Book Two

[Thomas]

Aristotle ends Book One and starts Book Two with a distinction between intellectual virtues and ethical virtues. Things like wisdom, astuteness, and practical judgement are intellectual virtues and things like generosity and temperance are ethical virtues.  Intellectual virtues are acquired through teaching, while ethical virtues are developed through a combination of disposition and habit. Assuming we have the natural disposition for certain virtues, we acquire them through practice. But how does this happen exactly? Can a person really become generous or temperate through simple repetition? How mindful is an habitual action?

I tend to think of a habit as something automatic, something I do without thinking about it. But this isn't what Aristotle means.  In chapter four he says that virtuous character is not a matter of action simply, but a condition of the soul.  Aristotle tells us that virtuous deeds must be done knowingly, they must be chosen and chosen for their own sake, and they must be done while in a "fixed and permanent disposition of character." 1105a30 The analogy he uses is that of literacy and music -- a person who writes what he is told is not literate in the same way as one who “produces something literate and does so in a literate way, that is, in accordance with the writing within oneself.” It’s almost as if one must be virtuous before one can be virtuous. How does habit fit into this?

Aristotle speaks of virtue as a hexis, an active condition of the soul. (Bartlett and Collins translate hexis as “characteristic.” Others translate it as “disposition.” All agree that it is a very difficult word to translate.) The root of the Greek word is echein, which means to hold. In the Categories, Aristotle says that knowledge and virtue are two examples of hexis; they both require a kind of receptivity, an openness to them in order to acquire them. In his introduction, Joe Sachs offers the following illustration as an analogy:

In Book VII of the Physics, Aristotle says much the same thing about the way children start to learn: they are not changed, he says, nor are they trained or even acted upon in any way, but they themselves get straight into an active state (hexis) when time or adults help them settle down out of their native condition of disorder and distraction. (247b, 17-248a, 6) Curtis Wilson once delivered a lecture at St. John's College, in which he asked his audience to imagine what it would be like if we had to teach children to speak by deliberately and explicitly imparting everything they had to do. We somehow set them free to speak, and give them a particular language to do it in, but they--Mr. Wilson called them "little geniuses"--they do all the work.

The second major theme of Book Two concerns Aristotle's famous "golden mean." Does the preceding material on how we acquire virtues help us to understand the "mean?" How does one go about determining the mean anyway, especially when Aristotle admits that it is not the same for everyone. Is the "mean" a relative thing?

[David]

A thought on habit:
My High School Math teacher was fond of saying, "Practice doesn't make perfect; perfect practice makes perfect."

In other words, if you do a bunch of math problems over and over again without any understanding the wrong way getting the wrong results, you are not perfecting your math skills.

A thought on becoming through repetition:
As a thought experiment I can think of an evil person who to avoid being discovered as such only performs good deeds and then dies before taking any evil actions. Has the evil person become a good one by repetition? How do the facts of his deception and his never doing anything evil affect our judgement of him? Do actions speak louder? Do actions make the person?

[Lily]

David wrote: "As a thought experiment I can think of an evil person who to avoid being discovered as such only performs good deeds and then dies before taking any evil actions...."

Dave -- are you possibly taking on the assumption of our profession (the IT world) and assuming everything can be expressed in binary, i.e., here, evil and not evil?

Too often, well-intended actions can have unintended negative consequences. I was in a circle today that discussed the schism a denomination has undergone because of a stance it has taken. Somehow, "justice," whatever that might be, seems a bit relegated to tribes, rather than any whole. Michelle Kuo, in her Reading with Patrick: A Teacher, a Student, and a Life-Changing Friendship, indicates that desegregation in some places was known to close black schools entirely and leave their teachers with jobs. Those may be dramatic examples, but I suspect we see shadows of the same difficulties in our daily, even sometimes hourly, decisions. Fortunately, often the balance is clear for the case at hand. But even such may not deal with cumulative effects.

[Thomas]

David wrote: A thought on becoming through repetition:
As a thought experiment I can think of an evil person who to avoid being discovered as such only performs good deeds and then dies before taking any evil actions. Has the evil person become a good one by repetition?""

How could one know that the person was evil to begin with?

Aristotle suggests that one does not need to have knowledge of virtue in order to be virtuous... but I think your example illustrates why this might be problematic. How do we identify virtue or virtuous people (or vicious/evil people) if we don't know what virtue is?

[David]

Thomas wrote: "How could one know that the person was evil to begin with?"

It is just a thought experiment, but lets say the evil person was a member of a terrorist cell that traveled to another country with the intention of one day killing as many people as possible. In order to avoid suspicion until that day comes he becomes a model citizen performing many good deeds and virtuous acts. This goes on for years earning the man a great reputation. Then he is finally activated to commit his act of terror, but kills himself in an accident preparing explosives.

What do we say of his many good deeds and virtuous acts? In order to successfully deceive his future victims the terrorist would have to have knowledge of what would be seen as a virtuous act and what would not. Furthermore, wouldn't these virtuous acts appear contrary to his true nature?

[David]

Cphe wrote: "Question:

Does "mean" = equilibrium/base?"

I think it is more like the middle ground between two extremes. The term is drawn from mathematical mean, or average.

The mean between 2 and 6 is 4.
The mean between passive and aggressive is assertive.

[Thomas]

David wrote: "Thomas wrote: "How could one know that the person was evil to begin with?"

