Book Two

[Ian]

Ian wrote: "Genni wrote: "Quick question: In my edition, each book is divided into sections and has a section head that tells you the material to be found in it. Are these sections and headings Aristotle's or ..."

(Yes, I know I'm replying to myself -- I have more information, and thought the post too long to just insert it as an edit.)

I probably over-emphasized the difficulty of finding things in ancient manuscripts, due to their "wall of words" appearance. It fact, ancient scribes provided readers with helpful practices other than word divisions and consistent punctuation.

For example, the length of each line, producing narrower or wider columns, could be adjusted to whether the copy was intended to be read out loud, or silently. There were ways to use the standardized columns as a way to find specific passages, too.

For a technical, but mostly readable, discussion, from the viewpoint of how the mind handles texts of various sorts, see:
"Techniques of Reading and Textual Layout in Ancient Greek Texts," by Luigi Battezzato

It can be accessed at academia.edu, which is free for basic service (locating articles), but requires signing up for an account. Some articles can be read on-line, but this is one that requires down-loading a PDF.

Once you have an account, you can go directly to

https://www.academia.edu/818140/TECHN...

[Lily]

David wrote: "....I read this as sometimes it is appropriate, as judged or perceived by yourself and others, to vary our response a little from the mean towards an extreme or a deficiency to fit the circumstances...."

David -- enjoyed your selection and highlights here! It "felt" so Aristotelian in the search for what might be perceived as the "mean" -- and such fun to try to relate to current negotiations to avert (or provoke?) a U.S. federal government shutdown.

[David]

Lily wrote: "David wrote: ". . .and such fun to try to relate to current negotiations to avert (or provoke?) a U.S. federal government shutdown."

Isn't a govt. shutdown one of those events without a mean and is always wrong? What are the deficient and excessive states of a government shutdown; budget cuts and anarchy? Is there such a thing as a government shutdown done in the right way, at the right time, by the right people, for the right reasons?

If so, I am going to have to start researching how to commit that affair with the right woman at the right time in the right way. . .:)

[Christopher]

David wrote: "If so, I am going to have to start researching how to commit that affair with the right woman at the right time in the right way. . .:) ..."

The increasing prevalence of post-marital sex.

[Shelley]

I fell behind with the reading last week but am finally catching up.

Totally agree with Ignacio (message 26) that Book II is much easier to follow than Book I.

Interesting of Thomas to bring up the mathematical basis to "the mean" in message 35. In the introduction to the mean, Aristotle's position strikes me as being more biological, rather than mathematical in the Platonic sense.

(Here, I'm making the highly crude and unscientific distinction between Platonic mathematics [i.e. there is one true solution to every problem, an ideal Form for every idea, etc etc] versus biology [i.e. there is a population of individuals with great inter-individual variability, and the truth is best described as a distribution with a mean and a variance]).

Aristotle clearly seems to be in the latter camp. It's there in the biological language he chooses: "if eating ten pounds is a lot but two pounds too little, the trainer will not prescribe six pounds: for Milo, it would be too little; for someone just starting gymnastic training, it would be too much" (1106b). It's also there in the practical conclusion which David summarizes so eloquently in message 50: "It is difficult to reason how much our responses must vary in each case, but over many responses in many cases our responses should 'average out to the mean'".

[Thomas]

Shelley wrote: "Interesting of Thomas to bring up the mathematical basis to "the mean" in message 35. In the introduction to the mean, Aristotle's position strikes me as being more biological, rather than mathematical in the Platonic sense."

Just to be clear, mathematics is not a basis for the mean. Math is just an analogy, and maybe not the best one. The Greek term for "the mean" is he mesotes, which just means "the middle." One of the interesting things about the mean is that it can't be calculated. It must be sensed.

[Lily]

Thomas wrote: "One of the interesting things about the mean is that it can't be calculated. It must be sensed. ..."

[g] Are we "back" to Hume? (Only the observable "counts"/"matters"/is real?)

[Christopher]

Thomas wrote: "One of the interesting things about the mean is that it can't be calculated. It must be sensed. ....."

