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Aristotle's Metaphysics
Nemo wrote: "If time is linear like a line in space, then it has parts and is divisible, and cannot be eternal."I think that is a very specific distinction he makes in here; that points and lines are distinct. Randal makes reference to that above I think. I certainly agree personally that time isn't eternal; I am very interested to know if Aristotle believed it was. If he posits limitation to time, that is, a point where it did not exist as such, then he faces the problem of explaining how contrary forms could exist simultaneously pre-time, where time no longer separates them. Many of his arguments would seem to be moot at that point.
Nemo wrote: "I think Platonists would agree that contraries cannot exist in the same subject at the same time. Forms don't change with time, being outside of time; what changes is matter that participates in the Forms."
I figure so as well; but I think Aristotle is trying to critique ideal forms by saying that if a tree is a form, but that same tree can become a shelf, a house, a chair etc, how can it exist as a separate ideal form, when in real world application it no longer retains it's initial form? What would be it's ideal form? Another example being the contraries he mentions, which indicate change of form between contraries. If the real world forms are diverse, he apparently asserts that saying that it exists as another separate ideal form doesn't work. I don't agree with him, but his argument is interesting.
Nemo wrote: "But it has everything to do with his identify as *unmoved* mover. How does Aristotle keep his prime mover unmoved without recourse to an unchanging realm?"
That's a good question and I think that shows what is problematic about his approach. If he doesn't posit an eternal time, then he is faced with making his contrary forms and disparate forms all exist simultaneously as ideal forms prior to time.
Nemo wrote: "If all things we perceive in this world of movement and change have their roots in unchangeable substances, it would follow that time itself can be defined as such."
I agree.
Erick wrote: "if a tree is a form.."Yeah, "IF" is the operative word. A tree in the world of change is a substance for Aristotle, but not for Plato, for nothing that is in a constant flux is substantial. The ideal form of tree doesn't change.
Aristotle concedes that knowledge of eternal truth exists, as Dr. A points out. How is knowledge possible if the object of knowledge is in a constant flux?
Nemo wrote: "A tree in the world of change is a substance for Aristotle, but not a substance for Plato, for nothing that is in a constant flux is substantial. The ideal form of tree doesn't change."That's how I saw it as well.
Nemo wrote: "Aristotle concedes that knowledge of eternal truth exists, as Dr. A points out. How is knowledge possible if the object of knowledge is in a constant flux? "Indeed. I'm not sure that Aristotle is altogether consistent on such points. I wasn't enthused over the translation I admit. The Greek probably is much clearer.
Consistency is hard to come by when one lives in a world of flux and change. It has little to do with the translation, imo.Ironically some people defend Aristotle by arguing that the inconsistent and fragmented writings are student notes, not his own writings, essentially appealing to the Platonic form of Aristotle, and not the Aristotle that we read in the "real" world.
Nemo wrote: "Consistency is hard to come by when one lives in a world of flux and change. It has little to do with the translation, imo."That could be. I will read more of him, but I doubt it will be any time soon. Verdict is still out until more evidence comes in and I've weighed it. I must admit though, it doesn't look good from what evidence I have seen so far.
Book III and IVIf you have any questions about Book I and II, now would be a good time to discuss before we move on to the next two books.
(Is everyone scared off or bored silly already?)
Nemo wrote: "If you have any questions about Book I and II, now would be a good time to discuss before we move on to the next two books. "Since I finished the book already, I don't remember what was going on in those chapters. haha. I am interested in getting the Greek terminology though. One word that caught my attention in the translation I read was the word "entity." I'm very curious to know what the original Greek term was.
I am really interested in seeing a list of he Greek terminology that he used the most.
HI Erick, can you send a quote in which the word is being used with a citation for the Book.Part? In that way one of us can look it up. Best, Dr.A
Nemo wrote: "Book III and IVIf you have any questions about Book I and II, now would be a good time to discuss before we move on to the next two books.
(Is everyone scared off or bored silly already?)"
HI Nemo, due to time limitations, my plan is to post once a week prob. on Wed or Thr, so no, not bored or scared :-) In general, I think it would be good to stick close to the text, at least to start with, until we have some shared understanding under our belts, yes? It may also be a good idea to tap one person per week to create an exegesis or summary of the text, and work our discussions out from there, to stay on point?