It is just a thought experiment, but lets say the evil person was a member of a terrorist cell that traveled to another c..."

Fascinating scenario, David. I'm going to have to give that one some thought with regard to Aristotle. I want to say that it's the intention behind the deed that matters, but I'm not sure what part intention plays in "hexis." Every act aims at some "good," but in this case the good is not good! I'll have to ponder this one a bit.

[Tamara]

David wrote: "Thomas wrote: "How could one know that the person was evil to begin with?"

It is just a thought experiment, but lets say the evil person was a member of a terrorist cell that traveled to another c..."

I think the issue with the scenario you gave is that, in all likelihood, the terrorist does not perceive his would-be act as evil. He probably sees it as a "good" that addresses an existing evil. So if, as Thomas says (#10), it's the intention behind the deed that matters, he thinks his act aims at some "good" even though the rest of us recognize it as evil.

[Thomas]

David wrote: "Thomas wrote: "How could one know that the person was evil to begin with?"

It is just a thought experiment, but lets say the evil person was a member of a terrorist cell that traveled to another c..."

The good deeds done by the terrorist would not be done "for their own sake," as Aristotle says virtuous acts are done at 1105a30. The terrorist is doing good deeds to achieve another end, and of course he is acting insincerely. Maybe this is what Aristotle means in that passage when he says that virtuous acts must be done "in a certain way" by the one doing them.

As for the terrorist's ultimate goal, Aristotle mentions toward the end of Book 2, chapter 6 that some actions and feelings do not admit of a mean condition -- he mentions "joy at others' misfortunes, shamelessness, and envy" among the feelings, and "adultery, stealing, and murder" among the actions. These things are simply understood as wrong. Is this avoiding the philosophical challenge of determining why these things are wrong, or is this just common sense?

[Lily]

Cphe wrote: "Is evil a more modern term/concept? ..."

Fascinating question, Cphe.

I started by looking for the etymology of evil. This is what I have found so far:

Origin of EVIL

Middle English ivel, evel, evil, from Old English yfel; akin to Old Frisian evel evil, Old Saxon uƀil, Old High German ubil, Gothic ubils evil, and perhaps to Old English ūp up; from the concept that evil is beyond the limits of accepted conduct — more at up

First Known Use: before 12th century (sense 1a)

1 a : not good morally : marked by bad moral qualities : violating the rules of morality : wicked, sinful [fell into evil courses] [never was a more evil attitude toward life transmitted to the young — Stephen Duggan] [an evil piece of work]

“Evil.” Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged. 2018.. Web. 11 Jan. 2018.

This was as an adjective. Noun form was no more helpful, imo.

Now I want to know what are the Latin/Greek predecessors of the word "evil." I know many other ways exist to make this query, I just got caught on this one at the moment.

[Lily]

Cphe wrote: "Thank you Lily for the above info.

I did wonder at first if it was related to the translation I am attempting to grapple with."

Cphe -- When I went to the "up" link and tried following it, there seems to be an "over" and "under" shading embedded here -- evil seeming to be belonging to the "under" in perhaps some spiritual sense. But that is funky thinking/exploration yet.

[David]

Cphe wrote: "Can I infer then that evil is a term/concept not understood by Aristotle?"

I think Aristotle does have an understanding of evil:

Again, it is possible to fail in many ways (for evil belongs to the class of the [1106.30] unlimited, as the Pythagoreans conjectured, and good to that of the limited), while to succeed is possible only in one way (for which reason one is easy and the other difficult— to miss the mark easy, to hit it difficult); for these reasons also, then, excess and defect are characteristic of vice, and the mean of excellence; [1106.35] For men are good in but one way, but bad in many.

Aristotle. The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, One-Volume Digital Edition (Bollingen Series (General)) (p. 1748). Princeton University Press. Kindle Edition.

As for the terrorist experiment I will have to go with the lines I think Thomas was referring to:

But not every action nor every passion admits of a mean; for some have names [1107.10] that already imply badness, e.g. spite, shamelessness, envy, and in the case of actions adultery, theft, murder; for all of these and suchlike things imply by their names that they are themselves bad, and not the excesses or deficiencies of them. It is not possible, then, ever to be right with regard to them; one must always be wrong.

[Christopher]

The cutter-and-paster is here:

This is from the Introduction to a translation of Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality

‘Good, bad and evil’
In the first of the three essays of which the Genealogy is composed,
Nietzsche invites us to imagine a society which is split into two distinct groups: a militarily and politically dominant group of ‘masters’ exercises absolute control over a completely subordinate group of ‘slaves’. The ‘masters’ in this model are construed as powerful, active, relatively unreflective agents who live a life of immediate physical self-affirmation: they drink, they brawl, they wench, they hunt, whenever the fancy takes them, and they are powerful enough, by and large, to succeed in most of these endeavours, and uninhibited enough to enjoy living in this way.

They use the term ‘good’ to refer in an approving way to this life and to themselves as people who are capable of leading it. As an afterthought, they also sometimes employ the term ‘bad’ to refer to those people – most notably, the ‘slaves’ – who by virtue of their weakness are not capable of living the life of self-affirming physical exuberance. The terms ‘good’ and ‘bad’ then form the basis of a variety of different ‘masters’ moralities’.

