is a four-legged furry critter, and a cat is also the idea of that physical cat. Both express the essence of Cat, and one is not more real than the other.
We commonly think of the physical world as real and "objective" and the act of thinking about it as "subjective," and the subjective always gets short shrift. There's something fuzzy about the subjective, as if it isn't something real, it's just an opinion about a real thing. But that's not how Spinoza approaches it. Spinoza thinks the physical thing and the idea of that thing are just two different expressions of the same thing. There is no way that the idea of Cat and Leporello (currently curled up in my chair) can disagree, because they are in fact the same thing.
However.... this only works for Infinite beings (i.e., God.). Finite things, human beings included, are "modes" or modifications of the pure expressions of essence I just described. If we had access to the pure essence of Cat, we would see clearly that the idea of cat and the physical cat are of exactly the same thing. But as finite beings we don't have this access and are confused by perceptions. This is most easily seen in mathematics, where we do have access to purely rational ideas, but these ideas don't perfectly fit our perceptions.
So what is an idea? It's the conceptual expression of the essence of something that exists. The parallel question is: "What is a body?" And that is the physical (extensible) expression of the essence of something that exists. And in an infinite world, in the mind of God, those two things are just attributes of exactly the same thing.
Fed wrote: "Which also explains why scorpions don't write books on ethics."I have to admit that at the moment Spinoza appears to me rather scorpioid. How can there be ethics without free will? I'm really curious to find out how he escapes this deterministic prison, which he must, because the last parts are about human bondage and freedom.
Thomas wrote: "How can there be ethics without free will? I'm really curious to find out how he escapes this deterministic prison..."I think the keys to the deterministic prison are shown in the Scholium for Proposition 49 when he writes
1. It teaches that we act only by God’s will, and that we share in the divine nature, and all the more as our actions become more perfect and as we understand God more and more.Spinoza seems to suggest in this section that improving one's understanding of these influences can lead to less error and better choices and the ethical advantages he lists at the end of part II. While deterministic, Spinoza's philosophy allows for the possibility of reform through enhanced knowledge and rationality. He seems to be saying we would not act so badly if we all knew better.
It reminds me of Socrates conveying they idea that if one truly knows what is good, one will act accordingly, as no one willingly chooses to do wrong if they understand what is right.
Thomas replied to my question: >So what is an idea? It's the conceptual expression of the essence of something that exists.<
This definition seems circular because a "concept" would be synonymous with an "idea", and "conceptual" would mean ideational.
Or, what is the difference between a concept and an idea?
David wrote: "While deterministic, Spinoza's philosophy allows for the possibility of reform through enhanced knowledge and rationality."
I'm not sure how helpful the use of the category of "determinism" – which according the Oxford English Dictionary is not attested before 1846 – might be. Present-day debate seems to agree that the historical method should make an effort to describe the object of its investigation using categories contemporary to the object itself.
For instance, the past twenty years of research show significant agreement on the fact that "Gnosticism" – non only the term, but the 'historical' phenomenon as well – never existed, and "Orphism" is currently being shown the door too.
Even supposing that Spinoza's thought could be said to be deterministic, this would require an ad-hoc definition of the term – scores of such definitions already exist, one for each supposedly deterministic thinker – and still come at the price of squeezing someone's thought into categories they probably never used and didn't know of.
I'm not sure how helpful the use of the category of "determinism" – which according the Oxford English Dictionary is not attested before 1846 – might be. Present-day debate seems to agree that the historical method should make an effort to describe the object of its investigation using categories contemporary to the object itself.
For instance, the past twenty years of research show significant agreement on the fact that "Gnosticism" – non only the term, but the 'historical' phenomenon as well – never existed, and "Orphism" is currently being shown the door too.
Even supposing that Spinoza's thought could be said to be deterministic, this would require an ad-hoc definition of the term – scores of such definitions already exist, one for each supposedly deterministic thinker – and still come at the price of squeezing someone's thought into categories they probably never used and didn't know of.
