THE WORLD WAR TWO GROUP discussion
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2015 - December - Theme Read - Warfare in the Asia-Pacific Region

"Guadalcanal saved the Pacific, and the Coastwatchers saved Guadalcanal." - William Halsey


Mrs Happy will bring it home for me tomorrow.


As for Halsey, I don't it's surprising that he's so closely identified with Guadalcanal. After all the movie, "The Gallant Hours," paid homage to just that.

Mrs Happy will bring it home for me tomorrow.

Keen to hear your views Happy, I have that book plus the second volume. I may try and squeeze the first one in as well if I can.




He mentions December 7, 1941, and then states that the Japanese always followed the method of bombing first and then landing troops to occupy, and this strategy was followed in the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, etc.
My question for the group (and one that Toll doesn't attempt to explain) is this: why didn't the Japanese invade Hawaii? The pretense of the Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was one of liberating indigenous peoples from the influence of the Europeans; why didn't Hawaii qualify on those grounds? And although Hawaii was a territory of the U.S. (not becoming a state until 1959), there was much less certainty of victory in Singapore - the "Gibraltar of the East" - for the Japanese.
What are the thoughts of other members of the group on this subject?


He mentions December 7, 1941, and then states that the Jap..."
Paul: I haven't read anything specific on the subject, but I would guess --
1. It's 6,500 miles from Tokyo to Hawaii. An invasion fleet probably wouldn't have escaped detection. The fleet would have been opposed by the U.S. Navy's carrier forces and subs before reaching Hawaiian waters. The logistics of supporting such a force so far out on a limb were daunting. Japan didn't possess a substantial fleet train.
2. Hawaii was a fortified outpost. Navy, air corps, and army elements were there in number. There were about 45,000 troops in two infantry divisions plus the National Guard present, along with 230 aircraft, a large coastal artillery establishment, and a significant naval force.
3. Most importantly, it wasn't in their planning to project that far away from the essential areas they wanted to control. Any forces left in Hawaii would have been left dangling. What would be the "upside" of occupying Hawaii? No oil, no rubber, no rice, just plenty of pineapples.





He mentions December 7, 1941, and then states..."
Playing devil's advocate, I think you're right about the dangling part and the lack of strategic resources, and the distance was rather large, but the forces and fortifications didn't keep them from attacking Singapore, Indonesia, New Guinea, etc. The distance was also not big enough to deter the planning of the attempted Midway invasion less than six months later. And if they could have captured the Hawaiian Islands, there would not have been any significant Allied presence between the West Coast of the U.S. and Australia.
I think as much as anything, the correct answer is your last sentence: "No oil, no rubber, no rice, just plenty of pineapples."

Leckie of the elegant pen ? that's a TBR !




I agree, Howard, but doubt there was enough striking power (i.e. aircraft capable of enough sorties and adequate bomb loads) in the Japanese carrier force to destroy the ships of the fleet, the shore-based air forces, the oil facilities and drydock/ship repair installations. It was a raid, not a sustained air campaign.


I've had this one on the shelf, so I'll take off with this one :

Finish Forty and Home: The Untold World War II Story of B-24s in the Pacific


He mentions December 7, 1941, and then states that the Jap..."
So first most of the land invasions were performed by the Army. Early on the Army decided that Hawaii was to big with to large a military presence to far away to be supplied to take in the initial stages of the campaign. Also, the immediate concern for the Japanese was to create a barrier that the US would have to crack through. Hawaii wasn't on their list of objectives for this barrier at any time. Midway didn't get on the list until after the Doolittle Raid. Even Dutch Harbor was never actually put on that list as far as I can tell.
The initial stages of the war the Japanese were focused on two things, resources and the ability to be used in their defensive barrier. In a very real sense Hawaii has neither of these. A lack of raw materials and to close to the West Coast for the Japanese to feel at ease in being able to secure the islands, or even just one of them and fortify it with any appreciable speed. So their priority targets were more to the south.
Also there was a question of ability. The Japanese were using the bulk of their naval air to perform the attack on Pearl, but the rest of the fleet was spread far and wide conducting operations in many different and mutually unsupportable locations. To take the island the force would have to stay in the area for an extended amount of time which would throw off the time tables that were set in place. (The Japanese were big on very complex plans) Also at the time there was a general lack of regard for the power of air attacks. Not surprising when one considers the time frame, even with the Japanese having the best Naval Air Force in the world at the time, there was still concerns of their being able to pull off the attack on Pearl Harbor successfully. So much so that Yammamoto had to threaten to resign to get the go ahead. Something that would come back and bit the Japanese Navy in the future.
So all in all, an invasion of Hawaii was never really a deep consideration on the part of the Japanese.


He mentions December 7, 1941, and then states that the Jap..."
I made a mistake in what Mrs Happy brought home from the library for me. It was this book she brought home. I started it today.
One slightly amusing observation from the prologue. It talking about the Solomon Islands, prewar Europeans said the most attractive view of the islands, "was from the stern of a departing ship".
Paul, James Scott goes into this a little bit in his book Target Tokyo: Jimmy Doolittle and the Raid That Avenged Pearl Harbor. It comes down to interservice rivalry. The original attack was always intended as a hit and run raid. The Navy had made plans for the invasion later on, but the Army was concentrating on China and South East Asia and wouldn't release the resources to accomplish it.