One of the most important events in Western history occurs when
the slaves revolt against the masters’ form of valuation. The slaves are, after all, not only physically weak and oppressed, they are also by virtue of their very weakness debarred from spontaneously seeing themselves and their lives in an affirmative way. They develop a reactive and negative sentiment against the oppressive masters which Nietzsche calls ‘ressentiment’, and this ressentiment eventually turns creative, allowing the slaves to take revenge in the imagination on the masters whom they are too weak to harm physically. The form this revenge takes is the invention of a new concept and an associated new form of valuation: ‘evil’. ‘Evil’ is
used to refer to the life the masters lead (which they call ‘good’) but it is used to refer to it in a disapproving way. In a ‘slave’ morality this negative term ‘evil’ is central, and slaves can come to a pale semblance of self-affirmation only by observing that they are not like the ‘evil’ masters. In the mouths of the slaves, ‘good’ comes to refer not to a life of robust vitality, but to one that is ‘not-evil’, i.e. not in any way like the life that the masters live. Through a variety of further conceptual inventions (notably, ‘free will’), the slaves stylize their own natural weakness into the result of a choice for which they can claim moral credit.

Western morality has historically been a struggle between elements that derive from a basic form of valuation derived from ‘masters’ and one derived from ‘slaves’.

http://www.inp.uw.edu.pl/mdsie/Politi...

It's been a long time since I've read From Shakespeare to Existentialism, but I do remember Walter Kaufmann going on at length about Aristotle's 'great-souled man' and how it preceded this resentment which 'invented' evil.

As far as 'extremism,' remember the motto from Aristotle which Rousseau took for the title page of his Second Discourse:



We ought to think about what is natural not in things which are corrupt
but in things which are well ordered by nature.*
Aristotle, Politics, I, 5.
* The Latin epigraph reads: “Non in depravatis, sed in his quae bene secundum naturam se habent, considerandum est quid sit naturale.”

[Christopher]

I wanted to look up the Greek (which I don't really know) and check on some of these appearances of "evil" in the Ethics.

Here is a passage from early in Book Two:

ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἡδονῇ μάχεσθαι ἢ θυμῷ, καθάπερ φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος, περὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον ἀεὶ καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἀρετή· καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὖ βέλτιον ἐν τούτῳ. ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πᾶσα ἡ πραγματεία καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ πολιτικῇ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὖ τούτοις χρώμενος ἀγαθὸς ἔσται, ὁ δὲ κακῶς κακός.

As Heraclitus says, it is even more difficult to fight against pleasure than anger. Now the more difficult is always treated by art and virtue, which operate well and more efficiently in the face of difficulty. Hence the whole business of virtue and of political science is occupied with pleasures and sorrows. Assuredly he who uses these well will be virtuous, and he who uses them badly will be evil.

(This last sentence in Collins reads "For he who deals with these well will be good, but he who does so badly will be bad."-which you can see just by looking at the Greek, is more literal.)

[Thomas]

Cphe wrote: "I was thinking that when Aristotle talks of the "mean" and the extremes of good/bad my understanding from his words being,

1 it is possible to delve into good-bad and then come back to the "mean" ..."

I'm not aware of a term in Greek for "evil" per se. The term used in the passage David cites (@19) is "to kakon", which is the same term used in the one Christopher cites above (@21). It is translated bad or evil interchangeably.

Here is the brief lexicon entry:

κακὸς

bad, Lat. malus:
I.of persons,
1.opp. to καλός, mean, ugly, Il.
2.opp. to ἀγαθός, ἐσθλός, ill-born, mean, ignoble, Hom., Soph.
3.craven, cowardly, base, Hom., Hdt., attic
4.bad of his kind, i. e. worthless, sorry, poor, κ. ἀλήτης a sorry beggar, Od.; κ. ἰατρός Aesch.; κ. ναύτης Eur.; πάντα κακός bad in all things, Od.; κακὸς γνώμην Soph.;— c. inf., κακὸς μανθάνειν bad at learning, id=Soph.
5.in moral sense, bad, evil, wicked, Od., attic
II.of death, disease, etc., bad, evil, baneful, Hom., attic; of omens, bad, unlucky, attic; of words, evil, abusive, Soph.; κ. ποιμήν, i. e. the storm, Aesch.
B.κακόν, and κακά, τά, as Subst. evil, ill, Od., Hdt., etc.; δυοῖν ἀποκρίνας κακοῖν having chosen the least of two evils, Soph.:— κακόν τι ἔρδειν or ῥέζειν τινά to do evil or ill to any one, Il.; κακὸν (or κακὰ) ποιεῖν τινά attic; κακὰ κακῶν ῀ τὰ κάκιστα, Soph.
2.kaka/, ta/, also evil words, reproaches, Hdt., Trag.
C.degrees of Comparison:
1.regul. comp. κακώτερος Od., Theocr.; but never in attic:—irreg. κακίων, ον, [ with ι^], Hom., [with ι_], attic
2.Sup. κάκιστος, Hom., etc.:—but χείρων, χείριστος, and ἥσσων, ἥκιστος, are also used as comp. and Sup.
D.adv. κακῶς, Lat. male, ill, Il., etc.:— κακῶς ποιεῖν τινα to treat one ill; κακῶς ποιεῖν τινά τι to do one any evil, attic; κακῶς πράσσειν to fare ill, Aesch.; κακῶς πάσχειν id=Aesch.; κακῶς γίγνεταί τινι Hdt.; κακῶς ἐκπέφευγα, Lat. vix demum effugi, Dem.:—comp. κάκιον, Hdt., attic: Sup. κάκιστα, Ar., etc.
E.in Compos., when added to words already signifying something bad, it increases this property, as in κακο-πινής: but added to words signifying something good, it implies too little of this property, as in κακό-δοξος. Once or twice it stands merely as an adj. agreeing with the Subst. with which it is compounded, as Κακοΐλιος for κακὴ Ἴλιος, κακόνυμφος for κακὸς νυμφίος.