David wrote: "It reminds me of Socrates conveying they idea that if one truly knows what is good, one will act accordingly, as no one willingly chooses to do wrong if they understand what is right..."There is much in the Ethics that reminds me of Plato. Spinoza's rationalism is very much like Socrates'. It's aspirational - happiness lies in the pursuit of knowledge, and the closer we come to perfect knowledge the closer we come to the infinite.
With Plato this pursuit always ends in aporia, and with good reason, because the finite can never touch the infinite. The cave dwellers in the Republic catch a glimpse of the infinite, but it blinds them and they must return to the cave. I'm not sure that Spinoza acknowledges this problem; there is something mysterious about this "mode" business, premised on the ontological argument, that strikes me as suspicious. But I digress...
Spinoza is so certain of the virtue of pure reason that he eliminates volition altogether and replaces it with judgement. Proposition 48 takes Socrates' suggestion that we would obviously choose the good if we knew it, and eliminates the choice. The human mind only says yes or no. This strikes me as idealistic in a way that surpasses even Socrates, and I'm not sure it's such a good move. Doesn't the human mind have to *choose* rational knowledge over perceptions and imagination?
Sam wrote: "Thomas replied to my question: >So what is an idea? It's the conceptual expression of the essence of something that exists.<
This definition seems circular because a "concept" would be synonymous ..."
Yes -- names of things are a problem for Spinoza. He thinks universals (like names) are a source of confusion, but there's no way out of using language. The closest equivalent that I can think of for Spinoza's "idea" is "explanation." Everything for Spinoza begins in God/Substance and is founded upon it, and there are two ways in which these foundations are built upon: First, in the physical world, they are built by causation -- God causes one thing and that causes another, and a chain of events unfolds in accordance with the laws of causality. The other way is mental. Replace the causality of the physical world with reason. God is the premise of all that can be truly conceived, and every rational argument is built upon that premise and unfolds in accordance with the laws of reason. "Ideas" are the explanations of these arguments.
The Introduction in my copy says:13. Idea (idea) This is an extremely important term in Spinoza’s philosophy. It is not usually equivalent to the English ‘idea,’ when the latter is synonymous with ‘notion’ or ‘image.’ In fact, Spinoza warns us not to construe ‘idea’ as signifying a pictorial representation of a thing, a “dumb picture on a tablet.” An idea, for Spinoza is an act of thought; it is almost a transitive verb having an object, its ideate (‘ideatum’), i.e. ‘that which is idea-ed.’ Spinoza does in fact use ‘objectum’ (‘object’) and ‘ideatum’ (‘ideate’) as alternative expressions. In many contexts the term ‘idea’ has the meaning of judgment, or assertion (Pr. 48-49, II). Accordingly, ‘idea’ is for Spinoza closer in signification to the term ‘proposition’ than to such terms as ‘concept’ or ‘notion.’ Ideas then will be true or false.I also found this statement in the introduction interesting,
Clear and distinct ideas, however, cannot be doubted; and that is why Spinoza begins his Ethics by laying down such ideas as definitions and axioms. Indeed, for Spinoza doubt is impossible. Spinoza’s method then is his philosophy.
Spinoza, Baruch. Ethics: with The Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters (Hackett Classics) (p. 8). Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.
David wrote: "I also found this statement in the introduction interesting,Clear and distinct ideas, however, cannot be doubted; and that is why Spinoza begins his Ethics by laying down such ideas as definitions and axioms. Indeed, for Spinoza doubt is impossible. Spinoza’s method then is his philosophy."
Spinoza has a penchant for the "self-evident," which is interesting considering how careful and methodical he is to argue from first principles only:
2P21: For the idea of the mind, that is, the idea of the idea, is nothing but the form of the idea insofar as this is considered as a mode of thinking without relation to the object. For as soon as someone knows something, he thereby knows that he knows it, and at the same time knows that he knows, and so on, to infinity. But more on these matters later.