Nemo wrote: "Dr. A wrote: "The argument in part two (II.2) is crazy! Anyone care to try and lay it out? "He is rehashing arguments in his works on Logic, esp, Posterior Analytics, why do you say..."
I'd love a gloss of the passage - I find it v. confusing!
Nemo wrote: "Book III and IVIf you have any questions about Book I and II, now would be a good time to discuss before we move on to the next two books.
(Is everyone scared off or bored silly already?)"
Nemo,
I certainly want to respond to your "last call" for comments. Have read Books I an II through (again) and plan to keep at reading with the group through the whole text.
Book I surely is a "romp through the Pre-Socratics," but also a key part of Aristotle's critique of Plato's Theory of Ideas (TOI). This bit in Aristotle (A) provides a lot of the ground for Harold Cherniss's attack (in his books Aristotle's Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy and Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy) on A in defense of both. If I may summarize his argument in one sentence: Cherniss faults A for judging (and distorting the meaning of) the Pre-Socratics to suit his own philosophy. Cherniss sees A, both in his critique of the Pre-Socratics and of Plato as a dark genius intent on twisting their meaning. Rather than giving A credit for having more complete knowledge of the theories of his predecessors than do we (because he had access to so many more of the texts), Cherniss takes this privileged access as a part of A's dark plan.
I don't see it that way. I rather see A as a practical man trying to make SOME sense of so many heterogenous views (monism versus atomism, materialism versus idealism, etc.). As I have said above, I take his criticism of Plato's TOI here as a reasonable one and have elaborated much more on this here.
As for A's four causes, I am afraid that I look at this through Hume's eyes and through the eyes of Sextus Empiricus before him. I wonder about our obtaining ultimate knowledge about any cause, but don’t take that as a reason to stop trying to seek the truth.
As for my reactions to Book II, I take note of the Loeb translator’s comment that “Book II. (alpha) has no connexion with what precedes and follows; it is introductory to the study of philosophy in general, and its Greek title implies that it was added when the corpus was already completed.” I take that as authorization to ignore it as a part of The Metaphysics and to take it up (if ever) at some later date.
Cheers,
Randal
Nemo wrote: "How is knowledge possible if the object of knowledge is in a constant flux? ..."Quite true and, I think, just what sinks Plato's Theory of Ideas. Plato was impressed by BOTH Parmenides and Heraclitus and to my mind was never able to split the difference or combine the two. His defense of the TOI rests on our being able to gain knowledge of ultimate matters, which knowledge he was unable to demonstrate in the Theaetetus, which ends in aporia.
Randal wrote: "I certainly want to respond to your "last call" for comments. "Hi Randal, I was hoping you would. :) I read your post on Plato's TOI in part, and plan to respond when I finish Metaphysics. In the meantime, it would be nice if we could address the arguments one by one in the order that they appear in these books.
Cherniss faults A for judging (and distorting the meaning of) the Pre-Socratics to suit his own philosophy.
I haven't read Cherniss, but I got the same impression (msg. 30 and msg.35). Simply put, I don't think Aristotle argues fairly, for two main reasons:
Firstly, if, as you say, he is really "trying to make some sense of" the other philosophers, he should trace the chain of their reasoning first, and re-present their arguments in a somewhat logical order, and then he can pick their arguments apart and prove their logical errors and inconsistencies. That would be a fair way for a philosopher to argue, as Aristotle himself also teaches in his works on Logic, but he seldom practices what he preaches.
On the contrary, like Procrustes, Aristotle sets up his own system first, and then proceed to stretch others on his "bed", and mutilate them when they don't fit into his system. As a result, the pre-Socratic philosophers became so dismembered that it is hard to believe they had been rational human beings.
Secondly, although it is true that we have much more limited access to the pre-Socratics than Aristotle, and therefore are not qualified to judge between them, that is not true in the case of Plato. whose works have come down to us in their entirety. Having read the complete works of Plato and half the works of Aristotle, I don't think it's out of place for me to voice my opinion that Aristotle is either incompetent at comprehending his teacher's ideas or dishonest in misrepresenting them.
Dr. A wrote: "It may also be a good idea to tap one person per week to create an exegesis or summary of the text, and work our discussions out from there"Hi Dr. A,
Thank you for the feedback and good suggestions. I'm terrible at writing, so providing an exegesis or summary text for each book would be a hard task for me, even if I can afford the time. (Do we have any volunteers?)
