Political Philosophy and Ethics discussion
Ethics
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Human Ethics: Basis, Principles, Applications
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Here is Randal's post as copied and pasted from my PDF of it (unfortunately, the links and italics did not survive this procedure, and perhaps Randal can repost the original from a Word document):
Alan,
I have been able to read a bit in your book First Philosophy and Human Ethics. There is much
here to praise. I am delighted to learn, for example, that a humble sewage treatment engineer may
aspire to the title of “philosopher.” Likewise, there is much good sense in the discussion of reason.
But, as is normal in affairs of this kind, I have a few doubts. I will concentrate on Chapter 2, The
Supreme Intelligence.
Chapter 2 presents the argument that “the philosophical premise of a Supreme Intelligence in the
universe is the only premise that is consistent with rational thought.” The argument seems to go like
this: since without the Law of Non-contradiction (LNC - you call it the principle of contradiction), “A
cannot not be A,” you say that “rational thought is impossible” and since the questions 1) What is the
origin of the Earth?; 2) Is time eternal or not?; and 3) Is space infinite or not?, cannot be answered,
you conclude that “No other premise (than that of a Supreme Intelligence) makes sense. Human
reason cannot, by its nature, penetrate beyond the principle of contradiction as it operates in the
universe known to us.” I won’t try to rehearse your detailed argument, but I take this to be the gist of
it. And I would agree with it, except that I wonder about the first premise and wonder if we really
need to answer those three questions.
You say that you “have not studied other contemporary religions as much as I have studied Judaism
and Christianity and therefore hesitate to evaluate them from an ethical perspective.” That is fair
enough. But I have several hundred books on my shelves on the subject of Buddhism (few of them
posted to Goodreads) and have even read a good number of them. I have traveled widely in Buddhist
Asia: to Korea, Japan, Thailand, to Tibetan regions of Western China and, significantly, to the
historical Buddhist sites in Northern India. I have studied most of the lineages of Buddhism: Zen,
Tibetan practice, and Theravada practice, but I am most impressed with the original Pali books that
were written down in the 3rd century B.C.E. relating the life of Siddhattha Gotama (in Pali, aka the
Buddha) in the 5th century B.C.E. So I wonder what light Buddhism, and specifically the Pali Canon,
can throw on this question.
There is a wonderful short sutta in the Samyutta Nikaya, the Vacchagotta Sutta, which you could
read here in 10 minutes, that asks similar questions to your own. Master Gotama encounters a
wanderer (sramana or seeker) who asks Gotama a number of questions:
1) Now then, Master Gotama, is the cosmos eternal?
2) Well then, Master Gotama, is the cosmos not eternal?
3) Then is the cosmos finite?
4) Is the cosmos infinite?
5) Is the body the same as the soul?
6) Is the body one thing, and the soul another?
7) Does the Tathagata (another name for the Buddha) exist after death?
8) Does the Tathagata not exist after death?
9) Does the Tathagata both exist and not exist after death?
10) Does the Tathagata neither exist nor not exist after death?
To each of these questions Gotama replies, “That has not been declared by me, Vaccha.” He then
goes on to explain to Vaccha what he does declare: that the so-called five khandas (form, feeling,
perception, fabrications, and consciousness) are not “self.” This is a recapitulation of his Second
Discourse at Sarnath. In answer to similar questions elsewhere in the Canon, Gotama answers that
what he does teach is the Four Noble Truths, given in his First Discourse at Sarnath. My point here is
not to discuss Buddhist doctrine, but to point out the fact that the questions that you have posed
were not considered important by Gotama. So he had no need to hypothesize a Supreme Intelligence
to explain why these questions couldn’t be answered. What Gotama thought important were his
teachings on psychology and on ethics, something like Socrates.
Another thing to notice about this sutta is that Gotama references a four-valued logic: true, false,
both true and false, and neither true and false. The idea of multivalued logic was foreign to Western
Philosophy until the twentieth century. Since then, there has been a vigorous development of various
multivalued logics. But it was quite common in ancient India. There is a wonderful book by a
Cambridge-trained philosopher (he studied with Wittgenstein), K.N. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist
Theory of Knowledge, which outlines many of these early Indian logics. The Jains, for example,
favored a seven-valued logic.
And among contemporaries, there are many who leave traditional bivalent logic behind. First among
them, in my view, is Graham Priest, whose book Beyond the Limits of Thought is in my experience,
the best book of philosophy in our new century. Priest is a Brit who taught in Australia for many
years, but who now has an esteemed professorship at CUNY. Oxford University Press chose Priest to
author its book on Logic in its Very Short Introduction series. Priest denies that the LNC holds in all cases, and points out that it especially does not hold in cases like the questions that you have posed. I note in the Update on your blog that you make reference to Kant. Priest gives Kant the credit for being the discoverer of what Priest calls, "dialetheism", the theory that not all contradictions are false.
I won’t go on more about this here, but I have written short pieces on this on my blog here and here
and longer pieces about Susan Haack’s first book on multivalued logics and on Aristotle’s doubts
about bivalence.
That is enough for now. On to Murder, Courage, Work, Leisure, and Sex!
Best regards,
Randal
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Thank you very much, Randal, for your comments and especially for your philosophical critique of the metaphysical excursion in Chapter 2 of First Philosophy and Human Ethics. My wife (whom I did not meet until a couple of years after I published the book) also has issues with my metaphysical analysis, albeit from the perspective of modern science.
I have not, with the exception of portions of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, read any of the sources you reference, but I will do so after I complete my present book on Roger Williams. I had always been peremptorily dismissive of Buddhism, associating it with the Zen Buddhism of my hippie contemporaries during the late 1960s, who seemed to reduce it to a simplistic dictum of living for the present and smoking pot ("not that there's anything wrong with that," as Seinfeld and some others currently near and dear to me would say—LOL). Even thinking of it today conjures up images in my mind of stoned Beatles in eastern religious regalia. If something was popular, I automatically assumed, without sufficient investigation, that it was wrong—call it intellectual elitism. I did read Herman Hesse's Siddhartha at that time (to see what all the fuss was about), though I recall none of it today. Nevertheless, perhaps some of the things in Siddhartha were somehow buried in my subconscious when I wrote Chapter 2 during the late 1990s. I'll read Siddhartha again after I publish the Roger Williams book to ascertain whether I was unconsciously influenced by it in any way, though I currently doubt it. I also read Hesse's The Glass Bead Game (Das Glasperlenspiel) for a college course. The only thing I got out of that book was that it seemed to be a satire or parody of academia. I don't know whether that was Hesse's intention or not—probably not, considering the seriousness with which academics have taken the work. Nevertheless, the hero, Joseph Knecht, ends up departing from the novel's stand-in for the academic world.
But I digress. With regard to your specific points, I note the following.