[Ian]

Thanks for posting this. I became frustrated trying to run down a term for "evil" in a digital edition of the great Liddell-Scott Lexicon, and this is probably why.

A search of Kindle editions show that some translators do use "evil" in rendering the "Nicomachean Ethics" (and the obscure "Eudemian Ethics" as well), but translators differ on using "evil" or "bad" in rendering the same passage.,

It seems to be much more common to use "evil" in the works on logic ("Categories," "Prior Analytics," etc.), generally to indicate a lack of something (where it is expected).

At least, that is the case in the older translations included in the (inexpensive) Delphi Complete Works digital edition, which can be searched. It also has Greek texts, for anyone who feels up to trying them. The Kindle edition doesn't show up on the add book/author function -- brings up Aristophanes (!) instead -- but, if you don't want to bother with a search, here is a link to Amazon:
https://www.amazon.com/Complete-Arist...

Someone with a lot more Greek than I do may be able to figure if this represents a different Greek word, but my short look suggests not.

The use to indicate that something is missing is related to the view that Aristotle had what is called a Privation Theory of Evil, in which evil has no real existence. There are several on-line discussions of Aristotle and Privation theory, for those who want to follow up this.

[Bryan--The Bee’s Knees]

I've only read a few chapters out of book II, but I was struck by Aristotle's notion that the virtues were acquired through action. A long time ago (and at a time when I needed to hear it), a fellow told me, 'if you want self-esteem, do esteem-able things.' The proverbial light bulb went off in my head. So I was amazed to read Aristotle saying nearly the same thing...almost 2500 years ago.

[Christopher]

Bryan,

Yes, but notice he puts 'honor' as a less ultimate good than happiness, for the very reason that 'honor' depends on other people's estimation of ourselves.

"... But this seems too superficial to be the good we are looking for. Honor consists in the action of those rendering it rather than anything in the power of the person honored; while happiness certainly should be a good proper to man and a thing not easily taken from him."

[Ignacio]

Book II is making a lot more sense to me than book I, mainly because he is laying out his system on virtues/vices and the "mean." This doesn't mean the difficulties disappear (as you are all pointing out: does repetition really result in true virtue? is there such a thing as absolute evil or is evil simply "the bad" or "the absence of virtue"?)

But it seems to flow better. A lot of things seem sensible or, as I said before, "eloquent." The idea that we learn virtue (especially as children) through repetition makes some sense to me. Although perhaps I'm thinking more about what today we call "modeling": that is, I learn how to behave compassionately, or courageously, because that behavior is modeled by my parents, other adults, or older friends I look up to. But isn't there a "repetition" or "practice" aspect to this? I'm thinking of something as simple as: when Christmastime comes around, we are more likely to donate or help out others (assuming this is a virtuous behavior and not simply the result of peer pressure). It gets easier to do it because we do it over and over until it becomes second nature.

What about other virtues? Such as confronting a bully or a racist with the "right amount" of anger: neither becoming belligerent and abusive nor simply being passive. But we must have learned or observed this behavior from parents, etc. And then, if we repeat it, it becomes ingrained. It is interesting to me that Aristotle says something about how moral virtues are not in us by nature but they make us "complete" (or fulfilled?) as a human being.

I keep returning to the idea of models, because Aristotle's moral system seems to rely on this idea of "exemplars" or excellence and virtue: otherwise, how would we know and learn (and repeat through habit) what is good? It also seems that what is bad or evil is what would appear "shameful" in the face of such exemplars.

I also appreciated how he says: correct practice makes you virtuous, but repeating errors over and over makes you worse. As someone said before in relation to math, you need to practice what is correct. As a language instructor, I am VERY aware of this!

[Bryan--The Bee’s Knees]

Christopher wrote: "Bryan,

Yes, but notice he puts 'honor' as a less ultimate good than happiness, for the very reason that 'honor' depends on other people's estimation of ourselves..."

I've missed the connection somehow between our posts. I've always interpreted the idea behind the idea of 'doing esteem-able things' as simply a way of acquiring whatever positive aspect that I felt I might be lacking--do the thing you feel is lacking. In book II, chapter I (1103b), Aristotle posits that this is exactly the way one acquires any virtue.

"Similarly, we become just by the practice of just actions, self-controlled by exercising self-control, and courageous by performing acts of courage."

(I would quibble with the courage aspect, but that arises probably more from semantics than any appreciable difference)

[Christopher]

Bryan wrote: ""Similarly, we become just by the practice of just actions, self-controlled by exercising self-control, and courageous by performing acts of courage." ."

OK- but those are virtues. They are desired for their own sake, not for 'esteem,' or honor's sake.

[Bryan--The Bee’s Knees]

Christopher wrote: "Bryan wrote: ""Similarly, we become just by the practice of just actions, self-controlled by exercising self-control, and courageous by performing acts of courage." ."