What I can do, however, is to answer whatever questions others might have to the best of my abilities. If a specific passage or point in Book II is unclear, I'd be happy to explain the best way I can, but I can't provide "a gloss".
Randal wrote: "His defense of the TOI rests on our being able to gain knowledge of ultimate matters, which knowledge he was unable to demonstrate in the Theaetetus, which ends in aporia. "Aristotle agrees with Plato on our ability to gain knowledge of ultimate matters, knowledge of the substance or essence of things, not just the phenomena. It follows that the object of knowledge cannot be the things that undergo constant changes in the world of senses. Ergo, Forms.
In the Theaetetus, Socrates, the midwife, proved that the title character didn't have true knowledge, i.e., Theaetetus gave birth to a "wind-egg", not a true offspring. One can also draw a positive conclusion from this. For we can't prove what is not knowledge, unless we have some inkling of what knowledge is.
Erick wrote: "One word that caught my attention in the translation I read was the word "entity." I'm very curious to know what the original Greek term was."Hi Erick,
As Dr. A said, it would be best to provide the Bekker numbers for the passages that caught your attention. "Entity" is a very vague term which could be used to render many Greek words.
Nemo wrote: "Erick wrote: "As Dr. A said, it would be best to provide the Bekker numbers for the passages that caught your attention. "Entity" is a very vague term which could be used to render many Greek words. "He uses it in a very specific context. One example from Book 1 987b:
"But since the forms are causes of other things, the elements of all these he supposed to be elements of entities"
Book 2 994a:
"But truly, that there is, at least, some first principle, and that the causes of entities are not infinite, either in a straight forward direction, or according to form is evident."
In my translation, he uses the English word pretty consistently in the same context, so I hope the translator was consistent with the underlying Greek. The more interesting use was in regards to the question as to whether "entity" equates to "unity." Anyway, since the term was so important I'd like to know what the Greek term is here; but I'd also like a resource for the more prevalent Greek terms in Aristotle.
Here is the Greek for 987b: "ἐπεὶ δ᾽ αἴτια τὰ εἴδη τοῖς ἄλλοις, τἀκείνων στοιχεῖα πάντων ᾠήθη τῶν ὄντων εἶναι [20] στοιχεῖα."
[Another translation: "Now since the Forms are the causes of everything else, he supposed that their elements are the elements of all things."]
The relevant word being translated as "entities" is ὄντων/ontos/beings, from which we get the word ontology.
Here is the Greek for 994a:
"ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γ᾽ ἔστιν ἀρχή τις καὶ οὐκ ἄπειρα τὰ αἴτια τῶν ὄντων οὔτ᾽ εἰς εὐθυωρίαν οὔτε κατ᾽ εἶδος, δῆλον. "
[Another translation: "Moreover, it is obvious that there is some first principle, and that the causes of things are not infinitely many either in a direct sequence or in kind."]
Same word, ontos/ὄντων. It's a very broad term that is used in many ways, but you can look it up in a Greek-English Lexicon like Liddell and Scott: http://www.tlg.uci.edu/lsj/#eid=1&...
Tell us what you find?
Source: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/t...
Dr. A wrote: "The relevant word being translated as "entities" is ὄντων/ontos/beings, from which we get the word ontology."I figured something like that. I had read that one of the issues discussed throughout the middle ages into the Renaissance was the relationship between "the One" and "being"; whether "the One" was beyond "being" as the Platonists believed or was "being" as Aristotle believed. Mirandola specifically attempted to reconcile the two views. I figured the original word meant being. Ontos makes sense.
Thank you Dr. A. I appreciate it.
I also thought it would be *ontos*, but it's always good to double check these translations...There are two debates/questions at issue: The first is the Presocratic debate between the One (Parmenidean) and the Many (Empedoclean), and there is a good book on this: One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy (Publications of the Center for Hellenic Studies) by Michael Stokes.
It seems that the main thread through the History of philosophy teaches us that a decision is made in favor of the "One," And both A and Plato seem to agree on this point, favoring the One. There is, howerver, an alternative history of Philosophy that runs along side that takes up the Many as it's starting point - e.g., Empedocles, Heraclitus, Nietzsche, Spinoza, Bergson, Heidegger, Deleuze...