The second paragraph of your post contains, I think, some typos, or, at least, it is not an entirely accurate summary of what I wrote. I did not say that "rational thought is impossible" (a position I emphatically reject), though I did say that reason as we know it cannot explain the ultimate paradoxes. I am not concerned with "the origin of the Earth" (which certainly is no mystery, given the current state of our natural science—see the updated Cosmos series on TV, which presents long-known information regarding the origin of the earth) but rather with the origin of the known universe. As I observed in the book and in the online updates, the universe appears to have been created by the Big Bang, and some of the ultimate questions include what caused the Big Bang and what created the laws of nature that govern our universe. In my online updates, I back away from using the term "Supreme Intelligence" as being too anthropomorphic. Indeed, as I indicated there, it appears to me now that the current speculations of some theoretical physicists regarding multiple universes might explain this quandary, though the final answer may not be accessible to us. In other words, the universe known to us (with the physical laws of nature known to us) may have been created by some "force" (for want of a better term) in another universe, with different laws of nature that would explain the ultimate paradoxes that appear to be inexplicable to us. The religionists may call this force "God," but it has nothing to do with any scripture that has appeared in human history.
Your comments about Buddhism and your linked discussions are interesting, and, as observed above, I will read more about this (as well as related topics) after I finish writing my current book. You state: "My point here is not to discuss Buddhist doctrine, but to point out the fact that the questions that you have posed were not considered important by Gotama. So he had no need to hypothesize a Supreme Intelligence to explain why these questions couldn’t be answered. What Gotama thought important were his teachings on psychology and on ethics, something like Socrates." Although I think that these questions are, indeed, important, I have no confidence in our ability to answer them. Therefore, I conclude, as did Socrates and apparently like Gotama, that human beings should focus on questions of ethical (and political) philosophy. That was really the point of Chapter 2. If I prepare a second edition (after completing my current book), I may, in fact, either omit entirely the metaphysical discussion in the current Chapter 2 or rewrite it and put in an appendix. It is not necessary for the discussion of ethics, because the argument that we cannot obtain ethics from religion is demonstrated from the contradictions among the claims to revelation, which is discussed not only in Chapter 2 but also in the Appendix of the current version of the book.
I must admit that I never heard about "multivalued logic" before reading about it this year in the Goodreads Philosophy Group posts and in your subject post in the present group. Multivalued logic is a kind of abstract and quasi-mathematical logic that is foreign to my way of thinking (see First Philosophy and Human Ethics at pages 36-38), but it looks like I am going to have to read up on it if I want to advocate the principle of contradiction (or noncontradiction). My instinctual aversion to twentieth-century philosophy may have to give way to the quest for truth. Dang it. Given my current ignorance about multivalued logic, I will not opine on it at this time.
Thanks again for your comments. This is the kind of rational discourse that I appreciate and enjoy. Please don't hesitate to comment on the remainder of the book.
Alan,Thanks for your good-hearted response to my somewhat puckish post. Here is the version of my original post with the links:
I have been able to read a bit in your book First Philosophy and Human Ethics. There is much here to praise. I am delighted to learn, for example, that a humble sewage treatment engineer may aspire to the title of “philosopher.” Likewise, there is much good sense in the discussion of reason. But, as is normal in affairs of this kind, I have a few doubts. I will concentrate on Chapter 2, The Supreme Intelligence.
Chapter 2 presents the argument that “the philosophical premise of a Supreme Intelligence in the universe is the only premise that is consistent with rational thought.” The argument seems to go like this: since without the Law of Non-contradiction (LNC - you call it the principle of contradiction), “A cannot not be A,” you say that “rational thought is impossible” and since the questions 1) What is the origin of the Earth?; 2) Is time eternal or not?; and 3) Is space infinite or not?, cannot be answered, you conclude that “No other premise (than that of a Supreme Intelligence) makes sense. Human reason cannot, by its nature, penetrate beyond the principle of contradiction as it operates in the universe known to us.” I won’t try to rehearse your detailed argument, but I take this to be the gist of it. And I would agree with it, except that I wonder about the first premise and wonder if we really need to answer those three questions.
You say that you “have not studied other contemporary religions as much as I have studied Judaism and Christianity and therefore hesitate to evaluate them from an ethical perspective.” That is fair enough. But I have several hundred books on my shelves on the subject of Buddhism (few of them posted to Goodreads) and have even read a good number of them. I have traveled widely in Buddhist Asia: to Korea, Japan, Thailand, to Tibetan regions of Western China and, significantly, to the historical Buddhist sites in Northern India. I have studied most of the lineages of Buddhism: Zen, Tibetan practice, and Theravada practice, but I am most impressed with the original Pali books that were written down in the 3rd century B.C.E. relating the life of Siddhattha Gotama (in Pali, aka the Buddha) in the 5th century B.C.E. So I wonder what light Buddhism, and specifically the Pali Canon, can throw on this question.
There is a wonderful short sutta in the Samyutta Nikaya, the Vacchagotta Sutta, which you could read here in 10 minutes, that asks similar questions to your own. Master Gotama encounters a wanderer (sramana or seeker) who asks Gotama a number of questions:
1) Now then, Master Gotama, is the cosmos eternal?
2) Well then, Master Gotama, is the cosmos not eternal?
3) Then is the cosmos finite?
4) Is the cosmos infinite?
5) Is the body the same as the soul?
6) Is the body one thing, and the soul another?
7) Does the Tathagata (another name for the Buddha) exist after death?
8) Does the Tathagata not exist after death?
9) Does the Tathagata both exist and not exist after death?
10) Does the Tathagata neither exist nor not exist after death?
To each of these questions Gotama replies, “That has not been declared by me, Vaccha.” He then goes on to explain to Vaccha what he does declare: that the so-called five khandas (form, feeling, perception, fabrications, and consciousness) are not “self.” This is a recapitulation of his second discourse at Sarnath. In answer to similar questions elsewhere in the Canon, Gotama answers that what he does teach is the Four Noble Truths, given in his First Discourse at Sarnath. My point here is not to discuss Buddhist doctrine, but to point out the fact that the questions that you have posed were not considered important by Gotama. So he had no need to hypothesize a Supreme Intelligence to explain why these questions couldn’t be answered. What Gotama thought important was his teachings on psychology and on ethics, something like Socrates.
Another thing to notice about this sutta is that Gotama references a four-valued logic: true, false, both true and false, and neither true and false. The idea of multi-valued logic was foreign to Western Philosophy until the twentieth century. Since then, there has been a vigorous development of various multi-valued logics. But it was quite common in ancient India. There is a wonderful book by a Cambridge-trained philosopher (he studied with Wittgenstein), K.N. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, which outlines many of these early Indian logics. The Jains, for example, favored a seven-valued logic.