OK- but those are virtues. T..."

Ah--I understand where I got crossed up. Loosely, I'd equate self-esteem with the 'happiness' that Aristotle talks about--a feeling of being fulfilled and living the right life rather than self-pride. So, if I felt less than, or not measuring up somehow, the advice was not sit around and wait for someone to give me those things that would make me feel good about myself, but to go do those things that made me feel worthy, or, as A. might say, 'virtuous'.

It was all an internal thing, not dependent on others showing me esteem.

[Christopher]

Bryan wrote: "Christopher wrote: "Bryan wrote: ""Similarly, we become just by the practice of just actions, self-controlled by exercising self-control, and courageous by performing acts of courage." ."

OK- but ..."

That does clarify. Thanks.

[Thomas]

Ignacio wrote: "What about other virtues? Such as confronting a bully or a racist with the "right amount" of anger: neither becoming belligerent and abusive nor simply being passive. But we must have learned or observed this behavior from parents, etc. ."

I like this example. It's complicated, but not unusual -- it's the sort of difficult situation we're all familiar with, and I can see a lot of what Aristotle is talking about in it. First, the person standing up to the bully has to restrain her anger and summon up her courage to do something without letting either emotion take charge. This in itself requires a certain disposition/characteristic/hexis.

She next has to decide what to do, what words to say, what body language is appropriate. This is done spontaneously, but there is a rational element to it. How strong a position does she take? What is the goal she is shooting for? Is she making a point in front of a crowd of people, or is she trying to deescalate a volatile situation? How does she hit "the mean" and how does she know when she has hit it?

It's interesting that Aristotle says that virtue is apt to hit the mean, not that it always does. On the other hand, he says that there are many ways to get something wrong, but only one way to get it right.

[Christopher]

He says in one sense it is a mean; but in another sense it is an excellence.
That is, there is nothing "mediocre" about acheiving the mean.

[Lily]

Thomas wrote: "On the other hand, he says that there are many ways to get something wrong, but only one way to get it right...."

And I am not certain that is "true." Sometimes "right" seems to come from unexpected combinations and directions -- and if those had been different, an entirely different "right" may have emerged, even if far different than the original goals.

[Thomas]

Christopher wrote: "He says in one sense it is a mean; but in another sense it is an excellence.
That is, there is nothing "mediocre" about acheiving the mean."

Yes, he does say that too. It makes me wonder about the consequences for moral principles though. The mean is always a compromise of sorts, a wise compromise, but a compromise nevertheless. Can one stand on any kind of principle with this approach? (Aside from the "mean" as a principle, of course.)

Additionally, there is no way to define the mean, since it depends on particular circumstances. The mean changes from situation to situation, so laws that are written in general terms don't really apply anymore. Maybe they can be of assistance, but laws cannot prescribe specific behavior; they can only tell us to choose the mean, whatever that might be in any given situation.

[Thomas]

Lily wrote: "Thomas wrote: "On the other hand, he says that there are many ways to get something wrong, but only one way to get it right...."

And I am not certain that is "true." Sometimes "right" seems to com..."

I think Aristotle is thinking mathematically here, or applying a mathematical analogy. The mean is like a fulcrum point, where the force on one side of the lever is equal to the other. Given two different weights and a lever of a certain length, there can be only one fulcrum point.

I'm not sure if mathematics is adequate as an analogy, but it tends to be the way the ancient Greeks thought about things. There is a tradition that a sign hung over the entrance to the Academy saying, "Let no one ignorant of geometry enter here."

[Bryan--The Bee’s Knees]

Thomas wrote: "The mean is always a compromise of sorts, a wise compromise, but a compromise nevertheless...."

I may not have read it right, but I didn't take Aristotle's use of the 'mean' to be a compromise. One of the examples was that ''in giving and taking money, the mean is generosity, the excess and deficiency are extravagance and stinginess." But generosity isn't a compromise, it's a choice. Compromise, in my mind, represents a weaker position that takes as many strengths as possible from two opposite position, becoming not as strong or as pleasing as the extremes, but still able to satisfy the greatest amount of circumstances. I take the 'mean' (in the sense we are using it here) to be the inverse of a compromise.

[Genni]

Thomas wrote: "Aristotle suggests that one does not need to have knowledge of virtue in order to be virtuous."

I'm confused. I thought that Aristotle was saying that we did need knowledge, or some at least, to be virtuous. Doesn't he say that good deeds must be done actively, or knowingly, and for their own sake? Doesn't that require knowledge?

[Genni]

Bryan wrote: "I may not have read it right, but I didn't take Aristotle's use of the 'mean' to be a compromise."

I'm with you. I have mostly been thinking of a line with the mean simply being a position on the line. It seems to me that there is some confusion of the mean that Aristotle is talking of with our usage of it sometimes as "average", which I don't think is what Aristotle is championing?

[Genni]

Quick question: In my edition, each book is divided into sections and has a section head that tells you the material to be found in it. Are these sections and headings Aristotle's or my editor's?

[Thomas]

Genni wrote: "Thomas wrote: "Aristotle suggests that one does not need to have knowledge of virtue in order to be virtuous."

I'm confused. I thought that Aristotle was saying that we did need knowledge, or some..."

The passage I was referring to is at the beginning of chapter 2, at 1103b25.