This sounds like Meno discovering the square on the hypotenuse. In a flash of insight, he discovers something so self-evident that he must have already known it; it is a logical necessity. There can be no doubt about the truth he has realized.
Later, at P43, Spinoza claims that truth is its own standard.
And I ask, who can know that he understands some thing unless he first understands it? That is, who can know that he is certain about some thing unless he is first certain about it? What can there be which is clearer and more certain than a true idea, to serve as a standard of truth? As the light makes itself and the darkness plain, so truth is the standard both of itself and of the false.
Spinoza must not have been an easy person to argue with.
Thomas wrote: "Spinoza must not have been an easy person to argue with."That fact probably contributed to the extra animosity he received.
But the concept of self-evident can be subjective and contentious, particularly on this Fourth of July weekend. The notions of equality — that all individuals are created equal — and rights — that individuals are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, including Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness — appear more controversial than their assertion as self-evident truths might suggest.
Spinoza circumstantiates his statements, including those regarding self-evidence and truth; they are never less than perfectly integrated in a complex train of thoughts. His use of axioms, as noted before, is in line with the tradition of western thought (which includes hard sciences). When his statements could be perceived as hurried, he is often implicitly referring to results or ideas found and discussed in notable works of his predecessors, especially Descartes.
Some comments in this discussion happen to mix Spinoza's thought with that of his interpreters. More in general, although we are all entitled to forming an opinion – something we can't even prevent – it could be pointed out that some opinions are worth less than others, and that some are worthless when based on false assumptions, misunderstandings and/or incomplete information.
Considering that Spinoza's Ethics is the result of twelve years of dedicated work, of innumerable discussions with contemporary intellectuals, of a whole life devoted to the study of philosophy and of the works of his predecessors by one of the most influential thinkers in history, we have some good reasons to try and adopt an equally inquisitive and humble approach, possibly avoiding premature judgements. After all we've read what?, one-hundred pages of Spinoza in the little time we have left between office, family and 4th of July celebrations?
Some comments in this discussion happen to mix Spinoza's thought with that of his interpreters. More in general, although we are all entitled to forming an opinion – something we can't even prevent – it could be pointed out that some opinions are worth less than others, and that some are worthless when based on false assumptions, misunderstandings and/or incomplete information.
Considering that Spinoza's Ethics is the result of twelve years of dedicated work, of innumerable discussions with contemporary intellectuals, of a whole life devoted to the study of philosophy and of the works of his predecessors by one of the most influential thinkers in history, we have some good reasons to try and adopt an equally inquisitive and humble approach, possibly avoiding premature judgements. After all we've read what?, one-hundred pages of Spinoza in the little time we have left between office, family and 4th of July celebrations?
Fed wrote: "Spinoza circumstantiates his statements, including those regarding self-evidence and truth; they are never less than perfectly integrated in a complex train of thoughts. His use of axioms, as noted..."Excellent points about the depth and rigor of Spinoza's work; his dedication and the intellectual context in which he worked certainly deserve our respect. A reminder to value informed opinions and avoid premature judgments is also well taken.
I would also emphasize that criticism of one aspect does not necessitate dismissing the entire work as if it were a collapsed house of cards. It simply means we can take away some aspects, reserve judgment on others, and are free to continue embracing and challenging our doubts on the rest.
As we converse with Spinoza's work through active reading, we may annotate our thoughts in the margins as we journey toward understanding the text. These notes often find their way into our comments here. These collective thoughts may include critical perspectives learned from others, misunderstandings that are uncorrectable if left unsaid, and represent varying degrees questions and probable opinion; all of which warrant equatable consideration and response.
Fed wrote: "Spinoza circumstantiates his statements, including those regarding self-evidence and truth; they are never less than perfectly integrated in a complex train of thoughts. His use of axioms, as noted..."Fed wrote: "Spinoza circumstantiates his statements, including those regarding self-evidence and truth; they are never less than perfectly integrated in a complex train of thoughts. His use of axioms, as noted..."
