On War: All volumes

by Carl von Clausewitz

principal foundation of, that wholesome methodicism which, like the beat of a pendulum, regulates the work in War,

That the Army shall be able to exist without inconvenience, and that it shall be able to concentrate without difficulty for the purpose of fighting, are, therefore, the two requisite conditions.

enemy must be made to develop his whole strength before such a Corps, and thereby reveal to a certain extent, not only his force, but also his plans.

advanced Corps effects more by its presence than by its efforts, less by the combats in which it engages than by the possibility of those in which it might engage: that it should never attempt to stop the enemy’s movements, but only serve like a pendulum to moderate and regulate them, so that they may be made matter of calculation.

All those subjects which relate to the internal arrangement of the combat and the transition into the state of combat belong to tactics.

Since the Wars of the French Revolution, Armies have completely done away with the tents on account of the encumbrance they cause.

smaller the mass of troops in one column the greater the ease and precision with which the march can be performed.

Unity of command is much more important than the original geometrical relation;

For our modern Armies it has long been settled that a march of fifteen miles should be the usual day’s work

the fatigue endured by a soldier loaded with his pack for ten or twelve hours is not to be judged by that of an ordinary journey of fifteen miles on

foot which a person, on tolerable roads, might easily get over in five hours.

A march of twenty-five miles requires a halt for several hours; and a Division of 8000 men will not do it, even on a good road, in less than sixteen hours.

If a bad road or a hilly country has to be marched over, all these calculations as to time and distance undergo

such modifications that it is difficult to estimate, with any certainty,

One single moderate march does not wear down the instrument, but a succession of even moderate marches is certain to tell upon it, and a succession of severe ones will, of course, do so much sooner.

The losses of this Army in general were at the commencement of the campaign at the rate of 1/150 daily, subsequently they rose to 1/120, and in the last period they increased to 1/19 of the original strength.

The retreat of french army from Moscow to Newman

Of the retreat of the French from Moscow to the Niemen, we shall say nothing, but this we may mention, that the Russian Army following them left Kaluga 120,000 strong, and reached Wilna with 30,000. Every one knows how few men were lost in actual combats during that period.

We must, therefore, make up our minds to great wear and tear of our own forces, if we are to carry on a War rich in movements, we must arrange the rest of our plan accordingly, and above all things the reinforcements which are to follow.

Huts and open-air camps (bivouacs as they are called), however far such arrangements may be carried, can still never become the usual way of locating troops without sickness gaining the upper hand, and prematurely exhausting their strength, sooner or later, according to the state of the weather or climate.

an advantageous position for cantonments is that they should be taken up behind some natural obstacle of ground affording cover, whilst the sides next the enemy can

if we are not very close to the enemy, and have a suitable advance guard we might remain in cantonments, even if the enemy is concentrated,

The power of enduring privations is one of the finest virtues in a soldier, and without it no Army is animated with the true military spirit;

but such privation must be of a temporary kind,

conditio...

the force of circumstances, and not the consequence of a wretchedly bad system, or of a parsimonious abstract calculation of the smal...

There are three properties through which the ground has an influence on action in War; viz., as presenting an obstacle to approach, as an obstacle to an extensive view, and as protection against the effect of firearms;

countries deviate from the idea of perfectly open level plains principally in three ways: first by the form of the ground, that is, hills and valleys; then by woods, marshes, and lakes as natural features; and lastly, by such changes as have been introduced by the hand of man.

Each of these three kinds of ground has its own effect on movement, on the range of sight, and in the cover it affords.

But it is undeniable that infantry has a decided advantage over every other arm in difficult country,

Every exertion of physical force if made upwards is more difficult than if it is made in the contrary direction (downwards); consequently it must be so in fighting; and there are three evident reasons why it is so. First, every height may be regarded as an obstacle to approach; secondly, although the range is not perceptibly greater in shooting down from

height, yet, all geometrical relations being taken into consideration, we have a better chance of hitting than in the opposite case; thirdly, an elevation gives a better command of view.

The strategic advance is not the continuous movement of a piece of wheelwork; it is made in single marches with a longer or shorter interval between them, and at each halting point the assailant is just as much acting on the defensive as his adversary.

with such phraseology they are drawing water in the leaky vessel of the Danaides.

if nothing but the number and value of victorious combats decides in War, it is plain that the comparative value of the opposing forces and ability of their respective leaders again rank as the first points for consideration, and that the part which the influence of ground plays can only be one of an inferior grade.

In tactics every combat, great or small, is defensive if we leave the initiative to the enemy, and wait for his appearance in our front.

In Strategy there is no victory,

Now Strategy, in its province, deals with large masses of men, extensive spaces and considerable duration of time; with tactics, it is the reverse.

we imagine to ourselves a defensive, such as it should be, we must suppose it with every possible preparation of all means, with an Army fit for, and inured to, War, with a General who does not wait for his adversary with anxiety from an embarrassing feeling of uncertainty, but from his own free choice, with cool presence of mind, with fortresses which do not dread a siege, and lastly, with a loyal people who fear the enemy as little as he fears them.

All campaigns which are remarkable for temporising, as it is called, like those of the famous Fabius Cunctator, have been calculated chiefly on the destruction of the enemy by his own efforts. This principle has been the leading one in many campaigns without that point being almost ever mentioned; and it is only when we disregard the specious reasoning of historians, and look at things clearly with our own eyes, that we are led to this real cause of many a solution.