Classics and the Western Canon discussion
This topic is about
Fear and Trembling
Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling
>
Problems 1 and 2
Thomas wrote: "On the other hand, does the ethical as a universal (in which God is not personal, but a law applicable to everyone) reduce all individuals to a collective herd?"Good question! Never thought about the problem in this angel, very interesting...
Thomas wrote: "In assuming the paradox of faith, the single individual is "utterly unable to make himself intelligible to anyone." Why is this, and why would anyone want to put himself in this position?"
I do not think that anybody want to put oneself in this position, it is more like necessity if you want to have relationship with God (it is a theological rabbit hole, I fear, this 'want' itself require a lot of theological stuff to explain why and who 'want' or can 'want')
Alexey wrote: "Thomas wrote: "In assuming the paradox of faith, the single individual is "utterly unable to make himself intelligible to anyone." Why is this, and why would anyone want to put himself in this position?""Well, this is it, isn't it? SK's Christianity is personal and subjective, and what is subjective can never be completely shared. You are alone in your faith. The experience can't be adequately described in words. SK has this problem. This has to conflict with the very idea of a congregation and shared faith and beliefs. I can't even see how SK and a church preacher could agree to much. We can share ethics but not faith.
Again, I've read the first part of this section, but not sure I have anything meaningful to contribute. I feel as though when I'm finished with the entire book, I'm going to have to flip back to page one and start again.When I got to this section:
...it is the particular individual who, after he has been subordinated as the particular to the universal, now through the universal becomes the individual who as the particular is superior to the universal, for the fact that the individual as the particular stands in absolute relation to the absolute
I couldn't get Groucho Marx's 'party of the first part' sketch out of my head
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G_Sy6...
On another note, in my used copy someone had underlined that same passage, with an arrow drawn to the margin, where he or she had written, 'god damn parallelism'. I don't know if that's meant as a sudden burst of insight or of frustration.
I think it's also interesting that, right before this verbally gymnastic passage, JdS himself quotes Boileau--'an idiot always finds another idiot who admires him.'
All in all though, I thought I followed along pretty well with his arguments in this first section, but just as a follower--I keep feeling as I'm reading all of this that I want to see where he's going with it all before commenting. That's kind of why I feel like I'll be wanting to turn around and go back to page one when I'm done. It'll be easier to understand his argument once I've read it all the way through.
Bryan "I couldn't get Groucho Marx's 'party of the first part' sketch out of my head"Or Who's on First!
Universal is at First
Particular is at Second
Infinitude is at Third
and Finitude is guarding home plate
Thomas wrote: "This section is full of philosophical jargon, so feel free to say "STOP!" and ask questions about what certain words mean: Immediate, mediation, the universal, etc. It sounds like a few of us have ..."Thomas, thank you for your excellent summary of these sections of Fear and Trembling.
I've been particularly focussed on "teleological suspension of the ethical," a key concept in SK's thinking. I found a YouTube short lecture that discusses the meaning and implications of it that I found very helpful. For those who are interested, here's a link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bByV9...
I suspect Gary's youtube video link will be more helpful than mine was, all things considered.
Thanks for the video, Gary.I was glad to see that my understanding of the passage dovetailed with his explanation of it.
I'm also glad you didn't rickroll us with the video.
I was thinking as I read this part about the Teleological Suspension of the Ethical, it kind of goes back to some of the things mentioned in the earlier threads about a universal ethical situation. It would seem the Kierkegaard (or Johann) agrees that there is.
Thomas wrote: “ … each individual person has her rightful place in the ethical, meaning she, like every individual, must follow the law of her community do what's right.” I don’t believe Kierkegaard ever describes the ethical as being determined by community. Instead he writes the ethical is common to all: ”The ethical as such is the universal, it applies to everyone.” This is consistent with long-held views in the West. Whether or not these universal ethics were instilled by God or through evolution was a controversy that grew out of Darwin’s work. Today we are suspicious about any claim to ethical universality. For my part, I believe there are certain universal norms that enable us to live in groups, but there are also norms that are more or less determined by time, place, and community. "Thou shalt not kill" is an example of the former, whereas "Thou shalt not lie" has be stretched today to mean different things to different groups ... the classic is Main Street vs Wall Street.
Other than Agamemnon actually sacrificing Iphigenia, while Abraham only went through the motions of preparing to kill Isaac, I am failing to understand SK's differentiation between them. It only makes sense to me that in actually fulfilling the command, Agamemnon was more faithful to his gods than Abraham was to his. They both resigned themselves to divine command; they both suffered anxiety over their decision.Is their motivation the difference? Agamemnon did it in a bargain with a divine for favorable winds, i.e., earthly personal gain; Abraham did it just because god told him to. Although they both earthly gains, Agamemnon got his winds and Abraham received Isaac a second time. What am I missing?