Now since our present occupation is not for the sake of contemplation, as the other kinds of study are (for we are investigating not in order that we might know what virtue is, but in order that we might become good, since otherwise there would be no benefit from it) it is necessary to investigate, with respect to the things involved in actions, how to perform them...

I think this is a swipe at Plato's Meno, where Socrates attempts to define virtue. (The central question in that dialogue is "Can virtue be taught?") Socrates tries to show that knowledge is something we are born with, and the argument is not entirely persuasive. Aristotle seems to be saying here that knowing what virtue is (in the abstract) is not required; someone can learn to be temperate by practicing temperance, just as someone can learn to play an instrument without knowing music theory.

But the person who practices must still act knowingly, without someone else making the decisions for him. (Chap 4, 1105a30) He is acting knowingly in the practical sense, but without knowledge in the abstract sense. (...if that makes any sense?)

[Ian]

Genni wrote: "Quick question: In my edition, each book is divided into sections and has a section head that tells you the material to be found in it. Are these sections and headings Aristotle's or my editor's?"

All such divisions found in Aristotle are editorial -- they were not in use in Aristotle's time, in which prose was generally written in a continuous, unbroken, fashion, like a "wall of words." (If you've run into someone who does that on-line, then you've experienced one of the difficulties facing ancient readers.) There was also no consistent system of punctuation, although attempts were made to devise one.

Even the "book" divisions are those standardized by later (albeit still ancient) scholars and copyists. They indicate the size of a papyrus roll, which could not be made too long without coming apart in use. These (*sometimes* logical) divisions are often attributed to the Library of Alexandria, although a rival institution at Pergamon may be just as likely a source.

The standard chapter divisions are apparently even later, either medieval or Renaissance -- I don't recall seeing a clear statement as to which, although a lot of such sub-divisons came into use with printing, as they could be made uniform in a whole lot of copies.

Some Protestant nineteenth-century classicists were especially eager to replace them with the Bekker numbers (from an edition of the 1830s, which supplied standardized page, column, and line numbers), not just because the new system was more precise, but because they thought the old reference system was somehow too Catholic. (And Catholics probably went on using the old system for a while, as the new one was too Protestant......)

[Thomas]

Genni wrote: "Bryan wrote: "I may not have read it right, but I didn't take Aristotle's use of the 'mean' to be a compromise."

I'm with you. I have mostly been thinking of a line with the mean simply being a po..."

I guess the question I have is whether a doctrine of the mean precludes categorical imperatives. Say a man comes along and says "Give away all that you own to the poor, and follow me." Would a follower who does this be considered "extravagant," and non-virtuous by Aristotle? Would a vow of chastity be considered "insensible?"

[Bryan--The Bee’s Knees]

Thomas wrote: "Would a follower who does this be considered "extravagant," and non-virtuous by Aristotle?..."

He might. Many other people thought (or think) it's extravagant.

When he introduces the idea of 'means', A talks about relativity. "By the medium relative to us, I understand an amount neither too large nor too small, and this is neither one nor the same for everybody."

He also goes on to talk about some actions where no mean exists. I take it for granted that if one's goal was to live like Christ, or follow his rules, then there was no mean involved. My suspicion would be that A would personally have a dim opinion of this level of devotion, but I don't have anything to back up that suspicion, other than my idea that most of the ancient world would have had difficulty accepting the precepts of Christianity.

[Genni]

Thomas wrote: "But the person who practices must still act knowingly, without someone else making the decisions for him. (Chap 4, 1105a30) He is acting knowingly in the practical sense, but without knowledge in the abstract sense. (...if that makes any sense?) "

I don't think it does, lol, but I don't think that is anything against you. I think the fact that A is trying to skirt around fundamental problems is an issue. Although after seeing the passage you had in mind, I can see now why it seems he is saying knowledge is not required. I simply don't see how it is possible to act knowingly in a practical sense and not in the abstract sense. He says that virtues do not arise in us by nature. To acquire a habit requires some abstract thought, doesn't it? Habit requires some kind of effort, usually, a decision, which is usually abstract before it becomes concrete??

[Genni]

Ian wrote: "Genni wrote: "Quick question: In my edition, each book is divided into sections and has a section head that tells you the material to be found in it. Are these sections and headings Aristotle's or ..."

Thanks, Ian. For some reason I had it in my head that providing some sort of outline used to be a common practice by authors, but couldn't remember where I read that. It seems that, if it is even true, it must have been a later practice...

[Genni]

In the very last paragraph, after all in praise of reason, he says the final decision for the mean rests with perception? I am a little thrown by that. So by erring to the right, then to the left, we finally perceive the mean? The way it is worded, he seems to be not including that phenomenon with either reason or passion so not sure what to make of it.

[Genni]

Bryan wrote: "He also goes on to talk about some actions where no mean exists. I take it for granted that if one's goal was to live like Christ, or follow his rules, then there was no mean involved. My suspicion would be that A would personally have a dim opinion of this level of devotion, but I don't have anything to back up that suspicion, other than my idea that most of the ancient world would have had difficulty accepting the precepts of Christianity. "

The actions where no mean exists were only actions that were inherently bad, right? In the case of devotion to an ethical teacher (or God), I don't know that it would fall under the category of an action with no mean?