The second question is the disagreement, a generation later, between Plato and Aristotle, between the Platonic Ideas subtending phenomenal change, and Aristotle's proposal (given the problems with Plato's theory of forms) of an underlying "substance" (hupokeimenon). But be warned, as you enter A's *Metaphysics,* his hupokeimenon is no less problematic and no more mysterious than the ideal Forms.
Roughly speaking, the debate between "Idealism" and "Materialism" animates the history of Philosophy through to the Modern era (Descartes), and beyond. Henceforth, all ontologies / metaphysics are an elaboration of one or the other position. This is part of what makes Aristotle's *Physics* and *Metaphysics* so important, since it sets up this problematic as THE question of philosophy as an ontological project. Many have claimed to overcome this dualism, but arguably no one has done so, perhaps indicating that there is something about the structure of existence that entails or embodies this dualism?
Dr. A wrote: "Many have claimed to overcome this dualism, but arguably no one has done so, perhaps indicating that there is something about the structure of existence that entails or embodies this dualism? "Great question. There must be some reason it is a perennial issue.
Dr. A wrote: "Roughly speaking, the debate between "Idealism" and "Materialism" animates the history of Philosophy through to the Modern era (Descartes), and beyond. Henceforth, all ontologies / metaphysics are an elaboration of one or the other position."
Here's another question: if Aristotle is more of a materialist view, is there still an attempt to incorporate a portion of idealism in regards to a divinity? His system does indicate less materialism than Democritus' and Lucretius' systems as far as I can tell. I don't think there is any room in those systems for a divinity like Aristotle's first cause or unmoved mover.
I'm saving the links you've provided.
The best place to go for a balancing act between P and A is Plotinus' Enneads, who tried to do precisely that. There is a christian reading of Aristotle (and mainstream translations support this) that puts a supernatural deity like the Christian God as first cause, but perhaps there are others in this forum who can speak more precisely to this point? As to Democritus' and Lucretius, I totally agree with you that there are no divinities in the atomists. Indeed, they have a hard time accounting for the origin/cause of movement, a problem A sees himself as addressing and trying to fix in the *Metaphysics* specifically with the unmoved mover doctrine.
The Six Enneads of Plotinus
Dr. A wrote: "There is a christian reading of Aristotle (and mainstream translations support this) that puts a supernatural deity like the Christian God as first cause..."It's quite easy to read Christian theology into Aristotle's Four Causes, if one takes the former as a starting point. However, the arguments on the Causes in Book I, if considered in isolation, doesn't suggest a supernatural deity.
Firstly, Aristotle is having trouble here conceiving a world beyond the senses, how can he imagine a deity that transcends nature?
Secondly, he also insists that the (formal) cause of a thing must inhere in the thing itself, the supernatural deity doesn't inhere in matter, so it cannot be the cause.
Thirdly, it's hard to find a place for a supernatural deity among the four causes. Take building for example. The definition of a house is the formal cause, its essence; the builder is the efficient cause, the rocks and bricks the material cause, and the actual house itself the final cause, the good for whose sake others exist. If the deity is the final cause, then it does not and cannot exist until the very end of the process, therefore not a first cause.
Nemo wrote: "Aristotle agrees with Plato on our ability to gain knowledge of ultimate matters, knowledge of the substance or essence of things, not just the phenomena. It follows that the object of knowledge cannot be the things that undergo constant changes in the world of senses. Ergo, Forms...."Nemo,
Could you refresh our failing memory on this.
I have been just try to follow A's argument in Book I, Chapters VIII and IX. He concludes [991a]"Again, they (the Forms) are no help towards the knowledge of other things (for they are not the substance of things, otherwise they would be in things), nor to their existence, since they are not present in the things which partake of them. . . " and in [991b] he says "It is stated in the Phaedo that the Forms are the causes both of existence and of generation. Yet, assuming the Forms exist, still the things which participate in them are not generated unless there is something to impart motion." And how do the Forms cause motion?
Whatever one thinks of Aristotle's arguments, I find him tending toward profound questions about the Theory of Ideas. Do you believe that Ideas exist in a world of their own? Plato apparently did. Aristotle apparently did not. Plato is a wonderful genius and profound writer and the form of Aristotle's arguments is often muddled, but I think the TOI is an unsuccessful theory and applaud Aristotle's struggling (and failing) to make sense of it. Not that I embrace Aristotle's essences, of which more later.