Being invited/commanded by God to move beyond the universal to something higher and to faith does not come easy. Silentio says it cannot be done without trial and personal dread, distress, and irrational embrace of the absurd. It's interesting that Silentio uses Mary as another example of someone who rose above the universal to the absolute and then again to the particular. In addition to the dread and distress of childbirth, Mary surrendered to the absurd, i.e. the paradox that she, a maiden, would give birth to God. This trial made her a woman of faith and great."She [Mary} has no need of worldly admiration, any more than Abraham has need of tears, for she was not a heroine, and he was not a hero, but both of them became greater than such, not at all because they were exempted from distress and torment and paradox, but they became great through them"
David wrote: "Other than Agamemnon actually sacrificing Iphigenia, while Abraham only went through the motions of preparing to kill Isaac, I am failing to understand SK's differentiation between them. It only ma..."The "tragic heroes" Agamemnon, Jephtah, and Brutus each murdered their own child in the interest of a greater (community) good. How is Abraham's non-murder of Issac all that different? Silentio writes that the tragic hero remains within the ethical by exchanging one telos for a higher one.
"The tragic hero still remains within the ethical. He lets one expression of the ethical find its telos in a higher expression of the ethical; the ethical relation between father and son, or daughter and father, reduces to a sentiment which has its dialectic in the idea of morality. Here there can be no question of the teleological suspension of the ethical."He seems to be saying that it is ethical to love one's child, but loving one's tribe or city is a higher ethical telos, therefore the tragic hero remains within the universal; " ... whereas the tragic hero is great by reason of his moral virtue, Abraham is great by reason of a personal virtue."
I'd like to register some confusion about this. In the case of the tragic hero it seems that the ethical obligation to the tribe/city is a higher telos than the ethical obligation to one's own child. Yet in the Preliminary Expectoration, Silentio writes about Abraham “ … to the son the father has the highest and most sacred obligation.” What's good for the goose ... ?Silentio says Abraham's test was fundamentally different from the tragic hero's because it was not for sake of tribe or city, but only for God's sake. Abraham's relationship with the deity is individual and private, and this relationship not mediated.
Moreover, "The tragic hero gives up the certain for the still more certain." But Abraham gives up the universal for something higher, for the absolute.
Silentio, speaking of Abraham's personal relationship with God says, “Such a relationship to the deity paganism did not know. The tragic hero does not enter into any private relationship with the deity, but for him the ethical is the divine, hence the paradox implied in his situation can be mediated in the universal.”
Hence, according to Kierkegaard, Abraham's test and faith are fundamentally different from Agamemnon's, Jephtah's, and Brutus', but similar to Mary's.
David wrote: "Is their motivation the difference? Agamemnon did it in a bargain with a divine for favorable winds, i.e., earthly personal gain; Abraham did it just because god told him to. Although they both earthly gains, Agamemnon got his winds and Abraham received Isaac a second time. What am I missing?"I thought the same thing as their motivations being the difference. However, I think the point that JdS was trying to get across is that Agamemnon sacrificed his daughter for the expected benefit (wind) to himself and his people, and sacrificing what you have for the good of others has to do with ethics (the proper rules for a society) as opposed to faith.
The difference between Agamemnon and Abraham being that God didn’t tell say to sacrifice Isaac in return for the fulfillment of the promise to be father of nations; he simply told him to sacrifice Isaac, period. Abraham’s faith lies in the anxiety of knowing that it was humanly impossible (i.e. absurd) for God to keep his promise to make Abraham the father of many nations if Abraham killed Isaac and had no other (legitimate) children. The fact that Abraham presumably knew it was absurd, but made the double-movement of resignation and faith is what JdS says makes him the true Father of Faith.
Most important seems to be that Agamemnon did it for his people and the finite world (ethics), whereas Abraham concerned himself with his inward relationship with God and the universal (true faith).
Gary wrote: "Silentio says Abraham's test was fundamentally different from the tragic hero's because it was not for sake of tribe or city, but only for God's sake. Abraham's relationship with the deity is individual and private, and this relationship not mediated."This notion could be challenged by stating both men had a personal relationship with a god that had public benefits? Didn't Agamemnon and Artemis have a personal relationship, albeit not a good one since Agamemnon killed one of Artemis' sacred deer? Artemis only asking for Agememnon's child to be sacrificed seems personal. Also Abraham's deed resulted in the very public founding of a nation.
Isn't SK just ranking consequences by subjective values?
High value: Son's and Daughters
Higher value: Divine intervention for a nation in time of war.
Highest value: Personal relationship with god.
Gary wrote: "I don’t believe Kierkegaard ever describes the ethical as being determined by community. Instead he writes the ethical is common to all: ”The ethical as such is the universal, it applies to everyone.” "I suspect that Kierkegaard's "ethical" has the root meaning from ethos (ἦθος) meaning custom or common usage. He doesn't mean that the ethical is universal in an absolute sense -- it doesn't transcend all communities -- but it is specific to the customs of a given group of people. He says "the ethical has within its own scope several gradations" before citing the examples that you mention @12, Agamemnon, Jephthah, and Brutus, where the ethical duties are to the Greeks, Israelites, and Romans.