I don't think that is his point at all. What he says is that general rules cannot be applied in every case. (1107a 30- start of ch. 7)

... We must speak of virtue not only under its universal aspect but we must apply the doctrine to individual cases. In discussions which treat of actions, universals are not of much utility and particulars are more accurate, for actions are concerned with singulars. It is fitting then that discussions be in harmony with particulars. Therefore our teaching must be based on the explanation of individual virtues.

(The word translated here as 'discussions' is logoi- the arguments.

Every ethical decision is based on arguments, although a 'general rule' will not help the 'prudent' man on a case by case basis.

That is very different from 'sensing' the mean.

[Lily]

Christopher wrote: "Every ethical decision is based on arguments, although a 'general rule' will not help the 'prudent' man on a case by case basis...."

?! "not help" seems a little strong in this context?

Or perhaps precedent is more significant than even 'general rule'?

[Christopher]

Lily wrote: "Christopher wrote: "Every ethical decision is based on arguments, although a 'general rule' will not help the 'prudent' man on a case by case basis...."

?! "not help" seems a little strong in this..."

You're right. I think A. is thinking of someone who has a rigid general rule which can lead to mischief applied to every case.

(Trying to think of a good example... "Never give a sick man cold water." Something like that...)

Anyway, this has political implications because A. says the law is like this.. too general.

[Thomas]

Christopher wrote: "Every ethical decision is based on arguments, although a 'general rule' will not help the 'prudent' man on a case by case basis.

That is very different from 'sensing' the mean.

I think he's speaking there of his analysis, not the way in which the mean is determined in any given situation. "We must speak of virtue as..." and "In discussions which treat of actions..." etc. I don't think he suggests anywhere that the virtuous person actually decides how to act based on argumentation. Just the opposite, I think -- virtue is not a matter of argumentation (or of following rules, which would presumably be the products of argumentation) but of perceiving the mean in specific situations.

ETA: But wait! What about deliberation? (Book 3, Chapter 3) What about virtues in general, which Aristotle says "make one do things in the way right reason would dictate"? (1114b25) Perhaps these are "argumentations" in a way?

Then why does he also say that judgment of the mean is a matter of perception? (1109b20)

[Lily]

Christopher wrote: "You're right. I think A. is thinking of someone who has a rigid general rule which can lead to mischief applied to every case...."

Thx, Christopher.

I think it is fun, but difficult, to think one can think what someone else thinks, even if that person has attempted to be as precise as Aristotle seems to have done. (view spoiler)[I think I was pretty good at it with my sometimes taciturn husband when he was alive. But at least he could attempt to correct me! And millennia did not separate our experience of life. Please forgive me the bit of spoofing -- well, maybe not quite the right word; I do mean good natured fun, but not sure this is by misrepresentation. :-0 (hide spoiler)]

[Bryan--The Bee’s Knees]

I was doing some other reading and ran across this concept of 'the mean' in Confucian thought--here's the Wiki link in case anyone is interested

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doctrin...

[[deleted user]]

Bryan wrote: "I was doing some other reading and ran across this concept of 'the mean' in Confucian thought--here's the Wiki link in case anyone is interested

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doctrin..."

That was interesting. I noticed Confucius held that such a man as lived by the mean was rare.

Likewise Aristotle would not put many in the virtuous category. He seemed to me to hold a pretty strict standard. I had thought at first when he allowed that each individual would have a rather unique mean, that A was taking individual's personal circumstances in account. But later, no. He didn't seem to give any ... excuse/consideration .. for an individual's circumstances. No "So and so had a tough childhood" for Aristotle. From Book III

(view spoiler)[ But perhaps a man is of such a character that he cannot attend to such things: still men are themselves the causes of having become such characters by living carelessly...... As for the plea, that a man did not know that habits are produced from separate acts of working, we reply, such ignorance is a mark of excessive stupidity." (hide spoiler)]

So I'm not sure what he means when he writes that the mean is different for different individuals, different cultures. How so? I wonder. What am I missing?

[Lily]

Adelle wrote: "That was interesting. I noticed Confucius held that such a man as lived by the mean was rare."

Including the section on "Disputes."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doctrin...