Regards,
Randal
Randal wrote: "Yet, assuming the Forms exist, still the things which participate in them are not generated unless there is something to impart motion..."Behold, the Unmoved Mover! (But of course, the Deus ex machina won't appear until much later in book XII).
I agree with you that Aristotle's struggle to understand and reconcile the Theory of Forms and the world of movement is admirable. He struggles precisely because he has to acknowledges that Plato's logic is unassailable, that the unchanging Forms must exist if there is to be knowledge of the truth.
Do you believe that Ideas exist in a world of their own? Plato apparently did.
It depends on what you mean by "a world of their own". Do they exist independently of matter? Yes. Do they exist in a world inaccessible to us? No.
Dr. A wrote: "The best place to go for a balancing act between P and A is Plotinus' Enneads, who tried to do precisely that."I read the abridged version of the Enneads (i.e. the Essential Plotinus) right before I read the Metaphysics. I liked what was there. I intend to read the complete Enneads in the future.
Dr. A wrote: "There is a christian reading of Aristotle (and mainstream translations support this) that puts a supernatural deity like the Christian God as first cause.."
I'm not sure it is suited for that as such. I realize there were some very capable Christian philosophers that attempted to do just that, but taken in the greater context of Aristotle's materialism, it is incredibly problematic to do so. As it stands, his first cause is rather anomalous with respect to his system as a whole. I have noted that I'm not the only one who thinks that it doesn't work without discrepancies with other facets of his system.
Dr. A wrote: "Roughly speaking, the debate between "Idealism" and "Materialism" animates the history of Philosophy through to the Modern era (Descartes), and beyond. Henceforth, all ontologies / metaphysics are an elaboration of one or the other position. This is part of what makes Aristotle's *Physics* and *Metaphysics* so important, since it sets up this problematic as THE question of philosophy as an ontological project. Many have claimed to overcome this dualism, but arguably no one has done so, perhaps indicating that there is something about the structure of existence that entails or embodies this dualism? "Dr. A,
I wonder if you are familiar with the work of Richard Sorabji and his student Jonardon Garneri. I have discussed Sorabji' book here and am deep into two books by Garneri. They track a thousand year history of Indian philosophy motivated by just these issues. To make the long story short, these are "embodied self" guys emphasizing that a first person narrative does not need to rely upon a world in the stars.
Thanks so much for your contributions to the discussion.
On to the rest of The Metaphysics!
Regards,
Randal
Nemo wrote: "He struggles precisely because he has to acknowledges that Plato's logic is unassailable, that the unchanging Forms must exist if there is to be knowledge of the truth..."Nemo,
Well, first off, I don't agree that Plato successfully defended the TOI. I agree that knowledge of truth is precisely the thing that is required and which Plato is unable to deliver in the Theaetetus. As can be seen, I don't share Aristotle's "acknowledgment," if that is what it is, that either he or Plato successfully arrived at "truth". Call me a Sceptic!
But, back to The Metaphysics!
Regards,
Randal
PS You will LOVE Cherniss!
Randal wrote: "I agree that knowledge of truth is precisely the thing that is required and which Plato is unable to deliver in the Theaetetus. "Firstly, it isn't Plato, but Theaetetus, who fails to deliver knowledge. Secondly, even if the knowledge of the truth were delivered, how would the others recognize it (Meno's paradox)?
P.S. Thanks for recommending Cherniss. I planned to read his translation of Plutarch's Moralia, but it's good to know he was also a philosopher.
Nemo wrote: "Firstly, it isn't Plato, but Theaetetus, who fails to deliver knowledge. Secondly, even if the knowledge of the truth were delivered, how would the others recognize it (Meno's paradox)? ..."Nemo,
Come now. Do you agree that The Theaetetus ends in aporia? If not, what was the definition that Socrates could provide in the end that was better than those of Theaetetus? The Ideas? Petitio Principii, "begging the question", "circular reasoning"; whatever you call it, we cannot use the TOI to prove that knowledge proves the TOI.
Cheers,
Randal
Randal wrote: "Do you agree that The Theaetetus ends in aporia?."The question is *whose* aporia? Isn't it possible that Plato left the problem unresolved as a homework assignment for Theaetetus (and the readers)? What good would it do to others if he did all the hard work?