David wrote: "Is their motivation the difference? Agamemnon did it in a bargain with a divine for favorable winds, i.e., earthly personal gain; Abraham did it just because god told him to. Although they both earthly gains, Agamemnon got his winds and Abraham received Isaac a second time. What am I missing? "Motivation is exactly the difference. Agamemnon's motive was to fulfill his duty as King. He must prosecute the war against Troy, but in order to do so he must sacrifice his daughter. He sacrifices Iphigeneia for the war, not because he loves Artemis. If this is a trial, then the choice is between his love for his people versus his love for Iphigeneia. He chooses his people.
Silentio maintains that Abraham's choice is qualitatively different: he must sacrifice what he loves most for the absolute, and the outcome doesn't matter. He would be justified by virtue of this absolute even if he didn't get Isaac back. On the other hand, if Agamemnon had not gotten the winds, the sacrifice of Iphigeneia would not have been justified because it was for the winds that she was killed.
Thomas wrote: "Motivation is exactly the difference. "OK, so the proper motivation is a key element, but apparently there is much more to it. SK mentions several times about the movements having to be made, properly. He writes this about the less than proper movements:
it would not be difficult for me to write a whole book if I were to go through all the various misunderstandings, the awkward postures, the slipshod movements I have encountered just in my modest practice.Where do all of these guidelines on distinguishing proper movements from improper movements come from? Who decides if they are proper or not?
When I think of the tragic hero's position, they are sacrificing something they love for a purpose--there is a reason, a logical reason, behind it. Even if we don't share their logic, we can see it. With Abraham, the purpose of Isaac had been to create a nation--sacrificing Isaac would be anti-purposeful.
David wrote: "Where do all of these guidelines on distinguishing proper movements from improper movements come from? Who decides if they are proper or not? "Another good question. I think what it ultimately comes down to authenticity. The movements of resignation and faith are singular, inward and isolated acts. There is no guide or law to deternine the correctness of one's faith; this is why Silentio says they are "above" the universal. No Sunday school teacher or "exegetical aid" can tell you if your act of faith is "proper" or not.
On a less ethereal plane, no one can tell you if you picked the right career or the right spouse either, at least if these things are self-defining movements of faith. Everyone has to judge the height of the tower for him or herself. Some set their sights too high, others too low, but it can never be a group decision.
(On a slightly unrelated note, I had to stop and wonder a bit if the tower parable that Silentio references has anything to do the Tower in "A Good Man is Hard to Find".)
Thomas wrote: There is no guide or law to deternine the correctness of one's faith; this is why Silentio says they are "above" the universal. No Sunday school teacher or "exegetical aid" can tell you if your act of faith is "proper" or not."And yet JS/SK claims he can write a whole book on improper movements and judges Agamemnon and Brutus' movements as improper and Abraham, and Mary's movements as proper.
I am reminded of these lines from Time Bandits (1981)
Randall: Look, do you want to be leader of this gang?
Strutter: No, we agreed: No leader!
Randall: Right. So shut up and do as I say.
The traditional rule for guiding one's faith is to consult the Bible, the teachings of the Apostles, the Church. That certainly would be my reaction if it occurred to me that God was telling me to do something ghastly. But Abraham had none of these, so it seems like he was in a different situation. And then, where do you get your faith in the Bible/Apostles/Church?
David wrote: "And yet JS/SK claims he can write a whole book on improper movements and judges Agamemnon and Brutus' movements as improper and Abraham, and Mary's movements as proper."Abraham's and Mary's movements are predicated on their absolute relationship to the absolute, which is what makes them "proper." The improper movements are mediated by the universal, i.e. they are guided and justified by a common standard of morality. (Which of course includes any Biblical or Church teaching.)
Movements of faith are just qualitatively different. They have no standards by which they can be objectively judged or understood. The only one who can understand a movement of faith is the one who makes it, and then he can't explain it.
David wrote: "And yet JS/SK claims he can write a whole book on improper movements and judges Agamemnon and Brutus' movements as improper and Abraham, and Mary's movements as proper...."Did JS actually call Agamemnon/ Brutus' movements "improper"? If he did, I missed it. I thought they were proper for the ethical realm, that's why they are tragic heroes, not religious (faith, resignation) heroes. That is, what they did was proper in the ethical realm, they concealed their task for a time, but eventually they know their peers would approve and admire them for it, silence is ultimately not required, their child-sacrifice was appreciated in their community.
Abraham intended to sacrifice (or murder) Isaac for himself, and for his God, but not for his community -- which is basically what Gary said -- it's not for the greater social good (whatever good means in that particular community in that particular time.) Abraham did it as an individual choosing to obey God, he didn't do it because that's the standard of behavior expected of him by his community.
I have real (cognitive, not existential) struggles with the term "movement," is he talking about the minute gestures, from how he mounted his donkey to how he remained silent to how readily he responded "here I am" etc etc, or is this "movement" in the "entelechia" sense?