I think we're perfectly entitled to question Spinoza's definitions as well as his train of thoughts. Admittedly, his train of thought is generally quite sound. His definitions, however, are far from bullet proof, starting with the notion that anything can cause itself to exist. What is self-evident to Spinoza sounds downright mystical to me. There's nothing wrong with that, and I'm willing to accept it to see where the argument goes, but so far I don't think Spinoza is as unassailable as you make him sound.
Some comments in this discussion happen to mix Spinoza's thought with that of his interpreters. More in general, although we are all entitled to forming an opinion – something we can't even prevent – it could be pointed out that some opinions are worth less than others...
The best remedy for this is to stick to the text of the Ethics. That's generally how we like to proceed anyway. Making your own argument doesn't mean ignoring other information and opinions that you've digested, but it does mean that you can make the argument from the text at hand without those opinions for support. The work can sustain itself on its own, so quoting liberally from the work itself is always helpful.
David wrote: "As we converse with Spinoza's work through active reading, we may annotate our thoughts in the margins..."
Thank you for sharing, David. I totally agree, indeed:
I'm currently reading about humanist Lorenzo Valla and the art of the «disputatio», which is also a mindset: the dialogic form becomes a «habitus», literary and social, and the standard for all exchanges of ideas, eventually shaping education (teaching and learning) as well. Humanists acquired wisdom through conversation; even the time they spent in the solitude of their study-room was time spent in conversation: with the past (studying and commenting ancient texts), with the present (writing letters and dialogues), with the future (most humanists had a vision, had social and political objectives). The dialogical-rhetorical mentality was characterised by: anti-dogmatism (many opinions are better than one); antagonism (truth is decided in and by the public forum; intellectual antagonism doesn't exclude personal friendship); tolerance of ambiguity (which had to do both with subtlety and refinement of thought on one hand, and social/political requirements on the other).
I remember reading about Talmudical hermeneutics and looking at examples of manuscript and early-print annotated Jewish bibles. In these editions, spanning several centuries, the standard layout of the page was: one single verse of the Bible (in large print, covering 20% of page area), an early commentary of the verse (in fine print, surrounding the bible verse and covering some 30% of the page), the author's commentary of the commentary (in very fine print, covering the rest of the page). Medieval and Renaissance commentaries (on christian or classic authors) generally show something similar: the commentary is much longer than the commented text. It's more or less the same with present-day critical editions of early texts.
What I'm trying to say is: the western tradition is deeply rooted in the analytical approach. Before we can afford synthesis, we have to carry out sufficient analysis, which means delving deep into the text and the ideas. Generally, the first result of this operation is the proliferation of material: we create indexes and vocabularies, we map ideas by linking different parts of the text to each other, we establish connections with other works by the same author and with those of other authors; we try to clarify by comparison and discussion... Years later, we might be in the condition of expressing an informed opinion. [Ha!]
The higher the complexity of the text, the stronger we are tempted to find something clear and simple we can hold on to, as soon as possible. We dislike doubt and uncertainty. Yet, we might be called to embracing and even fostering uncertainty for some time, giving the author space to express himself/herself and making the effort to look at things through the author's own lens and vocabulary. Thomas also spoke about this earlier in this discussion, and I quite liked it: reading through the first time to familiarise with the general ideas and trajectories, coming back to the details later, re-reading in future and adding related and secondary literature...
Machiavelli describes coming back home at evening, undressing of the dusty "work/public clothes" worn during the day, and getting ready for a night of classical studies. He's speaking of the mind – of the fresh, focused, dialogic approach needed.