[Ashley]

Adelle wrote: "...Likewise Aristotle would not put many in the virtuous category. He seemed to me to hold a pretty strict standard. I had thought at first when he allowed that each individual would have a rather unique mean, that A was taking individual's personal circumstances in account. But later, no. He didn't seem to give any ... excuse/consideration .. for an individual's circumstances. No "So and so had a tough childhood" for Aristotle..."

A strict standard, indeed! He puts a lot of emphasis on appropriate feelings that accompany appropriate action. From II.3 (Ross translation, Oxford University Press):

"...we ought to have been brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and be pained by the things that we ought; this is the right education...Again, it has grown up with us all from our infancy; this is why it is difficult to rub off this passion, engrained as it is in our life....to feel delight and pain rightly and wrongly has no small effect on our actions."

If someone were deprived of the "right" moral education from infancy, is there still any redemption? Will we ever be able to acquire virtue by doing virtuous things?

[Bryan--The Bee’s Knees]

Ashley wrote: "If someone were deprived of the "right" moral education from infancy, is there still any redemption? Will we ever be able to acquire virtue by doing virtuous things?"

Not too facetiously, I'd venture to say that the school of hard knocks can sometimes take the place of childhood learning. I think it went some ways toward teaching me things I couldn't learn as a rebellious teen. (Not that I'm claiming to be virtuous now, but relative to my teenage years...then yes, I'm a monk)

[Thomas]

Ashley wrote: "If someone were deprived of the "right" moral education from infancy, is there still any redemption? Will we ever be able to acquire virtue by doing virtuous things? "

The person who has been deprived of a proper education, or one who has been allowed to develop bad habits, is like the warped lumber Aristotle describes at 1109b. A person like that might become more virtuous than he was before by pushing himself in a direction opposite to his natural tendency, and maybe with great effort can "straighten" himself out.

But "warped" people don't normally do that because what appears warped to us looks straight to them. That's the problem I'm having with perception as a judge of the mean.

Aristotle seems to be saying that we have to be educated to perceive correctly; then we can see what is right. But doesn't this put everything in the hands of the educator? Does Father always know best?

[Thomas]

Bryan wrote: "Not too facetiously, I'd venture to say that the school of hard knocks can sometimes take the place of childhood learning. I think it went some ways toward teaching me things I couldn't learn as a rebellious teen.."

This is really interesting. Do you think there are ethical principles at play in the school of hard knocks? (Machiavellian ones, maybe? :) Can the school of hard knocks teach us how to live the good life and be happy in the Aristotelian sense?

[Tamara]

Thomas wrote: "Does Father always know best?..."

Maybe not Father. But Mother certainly does :)

[David]

Thomas wrote: "This is really interesting. Do you think there are ethical principles at play in the school of hard knocks? (Machiavellian ones, maybe? :) Can the school of hard knocks teach us how to live the good life and be happy in the Aristotelian sense?"

A short answer might be, maybe yes, game theory suggests it might.

[Roger]

Some fathers are better than others.

[Lily]

@50 David quoted: " for we too sometimes praise those who fall short and call them good-tempered, but sometimes we praise those who get angry and call them manly...."

A nice little case study on the ability of labeling/words to create reality, especially in a particular social setting. One of the ways a human group creates conformity in some cases, congeniality in others, or sometimes exclusion?

Many of us today know the jokes about the similarities and differences between righteous indignation and bitchiness. Was in a discussion this week where we talked about the situations where naming something by supplying a label can shut down communications -- whether the label might be political party or church affiliation or more general, like liberal, progressive, conservative; i.e., the labels themselves embed assumptions and even prejudices that can inhibit openness -- and options for action. (view spoiler)[Probably irrelevant add, hence the spoiler: And this is not to deny the value of calling a spade a spade -- even if on a closer look, it may or may not be. (hide spoiler)]

[Lily]

Tamara wrote: "Thomas wrote: "Does Father always know best?..."

Maybe not Father. But Mother certainly does :)"

{Laughing} Tamara, are you referring to Thomas's comment @23 on Book 3 about Thetis and Achilles?

[Tamara]

Lily wrote: "{Laughing} Tamara, are you referring to Thomas's comment @23 on Book 3 about Thetis..."

In comment @23 on Book 3, Thomas wrote: "His mom, Thetis, tells him that his death will come soon after Hector's. And Mom is always right."