This is partly influenced by the famous (notorious?) saying of "teleogical suspension," teleological as in telos, is he referring to Abraham (or Agamemnon, Danish Christians etc) moving towards their telos?
He also talked about dancers landing naturally vs wallflowers landing badly and with hesitation, is that part of that movement?
I agree with Thomas that the distinction is in the inwardness, in the psychology, in what they will, why they will, but it seems to me that those are the things not included in (physical) movements, they're invisible to us. Abraham binding Isaac out of terror of a sullen God would look exactly the same as Abraham binding Isaac out of trust in ultimate goodness of an incomprehensible God, which would look exactly the same as some Abraham who binds Isaac out of blind and absolute, unthinking obedience.
Thomas wrote: "Those who assert themselves as individuals "sin" against the ethical, and those who feel an urge to do so are in a state of temptation. (For those who read Beyond Good and Evil with us, does this sound like Nietzsche's "levelling"?)" I'm still chewing on Nietzsche's levelling, but, JS's (or SK's?) dismissive remarks about assistant professors and their lectern-triggered skepticism; as well as his head-scratching remark about mountains being sublime and not habitable for mermen... did remind me of Nietzsche (and his long legs.)
Thomas wrote: "If this is the case, SK says, then Abraham is a murderer. But of course he does not maintain this and claims instead that the single individual is higher than the universal." I want to challenge this reading. It seems to me that SK (or JS) is saying EITHER there is teleological suspension so that the single individual is actually, factually, naturally higher than the universal, OR there is no such suspension, so then we must condemn Abraham as a murderer. What you cannot have, what JS labors to exclude, is the middle ground.
Did he conclusively tell us it is in fact the proven case that teleological suspension is valid and that we ought not think of Abraham as a murderer? I thought he left it to readers to decide, to choose either TSoE is valid, or Abraham is gross. It seems he wants to force readers to exit the comfortable middle, where they pay lip service to Abraham as father of faith, where they blithely accept the predigested notion that (through the labors of Kant and Hegel etc) the religious is included in and entirely commensurable with the ethical.
I’ve been trying to puzzle out how the universal can be relative. Silentio writes that this is a paradox we can’t understand, but here are my thoughts about it anyway [my comments in the following are bracketed].“ … there is an absolute duty toward God; for in this relationship of duty the individual as an individual stands related absolutely to the absolute [an absolute duty toward God]. So when in this connection it is said that it is a duty to love God, something different is said from than in the foregoing [the duty toward God is not the same as the duty to love God?] ; for if this duty is absolute [the duty to love God ?] the ethical is reduced to a position of relativity.”So, if Abraham did not have an absolute duty toward God [and an absolute duty to love God? ] his transgression of the ethical norm against murder would be abhorrent. Faith would then be a temptation leading to an evil act and Abraham would be lost. But Abraham, as a knight of faith, moved toward the absolute, aka God, and in so doing would have murdered his own son as God commanded, which would have been a major transgression from the ethical, from the universal. In following God’s command Abraham rose above the universal for a moment in time, and then, having made absolute contact with the absolute, he returned to the universal.
My reading suggests that the relatively of the ethical, of the universal, is unique to the knight of faith in certain instances. Tragic heroes and even religious martyrs never reach this plane. No one other than the knight of faith can rise above the ethical, and only for moments.
Agree? Am I off base? Other perspectives?
For me problem 2 is summed as the difference between the tragic hero and the knight of faith. The tragic hero must give up there wish to fulfill there duty. The knight of faith must give up both there wish and duty in order to fulfill absolute duty. This is the difference between Agamemnon and Abraham. Abraham’s anxiety at his choice to complete the task or to refuse to comply with God's orders is what separates the knight of faith from the tragic hero.
Lia wrote: "I have real (cognitive, not existential) struggles with the term "movement," is he talking about the minute gestures, from how he mounted his donkey to how he remained silent to how readily he responded "here I am" etc etc, or is this "movement" in the "entelechia" sense?."I think the movement of faith is very similar (or perhaps the same) as what one does in making an unconditional commitment to someone or something. How this corresponds to dancing, I'm not sure, but maybe there is something in the leap that is intentional without being calculated. It requires effort and skill, but it is also inexplicable. One of the curious things about the movement of faith is that it is a movement, and not a state. It must be repeated.
Faith is exactly this paradox, that the single individual is higher that the universal, but in such a way, mind you, that the movement is repeated, so that after having been in the universal he now as the particular keeps to himself as higher than the universal.
Lia wrote: "Did he conclusively tell us it is in fact the proven case that teleological suspension is valid and that we ought not think of Abraham as a murderer? ."Yes. I think you're right that it is an either/or scenario, but Silentio states at the end of Problem One that in the story of Abraham there is in fact a teleological suspension of the ethical.
Isn't a suspension of the ethical a fancy way of saying actions normally considered unethical become ethical depending on values and conditions?For example, killing your son is usually considered unethical, but for anyone who values god above all else, killing your son by divine command becomes ethical, no suspension of the ethical is needed.