Thank you for sharing, David. I totally agree, indeed:
I'm currently reading about humanist Lorenzo Valla and the art of the «disputatio», which is also a mindset: the dialogic form becomes a «habitus», literary and social, and the standard for all exchanges of ideas, eventually shaping education (teaching and learning) as well. Humanists acquired wisdom through conversation; even the time they spent in the solitude of their study-room was time spent in conversation: with the past (studying and commenting ancient texts), with the present (writing letters and dialogues), with the future (most humanists had a vision, had social and political objectives). The dialogical-rhetorical mentality was characterised by: anti-dogmatism (many opinions are better than one); antagonism (truth is decided in and by the public forum; intellectual antagonism doesn't exclude personal friendship); tolerance of ambiguity (which had to do both with subtlety and refinement of thought on one hand, and social/political requirements on the other).
I remember reading about Talmudical hermeneutics and looking at examples of manuscript and early-print annotated Jewish bibles. In these editions, spanning several centuries, the standard layout of the page was: one single verse of the Bible (in large print, covering 20% of page area), an early commentary of the verse (in fine print, surrounding the bible verse and covering some 30% of the page), the author's commentary of the commentary (in very fine print, covering the rest of the page). Medieval and Renaissance commentaries (on christian or classic authors) generally show something similar: the commentary is much longer than the commented text. It's more or less the same with present-day critical editions of early texts.
What I'm trying to say is: the western tradition is deeply rooted in the analytical approach. Before we can afford synthesis, we have to carry out sufficient analysis, which means delving deep into the text and the ideas. Generally, the first result of this operation is the proliferation of material: we create indexes and vocabularies, we map ideas by linking different parts of the text to each other, we establish connections with other works by the same author and with those of other authors; we try to clarify by comparison and discussion... Years later, we might be in the condition of expressing an informed opinion. [Ha!]
The higher the complexity of the text, the stronger we are tempted to find something clear and simple we can hold on to, as soon as possible. We dislike doubt and uncertainty. Yet, we might be called to embracing and even fostering uncertainty for some time, giving the author space to express himself/herself and making the effort to look at things through the author's own lens and vocabulary. Thomas also spoke about this earlier in this discussion, and I quite liked it: reading through the first time to familiarise with the general ideas and trajectories, coming back to the details later, re-reading in future and adding related and secondary literature...
Machiavelli describes coming back home at evening, undressing of the dusty "work/public clothes" worn during the day, and getting ready for a night of classical studies. He's speaking of the mind – of the fresh, focused, dialogic approach needed.
David wrote: "Thomas wrote: "Spinoza must not have been an easy person to argue with."That fact probably contributed to the extra animosity he received.
But the concept of self-evident can be subjective and ..."
How does Spinoza handle subjectivity? He says in P11C that the human mind is "part of the intellect of God." He then qualifies this in a telling way: he says that when the human mind perceives this or that, it is God that has this or that idea, insofar as "he constitutes the essence of the human mind." Does the subjective even exist for Spinoza? Again, it appears to me that the "free" subject must be an illusion. There is no subject, only God/Stuff, which has a blurry reflection in the human mind. This is a highly idealistic position in which a great many things should be self-evident since nothing is contingent and everything is determined.
Thomas wrote: "How does Spinoza handle subjectivity?"It seems like Spinoza is more concerned with the essence of the human mind more than its differing individual modes. I think he touches on either subjectivity or fallible objectivity when he writes:
PROPOSITION 41 Knowledge of the first kind is the only cause of falsity; knowledge of the second and third kind is necessarily true. Proof In the preceding Scholium we asserted that all those ideas which are inadequate and confused belong to the first kind of knowledge; and thus (Pr.35,II) this knowledge is the only cause of falsity. Further, we asserted that to knowledge of the second and third kind there belong those ideas which are adequate. Therefore (Pr.34,II) this knowledge is necessarily true.It seems these three types are:
First kind, or Imagination: This is more subjective as it involves sensory experiences and imagination, which can be inadequate and confused, leading to errors. This seems to be a criticism of inductive reasoning.I am not sure I am right in this, but I am tempted to call the third kind of knowledge a priori and it reminds me of Meno when he asks Socrates if he can prove the truth of his claim that "all learning is recollection". Socrates responds by calling over an enslaved boy and, after establishing that he has had no mathematical training, gives him a geometry problem. With guidance, in the form of questions, the boy is able to solve the problem.