And among contemporaries, there are many who leave traditional bi-valent logic behind. First among them, in my view, is Graham Priest, whose book Beyond the Limits of Thought is in my experience, the best book of philosophy in our new century. Priest is a Brit who taught in Australia for many years, but who now has an esteemed professorship at CUNY. Oxford University Press chose Priest to author its book on Logic in its Very Short Introduction series. Priest denies that the LNC holds in all cases, and points out that it especially does not hold in cases like the questions that you have posed. I note in the Update on your blog that you make reference to Kant. Priest gives Kant the credit for being the discoverer of what Priest calls, "dialetheism", the theory that some contradictions are true.
I won’t go on more about this here, but I have written short pieces on this on my blog here and here and longer pieces about Susan Haack’s first book on multi-valued logics and on Aristotle’s doubts about bi-valence .
That is enough for now. On to Murder, Courage, Work, Leisure, and Sex!
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Alan wrote: "The following is my response to Randal's original Post No. 2, which I accidentally deleted: see current Post No. 2, which copies and pastes his original post from my PDF copy. Since the result los..."Alan,
I will take a look at your reply and post something in a bit. Given your aversion to twentieth century philosophy, you might as well just skip to twenty-first century and look up some of Graham Priest's papers and books or another philosopher who was a translator of my favorite 2nd century Indian Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna, Jay Garfield. Garfield doesn't use the mathematical notation that Priest is addicted to. You can get some little idea of their work from my blog posts. I will be posting more.
Randal
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Sounds good, Randal. Since I'm in the Eastern Time Zone, it's almost 11:30 p.m. here and time for me to hit the sack. I'll check out your additional post tomorrow morning. Alan
Alan wrote: "The following is my response to Randal's original Post No. 2, which I accidentally deleted: see current Post No. 2, which copies and pastes his original post from my PDF copy. Since the result los..."Alan,
Just a short post in reply. I was a West Coast guy, so Gary Snyder and Ferlinghetti at City Lights were beacons of light for me in my youth. You can skip Hesse, though. That is not Buddhism. And the Beatles (mostly George, I think) were into Hinduism, not Buddhism. Reverend Gotama was a concerted opponent of the Brahmanistic priesthood of his day. In the Digha Nikaya he parodied Brahma, the ultimate "soul" of the universe. Gotama was a "no soul" guy. One of the five precepts of Buddhism is abstention from mind-altering drugs or liquids, so stoned hippies were not practicing Buddhism either.
Sorry if I misquoted you. I thought I was quoting right out of the book, although I didn't reference pages.
There are plenty of Western logicians who still advocate bivalent logic. Susan Haack, who wrote two books on the subject of multivalent logic and was a teacher of Priest, was mostly a bivalent holdout before switching to epistemology. An interesting Oxford logician, Sir Michael Dummett, is a neither true nor false guy (three-valued logic) and the title of one of his books is The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. I think what Sir Michael had in mind was that to do metaphysics at all one needs to get one's logic square. A bivalent guy or gal will come to much different conclusions from someone who allows for both/and and/or either/or.
Randal
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I see now which passage of First Philosophy and Human Ethics you are referencing. I wrote (pages 17-18: "This [the principle of contradiction (or noncontradiction)] is one of the foundational axioms of philosophy because, without the principle of contradiction, rational thought is impossible." The footnote to my statement refers the reader to the citations in the preceding footnote, which identify writings of Plato, Aristotle, and H. W. B. Joseph. As I understand your position, this proposition is incorrect, because multivalent logic disproves the principle of noncontradiction. As previously indicated, I was totally unaware that there was any controversy, academic or otherwise, about the principle of noncontradiction at the time I wrote the book or, indeed, at any time before the present year. I will study these issues further in 2015. In all likelihood, I will rewrite my book to exclude any discussion of metaphysics as such, reserving the latter, if I am ever so inclined, to a future paper or book. However, metaphysics may be one of those subjects on which I am willing to learn but not to write.
Alan wrote: "Thanks again, Randal, for your thoughts and book references. I'll read up on these matters after I finish writing my current book on Roger Williams. My study of these additional topics will proba..."The link to my review of Vlastos's book on Socrates is here on my blog and here on Goodreads. In that review I question Vlastos's own clinging to the LNC in favor of what I consider to be a more open-minded attitude by Socrates, although I wouldn't try to twist Socrates into being a twenty-first century dialetheist. I am much more sympathetic to the skeptical critique of Plato and Aristotle that was documented by Sextus Empiricus (and similar to the attitude of the 2nd century Indian Buddhist, Nagarjuna) than I think you are. Of which more later (after you get out of the seventeenth century!)
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But I'm beginning to like the seventeenth century! Had it not been for all the religious wars and persecutions, it wouldn't have been so bad. (I speak here in jest, except for the remarkable figures of Roger Williams, John Milton, and John Locke, not to mention Coke, Bacon, and Newton.) But I will find it really hard to be pried out of the eighteenth century--everything has been downhill since the Enlightenment gave way to the Great Awakening and then to the Second Great Awakening. I may never be able to accept twentieth- and twenty-first-century philosophy. If we abandon the noncontradiction principle, does this not open the city gates to the barbarian hordes of the extreme right and the extreme left? We have enough trouble keeping people rational as it is. Telling them that they don't have to worry about contradicting themselves will only reinforce their preexisting prejudices instead of, like Socrates, challenging them. I guess I think of logic not so much as a theoretical, quasi-mathematical pursuit as a means of thinking clearly and living peaceably in the world. See my quotation from Locke (Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk. 4, chap. 17, § 4) on pages 37-38 of First Philosophy and Human Ethics.
Alan wrote: "If we abandon the noncontradiction principle, does this not open the city gates to the barbarian hordes of the extreme right and the extreme left?"Not to worry, Alan. Allowing some contradictions to rest quietly undisturbed does not mean that we need to abandon the LNC for almost all of the usual cases, including reductio ad absurdum. The problem comes just in the cases which you explored in your book, at the limits of iteration (infinity), the limits of expression, the limits of cognition, and the limits of conception. These are titles of chapters in Priest's referenced book, which includes a broad sweep of the history of philosophy from Plato, Cratylus, and Sextus to Russell, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger. Priest is a materialist opponent of skepticism (I am much more sympathetic). He just is honest enough to give contradiction its due. I am pretty sure that he wouldn't quarrel (nor certainly would I) with thinking clearly and living peaceably!
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Since I published First Philosophy and Human Ethics, I have discovered another work that appears to make a similar point to some of my observations in Chapter 2, though in a much more philosophically developed way: Eva Brann, What, Then, is Time? (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999). I have not yet had an opportunity to study Brann's book in depth, but her following discussion on pages 7-8 is on point:
"Since Einstein is not preoccupied with the nature of time, but rather with the time of nature, or to put it precisely, since he is not, as physicist, interested in the Being of time but in its measurement, simultaneity becomes problematic for him. . . . . Certainly it begins very simply with a reflection on the measurement of time— though it ends in mind-boggling new notions of the nature of time. But careful philosophers of science never lose sight of the fact that these temporal consequences are based on a certain theory of time-measurement, that is to say of observers and their time-instruments."