Closing a hatch on a sinking ship killing 3 to save hundreds. Pulling a switch causing a trolley to kill 1 instead of 3.
I feel this is not quite what SK is saying and I am still missing something.
David wrote: "Isn't a suspension of the ethical a fancy way of saying actions normally considered unethical become ethical depending on values and conditions?For example, killing your son is usually considered..."
I think it’s about ethics and faith being of different realms, according to SK. Ethics is what is arrived at through the use of human reason. Faith is the willing suspension of reason in favor of belief in something even if it is logically absurd.
The point not being the subjectivity of ethics, but rather that faith cannot be judged by ethics, because faith is not within the realm of reason with which ethics is concerned. Faith is believing in the Absurd, so it can’t be judged by human reason.
Lia wrote: "Abraham binding Isaac out of terror of a sullen God would look exactly the same as Abraham binding Isaac out of trust in ultimate goodness of an incomprehensible God, which would look exactly the same as some Abraham who binds Isaac out of blind and absolute, unthinking obedience.."This is an important point. Silentio addressed it a little bit in the Preface where the parson takes the sleepy follower to task for murdering his own son in imitation of Abraham, but he takes it up again in Problem 2. The psychology of the knight of faith is reflective and rife with anxiety. The Abraham who binds Isaac out of terror for himself or the Abraham who acts out of blind unthinking obedience are in states of unreflective immediacy. They're like children, or sleepy followers. I'm not sure they're even ethical. The ethical Abraham would rather kill himself than kill his son, which would make him a tragic hero, but not a knight of faith.
What seems to distinguish the knight of faith outwardly is anxiety, tension, pain, isolation, and unintelligibility. He also seems to be very vulnerable, always at risk, standing out like a prime target. The knight of faith "in the loneliness of the universe never hears any human voice but walks alone with his frightful responsibility." The guy on the corner with his "Repent! The End is Near" sign might be a close approximation.
RE Tom@32 -- thanks for addressing that bit, I'm still not sure why he focuses so much on movement if movement is the bits you can copy without repeating the essence, the crucial point, the "spirit," the inward stuff that makes Abraham significant. Receiving the Eucharist without the spirit is just mock cannibalism; Mulligan performing a mock mass at the parapet is mere celebration of narcissism, and not participation in a sacred ritual. Why this focus on movement then, if it can be repeated without the spirit and look just the same?
Or is fear and trembling itself part of the movement? (Which is inconvenient, because, as Roger points out, the Hebrew bible did not say he was in fact fearful and trembling ... though the angel did conclude he fears [but not love] God.)
I suspect, JS is meant to exemplify heroic failure, he's someone who admires Descartes, focuses on the outward movement, tries valiantly, and ultimately fails to find faith (but he's still heroic because unlike his peers, at least he knows himself enough to know he has no faith, like Socrates knows himself enough to realize he is not wise.)
David wrote: "For example, killing your son is usually considered unethical, but for anyone who values god above all else, killing your son by divine command becomes ethical, no suspension of the ethical is needed."I believe suspension of the ethical is absolutely required. We live within our ethical code, whether those ethics are universal or local. If we don't, we live an immoral life. The lone exception is God and faith.
The teleological suspension of the ethical seems to tell us that when God commands us to do something that violates our ethical code, then we ignore/suspend our ethics, because when commanded by God to do the unethical, it is no longer unethical to do it; instead to do so is to exceed the ethical. Is that the absurdity?
This sounds like an open-ended invitation to wreak havoc. I not only worry that someone with bad intentions will abuse this loophole to commit immoral, even heinous acts; I worry that someone with good intentions will, through his faith, commit immoral, even heinous acts.
Having faith that at the last minute God will stay your hand just like he stayed Abraham's sounds too convenient -- kind of like a deuce ex machina.
Silento or SK seem to assume this God is the kind God of Christianity. But what if God is closer to the God Lia describes (Eliot?). Aren't there examples aplenty of an angry, fickle, demanding, vengeful, and forgiving God venting his wrath in the OT?
Thou shalt not kill, except when God commands it. Actually it seems like Silento (SK?) is saying, yup, and it doesn't matter, faith is faith, which is kind of scary. Or better yet, the answer is found in the absurd.
How is a person, who has both faith and reason in his mind, to respond to this?
To my way of thinking, if you have a God, it is safer to have One who demands you live by the ethics He gave you than to have One who demands you violate them. Looks like Silento and Sk have thrown safety to the wind.
Looks like Silento and Sk have thrown safety to the wind.But isn't he trying to work this out the same way you've just stated? I think he recognizes the danger here, and the book is called Fear and Trembling--not Assurance and Confidence.
Plus, it seems to me that while Silentio admires Abraham, he's still looking at the fact that if there's no suspension of the ethical, than Abraham's a murderer. He's tried his best to intimate just how awful this state of faith is--it's like the office of President...just the fact that someone would want to live in the state of faith he describes ought to disqualify them from the opportunity. Silentio tells us he can't manage it, though evidently SK thought he could.