As mentioned above, the Japanese had neither the troops available nor the ships to move them.
Somewhere on the web (where, I can no longer find it), someone ran a map-analysis of Oahu, its beaches, and the defenses in place in 1941. The summary that I can remember ran something like this: The southern coast had the best beaches, and the existing prewar defenses were concentrated here. The east and west coasts had poor to no beaches and/or high surf, and were backed by mountains, allowing the defenders time to concentrate to meet them. The north coast was the farthest from Pearl Harbor, and also had poor beaches.
The Japanese Army's doctrine for landings was to try to land at unopposed beaches, seeking surprise. They had no training or equipment for naval gunfire support (their ships could and did shoot shore targets, but not with guidance from the beaches) or tactical air support. Going into a fortified position like Oahu would have been nearly impossible for them, IMO.

It had 14 inch guns, when they tested them after Pearl, the concussion did more damage to the hotels than the Japanese.


As mentioned above, the Japanese had neither the troops avail..."
It is an interesting point about equipment. Imagine a opposed beach landing in what basically amount to nothing more than Life Boats. Those nifty landing craft that they show in war movies (or talk about in books) were almost all developed during the war.

Yeah, that's why I asked the question - it would have made the front line in the naval war the west coast of the mainland, not Hawaii. All naval action by the U.S. in the theater would have been defensive.
Also, the Aleutians campaign wasn't begun until June 1942, so they didn't have that reference point.


He mentions December 7, 1941, and then states..."
Thanks, happy. I'm glad you're reading the same book - the reason I started with this is because I thought you had the first one. (For those that don't know, happy and I share the same library system.)
Toll also talks about the interservice rivalry. I'm glad you brought up that it was a plan for later; that seems to answer the question partially, because even though the Aleutians campaign was meant primarily as a diversion (and the Aleutians did't have much in the way of resources or strategic value), it was not an exception to the rule of an invasion following the original attack as posed in my original question.
Thanks to everyone for the comments on this discussion!

good point on the landing craft. On Wake Island, the Japanese finally resorted to beaching a ship full of men.


Military discipline was not a top priority, but the ability to think for themselves was. Definitely a different kind of war.


After talking about the courage and ingenuity of the coastwatchers, and the loyalty and devotion of the natives who risked their lives to rid their islands of the Japanese, Feldt went on to say:
"For all the help that FERDINAND received from Allied forces, in a way it owed most to the unwitting help of the enemy. The mistakes made by the Japanese, the fact that they apparently never fully realized what damage was being done them by a few skillful, resolute men, did most to reward FERDINAND'S effort with success."

Pg 5 Henry Stimpson, Sec of War on the causes of the interservice rivalry in the US military
"grew mainly from the peculiar psycology of the Navy Department, which frequently seemed to retire from the realm of logic into a dim religious world in which Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet and teh United States Navy the only true church"
pg 124 describing Nimitz trip to Noumea in Sept '42
"Nothing provided a more visceral sense of the immensity of the Pacific thatn flying across it in a World War II-era aircraft"

Pg 5 ..."
After all, Stimson was the Secretary of War.

What would Frank Knox or Jim Forrestal have said? We navy people always readily admitted:
"The U. S. Navy boasted 200 years of tradition, unhampered by progress."



It deal with India and the role of at least some units of the Indian Army in World War 2. Some of the book takes place on the subcontinent so I am assuming it could fit for the Pacific Theater. However, some Indian units served in the European Theater so will let the moderators advise me.


I'll be interested in your thoughts Michael.



I figured it involved the Japanese and it merges into WW2.


So if we do a Chinese theater theme, we can reach out into the Pacfic ;-)

I changed the title of the thread to warfare in the Asia-Pacific Region.


A couple of things I have read or thought so far with regard to India and WW2. I had not been aware that at least one Indian unit surrendered in Burma agreed to switch over to the Japanese. This apparently happened among Indian POW who were fighting against Germany and Italy as well. When one looks at the desire for Indian independence, the resistance the British toward Indian independence and the political climate in India prior to and during the war it is not surprising that these switches would take place.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subhas_...

" ... Like most other Japanese, Watanabe had been surprised by the tenacity of the Chinese defenders, and the sheer number of those willing to die for their cause. On the occasions when he had the chance to inspect conquered Chinese pillboxes, he was awestruck by the sight of dead defenders literally lying in layers. Childlike features showed that many of them couldn't even have reached the age of 20. Some of the Chinese corpses were still clutching their rifles, and the Japanese often found it impossible to prise them from their hands. It was, they said, as if their ghosts had returned to offer resistance."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dai_Li
Book on the subject:
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2004/...
Books mentioned in this topic
Shanghai 1937: Stalingrad on the Yangtze (other topics)The Conquering Tide: War in the Pacific Islands, 1942–1944 (other topics)
The Conquering Tide: War in the Pacific Islands, 1942–1944 (other topics)
Not the Slightest Chance: The Defense of Hong Kong, 1941 (other topics)
The Fall of Hong Kong: Britain, China, and the Japanese Occupation (other topics)
More...
Authors mentioned in this topic
Peter Harmsen (other topics)Raghu Karnad (other topics)
Peter Harmsen (other topics)
Raghu Karnad (other topics)
Robert Leckie (other topics)
The December theme read is on any book or books of your choice covering any aspect of the War in the Asia-Pacific Region - land, air or sea.