Book Five

[Christopher]

I have not been reading St. Thomas chapter for chapter. That would be nice, but I would have to give up virtually everything else, and in the end, how much smarter would I be?

But going over this early part of Book 5, which maybe I read too fast the first time, I can see what A. is trying to do.

The law commands its citizens to be virtuous, but, say, when a soldier throws down his shied, we do not call him unjust (breaking the law), but a coward.

But yes, it is a curious procedure, deriving this 'particular justice,' equity, from observing the particular injustice first, (Thomas calls it covetousness- the desire for more than one's share, or less than one's share of evil- I'm sure it is greed, although that word hasn't come up).. because we can see 'particular injustice' is some cases- the man who commits adultery for gain.. and A. may be thinking of Alcibiades here.. is not lustful, but 'covetous.' His desire for more than his share made him do a wrong of another kind.

I sympathize with everyone who is complaining. Reading this book, (book 5, that is) even with commentary, makes my eyes cross.

[Genni]

Christopher wrote: "But going over this early part of Book 5, which maybe I read too fast the first time, I can see what A. is trying to do.

The law commands its citizens to be virtuous, but, say, when a soldier throws down his shied, we do not call him unjust (breaking the law), but a coward.
"

Just to clarify, are you saying that the distinction he makes is that the just man in the complete sense will be just with or without laws?

[Genni]

Thomas wrote: "I'm trying to interpret what he's saying in 5.2, where he talks about "the sort of justice that is present in a part of virtue, for there is one, as we assert." In 5.1 he discusses the sort of justice that is a "complete virtue," which includes all the other virtues of character-- those things that I don't think of as being a part of justice normally. He's making a distinction in 5.2. He separates the general form of justice (which is equivalent to "complete virtue") from the particular forms, which involve taking more than one's share. Why does he treat this particular form of justice separately? My suspicion is that it's because this, the particular form that deals with equitable treatment, is what we think of when we think of justice, but I'm not sure. In any case, it takes up the rest of Book 5. "

So when he talks about complete justice, do you think he is just trying to broaden our vision of what justice is? But then spends most of his time on equitable justice and such because that is what people worry about more?

[Thomas]

Genni wrote: "So when he talks about complete justice, do you think he is just trying to broaden our vision of what justice is? But then spends most of his time on equitable justice and such because that is what people worry about more? "

Apparently the Greek term for Justice means both complete virtue (or general Righteousness) and equitable justice. I expect he spends most of Book 5 on the latter because he has already discussed the former.

[Lily]

@38 Thomas wrote: "even though he technically did an injustice to himself by refusing just compensation. ..."

Not sure I follow your definition/application of "injustice" here. What makes it an injustice to use one's resources/property as one chooses?

(My mind goes to the analogy of what President Trump is doing with his salary. My strong suspicion is that the return from his donations may well be larger than their face value, e.g., in good will, in business opportunities, .... I don't know that the same would be true of your colleague, but I am skeptical of his having done an "injustice" to himself.)

Another analogy is the Biblical story of the vineyard owner who pays each of his workers a day's wage, even if not all have worked a full day. His right to do as he likes with his resources; the justice(?) of providing a living wage in return for having access to a flexible work force?

What is the return from philanthropy -- beyond tax deductions? Medical centers, campus buildings, ....

[Thomas]

Lily wrote: "@38 Thomas wrote: "even though he technically did an injustice to himself by refusing just compensation. ..."

Not sure I follow your definition/application of "injustice" here. What makes it an in..."

In this case, just compensation is the mean, I think. Taking less than one deserves is as unjust as taking more. Few would say that he has the right to take more than he is worth, so why would it be right for him to take less?

(Thinking in Aristotelian terms, of course. In reality most of us do not know our true worth because such things are difficult to quantify. This quantification aspect is a major stumbling block for me in Aristotle's discussion of justice.)

[Lily]

Thomas wrote: "...This quantification aspect is a major stumbling block for me in Aristotle's discussion of justice...."

Okay. Thx for the response, Thomas.

I really stumble over this whole area of "justice," including as I watch our U.S. legislators wrestle with it in recent days. It does seem to reinforce the political nature/basis of "justice."

One of the exercises I did was go looking for modern day "authorities" on justice. Not satisfied with what I have found to date, but the list of books at this site do suggest the sensitivity to history (time) and geography (place) of human justice:

https://bookriot.com/2017/02/23/100-m...

[Lily]

@57 Ian wrote: "Lily wrote: "I find myself at times wondering if understanding Aristotle might be better attained by reading the life of his pupil Alexander."

An interesting suggestion: However, the the story of ..."

Ian -- sorry to be so slow about getting back to this post. Thanks for all the interesting background on Alexander and Aristotle. I was aware of the ambiguity, but without any careful trail.

What I was trying to suggest was more general -- if I can't understand Aristotle in terms of what he himself wrote, is there any chance of understanding him in terms of (some of) his impact on history. The question was prompted by those who sometimes talk about the impact of certain U.S. "forefathers" on subsequent law, e.g., Madison or Hamilton or ....

[Christopher]

Lily wrote: "@57 Ian wrote: "Lily wrote: "I find myself at times wondering if understanding Aristotle might be better attained by reading the life of his pupil Alexander."

An interesting suggestion: However, t..."

Lily,

I would say that when weighing Aristotle's influence, Alexander is not as important as Averroes and Aquinas.

Or if you consider Galileo, the scientific orthodoxy he was challenging was Aristotelian, much more than 'scripture based.'

That is, the university professors of G.'s day didn't really care what the Bible said about the solar system, so much as Aristotle's conception of the perfection of circular motion, the impossibility of actual infinity, and other things.

Alexander killed his best friend when both were drunk, so, no, I don't think he learned much from Aristotle.

[Ian]

Christopher wrote: "Lily wrote:..
the university professors of G.'s day didn't really care with the Bible said about the solar system..."

If they had tried to take the Bible literally on the subject, they would have been in trouble (institutionally or intellectually). At first look, there is little resemblance between the Biblical views of "the heavens" and "the Earth" (which seems to be flat). Instead, they read the Bible through an Aristotelian filter, supplied in some cases by authoritative glosses to the Biblical text.

According to some recent studies, the greatest problem Galileo faced with Aristotle was that generations of very hard effort had gone into reconciling his teachings with Scripture, including an interpretation of the Eucharist in terms of *their version* of Aristotle about substance and accidents. One could wind up with heretical implications if one wasn't very careful.

Neither the church nor the leading University teachers (many, if not all of them clergy, of course) was prepared to give up all of that received doctrine just because someone said they had got it all wrong, whatever possibly unreliable evidence he claimed to have.

Galileo had not received a Scholastic (medieval Aristotelian) education, and a lot of their very serious objects to his new physics seem to have gone right past him, since they were treating as certainties things he might not even have thought of, left to himself.

[Lily]

Christopher wrote: "Alexander killed his best friend when both were drunk, so, no, I don't think he learned much from Aristotle...."

But he did capture a-h-o-a-l of the world and left some systems of government behind him -- about which I know only the sketchiest of details or for how long the influence lasted. Something about sleeping with the right woman, rather like Mohammad, may be one tiny tidbit of the story. Maybe a family that knew how to govern for at least one region?