Classics and the Western Canon discussion
Arendt, The Human Condition
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Chapter VI: §40 - End, and the book as a whole
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The discussion around mathematics to me was interesting. There are two different high level schools of thought in Philosophy of Mathematics, one being Mathematical Realism and the other Mathematical Anti-realism. Mathematical Realism hold that mathematical entities exist independently of the human mind and are thus discovered by mathematicians. Whereas Mathematical Anti-realistic hold that mathematical statements have truth-values, but that they do not corresponding to a special realm entities, to an anti-realist mathematics is invented.
Definitely an interesting discussion, I agree. Arendt gives Descartes so much power though, and she seems thoroughly convinced that Cartesian doubt has made it impossible for the human mind to grasp an independently existing reality. That reality includes the mathematical structure of the universe. So Mathematical realism is out. On the other hand, it sounds like mathematical anti-realism doesn't rely on existing sense reality, and can even contradict it, but it can be perfectly true from a purely logical point of view. So what is true makes no sense to us. (She uses the example of non-Euclidean geometry as used by Einstein to frame his theory of general relativity.) And this non-sensical truth, she argues, is accepted because common sense has lost its value.
43. The Defeat of Homo Faber and the Principle of HappinessIn which Homo Faber, the instrument maker and utilitarian, is changed by the concept of process. The end products of homo faber lose value in commercialization -- exchange rates are relative, and products (like instruments) are merely the means for creating more products for consumption. Homo Faber has no inherent telos, or purpose, and is unable to build a lasting and stable world. What becomes significant at this point is the process of making, not the result. As the cliche goes, it's the journey, not the destination. "Happiness" is the primary motivation. But what is this "happiness" and how is it determined?
Whatever happiness is, it is a private experience; in fact, what is hidden behind the "greatest happiness principle" is egoism. Arendt links this egoism with "world alienation" and the notion that life itself is the highest good for individuals. An endless, meaningless theory of human evolution takes over the notion of a divine watchmaker who provides man with a purpose. The biological life process, life itself, is of paramount importance at this point.
44, Life as the Highest GoodSo it turns out that the notion of life as the highest good coincides with the Christian holding that individual human life is sacred and the human soul is immortal. This message of immortality is "disastrous for the esteem and the diginity of politics." She notes that this is the message of Christianity, not that of Jesus, who was actively political. In any case, the world is out, the life of the individual is in. (The "world" is for Arendt what is made by homo faber -- the state, the marketplace, social institutions, etc., and not nature nor what is given to human beings upon their birth.) The lives of individual people, and the biological life process itself, acquires the priority of a "self-evident truth." The implication is that before this, individual lives and human life process was subordinated to worldly power, to politics and the state. (Could this explain why Socrates accepted his fate so willingly in the Apology?)
45. The Victory of the Animal Laborans
Modern man seems to have gained something with faith in an immortal soul, but the secularization of modern society, instigated by Descartes and promulgated by a mechanistic, systematic, process-oriented approach to nature, leads to the loss of this immortality. What remains is the closed inwardness of introspection plus appetites, desires, and the biological life process. Thinking becomes a mechanical process of the brain easily replicated by machines. In place of acting (in Arendt's technical sense) modernity has the labor process, a kind of automatic functioning characterized by passivity. The consequence of this is a loss of human meaning, which for Arendt is a function of acting and speaking. Scientists act and speak, but they act "into nature" and not into the web of human relationship that provides meaning.
Some years ago, I have a conversation which was turning around Arendt’s works: whether the ‘right’ way of using history is to assemble a narrative from the past events or to test ideas in historical context. Back then, I thought Arendt was just a pretext to the conversation. Now it seems she used history as a source of examples for her narratives, not as a testing place for her ideas. Arendt raised relevant philosophical questions, but her freedom with historical references makes me very suspicious about her reliability.
Alexey wrote: "...but her freedom with historical references makes me very suspicious about her reliability...."What are you saying, Alexey? I guess I'm asking, try telling me what you just said another way that I might be more likely to understand. An example? A ,,,,?