Second kind or Reason: This is more objective as it involves understanding through logical deduction and common notions. The soundness of valid arguments (if the premises are true) is the source of Spinoza's certainty.
Third kind or Intuitive knowledge: This is also objective, as it involves direct and immediate understanding of the essence of things.
David wrote: "Third kind or Intuitive knowledge: This is also objective, as it involves direct and immediate understanding of the essence of things.I am not sure I am right in this, but I am tempted to call the third kind of knowledge a priori and it reminds me of Meno when he asks Socrates if he can prove the truth of his claim that "all learning is recollection""
It certainly sounds a priori -- we have knowledge of these things because they're necessary and follow from the nature of God's infinite essence. (Though there is that nagging problem of how God, as infinite Oneness, expresses itself in a finite mode, i.e. how eternity can be divided into finite segments, etc. This is a problem Plato has as well, though he couches it in terms of Being (eternal Forms) and Becoming (temporal existence.)
In any case, these ideas seem to be immediate, since they proceed directly from adequate ideas about the formal essence of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. (P40)
I find it interesting that the human mind has this kind of knowledge, but it does not know itself: "the human mind does not know itself, except insofar as it perceives the ideas of the affections of the body." (P23). The human mind is only capable of understanding ideas. It can perceive affections of the body, but it can only make sense of them via ideas of those affections. Taken one step further, it can only make sense of the mind via the idea of the mind. (P21) And where does that idea reside?
Thomas wrote: "Taken one step further, it can only make sense of the mind via the idea of the mind. (P21) And where does that idea reside?"I think from P21 ideas are linked to other ideas in the mind. Does this allow the mind to be self-aware and reflect upon itself?
Interesting thought! For Spinoza the human mind does not seem to be a thing, it's a network of ideas. These ideas must relate to each other somehow, since they are ideas of parts of the human body; presumably these ideas fit together in a way similar to way the body is organized. Perhaps there is a part of the body that is responsible for consciousness, for which in turn there is a parallel idea in the mind that recognizes the mind as the whole collection of ideas as a single network and can reflect on itself. But would that require a part of the mind to be outside itself to observe the whole objectively?
Though this erudite discussion fascinates me, it does not lead me to a sufficient understanding of Spinoza to participate. I think it requires a background in philosophy, especially metaphysics. I found Whitehead to be a more accessible approach to metaphysics, but then I had more guidance from a philosophy professor.I would be interested to know just how Spinoza deviated from the traditions of Judaism enough to be "excommunicated," even though that may be "self-evident" to some.
The introduction of my edition tells of the events of Spinoza's excommunication, but they are tough to coherently condense here.Spinoza's family were originally Jews who had been forcibly converted to Christianity in Portugal and later reconverted to Judaism in Amsterdam. This background influenced Spinoza's thinking and may have made his break with traditional Jewish beliefs and practices more pronounced.
Spinoza denied the divinity of Scripture, the election of Israel, and the popular ideas about the Hereafter.
Spinoza was influenced by free-thinking circle within the Sephardic community that promoted a more philosophical, naturalistic conception of God and religion.
His studies of medieval Jewish philosophers and exposure to Cartesian philosophy led to significant philosophical doubts.
Spinoza's actions diverged from orthodox Jewish practices, which was a major issue for the religious authorities.
His association with other controversial figure, like a Dr. Juan de Prado, who held radical views, which also contributed to his troubles with the Jewish religious establishment.
David wrote: "Spinoza denied the divinity of Scripture..."
Chapters VII and XII of the "Theological-Political Treatise" are devoted to defining and describing the divinity of Scripture.
«For as we have said, this does not take anything at all away from the divinity of the Scripture. Scripture would be equally divine even if it were written in other words or another language.» — Curley edition: XII, [33]
«Nam hoc, ut diximus, nihil Scripturæ divinitati detrahit; nam Scriptura æque divina esset, ersi aliis verbis aut alia lingua scripta fuisset.»
