The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and Xi Jinping's China

by Kevin Rudd

These formal assessments of China’s international operating environment are the product of multiple inputs from across the party, government departments, and official think tanks. As good Marxists, the Chinese leadership regard their conclusions—never reached lightly over a weekend but usually over several years—as revealing long-term trends that are “scientifically and objectively true,” to use the Marxist formulation. As such, once reached, such conclusions tend to guide strategy and policy for an extended period and are hard to shift. Indeed, this can create an analytical inflexibility on Beijing’s part in dealing with contrary worldviews (even from within China), which are often written off by the CCP’s political and analytical system as “subjective and inaccurate.” As a result, foreigners whose perspectives directly conflict with the party’s received wisdom are often invited to reflect on their “incorrect views” and form instead a “correct” view of history. It is much more difficult for the party to concede that its analysis might be flawed.