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"CHAPTER 2: THE SUPREME INTELLIGENCE
"In the forthcoming revision of this book, this chapter will be deleted in its present form and be replaced with a chapter provisionally entitled 'The Basis of Human Ethics.' My speculations in the first edition of this book about metaphysics and physics were not founded on an up-to-date understanding of the developments in the field of physics. Since I am not a physicist, I cannot speak competently on these issues.
"The title of the book will also be changed, in the second edition, so as to omit the term 'first philosophy.' The new Chapter 2 will focus on the conflicts among the claims to revelation and the corresponding necessity of basing human ethics on a teleological (albeit nontheological) view of human nature."
I am currently reading Philippa Foot's Natural Goodness (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001). I read the first few pages of this book in November 2001 but am now determined to read the entirety of it. From what I have read so far, it appears to me that Foot's approach to ethics is similar to mine. Ditto Rosalind Hursthouse's On Virtue Ethics (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999), which I will read next. Of course, I have learned never to predict what I think a book will say (see the linked review in my preceding post), but, so far, all signs are favorable. Stay tuned.
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• Other topics in the present "Ethics" folder
• The topic Reason, Logic, and Critical Thinking passim in the "General Topics" folder
• The topic Ancient Greek History and Religion passim, especially posts 69-93, in the "Political Philosophy" folder
• Posts 90-113 of the Totalitarianism, Authoritarianism, Rule of law topic in the "Political Philosophy" folder
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I have just now finished Philippa Foot's Natural Goodness. I agree with her basic principles, which (like my earlier book on ethics) are based on Aristotelian (nontheological) teleology, as updated by evolutionary biology (while recognizing the current nature of the human species). I have less fondness, however, for the way she elaborates and applies these concepts. My approach proceeds in a somewhat different direction. For a number of reasons, I am not writing a formal review of Foot's book, at least not at this time.
Alan wrote (post 20): "Ditto Rosalind Hursthouse's On Virtue Ethics (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999), which I will read next."
I received G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica in the mail today. I am going to take a look at this book before proceeding to Hursthouse's On Virtue Ethics.
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Randal, thank you for the reference to Richard Lattimore's translation, which I have just now ordered from a used-book vendor (the book is out of print, and the Kindle edition does not seem to have hyperlinks to the notes). Lattimore (1906-84) was, of course, an excellent translator of ancient Greek classics, and I have read his translations of The Iliad and other Greek literature. I was previously unaware that he had translated the Gospels and the book of Revelation.
I also have several other translations of the Bible as well as some Greek editions of the Christian New Testament. Lattimore professed himself not sufficiently expert to decide among the various Greek manuscript traditions, but his translation should nevertheless be quite good per the following statement in his Preface (available on the Amazon "Look Inside" feature): "I have held throughout to the principle of keeping as close to the Greek as possible, not only for sense and for individual words, but in the belief that fidelity to the original word order and syntax may yield an English prose that to some extent reflects the style of the original."
Christian theology is outside the scope of this "Political Philosophy and Ethics" Goodreads group. However, the ethics of Jesus (and, for example, of Paul) is within the scope of this group. For further discussion of Jesus and Paul, see posts 109-13 in the Totalitarianism, Authoritarianism, Rule of Law topic).
This looks like an interesting premise for a book. I came across it accidentally, purely whilst adding books to a group shelf, on a completely different topic. In practice, (considering the date of release) its likely just another one of those glib, 'popular exposes' --in the awful tradition of Malcolm Gladwell--but the title did catch my eye.Shmexperts: How Ideology and Power Politics are Disguised as Science
Okay I have a question. It's late, and this is a simplistic way of putting it...but I will forge ahead:We've discussed the studies of HR Dodds lately...and reflecting back over the past few months of chat around here, my curiosity tonight is: how did the Greeks define the 'self'?
Alan, you reminded us recently that Greek thinkers were simple and profound. Yet, they had not the benefit of modern understanding of the complex, human psyche. Plato defined and articulated many problems facing a civic man; the duties of a citizen; the dilemmas of a moral man; etc etc etc.
But what of true, modern, 'self-knowledge'? When Socrates says 'know thyself' and 'to thine own self be true', what can we assume he is referring to, taking into consideration the lack of psychological awareness in his society at the time Plato wrote?
Is it possible that when a modern man says 'I must know my self'--following this in modern times, might conflict with Socrates notion of what a 'self' constituted? Might advanced self-knowledge contravene even some postulated logic of the Greeks?
If today--in modern times--I am able to discover things about myself which guide and steer me, does that possibly supersede some notions of logic as conceived by men in Plato's time? Even though many facets of logic are timeless-- isn't this a possibility?
Today, in today's world--I can say to myself, "I am not a man who will ever act in such-and-such a fashion'...(thanks in part to my understanding of my own mental states, my own psychology, my own values) ...are these insights, ones that Plato might not ever have been able to account for?
Another angle: when we speak of 'cultural relativism' today, can we not take into consideration that even western logic is culturally relative? Eastern peoples needn't necessarily adhere to our precepts of Greek-descended logic. The Oriental brain doesn't grasp or express concepts as the Occidental brain does; (either at the level of mind or at the level of chemistry).
If ethics is based on logic, and logic is based on a shared acceptance of scientific or mathematic ideas supposedly common from man to man---how can ethics be prescribed 'universally' when different peoples perceive their logical basis so differently? There are surely differing views of how the universe operates, betwixt one culture and a neighboring culture. Just because westerners disbelieve in spirits, doesn't mean we can rearrange the understanding of another people and *then* tell them they must behave according to 'our' universal logic.
I suppose in essence, I am asking this: if the 'passions' are culturally relative, how is it that 'reason' is also not subject to cultural relativity?
These are blunt and somewhat inelegant questions, but I hope they are received favorably and generate discussion.
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I really have no idea what you are talking about. If all reason and logic are culturally or historically relative, then there's no basis for any kind of serious discussion. I don't think that the essentials of human reason and logic (which are not dependent on any particular theological or metaphysical view) are culturally or historically relative. Take Freud, for example. His ego, superego, and id are not all that different from what Plato set forth in his Republic. The ethical issues that we face today are not all that different from those considered by Plato and Aristotle. See my essay "The Teaching of Plato's Seventh Letter" (1971).
Sure, the passions and customs of particular peoples and societies are, to an extent, culturally relative, and the West has frequently erred in imperialistically attempting to impose its particular versions of same on other cultures. But is the ethical and political philosophy of Confucius, for example, all that different from, say, that of Plato and Aristotle? I don't think so. Both Confucius and Aristotle had a doctrine of the mean as a focus of their ethical philosophy. Compare Confucius's Analects with Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Both taught forms of what is now called "virtue ethics." Cultural particulars necessarily vary—that is the human condition, as we know it—and those varying particulars were certainly known to Aristotle, as evidenced in his Politics. Nevertheless, the universals (as understood by the philosophers, not necessarily by the masses) are not, to my mind, all that variable.