Bryan,Yes, SK thought he could. I see hand ringing but no discussion of protections against abuse.
I think what's missing here is a clear understanding that while the Knight of Faith might be doing God's work, he's still a murderer if he goes through with God's command. That's the protection.
In the spiritual world maybe he isn't a murder, maybe ethics don't apply there, but in the physical world they do apply, and there is no suspension of the ethical, so if this knight carried through with the deed, he would be a murderer. The problem is I don't think JS/SK gives us this option. My problem is with the suspension of the ethical.
Also . . .
Let's revisit Descartes. He worried about an evil demon (I think that's what he called it). If at the Knight of Faith's level there is only faith and no reason, then what's to stop an evil demon from disguising itself to fool you into thinking God is commanding you? Seems to me reason is needed to identify false gods.
Bryan "while Silentio admires Abraham, he's still looking at the fact that if there's no suspension of the ethical, than Abraham's a murderer..."Not really arguing against what you're saying, but I want to supplement this by pointing out Silentio admires Abraham in a certain demented sense, and "although Abraham arouses my admiration, he also appalls me."
It goes back to my (somewhat dubious) challenge to Thomas: the title of this section questions whether TSotE is a thing, and Thomas is right that JS explicitly states Abraham's story contains a TSotE, but does that mean JS had accepted, proven it is real or valid or "is there" in our world? Or is he simply saying this is how he interprets a piece of literature?
IF we accept there is a TSotE, then Abraham is not a murderer, but, JS admits he is himself not capable of faith, his admiration for Abraham is "demented" -- presumably outside reason. And he is appalled by Abraham, it seems the ethical has not been suspended for JS.
Xan Shadowflutter wrote: "Let's revisit Descartes. He worried about an evil demon (I think that's what he called it). If at the Knight of Faith's level there is only faith and no reason, then what's to stop an evil demon from disguising itself to fool you into thinking God is commanding you? Seems to me reason is needed to identify false gods..."Let's take this even further (JS/ SK are rolling in their graves): Kant actually used Abraham as an example, posits that reason informs Abraham he certainly ought not kill his son Isaac, but this voice which instructs him to kill Isaac is supposed to be God, but he can't be certain, it could be an evil demon. And so, Abraham ought to have disobeyed "God". That is, Kant ignored the turmoil and psychological aspect of the tale, and reduced it to a question of knowledge. (Which, as you suggested, is a standard Cartesian move.)
People say Kierkegaard is quarreling with Hegel (and he did namedrop Hegel frequently in this text), but why not Kant? (Universal is also a Kantian concept, no?) What if this piece is actually a challenge to Kant, not in the content of his "logic," but in his move to reduce the Abraham story into mere epistemology?
Xan Shadowflutter wrote: "Having faith that at the last minute God will stay your hand just like he stayed Abraham's sounds too convenient -- kind of like a deuce ex machina..."Right? I hope nobody told Jesus about Abraham, it would suck if he was expecting a repetition of the deuce ex machina while he's nailed to the cross, silently thinking "what's taking you so long, angel? I know my canon and I know how this story ends, so hurry up already?"
Xan Shadowflutter wrote: "Let's revisit Descartes. He worried about an evil demon (I think that's what he called it). If at the Knight of Faith's level there is only faith and no reason, then what's to stop an evil demon from disguising itself to fool you into thinking God is commanding you? Seems to me reason is needed to identify false gods."This strikes me as an important point. If a command from god to embrace the absurd means renouncing reason and transgressing the universal, you better be sure that the god giving the command is the "true" god." What with the multitude of "false gods," the knight of faith could easily screw this up. How can you tell that the god commanding you is true, especially as absurdity is part of the deal?
Lia wrote: "I have real (cognitive, not existential) struggles with the term "movement," is he talking about the minute gestures, from how he mounted his donkey to how he remained silent to how readily he responded "here I am" etc etc, or is this "movement" in the "entelechia" sense?""Movement" here is not physical. The way SK uses the word and the analogy of the dance are metaphors for change — change leading toward or away from some state of being. I see this movement/change as more general than entelechy.
Lia wrote: "IF we accept there is a TSotE, then Abraham is not a murderer, but, JS admits he is himself not capable of faith ... it seems the ethical has not been suspended for JS."JS is trying to explain the paradox of faith, but of course that's not really possible ... after all, it's a paradox. Abraham has or is given faith. By embracing the absurd he exists within the paradox and the ethical universal is suspended for him as an individual. JS/SK do not have this faith and do not exist within it. Therefore for them the ethical, as you suggest, is not suspended. They can only search for faith with speculation and philosophy, i.e. reason, which of course has to be renounced to realize faith. Sort of makes my head spin.