[David]

Genni wrote: "In the very last paragraph, after all in praise of reason, he says the final decision for the mean rests with perception? I am a little thrown by that. So by erring to the right, then to the left, ..."

My W. D. Ross revised by J. O. Urmson translation reads this way:

But this is no doubt difficult, and especially in individual cases; for it is not [15] easy to determine both how and with whom and on what provocation and how long one should be angry; for we too sometimes praise those who fall short and call them good-tempered, but sometimes we praise those who get angry and call them manly. The man, however who deviates little from goodness is not blamed, whether he do so in the direction of the more or of the less, but only the man who deviates more [20] widely; for he does not fail to be noticed. But up to what point and to what extent a man must deviate before he becomes blameworthy it is not easy to determine by reasoning, any more than anything else that is perceived by the senses; such things depend on particular facts, and the decision rests with perception. So much, then, makes it plain that the intermediate state is in all things to be praised, but that we [25] must incline sometimes towards the excess, sometimes towards the deficiency; for so shall we most easily hit the mean and what is right.

Aristotle. The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, One-Volume Digital Edition (Bollingen Series (General)) (p. 1752). Princeton University Press. Kindle Edition.

I read this as sometimes it is appropriate, as judged or perceived by yourself and others, to vary our response a little from the mean towards an extreme or a deficiency to fit the circumstances. It is difficult to reason how much our responses must vary in each case, but over many responses in many cases our responses should "average out to the mean".

[David]

*** RECOVERED FROM ACCIDENTAL DELETE ***
My apologies to Genni.

by Genni
Thomas wrote: "I guess the question I have is whether a doctrine of the mean precludes categorical imperatives. Say a man comes along and says "Give away all that you own to the poor, and follow me." Would a follower who does this be considered "extravagant," and non-virtuous by Aristotle? Would a vow of chastity be considered "insensible?" " I have been wondering something similar, but I suppose I have a qualm with your examples being categorical imperatives. I don't want to get too far off topic, but taking the rich young ruler as an example, the passage points out how sad he was when Jesus said that. That Jesus recognized that the man's affections lied with earthly goods, which A I think made pretty clear in Book I are not considered good. So that was the reason Jesus made that request for that individual? In some sense, I think it is almost in line with what A is saying? The mean is relative, and for the young man, he needed to move further away from affections for earthly goods. In another passage Jesus says to use money for good, so I don't think that particular invitation was for everyone. I have been wondering about love, though. I suppose it depends on which definition you adopt of it, but feeling or action-based, I'm not sure how to find a mean for it.

[Roger]

I don't think Aristotle means that we should deliberately try to be too angry sometimes, and too placid others. On the contrary, we should always try to hit the manly mean. But we should recognize that inevitably we will sometimes be a little in excess, and sometimes a little in deficiency, because of the fallibility of judgment. But if the errors are not too large, and average out to about zero, we should be satisfied.

[Thomas]

Genni wrote: "I simply don't see how it is possible to act knowingly in a practical sense and not in the abstract sense. He says that virtues do not arise in us by nature. To acquire a habit requires some abstract thought, doesn't it? Habit requires some kind of effort, usually, a decision, which is usually abstract before it becomes concrete?? ."

Plato would say so! But Aristotle takes a different tack. There is an interesting passage in Book 1, Ch. 4 that touches on this disagreement:

For Plato rightly raised this question, and used to inquire whether the road is from first principles or up to first principles, just as, on a race course, the run is either from the judges to the boundary or back again.

One must begin from what is known, but this has two meanings, the things known to us and the things that are known simply. Perhaps then we, at any rate, ought to begin from the things that are known to us. This is why one who is going to listen adequately to discourse about things that are beautiful and just, and generally about things that pertain to political matters, needs to have been brought up by means of habits. For the primary thing is that something is so, and if this is sufficiently evident, there is no additional need for the reason why. 1095b (Sachs)

Aristotle references Plato because he is politely disagreeing with him. Plato says (via Socrates in the Meno dialogue) that we can never know what virtue is unless this knowledge has been instilled in us before we were born. Otherwise, how can we know what virtue is when we see it in the everyday world? How can I recognize a certain man in the street when I've never seen him before and have no idea what he looks like?

But Aristotle seems to be saying we do not need abstract knowledge to know things -- we can know things approximately, sufficiently, or even second-hand. We can know things because we've been taught them, and we can act in a certain way because we've been taught to act that way. I can sort of recognize someone I've never seen before if I have a good enough description, or a decent but not totally clear photograph of that person. Education gives someone a vague description of what goodness is and habituation gives someone a general guideline on how to act. It's an imperfect start, but a start.

[David]

Roger wrote: "I don't think Aristotle means that we should deliberately try to be too angry sometimes, and too placid others...."

I agree, Aristotle is not saying we need to go to extremes, but we may need to vary our response from the mean a little.

For example, between fear and confidence there is the excess of rashness, the deficiency of cowardice, and the mean of courage. I don't think Aristotle is suggesting we be too rash or too cowardly, but instead he suggests we be a little more or a little less courageous. In choosing to stay in the fight but "picking your battles" you may appear cowardly, and in aggressively seizing an opportunity you may appear rash, but both, in their own case and right circumstances, are examples of courage.

[Ignacio]

Thomas wrote: "He is acting knowingly in the practical sense, but without knowledge in the abstract sense. (...if that makes any sense?)"