I grant that, according to Randal, some or all Eastern philosophers and some more recent philosophers have not accepted the noncontradiction principle (NCP), which Aristotle regarded as the "most certain" of all principles of reasoning. But, as Randal and I have previously discussed (see posts 2-14 and 20, above), the NCP breaks down only at the extremes of metaphysics and physics, for example, quantum mechanics (to take something discovered in the twentieth century). For ordinary questions of ethics and politics, the NCP must apply—else we get George Orwell's 1984. We may soon experience a real live demonstration of this—depending on who wins the US election next week. We have seen earlier examples in Hitler's Germany and Stalin's USSR. Indeed, such tyrannies may be the inevitable result of the abandonment of basic principles of reasoning in human ethical, political, and social life. Orwell discussed this at length. Cf. Plato's Seventh Letter and Republic. See also the topic Reason, Logic, and Critical Thinking passim in the "General Topics" folder of this group.
Is there an ancient-world equivalent of Jung’s notion of synchronicity (i.e., of meaningful coincidences)? I found synchronicity interesting because it’s acausal in terms of outward events, which in instances of synchronicity are merely coincidental, yet in such instances there appears to be a meaningful relation between a perceived outward occurrence and the internal world or ongoing psychological dynamics of the person who has perceived the outward thing.For example, a person deskbound in a lucrative job dreams of giving it all up to pursue a career in nature photography. One night he has a dream in which a butterfly appears and reappears, like a guide, as if to reassure him that he can accomplish anything he’s brave enough to risk. One afternoon not long afterward, following a particularly vexing meeting at the office, he returns to his desk, longing to quit that job yet unnerved by the idea of change. Glancing at the window, he sees a butterfly land on the sill.
In this instance, there’s no causal relation of the externals, yet there’s a meaningful connection between the perceived outer thing and the internal state.
Mod
I have read little of Jung, and that was several decades ago. I am not aware that any ancient philosophers discussed coincidences. It would seem to me that this is a religious rather than a philosophical concept.
Alan wrote: "But, as Randal and I have previously discussed... the NCP breaks down only at the extremes of metaphysics and physics, for example, quantum mechanics (to take something discovered in the twentieth century)...."re: #26
I'm understanding you to speak here [Alan] of our everyday human reality breaking down only in (let's say) "parts of the universe utterly remote from us".
Perhaps I'm not paraphrasing you correctly, and if so I invite you to redress me, before I frame my reply.
But if I were to confront this appraisal of what goes in the the world of the atom, (even with my meager grasp of quantum physics) I would want to say that what 20th c. physicists discovered was something much more when they finally got down there with their electron microscopes.
What I have read/heard of their first --and maybe most startling-- conclusion was that parts of the atom move in such a frenzied way that they literally are 'in two places at once'. This is no small insight, because it therefore means that the formation of any particular atom is impossible to predict at all. It's impossible to look at any set of conditions and expect the formation of one atom vs the formation of a wholly different atom in the same place.
Whereas--in all scientific history up to that point--there were many thinkers who theorized that the most universal particles must be the most precise and the most orderly, to bolster the order we can observe in our own lives. Well, this was overturned. Physicists found the opposite, the dismaying fact that the universe is built entirely on chaos.
At best, nested 'levels' of order and chaos may mount upwards in scale from the 'micro' towards the 'macro'. An analogy are ocean currents vs ocean waves. In between these two orderly-seeming patterns can be found much confused, irregular sprays of foam, surf, and water.
Certainly with regard to cause-and-effect in our human-scale world; we have our orderly systems of ethics and logic. We know that to kill a man results in his death. Yet the deepest reality of the universe has no such rules: an atom is formed at whim; and joins with another from blind chance. More randomness leads to the formation of a molecule and perhaps a compound and eventually a cell or a tissue in a man's body.
If I've recalled all this incorrectly from some late-night PBS science program, feel free to correct me. This 'confirmation of chaos' doesn't absolve us from any of our human responsibilities but it does lend an absurd quality to things, I feel.
Mod
I'm understanding you to speak here [Alan] of our everyday human reality breaking down only in (let's say) "parts of the universe utterly remote from us". "
As I indicated in my post 26, I am interested in reason and logic as it pertains to human ethics and politics. I am not interested in these extreme issues of metaphysics and physics, nor are they within the subject matter of this topic or even of this group. Let's stick with political philosophy and ethics. If you wish to discuss arcane scientific and/or metaphysical matters, I suggest you do so in another group or (if one does not exist) create your own separate group. I don't know why I have such difficulty keeping everyone on topic. To my mind, there is enough to be concerned about in the fields of ethics and political philosophy. I wish to leave physics to the physicists and metaphysics to the metaphysicians. I am not qualified, nor am I interested, in either of these fields.
Mod
I'm interested in some kind of kind of union of virtue ethics and a consequentialism of some kind. Not that I could possibly be the first to make that jump, I merely follow a well trod path."
As mentioned in my post 20 in the present topic, I recently read Philippa Foot's Natural Goodness. I also read part of Rosalind Hursthouse's On Virtue Ethics before being redirected to electoral college matters as a result of the recent US presidential election. (Perhaps somewhat off the point, I have also recently read Stephen Toulmin's The Place of Reason in Ethics and reviewed it here.) I have been somewhat disappointed in these academic productions. On the whole (excepting, for example, Aristotle's professed views about slavery and women), I prefer reading Aristotle himself rather than the latter-day academic adaptations of him under the rubric of "virtue ethics."
I agree with your interest in "some kind of kind of union of virtue ethics and a consequentialism of some kind." Indeed, I find these twentieth- and twenty-first century academic categories to be quite artificial. Any ethics that disregards consequences is, to my mind, not ethical.
Randal wrote: "I am delighted to learn, for example, that a humble sewage treatment engineer mayaspire to the title of “philosopher.” ..."
Randal, tut tut! Sewage engineering is not a humble but a mighty calling. It is one of the very foundations of civilisation itself. Try living with out them!
Joke!
Alan wrote: "Any ethics that disregards consequences is, to my mind, not ethical. "..."Totally agreed Alan. The use of the word consequentialism in Meta-ethics to describe the branch of ethics that commonly includes Utilitarianism, Ethical Altruism and others has come to obscure the fact that ethics cannot really be said to exist if it does not have as its end a concern for the consequences of my actions on others.
Ethics without consequences is blind. (Little Kantian joke).
We would be left with politics alone and then, only a politics of raw power.
There are I think excellent modern books on virtue ethics but when I asked my ethics lecturers for their suggestions none of the books you mentioned came up which is not to say of course that they may not be excellent reads.
The book that came up repeatedly was Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue and just as frequently a warning that it was weighty both in page count and intellectual engagement but worth every minute.