Socrates "midwife" analogy suggests to me that knowledge of the truth can only come from each individual himself, not as knowledge delivered by others. Theaetetus' failure only proves his own immaturity, but it by no means prove that the knowledge of truth is impossible
Nemo wrote: "Isn't it possible that Plato left the problem unresolved as a homework assignment for Theaetetus (and the readers)?...Socrates "midwife" analogy suggests to me that knowledge of the truth can only come from each individual himself, not as knowledge delivered by others. . . ."Ciao Nemo,
Good try. If he had an answer, which was crucial to the TOI, why not give it here? One answer might be that as perhaps our smartest philosopher, he knew that he couldn't use the TOI to prove the TOI. In the end of his life, in the Timaeus he returns to the Idea as the cause of the good (from the Republic) and resorts simply to myth to support it. Why not let us know then what he was up to back in the Theaetetus? It is OK to say that "knowledge of the truth can only come from each individual himself" but isn't one best to give reasons? But Plato fails to do so. At the end of his life he resorts to myth. This I take as telling.
On to Books III and IV. Lots of good stuff ahead.
Randal
Randal wrote: " If he had an answer, which was crucial to the TOI, why not give it here?"No, I don't think it is crucial to TOI.
To prove something exist by rational argument is not the same as presenting an instance of that something (Just as to prove that women can conceive children is not the same as actually delivering a child). Plato has already proven TOI by rational arguments; to find such virtue in a human being is another story.
Plato not only tells stories (myths), but also makes rational and logically consistent arguments. Both the artistic and logical elements are often, if not always, present in his dialogues. He does this, not because his arguments are weak, but because he is addressing not just the rational faculty of his audience, but also their desires and passions, the tripartite soul.
Nemo wrote: "Dr. A wrote: "There is a christian reading of Aristotle (and mainstream translations support this) that puts a supernatural deity like the Christian God as first cause..."It's quite easy to read ..."
Reluctantly, as a result of time constraints, I am unable to participate in this group read. I did, however, read Aristotle's Metaphysics decades ago and found it fascinating. I wish you all the best and will follow up and read all your comments when I have time.
In the meantime, I would point out that Joe Sachs's translations of Aristotle (including his translation of the Metaphysics) attempt to avoid an anachronistic (Christian medieval) reading by focusing on Aristotle's original concepts. Someone may have commented on this already, but I thought I would mention it in the event it has not been discussed.
Nemo wrote: "Plato has already proven TOI by rational arguments..."Nemo,
It seems we won't agree here. I would love to hear what arguments you think he has made that make the case. I see them as needing the possibility of certain knowledge of such an improbable thing as an idea existing in hyperspace. But let's put that discussion off and move on to Books III and IV. Thanks for your engagement.
Randal
Alan wrote: "I am unable to participate in this group read. ..."Thanks for the input, Alan. Good to hear from you here.
Randal
Randal wrote: "Nemo wrote: ".Thanks for your engagement.."The pleasure is mine. Engagement is what I was looking for in starting this group read.
Hello Alan. I'm glad to have your input. Technically, I have already finished it, but I am reviewing some of the chapters as they discuss it.Alan wrote: "In the meantime, I would point out that Joe Sachs's translations of Aristotle (including his translation of the Metaphysics) attempt to avoid an anachronistic (Christian medieval) reading by focusing on Aristotle's original concepts. Someone may have commented on this already, but I thought I would mention it in the event it has not been discussed."
Thank you for the heads up. My translation was by John McMahon. I didn't get the impression that it is the best one available.
Erick wrote: "Thank you for the heads up. My translation was by John McMahon. I didn't get the impression that it is the best one available."I am not familiar with John McMahon's translation. I had studied the translation of Hippocrates Apostle in 1969, and I reviewed it in March 2014 here. During the last few months I have become aware of the translations of Joe Sachs. Although I have ordered Sachs's translation of the Metaphysics, I have not yet actually read that translation. (I note, however, that the person directing this topic may be using the Sachs translation.) My guidance derives from what Sachs wrote in the preface to his translation of the Nicomachean Ethics:
"The general run of English translations of Aristotle’s theoretical works (the primary such works being the Metaphysics, the Physics, and On the Soul) is infected by a long Latin tradition that has obscured and distorted much that it has transmitted, and has blocked access to the straightforward sources of meaning that Aristotle himself made use of and built upon in his own language. In those writings, Aristotle makes use of the most vivid and familiar contents of everyday speech to construct an explanatory vocabulary that seeks to articulate the way the world is and works. The translator who wants to connect the English reader as directly as possible with what is written must bypass the accumulated baggage of a tradition that cannot accomplish that task."