I couldn't have put it better myself :)

[Genni]

Lily wrote: " Was in a discussion this week where we talked about the situations where naming something by supplying a label can shut down communications -- whether the label might be political party or church affiliation or more general, like liberal, progressive, conservative; i.e., the labels themselves embed assumptions and even prejudices that can inhibit openness -- and options for action. "

I have wondered about this. It seems to me that labels are almost essential for communication. Language would become most cumbersome if you were trying to talk about progressives and conservatives without the negative assumptions associated with each, wouldn't it? It seems to me that labels are not the problem, but the issue of labels becoming praise/censure versus descriptions??

[Lily]

Genni wrote: "...It seems to me that labels are not the problem, but the issue of labels becoming praise/censure versus descriptions??..."

Genni -- to me, this is one of the tough places of language and of communications. Even if labels manage to remain clear of value assessments (praise/censure), they often are part of the process of categorization. Categorization is easier when the boundaries are clear, but they often are not.

[Genni]

Hi Thomas, another question on the Greek. I was thinking about Aristotle's standard for pain/pleasure today in connection with virtue and was poking around the internet. Is it possible to translate pain/pleasure with like/dislike? I am struggling with the requirement to feel pleasure/pain at the right things. It seems more possible to like the ideals rather than to actually feel pleasure. I remember him talking about pleasure in the end result so I may be just confusing them in my mind again, but still, wanted to ask.

[Thomas]

Genni wrote: "Hi Thomas, another question on the Greek. I was thinking about Aristotle's standard for pain/pleasure today in connection with virtue and was poking around the internet. Is it possible to translate..."

The term for feeling pleasure is "hedesthai" (related to the English word "hedonist") and the word for liking is "philein" so they are separate concepts and not interchangeable. The examples Aristotle uses (1099a) are horses, the theater, just actions, and virtuous actions. People who like these things take pleasure in them. He suggests, however, that some things are pleasant by nature; these things are pleasant in themselves. Things that aren't pleasant by nature create conflicts in the soul, as the lover of wine discovers the next morning. Only one part of the wine lover's soul is pleased by wine; other parts conflict with this and suffer. Lovers of virtuous actions find virtue pleasing in itself, with no hangovers. (I'm not sure what part of the soul loves horses. I'll have to ask my neighbor if he has any conflicts in his soul over his horses.)

[Genni]

Thomas wrote: "The term for feeling pleasure is "hedesthai" (related to the English word "hedonist") and the word for liking is "philein" so they are separate concepts and not interchangeable. The examples Aristotle uses (1099a) are horses, the theater, just actions, and virtuous actions. People who like these things take pleasure in them. He suggests, however, that some things are pleasant by nature; these things are pleasant in themselves. Things that aren't pleasant by nature create conflicts in the soul, as the lover of wine discovers the next morning. Only one part of the wine lover's soul is pleased by wine; other parts conflict with this and suffer. Lovers of virtuous actions find virtue pleasing in itself, with no hangovers. (I'm not sure what part of the soul loves horses. I'll have to ask my neighbor if he has any conflicts in his soul over his horses.) ."

[g] Ok, thanks for this.

[Thomas]

It turns out that the horse lover does experience one unpleasant consequence from his love: horses are expensive to keep and require daily care. Virtuous actions are, by comparison, relatively inexpensive.

[Lily]

Thomas wrote: "It turns out that the horse lover does experience one unpleasant consequence from his love: horses are expensive to keep and require daily care. Virtuous actions are, by comparison, relatively inex..."

Virtuous actions towards people, at least those in one's family, aren't expensive to keep and don't require daily care? :-(

[Thomas]

Lily wrote: "Virtuous actions towards people, at least those in one's family, aren't expensive to keep and don't require daily care? :-( "

I think Aristotle is thinking of horses as possessions that give a horse lover pleasure. I would imagine we think of family members in a different way. Taking care of one's family is pleasant in itself, I would hope.

ETA: Though it occurs to me now that my neighbor does in fact think of his horses as family, and not an expense. Virtue for Aristotle is work, which is a kind of expense, but it is one that we are happy to pay when we are working well.