It makes sense within A's argument: you don't need to be able to define what virtue or justice are or to have intellectual knowledge of what piety or compassion are, in order to practice them (here is where he appears to depart from Plato). "Knowledge" in the sense of discursive/intellectual knowledge (logos) is not required; instead there is a "practical" knowledge and (perhaps? "feeling" of what is right?). BUT he also says you can't act virtuously just by accident or for the wrong reasons: there is some kind of knowledge involved in that your actions must be conscious, deliberate, and purposeful.

So, where does this leave us? I feel like by going in one direction, then another, in his argument, Aristotle is putting us readers in the position of having to find "the mean" (so to say) in the sense of reconciling the different things he says.

I have heard/read people say A's notion of "the mean" is just "commonsense" (don't be too much X or too little X, but "just right"), but now reading it I really seems more attractive because it's not an abstract or mathematical mean he is talking about: he makes it clear that "the mean" is situational and that it is up to us, in a sense it is the work of ethics, to figure out what "the mean" (or the just, or the good) is in each situation: "Hence it is in fact a task to be serious, for in each case it is a task to grasp what resides in the middle" (1109a).

At the same time, this is no way to suggest that Aristotle is a relativist: but he does suggest that there are no abstract or preexisting answers for every situation.

This also comes back to the question of the connection between "ethics" and "ethos" he mentions earlier. The value of ethical actions as habits is strongly bound to the values of the community and what that community considers excellent, virtuous, or shameful. Again, this is not to say A's position is cultural relativism, but it does seem to suggest a more historical/evolutionary understanding of ethics (I don't know if any of this makes sense; I'm just thinking out loud...).

[Thomas]

Genni wrote: " I have been wondering something similar, but I suppose I have a qualm with your examples being categorical imperatives. I don't want to get too far off topic, but taking the rich young ruler as an example, the passage points out how sad he was when Jesus said that. That Jesus recognized that the man's affections lied with earthly goods, which A I think made pretty clear in Book I are not considered good. So that was the reason Jesus made that request for that individual?"

That pesky context thing. :) I like Matthew's version best. "If you want to be perfect (teleios), sell your possessions and give to the poor, and you will have (hexeis) treasure in heaven..."

The young man says he is following all the commandments. Jesus tells him this isn't enough to be perfect. There is an argument that Jesus says this ironically (inasmuch as he has just rebuked the young man for calling him "good," because only God is good) but in effect he is saying that just following the rules is not enough.

Perhaps the Aristotelian interpretation of this might be that rules in general are inadequate. To be perfect may not be possible either, but the spirit of virtue means to be constantly striving for that perfection.

[Thomas]

Genni wrote: "In the very last paragraph, after all in praise of reason, he says the final decision for the mean rests with perception? I am a little thrown by that. So by erring to the right, then to the left, ..."

This is a great observation, especially going into Book 3. Aristotle periodically uses the word "beautiful" in a way that sounds strange to me. Sometimes this term -- kalos -- is translated "noble" instead, to avoid the strangeness of "beautiful." It sounds strange to me because I tend to think of aesthetics as shallow, but I think Aristotle disagrees. Judgement of the mean is in the perceiving, in the passage you cite. (The term he uses for the perceiving is ton aistheton.) You're absolutely right to contrast this with reason, and I think Ignacio put it really well (msg 55):

Ignacio wrote: " "Knowledge" in the sense of discursive/intellectual knowledge (logos) is not required; instead there is a "practical" knowledge and (perhaps? "feeling" of what is right?)."

Judgment of the mean is an aesthetic judgment. Moral actions aren't just right, they're aesthetically beautiful. They feel beautiful. That sort of blows my mind.

Look for this in what he says about courage in Book 3. The beautiful is not skin deep, and perception of beauty is crucial for recognizing virtue. It might even be the point, the goal of virtue.

[Ian]

Genni wrote: "Ian wrote: "Genni wrote: "Quick question: In my edition, each book is divided into sections and has a section head that tells you the material to be found in it. Are these sections and headings Ari..."
For some reason I had it in my head that providing some sort of outline used to be a common practice by authors

Now that you've brought it up, I have the same idea running through *my* head, but the examples I've been able to come up with are all Renaissance or later, like the detailed table of contents in Robert Burton's huge "Anatomy of Melancholy" (first edition 1621, with four expanded editions over the next seventeen years) -- which, of course, may be wrong.

Short lists of contents may have been attached by their authors to some classical works, at least those of unusual length. But the only case that comes to mind -- and which I've confirmed -- is the listing in Book One of the main topics (only) of the remaining thirty-six books in Pliny the Elder's Natural History (which is a sort of Roman encyclopedia without the convention of alphabetical order).

[Ignacio]

Thomas wrote: "Look for this in what he says about courage in Book 3. The beautiful is not skin deep, and perception of beauty is crucial for recognizing virtue. It might even be the point, the goal of virtue."

Thank you, this is helpful. I've had the sense that aesthetic judgment "resembles" ethical judgment, and I think some philosophers have developed this idea (maybe Kant?). I do believe in that idea though I can't fully explain it.

Of course for the Greeks, the good and the beautiful always go together: "kalos kai agathos" or "kalos kagathos." So "beautiful" implies other things beyond simply being pleasurable to the senses, such as harmony and justice, the "right" amount, the "perfectly appropriate" proportion (or color, of forms or volumes in sculpture, etc.)