Xan Shadowflutter wrote:..."(I’m on my phone, so please suspend the normal quoting etiquette and allow me do some lazy formatting)
The teleological suspension of the ethical seems to tell us that when God commands us to do something that violates our ethical code, then we ignore/suspend our ethics, because when commanded by God to do the unethical, it is no longer unethical to do it; instead to do so is to exceed the ethical. Is that the absurdity?
Out of nowhere, JS proclaimed this:
“ I am convinced that God is love; for me this thought has a primal lyrical validity”
He doesn’t justify it, he doesn’t argue to make a case, he simply stated that he personally is convinced, this is what God himself is. (Unfortunately, it immediately makes me associate that with the Greek Eros, whom is by definition a between-being, between infinite and finite, which ... out right contradicts JS’s conviction.)
But, with that as context, it seems it’s not so much that unethical actions (murder, for example, includes intent) become ethical when a character called “God” commands it, but rather, it might be suspended because JS’s “God” is love itself, so that Abraham can sacrifice Isaac only because he indubitably loves Isaac, and that binding and stabbing him (or attempting to) inexplicably expresses his love.
Ergo, planned-killing of Isaac is no longer attempted murder, the ethical is suspended not because God’s chosen ones have special privilege to break any rules and not be held accountable, but because this apparently violent, vile act somehow is a peculiar expression of “love.” The absurd is believing, though not knowing how it could possibly unfold, that whatever God commands him to perform will turn out to be good, and an act of “love”. And I think that’s where the absurd is located, the part that makes it impossible for Abraham to give an account of himself.
How is a person, who has both faith and reason in his mind, to respond to this?
To my way of thinking, if you have a God, it is safer to have One who demands you live by the ethics He gave you than to have One who demands you violate them. Looks like Silento and Sk have thrown safety to the wind.
Well, JS kind of commented on this:
“ Is it possible to speak unreservedly about Abraham without running the risk that some individual will become unbalanced and do the same thing? If I dare not, I will say nothing at all about Abraham, and the last thing I will do is to scale him down in such a way that he thereby becomes a snare for the weak. As a matter of fact, if one makes faith everything—that is, makes it what it is—then I certainly believe that I dare to speak of it without danger in our day, which is scarcely prodigal in faith. It is only by faith that one achieves any resemblance to Abraham, not by murder. If one makes love into a fleeting mood, a sensual feeling in a person, then one only lays snares for the weak by talking about the achievements of love.Everyone, to be sure, has momentary feelings, but if everyone therefore would do the dreadful thing that love has sanctified as an immortal achievement, then everything is lost, both the achievement and the one led astray.”
(I quoted more than I originally, intended because the “sanctified by love” bit seems to go nicely with what I was saying about sanctified (suspended) because love...)
JS seems to think it’s not a danger, because, for one, it seems modern people don’t have that kind of faith. And also, the point is to have faith in God (as love? as loving?), and not to permit murder as long as they claim God made me do it.
Another significant point is that this isn’t about making the particular universal: we are not willing everyone to go ahead and stab their children if they hear a voice (bluetooth speaker prank?) commanding them to do it. This isn’t about justification for all (it’s not in the realm of the ethical, the universal), this is about how one individual made difficult, authentic, individual decision, before organised religion was a thing, and in the process, “moved” towards faith.
With that said, I think, for Kierkegaard (and for Eliot and Yeats and Nietzsche etc), “safety” is probably not their priority. They seem to be against the modern impulse to privilege the comfortable, effortless, universal “safety” of the couch potato over well-considered, authentic, individual striving. That’s probably why JS made an offhand remark that in the present age (I’m paraphrasing, can’t find the passage) it’s unlikely to encounter tragic hero, and assistant professors are phoney because their position is so “secure” they’re completely removed from the “earthquake” of existence and only enact “doubt” in front of the lectern.
I’m almost certain T.S. Eliot lamented the weakening or watering down of God’s wrath in modern Christendom.
Lia wrote: "(I’m on my phone, so please suspend the normal quoting etiquette and allow me do some lazy formatting)"So you wrote this while on the phone? That's more impressive than anything SK has done. Maybe Hegel too.
Lia wrote about Love: “ … he simply stated that he personally is convinced, this is what God himself is. (Unfortunately, it immediately makes me associate that with the Greek Eros, whom is by definition a between-being, between infinite and finite, which ... out right contradicts JS’s conviction.)"Love in the Christian context is Agape, not Eros. Agape refers to the love of God for man and of man to God, and charity. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agape It is this sense in which it is said that God is love.
Xan Shadowflutter wrote: “To my way of thinking, if you have a God, it is safer to have One who demands you live by the ethics He gave you than to have One who demands you violate them.” To echo Lia’s point about this, the faith JS/SK writes about is anything but easy. Silentio expands on this in Problem II.
- Dread and distress are integral to the trial of faith.
-"The true knight of faith is always in absolute isolation.”
-“He is constantly tried”
-“The pain is his assurance that he is in the right way”
- He is “kept in constant tension,” and his situation is dreadful.
- His “absolute duty to God may cause one [the knight of faith] to do what ethics forbids.