Joe Sachs, preface to Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (Newburyport, MA: Focus, 2002), vii.
The foregoing comment by Joe Sachs is reminiscent of something Leo Strauss wrote long ago: "one rarely, if ever, comes across studies on classical philosophy which do not make ample use of modern terminology, and thus continually introduce non-classical thoughts into what claim to be exact presentations of classical philosophy." Strauss, "On a New Interpretation of Plato's Political Philosophy," Social Research 13, no. 3 (September 1946): 329, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40982155.
The distortion of Aristotle by medieval scholasticism is a byword for philosophical malpractice. Modern philosophy often assumed, wrongly, that the medieval gloss on Aristotle was correct, and the result has been a pervasive disdain for Aristotle in modern times. A similar phenomenon, discussed in Strauss's article (and many other of his writings), happened to Plato. Thomas Jefferson despised Plato because he saw Plato only through the warped prism of Christian neoplatonism (see the Jefferson-John Adams postpresidential correspondence). Jefferson directly blamed Plato for Christian metaphysical dogma. Of course, Jefferson also greatly admired the ethics of Jesus, and one finds it difficult to fault the deep ethical sense of such Christians as Roger Williams and Dietrich Bonhoeffer. But Christian ethics is different, in its principles and values, from Platonic or Aristotelian ethics. Since I am now getting off topic, I will leave these issues for another day.
Randal wrote: "I think Aristotle in the Metaphysics got his criticism of Plato's Theory of Ideas right. My review of this is here. "See also Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics 1217b-1218b.
Erick wrote: "My translation was by John McMahon. I didn't get the impression that it is the best one available. "I'm using primarily W.D.Ross' translation (which I posted at the beginning of this thread), as well as consulting Hugh Tredennick from Loeb Classical Library. I own Lawson-Trancred's translation for Penguin Classic, but haven't read it.
Nemo wrote: "I'm using primarily W.D.Ross' translation (which I posted at the beginning of thi..."Ross's translation is probably not bad. Although I don't have his translation of the Metaphysics, I used his translation of the Nicomachean Ethics the first time I read it. My impression was (and, upon later examination, continues to be) that he strove for accuracy. He was not freewheeling like many of his contemporaries who assumed that the reader was already fluent in Greek.
My apologies for missing your early note regarding Ross's translation. I was quite preoccupied with other matters when this topic started and did not read all of the earlier entries carefully. I based my hypothesis on the book cover at the head of the topic.
Alan wrote: " A similar phenomenon, discussed in Strauss's article (and many other of his writings), happened to Plato. Thomas Jefferson despised Plato because he saw Plato only through the warped prism of Christian neoplatonism (see the Jefferson-John Adams postpresidential correspondence). Jefferson directly blamed Plato for Christian metaphysical dogma."I don't doubt that Christian Platonist thinkers may have used Platonism to support Christian doctrine that it really doesn't; but I do think that Christianity and Platonism have many more commonalities than Aristotelianism and Christianity do. The commonalities shouldn't be pressed too far, but they are indeed there; even if one is not coming from a Christian background, it is really difficult not to see them; unless, one willfully chooses not to. We can make the one mistake of seeing Christian doctrine when it isn't actually there in Plato, but we can make the opposite mistake and not read Plato's dialogues as he intended because we are assuming that he didn't have something in mind that was actually very similar to what Christians believe. We really should avoid both. Scholarship, I believe, has swung in the opposite direction of earlier Christianized Platonism from the 19th century on.
Erick wrote: "We can make the one mistake of seeing Christian doctrine when it isn't actually there in Plato, but we can make the opposite mistake and not read Plato's dialogues as he intended because we are assuming that he didn't have something in mind that was actually very similar to what Christian believe."Thanks, Erick. This is a very large subject. At some point, I may feel qualified to address it in greater depth, but that day has not yet arrived. Knowing the right questions is important. This is, doubtlessly, one of the right questions.