Chapters VII and XII of the "Theological-Political Treatise" are devoted to defining and describing the divinity of Scripture.
«For as we have said, this does not take anything at all away from the divinity of the Scripture. Scripture would be equally divine even if it were written in other words or another language.» — Curley edition: XII, [33]
«Nam hoc, ut diximus, nihil Scripturæ divinitati detrahit; nam Scriptura æque divina esset, ersi aliis verbis aut alia lingua scripta fuisset.»
What is the meaning of "divine?" Does it mean "written by god"? or "inspired" by God? The Torah is self-evidently not written by god since God is a character in the narrative.Fed, did you mean that that is a point where Spinoza differed from Jewish tradition?
Sam wrote: "The Torah is self-evidently not written by god since God is a character in the narrative."Love the thought, but maybe God wrote it in the third person omniscient 😉
To respond more seriously, Spinoza did not see the Bible as a direct revelation of divine truth in the philosophical sense. Instead, he viewed it as valuable for its moral teachings and its role in guiding people to live virtuous lives. He stressed the importance of understanding the historical and cultural context in which the biblical texts were written and believed that many of the stories and laws in the Bible were specific to the circumstances of the ancient Israelites.
This will be a non-sequitur to the discussion thread here, but in my convoluted way of concatenating thoughts and throwing them against each other, I am daring to insert into the conversation: https://bigthink.com/starts-with-a-ba...
Sam wrote: "What is the meaning of "divine?..."
At some point in the extensive discussions of, among other related subjects, the role of the apostles and evangelists, of Christ and the Holy Spirit, and the relationship between New and Old Testament, Spinoza summarises:
«For these three reasons, then, Scripture is called the word of God: because it teaches the true religion, whose eternal author is God; because it relates predictions of future things as God's decrees; and, finally, because those who were really its authors mostly taught, not by the common natural light, but by a certain special light, and introduced God as speaking these things.» (Theological-Political Treatise, XII [22], Curley edition)
Sam, if you have an interest in Spinoza's opinion you might want to read it in its extended, original form through the primary sources. The Theological-Political Treatise is very approachable; for a 'tasting', you could try Chapter VII and XII quoted above in this discussion, or Chapter XI on whether the apostles wrote their Epistles as prophets or as sages.
At some point in the extensive discussions of, among other related subjects, the role of the apostles and evangelists, of Christ and the Holy Spirit, and the relationship between New and Old Testament, Spinoza summarises:
«For these three reasons, then, Scripture is called the word of God: because it teaches the true religion, whose eternal author is God; because it relates predictions of future things as God's decrees; and, finally, because those who were really its authors mostly taught, not by the common natural light, but by a certain special light, and introduced God as speaking these things.» (Theological-Political Treatise, XII [22], Curley edition)
Sam, if you have an interest in Spinoza's opinion you might want to read it in its extended, original form through the primary sources. The Theological-Political Treatise is very approachable; for a 'tasting', you could try Chapter VII and XII quoted above in this discussion, or Chapter XI on whether the apostles wrote their Epistles as prophets or as sages.
How can he be so sure that his pure rational ideas -- expressed without words or images I guess -- agree with the extensible world?
The ethical implications start to show toward the end of Part Two when Spinoza's discusses the will. Free will does not exist; only the perception of free will. In the mind there is only judgement, affirmation or negation. How does this sit with you? Isn't it a little offensive to suggest that free will doesn't exist? First it sounds like human beings are automatons; without free will all human actions are determined by the circumstances that follow the laws of physical causation and intellectual reason. These laws and rules are finite expressions of the infinite and are purely necessary. There are no exceptions. Everything is as it is and it could be no different.
To me it also suggests that people are not then individuals. How can one be a "self" without the power to determine oneself? Or is the self for Spinoza merely a product of the imagination?
Thanks for hanging in there with this!