The other was Dan Russell's Practical Intelligence and the Virtues which is a modern take but absolutely central is Russell's argument that both the foundation of the definition of what is 'virtue' and the path to finding and making a virtuous act must be founded upon Aristotle's notion of phronesis.
I know you have a long reading list already and a major project on the go but if you ever get the chance you might well find yourself quite interested in Russell. He is phil prof at the interestingly named Centre for the Philosophy of Freedom.
From his home page: Dan Russell is Professor of Philosophy at the Center for the Philosophy of Freedom, University of Arizona. He specializes in ancient philosophy and ethics, and his work focuses on ancient philosophy mainly as a source for expanding contemporary options for thinking about how to improve our lives. He has written on Plato’s ethics and psychology (Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life, Oxford University Press, 2005) as well as contemporary virtue ethics (Practical Intelligence and the Virtues, Oxford University Press, 2009).
I'll have a peak at those books you mentioned to see if they pique my interest.
Cheers.
Mod
Totally agreed Alan. The use of the word consequentialism in Meta-ethics to describe the branch of ethics th..."
Thanks, Gerard. I have just downloaded Russell's book on Kindle (very expensive even on Kindle, but that's typical for Oxford University Press) and have just ordered MacIntyre's book in paperback (not available on Kindle). I'll read these books when I return to my study of ethics after I finish my book on the electoral college.
Here's a tidy little ethical problem which emerged in the contemporary, modern world.The disturbing genesis of the Citigroup Center building, Manhattan
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Citigro...
Mod
The disturbing genesis of the Citigroup Center building, Manhattan
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Citigro......"
One wonders how many other buildings are structurally unsound.
It's not clear to me from this article whether engineering has a formal code of professional ethics, as do law and medicine, for example. Perhaps Randal, who is a professional engineer, can provide an answer to that question. I am, of course, quite familiar with professional ethics rules for lawyers. Some of these rules are somewhat counterintuitive to nonlawyers, but most of them have a rational basis.
The various codes of professional ethics each have their own unique rules that are not necessarily deducible from general ethical principles. There are lawyers who practice exclusively in the professional responsibility area. For example, lawyers represent other lawyers against whom disciplinary proceedings are brought by the relevant authority (usually a division of the state's highest court, though sometimes by local bar associations). The literature (including case law) is vast and complex.
There are also malpractice lawsuits brought against engineers, construction managers, architects, physicians, lawyers, and so forth. I have represented defendants in malpractice cases against engineers, construction managers, and lawyers. Now that I think of it, I believe that there are some kind of professional rules for engineers, but my memory, almost five years into retirement, is now fading on such questions.
Hmmm. Good question. Engineers must pass exams and receive licenses in order to practice their profession, I seem to recall. And engineering firms must be licensed in the state where they receive any contracts. Despite this, the engineering field (civil eng, where I worked) still had a lot of unprofessionalism. A lot of it. The money is so big that it can be a free-for-all where anything goes.
Mod
Mod
My post 12 in the other topic follows. Boradicus will respond with a post in the present topic.
Boradicus wrote: "I find the field of ethics interesting. However, in my own thinking, I have drawn a line between ethics and morality, labeling the latter as something which is absolute, such as the biblical commandments, which in themselves devolve to the Great Commandment from which all scripture and (biblical) law hangs."
I approach ethics from a purely secular perspective, asking the question what ethics is by nature as distinguished from revelation. I believe this is what Aristotle was trying to do in the Nicomachean Ethics, though he adapted his teaching in some ways to the culture in which he lived. If we are going to base ethics on revelation, we have the insoluble problem, from a rational perspective, of ascertaining which revelation we accept. There are many points raised in my 2000 book on ethics with which I still agree, including the following:
"Crusades, inquisitions, and religious wars have been waged over such issues as the divine status of Jesus or the truth of the prophecy of Mohammed as well as over seemingly infinite doctrinal disputes. A study of history discloses many different and inconsistent claims to revelation (see Appendix). How, then, is it possible to choose to believe one particular claim to revelation over another? After all, if religion is based upon revelation, but the claimed revelations of the various religions are mutually exclusive, then all of the revelations cannot be said to be unqualifiedly true. It may be that one of the conflicting revelations is true and the others false, but how can one know how to choose between the conflicting revelations?"
Alan E. Johnson. First Philosophy and Human Ethics: A Rational Inquiry (Philosophia, 2000), 16 (Kindle loc. 218-23).
The Appendix to this book is entitled "The Conflicts Among the Claims to Revelation." It discusses the conflicting claims to revelation (and thus moral systems) of the ancient Egyptians, Zoroastrianism, Mithraism, Manicheism, Gnosticism, Hinduism, Taoism, the Delphic oracle, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Mormonism, and Christian Science. One could add to this list.
Although I was raised a Lutheran, I have thought the foregoing ever since I was in high school.
I do not mean that we should somehow try to amalgamate all the world's religious systems into one overall system. That is impossible, due to the contradictions among the various religions, and is, moreover, nonsensical.
Nor do I accept any kind of relativism. As Strauss would say, the question is what is right by nature ("natural right"). This need not have a religious foundation, though Thomas Aquinas, for example, made a noble and perhaps exoteric effort along this line.
I am just scratching the surface here. My forthcoming book will elaborate my understanding in further detail. My 2000 book was kind of an outline, but it contains a number of statements (especially my offhand remarks about political and economic matters) with which I no longer agree. And my discussion of Einstein et al. in Chapter 2 was naïve and inadequate. I will make no effort to address metaphysics or physics in my forthcoming book. Once it is published, I will attempt to remove the 2000 book from the market.
We are getting pretty far afield of the subject matter of the present ["Ancient World"] Goodreads group and are probably testing the patience of the moderators. If you wish to discuss this further, perhaps you could join the Political Philosophy and Ethics group, of which I am the founder and moderator. See especially the topics in the Ethics folder.
So, rather than use the term, "morals," I think it is fine to use the term "religious ethics," (within the context of a discussion on ethics), and as well to use the term "secular ethics," in contradistinction to the former term.
Let me quote a response that I made from our email conversation (the primary purpose of which was to determine where in this thread the continuation of this conversation should take place, and the ancillary purposes of which were: to determine if a new topic ought to be created and if so what to name it; and which terminology we should use):
"I think that a good example of what might be considered ethically relative would be veganism: is it ethical to eat animals? Relative to some religious (and cultural) beliefs, there can certainly be opposition about whether it is ethical to eat animals or not; yet, even from a secular, humanistic perspective, there can be opposing camps: one base in the curation of our habitat and environment, and one based in human centric pragmatism (whether when facing starvation, etc, a human should eat animals).