That said, the issue between Plato and Christianity has always seemed to me to be the issue between reason and revelation. Granted, Plato, unlike Aristotle, has a lot of myths (and the Straussians consider, I believe, the theory of ideas to be just another myth). But, in the last analysis, reason was everything for Plato. That certainly was not the case for Paul and was especially not the case for Luther (who called reason the "great whore") and his progeny.
Alan wrote: "But, in the last analysis, reason was everything for Plato. That certainly was not the case for Paul and was especially not the case for Luther (who called reason the "great whore") and his progeny. "I don't believe such an approach to reason is found in the New Testament. Ironically, I was just reading last night how a number of 17th century Lutheran fundamentalists had attacked the influence of Plato on Christian mystical writers. I don't think it is always that easy to see what actually came from Plato and what was a common idea between them. Firstly, the debate about reason here shouldn't be confused with empiricism. Empirical reason isn't any more evidenced in Plato than it is in the New Testament. Accepting that, we then have to understand what reason was for Plato. His was based on logic certainly, but he also accepted, a priori, the existence of gods, daimons and other religious notions that can only really be matters of revelation, not logical deduction. So, I agree that Plato used analytical reason primarily, but he also accepted revelation on some level too. St. Paul did indeed rely more heavily on revelation, but rational argument is not absent from his letters. I don't see here oppositional ideologies; I see more a matter of dispositional preference.
Erick wrote: "we then have to understand what reason was for Plato. His was based on logic certainly, but he also accepted, a priori, the existence of gods, daimons and other religious notions that can only really be matters of revelation, not logical deduction. So, I agree that Plato used analytical reason primarily, but he also accepted revelation on some level too"Here is where we differ. In my view, Plato did not really believe in any of the supernatural notions he propagated. They were all exoteric myths--part of the "noble lie" of which he spoke in The Republic. Plato was probably trying to replace the irrationalism of Greek mythology (which he criticized) with a more rational mythology created by himself. That didn't mean that Plato really believed what he said. I think Plato would have been astonished to see what Christianity eventually made of his notions. Plato was, in a way, the great Nietzschean creator. Aristotle was more down-to-earth--and perhaps more honest.
The fate of Plato--and of Platonism--is an object lesson to all who would deliberately try to shape human culture with what they know to be mythology. There are many other examples.
It is the distinction between exoteric and esoteric teachings, as patiently explained by Leo Strauss over the course of many decades. I don't always agree with Strauss, but I think he was on to something. Strauss never took Plato's mythology at face value, just as he never took the theory of ideas seriously.
Alan wrote: "In my view, Plato did not really believe in any of the supernatural notions he propagated. They were all exoteric myths--part of the "noble lie" of which he spoke in The Republic... Strauss never took Plato's mythology at face value, just as he never took the theory of ideas seriously."I do strongly disagree. I think that position is one that has to assume something that is not actually present in the dialogues themselves. There is really no evidence for it that I can see. Xenophon believed that the Greek gods were immoral and I am sure that Plato on some level agreed. However, no follower of Plato ever claimed that he was an atomist; or that he was an atheist; or an agnostic when it came to the Greek gods. He did assume the existence of a God that was preeminent above them, but that doesn't mean he rejected their existence. The idea that he would voice belief in their existence in his dialogues, but be surprised that Greek readers would take him as really believing in them when he didn't, defies logical common sense. I don't think Strauss' view has much going for it, evidentially speaking.
Strauss spent a lifetime developing his views. I cannot begin to replicate them here, and I suggest you just read his writings as well as those of other Straussians, e.g., Joseph Cropsey's Plato's World: Man's Place in the Cosmos (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). I took one course from Strauss before he left the University of Chicago and many courses from Joseph Cropsey. If I recall correctly, it was Cropsey (in class) who characterized the theory of ideas as a myth. I have added a few of my own observations/thoughts above, but I think the position I have taken is essentially what Strauss taught.
Philosophy
Books mentioned in this topic
Plato's Theory of Ideas (other topics)The Enneads (other topics)
Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy, vol. I (other topics)
Posterior Analytics/Topica (other topics)
Posterior Analytics/Topica (other topics)
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He is rehashing arguments in his works on Logic, esp, Posterior Analytics, why do you say it is crazy?