Lily wrote: "Alexey wrote: "...but her freedom with historical references makes me very suspicious about her reliability...."What are you saying, Alexey? I guess I'm asking, try telling me what you just said ..."
Thank you, I'll try to be less clumsy.
Imho, Arendt used history to pick facts, theories, and works that are consistent with her agenda and way of thinking, ignoring contrafactual. I do not think that the cause is her laziness, but the approach that history is the source of proving and strengthening the position rather than testing it - this approach is inherently flawed.
We suppose A caused B. We may look for every instant of B in the history, and check if it preceding by some A. Unless our theory is out of touch with reality, we can easily find some A in every instance of B. Alternatively, we can look for A, and check if it caused B. In this case, we must find that sometimes it caused B, sometimes not. So, we would have to explain this and to test our explanation. So the knowledge is growing.
The way Arendt uses history reminds me of the way Kierkegaard speaks about the historical Jesus: the story matters more than the historical fact. There is very little concrete historical evidence for the existence of Jesus, but his story, written by others many years after Jesus' death, remains incredibly powerful thousands of years later. And of course there are parts of his story that defy logic. That doesn't matter. Even if there were some definitive proof that the historical Jesus did not exist, his story and the powerful influence of that story would continue. Arendt talks about this in section 25 on the "Web of Relationships and the Enacted Stories." It certainly is an old, non-modern, non-scientific approach. She treats history as a story rather than a chain of materially or logically connected events. The "Great Man" theory is a myth because individual agents cannot be isolated from the web of human relationships, and ultimately this web is what really matters and what gives human life meaning. (And the ways in which this web have broken down seems to be the impetus for her writing The Human Condition.)
40. Thought and the Modern World View
Does the history of science make us more certain or more suspicious of current theories? We know in the past that people felt certain about their scientific beliefs, and their ideas were eventually disproven and replaced by new ideas. Shouldn't that make us feel uncertain? Is that what happened to Descartes and led him to start with radical doubt?
Is pure mathematics a "prison" we have created for ourselves or simply the language of the universe? Is it possible that what we understand with mathematics is only part of what we are able to perceive, and relying exclusively on mathematics restricts us from perceiving things that aren't "thinkable" in terms of pure reasoning?
41 The Reversal of Contemplation and Action
She maintains that modern technology has its origins in the search for knowledge for its own sake. The watch, for example, was created as an instrument to be used in scientific experiments, not to tell people the time of day. In the modern age, truth can only be determined via instruments; truth is not something that can be simply beheld, so the search is on for better and better instruments, which yield information and truths that defy common sense.
On the other hand, "contemplation" reveals a truth that is beyond words and thinking. But the modern age has discarded contemplation, or at least subverted it to thinking for the sake of doing. So the implication is that there is some aspect of what we are doing that we don't entirely understand. We can explain it in terms of mathematics and science, but we have not properly "contemplated" what we are doing. Say for example, genetic modification. We know that certain pieces of the genome are associated with certain traits, and we can manipulate DNA to change the genetic makeup of living things, but are we really *thinking* what we are doing when we do this?
42 The reversal within the Vita Activa and the Victory of Homo Faber
I found it hard to follow Arendt's train of thought here, but it might be something like: Our conviction that we can only understand things we *make* ourselves leads us to think about how things come to be and a concern with process. This extends to the making of politics. Just as Descartes looked to himself for his ultimate starting point, so Hobbes also looks into himself and declares that all men are similarly made in terms of thoughts and passions. The rules and standards for building the State are within each person. The State can be built with this introspective knowledge in the same mechanistic way that science applies mathematics.
Hobbes' rationalization for the State is built on the scientific production model and rejects reality as given. Platonic "eidos" and the wonder of thaumazein, examples of vita contemplativa, are no longer of any significance to homo faber, though he does occasionally refuse to work and calls this contemplation.