I just wanted to give you an example. I am sure that there are many other topics where (for example) ethics have historically changed (even from a humanist perspective) and are therefore relative to history, such as the ethics of polygamy, which at one point in history was a model for providing political stability through the engendering of many heirs; and it was heirs upon which the stability of a monarchy depended (in this sense, King Henry VIII was very nearly polygamous). Yet relative to such a position today, polygamy might be considered (in humanistic terms; I for one have absolutely not desire to be polygamous, nor is it legal in most states and many countries) ethically problematic, giving rise to legal difficulties with probate, the illegality of marriage based in consanguinity, etc. One could also ask whether it is ethical or not (when considering whether ethics should be absolute or not) to allow the state of Utah, under our existing federal structure, to decide for itself whether or not polygamy is ethical (in this sense, the federal structure might be considered to be ethically relative with respect to differences between state laws)."
Let me also quote one of my posts from the aforementioned thread (in case people are feeling lazy, or in case something might happen to that thread that would break the link to it):
"Learning is really a life-long, dynamic process. The shift that occurred with Wittgenstein with respect to his ideas about the accuracy with which language functions is an amazing example of this. I think that it takes time to absorb material from those who came before us, and that such shifts occur in our integration of the material as a natural consequence of obtaining some level of mastery and ability to both adapt and abstract the material to new perspectives that are uniquely our own, albeit probably having some convergence with contemporary thought simultaneously emerging elsewhere.
I find the field of ethics interesting. However, in my own thinking, I have drawn a line between ethics and morality, labeling the latter as something which is absolute, such as the biblical commandments, which in themselves devolve to the Great Commandment from which all scripture and (biblical) law hangs. On the other hand, I see ethics as stemming from "man-made" ideas, theories, sentiments, and laws (which are not necessarily non-confluent with moral standards). So, by contradistinction, I see ethics as being much more relative to people, polities, geographies, cultures, situations, and circumstances. I also see ethics (being a Christian, myself) as a form of working toward moral absolutes given the temporal constraints of this world. In other words, to me, it seems that it would be quite challenging, and perhaps even impractical to attempt to integrate the differing ethical beliefs of various cultures into a synthesized system of ethics. Rather, it would seem more practical to find consensus both between existing standards and ideal standards to be worked toward in order to create a universal ethical system that still contains room and the toothing into which existing systems can fit themselves."
So, to me, "secular ethics," are relative in the ways that I stated above, while "religious ethics" are absolute with respect to the absolute nature of the Deity from which they depend. Even the distinction of the categories of "secular ethics," and "religious" ethics implies relativity, being that secular ethics are relative to secular considerations, whereas religious ethics are relative to religious considerations, and given that the two are differentiated and therefore by definition not mutually inclusive of each other. Further, within the category of "secular ethics," some similar division might be made by some between "humanist ethics" and the whole of "secular ethics," (not to mention the fact that there can also be overlap between humanist and religious ethics). Thus, where categorical divisions exist in ethics, relativity exists wherein distinct fields are relative to their differing ontological bases.
The difference of opinions is frequently one that is to a large extent taxonomical in nature.
How do all of you categorize/sub-categorize ethics?
Thanks,
B
Let me quote a response that I made from our email conversation (the primary purpose of which was to determine where in this thread the continuation of this conversation should take place, and the ancillary purposes of which were: to determine if a new topic ought to be created and if so what to name it; and which terminology we should use):
"I think that a good example of what might be considered ethically relative would be veganism: is it ethical to eat animals? Relative to some religious (and cultural) beliefs, there can certainly be opposition about whether it is ethical to eat animals or not; yet, even from a secular, humanistic perspective, there can be opposing camps: one base in the curation of our habitat and environment, and one based in human centric pragmatism (whether when facing starvation, etc, a human should eat animals).
I just wanted to give you an example. I am sure that there are many other topics where (for example) ethics have historically changed (even from a humanist perspective) and are therefore relative to history, such as the ethics of polygamy, which at one point in history was a model for providing political stability through the engendering of many heirs; and it was heirs upon which the stability of a monarchy depended (in this sense, King Henry VIII was very nearly polygamous). Yet relative to such a position today, polygamy might be considered (in humanistic terms; I for one have absolutely not desire to be polygamous, nor is it legal in most states and many countries) ethically problematic, giving rise to legal difficulties with probate, the illegality of marriage based in consanguinity, etc. One could also ask whether it is ethical or not (when considering whether ethics should be absolute or not) to allow the state of Utah, under our existing federal structure, to decide for itself whether or not polygamy is ethical (in this sense, the federal structure might be considered to be ethically relative with respect to differences between state laws)."
Let me also quote one of my posts from the aforementioned thread (in case people are feeling lazy, or in case something might happen to that thread that would break the link to it):
"Learning is really a life-long, dynamic process. The shift that occurred with Wittgenstein with respect to his ideas about the accuracy with which language functions is an amazing example of this. I think that it takes time to absorb material from those who came before us, and that such shifts occur in our integration of the material as a natural consequence of obtaining some level of mastery and ability to both adapt and abstract the material to new perspectives that are uniquely our own, albeit probably having some convergence with contemporary thought simultaneously emerging elsewhere.
I find the field of ethics interesting. However, in my own thinking, I have drawn a line between ethics and morality, labeling the latter as something which is absolute, such as the biblical commandments, which in themselves devolve to the Great Commandment from which all scripture and (biblical) law hangs. On the other hand, I see ethics as stemming from "man-made" ideas, theories, sentiments, and laws (which are not necessarily non-confluent with moral standards). So, by contradistinction, I see ethics as being much more relative to people, polities, geographies, cultures, situations, and circumstances. I also see ethics (being a Christian, myself) as a form of working toward moral absolutes given the temporal constraints of this world. In other words, to me, it seems that it would be quite challenging, and perhaps even impractical to attempt to integrate the differing ethical beliefs of various cultures into a synthesized system of ethics. Rather, it would seem more practical to find consensus both between existing standards and ideal standards to be worked toward in order to create a universal ethical system that still contains room and the toothing into which existing systems can fit themselves."
So, to me, "secular ethics," are relative in the ways that I stated above, while "religious ethics" are absolute with respect to the absolute nature of the Deity from which they depend. Even the distinction of the categories of "secular ethics," and "religious" ethics implies relativity, being that secular ethics are relative to secular considerations, whereas religious ethics are relative to religious considerations, and given that the two are differentiated and therefore by definition not mutually inclusive of each other. Further, within the category of "secular ethics," some similar division might be made by some between "humanist ethics" and the whole of "secular ethics," (not to mention the fact that there can also be overlap between humanist and religious ethics). Thus, where categorical divisions exist in ethics, relativity exists wherein distinct fields are relative to their differing ontological bases.
The difference of opinions is frequently one that is to a large extent taxonomical in nature.
How do all of you categorize/sub-categorize ethics?