No walk in the park. To follow an ethical code is not nearly so daunting. This is but one reason there are so few knights of faith.
Yes to the hardships. And I'd go further and say SK's (and Dostoevsky's) idea of faith and Christianity is not standard fare. It's hard work and difficult and lonely and personal. But that wasn't what I was questioning in my post. And if I made it sound like I was dismissing faith as something trivial, then I apologize. That was not my intent. If I understand SK correctly, you get the bonus of feeling dread and despair by simply living. In fact, according to SK, placing one's self in God's hands may be one of the few ways to rid one's self of dread and despair.
And I'm done for the day. It just took me 7 tries to type the word "that" correctly.
I’m either really struggling with this text, or I grasp it completely. For me, I don’t believe in God. Other people’s struggle with faith is not for me. Which, I think, is K’s point. Done and done. I don’t understand it, I can’t understand it. Abraham can keep his feelings to himself as far as I’m concerned. Dialectical prattle won’t yield results. So, why are we talking about it?I keep coming back to John the Silent. Ironic moniker for someone who sure talks a lot. It is K who’s silent. Because K has faith. No good describing it to me, I won’t understand it anyway. JS, however, is a doubter. And thus, he imposes all of these outside ideas about duty to society.
Do I believe in a universal morality? eh.. kinda… But Thomas mentioned something interesting… “…the single individual in his relation to the absolute is higher than the universal. As a result, the universal/ethical is reduced to the relative. Doesn't this set up a community of competing moralities, each one absolute for each individual, but relative for the rest of the community?” Why do the moralities have to be competing? I don’t have a problem with Abraham following his own faith.
Bryan "They call me the Doge" wrote: "Again, I've read the first part of this section, but not sure I have anything meaningful to contribute. I feel as though when I'm finished with the entire book, I'm going to have to flip back to page one and start again."Ditto that, Bryan.
David wrote: "Other than Agamemnon actually sacrificing Iphigenia, while Abraham only went through the motions of preparing to kill Isaac, I am failing to understand SK's differentiation between them. It only ma..."Agamemnon was motivated by community rather than by an individual relationship with faith.
Problem One: Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical?
Silentio's claim is that the ethical is the universal. Defined immediately, each individual is the particular that has its end in the universal. In other words, each individual person has her rightful place in the ethical, meaning she, like every individual, must follow the law of her community do what's right. Those who assert themselves as individuals "sin" against the ethical, and those who feel an urge to do so are in a state of temptation. (For those who read Beyond Good and Evil with us, does this sound like Nietzsche's "levelling"?)
If this is the case, SK says, then Abraham is a murderer. But of course he does not maintain this and claims instead that the single individual is higher than the universal. How is this possible? How can anything, or anyone, be higher than the universal? And what does it mean to be outside the universal? What difficulties does the single individual experience, as an outsider who is "incommensurate" with the universal? How does such a person live in society?
To make things even more difficult, Silentio says the single individual, "after having been subordinate to the universal as the particular, now through the universal becomes the single individual who as the particular becomes superior to it; (faith is this paradox.) that the single individual as the particular stands in an absolute relation to the absolute". What? How can a particular be an absolute?
What makes a tragic hero, like Agamemnon when he is called to sacrifice Iphigeneia, understandable, while Abraham is not? Silentio says we can weep over the tragic hero, but we cannot weep over Abraham. Why not? Silentio claims that there is justification for Agamemnon's act, a higher purpose, which does not lessen the suffering of his sacrifice, but it makes it undersandable. If this higher purpose, the ethical, is suspended, can Abraham be justified?
What is the standard by which actions are to be judged if the single individual is higher than the ethical/universal? Can we judge such an action by the result? Is Abraham still within the right because he did not actually kill Isaac?
For those who might have read Beyond Good and Evil with us: How does SK's "single individual" compare to Nietzsche's "Free Spirit"?
Problem Two: Is there an absolute duty to God?
Silentio's argument is that God is higher than the universal. What distinguishes God from the universal? What are the implications of a God who is not universal, who is different for every individual?
What does he mean when he says that faith is not a feeling or a mood, but a "new inwardness"?
The paradox of faith, he says, is that the single individual is higher than the universal. Or more specifically, that the single individual in his relation to the absolute is higher than the universal. As a result, the universal/ethical is reduced to the relative. Doesn't this set up a community of competing moralities, each one absolute for each individual, but relative for the rest of the community?
On the other hand, does the ethical as a universal (in which God is not personal, but a law applicable to everyone) reduce all individuals to a collective herd?
In assuming the paradox of faith, the single individual is "utterly unable to make himself intelligible to anyone." Why is this, and why would anyone want to put himself in this position?
In addressing this question, Silentio asks on a related note if it is necessary for the single individual to "hate" everyone else in order to observe his duty to the absolute (citing the Scripture in which Jesus says that no one can be his disciple unless he hates his own family and even himself.) Is this extremism, or is there a middle ground?