Thanks,
B
Mod
With regard to Utah and polygamy, Utah was admitted as a state only after agreeing in Article III of its state constitution (1895) as follows: "Perfect toleration of religious sentiment is guaranteed. No inhabitant of this State shall ever be molested in person or property on account of his or her mode of religious worship; but polygamous or plural marriages are forever prohibited." (Emphasis added.) Moreover, under the same Article III, this requirement "shall be irrevocable without the consent of the United States and the people of this State." So this is not really a question of federalism. Ever since Utah became a state (1896), polygamy has been illegal under both federal and state law. The Supreme Court has also upheld the prohibition of polygamy, though I don't have the citation in front of me right now. The question of whether this is ethically appropriate is a topic I have not examined in any depth and accordingly cannot address at this time.
My statement in post 40, above, was my earlier response (post 12 in the "Ancient World" topic) to Boradicus's second extended quotation in the preceding post. I don't have anything further to add at this time. It should be emphasized, however, that I do not agree that all secular ethics are necessarily relativistic ethics.
Thanks for the insight on polygamy in Utah. I do apologize for my ignorance!
I was thinking that perhaps "relativism" is not the best or even correct term. What I seem to be describing seems to be more along the lines of pluralism.
In any case, I don't want to beat a dead horse. Also, to be able to intelligently converse with you about Aristotle's Ethics, I would need to first read and study them. They are on my list, but they were not a part of my course work when I was at the university.
It was not actually my intention to open a full-fledged discussion regarding ethics; rather I was trying to make "philosophical small talk," if such a thing exists! :D
Thank you for the conversation!
I was thinking that perhaps "relativism" is not the best or even correct term. What I seem to be describing seems to be more along the lines of pluralism.
In any case, I don't want to beat a dead horse. Also, to be able to intelligently converse with you about Aristotle's Ethics, I would need to first read and study them. They are on my list, but they were not a part of my course work when I was at the university.
It was not actually my intention to open a full-fledged discussion regarding ethics; rather I was trying to make "philosophical small talk," if such a thing exists! :D
Thank you for the conversation!
I would also like to make one last re-emphasis. I think that it is hard, ultimately, to go wrong when our guiding principal - from the (two) Great Commandments (but more specifically when referring to ethics the second Great Commandment) is love. However, how we get to what is "best" through the lens of love is a question and a dialog, that has existed - and I very much suspect will continue to exist - throughout the ages.
Cheers
Cheers
Mod
Do read Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics when you get a chance. Probably the best translation is that of Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins. The David Ross translation, which I studied long ago (in an earlier edition), is also quite good.
I have recently acquired Professor Ronna Burger's Aristotle's Dialogue with Socrates: On the "Nicomachean Ethics" (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). I haven't yet read this book, but it looks promising.
The Nicomachean Ethics is that rare treatment of ethics that is based on reason, as distinguished from religion or feelings. It is sometimes said to be compiled from lecture notes of Aristotle's students. But the thoughtfulness of Aristotle's writing indicates that it is, in fact, a carefully written work of art.
Thank you for the recommendation.
Alan wrote: "Boradicus, who has joined this Goodreads group today, and I have had a discussion at posts 5-13 of this topic of the "Ancient World" Goodreads discussion group. We have agreed to continue this dis..."The problem I always saw with Pascal's wager is that the gambling situation is really more like a horse race. You don't just have to bet that there's a horse, you have to guess which one gets across the finish line first.
The wager also appears in 'Justine' by the Marquis de Sade.
Boradicus wrote: "So, rather than use the term, "morals," I think it is fine to use the term "religious ethics," (within the context of a discussion on ethics), and as well to use the term "secular ethics," in contr..."With regards the morals versus ethics discussion, there doesn't seem to be any real agreement on standard definitions against each other.
A quick review of online sources finds some definitions where ethics are what society agrees on and morals are what we ourselves decide to do. Immediately following that comes a definition that turns those definitions on their heads with morals being what society agrees on etc. Some sources like Encyc. Brittanica just say there is lots of confusion and the terms tend to be used interchangeably.
The best definitions I could find are by two academic ethicists here: http://theconversation.com/you-say-mo...
They refer to the original ancient meanings (the philology) of the two words. Ethics coming from the Greek 'ethikos' means something like virtue ethics properly understood and so it has the flavour of decisions based on character while morality coming from the Latin 'mores' leans more towards communal norms as in a societies mores.
That aside, I would have said myself that ethics is what I studied at Uni and implies a systemic and comparative approach while morality is what we agree upon in the street .
Well! I'm glad we've cleared that up! ;-)
Mod
I plan to discuss this in some depth in my forthcoming substantial revision of my 2000 book (or a completely new book) on ethics, provisionally entitled Reason and Human Ethics. The various definitions are, as you observe, arbitrary and inconsistent. I will define my terms at the beginning and go from there. The ancient Greek word from which our English word "ethics" is derived had much to do, as you point out, with character or what they now call "virtue ethics": the root meaning was "habit." See Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics for a discussion of this.
There are, as I understand it, two somewhat separate strands of ethics or morality: (1) ethics directed toward oneself (again, Aristotle and "virtue ethics"), and (2) ethics or morality regarding one's treatment of other human beings. These things all tend to get conflated or inadequately distinguished in popular discussions.
A separate topic in this folder addresses Neuroscience, Evolutionary Biology, and Ethics, i.e., the relationship between ethics, on the one hand, and neuroscience and evolutionary biology, on the other.
See also the other topics or threads in the present "Ethics" folder.
Although this topic sometimes discusses the subject of free will, we also have a separate topic devoted to that inquiry: https://www.goodreads.com/topic/show/.... In 2021, I published a book titled Free Will and Human Life , which addresses important questions about free will.
In 2000, I published a book titled First Philosophy and Human Ethics: A Rational Inquiry. I no longer agree with some of the statements I made in that book and am accordingly replacing it with a book titled Reason and Human Ethics, scheduled for publication later this year (2022). Some of the early comments in the present topic relate to the 2000 book.
Alan E. Johnson
Independent Philosopher and Historian
(Note: This comment was substantially revised and updated on April 16, 2022.)
July 9, 2022 NOTE:
My book Reason and Human Ethics has now been published in both paperback and Kindle. The Amazon link is at https://www.amazon.com/Reason-Human-E.... A book description and synopsis is posted at https://www.academia.edu/82205975/_Re....
Today, I posted the following on Academia.edu: “Excerpts from Reason and Human Ethics by Alan E. Johnson” (https://www.academia.edu/82835731/Exc...). The front matter (excerpts), Chapter 1 ("What Is the Basis of Human Ethics?"), and Chapter 2 ("Human Reason") of Reason and Human Ethics were included in this public post. These excerpts are from the published book. Chapters 3 ("Individual Ethics"), 4 ("Social Ethics"), 5 ("Citizen and Media Ethics") 6 ("Political Ethics"), and the Appendix ("Conflicts among the Claims to Revelation") were not included.
I also deleted the previous papers on Academia.edu that constituted excerpts from earlier drafts of this book.