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and although the alarms which are thus propagated like the waves of the sea subside into themselves, still, like them, without any apparent cause they rise again. Firm in reliance on his own better convictions, the Chief must sta...
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Everything is very simple in War, but the simplest thing is difficult.
Friction is the only conception which in a general way corresponds to that which distinguishes real War from War on paper.
Theoretically all sounds very well: the commander of a battalion is responsible for the execution of the order given; and as the battalion by its discipline is glued together into one piece, and the chief must be a man of acknowledged zeal, the beam turns on an iron pin with little friction.
But it is not so in reality, and all that is exaggerated and false in such a conception manifests itself at once in War.
The battalion always remains composed of a number of men, of whom, if chance so wills, the most insignificant is able to oc...
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Activity in War is movement in a resistant medium. Just as a man immersed in water is unable to perform with ease and regularity the most natural and simplest movement, that of walking, so in War, with ordinary powers, one cannot keep even the line of mediocrity.
the most consummate skill, presence of mind,
Now is there, then, no kind of oil which is capable of diminishing this friction? Only one, and that one is not always available at the will of the Commander or his Army. It is the habituation of an Army to War.
Habit gives strength to the body in great exertion, to the mind in great danger, to the judgment against first impressions.
the condition of the mind has always the most decisive influence on the forces employed in War.
According to our classification, therefore, tactics is the theory of the use of military forces in combat. Strategy is the theory of the use of combats for the object of the War.
Courage is, however, by no means an act of the understanding, but likewise a feeling, like fear; the latter looks to the physical preservation, courage to the moral preservation.
Courage is therefore no mere counterpoise to danger in order to neutralise the latter in its effects, but a peculiar power in itself.
the most distinguished Generals have never risen from the very learned or really erudite class of officers, but have been mostly men who, from the circumstances of their position, could not have attained to any great amount of knowledge.
the human mind is trained by the knowledge imparted to it and the direction given to its ideas. Only what is great can make it great; the little can only make it little, if the mind itself does not reject it as something repugnant.
45.: OF THE NATURE OF THIS KNOWLEDGE.
State policy is the womb in which War is developed,
experience is of more value in the Art of War than all philosophical truth.
A third fault in criticism is the misuse of historical examples, and a display of great reading or learning.
the use and abuse of historical examples.
when the object is to establish a new or doubtful opinion, one single example, thoroughly analysed, is far more instructive than ten which are superficially treated.
Although we know very little about the tactics in the battles between the Swiss and the Austrians, the Burgundians and French, still we find in them unmistakable evidence that they were the first in which the superiority of a good infantry over the best cavalry was displayed.
It would be an immense service to teach the Art of War entirely by historical examples, as Feuquières proposed to do; but it would be full work for the whole life of a man, if we reflect that he who undertakes it must first qualify himself for the task by a long personal experience in actual War.
the moral forces are amongst the most important subjects in War. They form the spirit which permeates the whole being of War. These forces fasten themselves soonest and with the greatest affinity on to the Will which puts in motion and guides the whole mass of powers, uniting with it as it were in one stream, because this is a moral force itself.
where an Army can be kept concentrated, the genius of the General takes a greater place,
The military virtue of an Army is, therefore, one of the most important moral powers in War, and where it is wanting, we either see its place supplied by one of the others, such as the great superiority of generalship or popular enthusiasm, or we find the results not commensurate with the exertions made.—How
The more a General is in the habit of demanding from his troops, the surer he will be that his demands will be answered.
Stratagem implies a concealed intention,
nothing in common with means of persuasion, of self-interest, of force, but a great deal to do with deceit,
The best Strategy is always to be very strong,
A reserve has two objects which are very distinct from each other, namely, first, the prolongation and renewal of the combat, and secondly, for use in case of unforeseen events.
Whoever reads history with a mind free from prejudice cannot fail to arrive at a conviction that of all military virtues, energy in the conduct of operations has always contributed the most to the glory and success of arms.
the essence of the defence consists in an intimate alliance of the Army with the ground on which it fights and its obstacles,
He who has not been present at the loss of a great battle will have difficulty in forming for himself a living or quite true idea of it, and the abstract notions of this or that small untoward affair will never come up to the perfect conception of a lost battle.
The more War is War
in earnest, the more it is a venting of animosity and hostility, a mutual struggle to overpower, so much the more will all activities join deadly contest, and also the more prominent in importance becomes the battle.
The battle is the bloodiest way of solution. True, it is not merely reciprocal slaughter, and its effect is more a killing of the enemy’s courage than of the enemy’s soldiers, as we shall see more plainly in the next chapter—but still blood is always its price, and slaughter its character as well as name; from this the humanity in the General’s mind recoils with horror.
Great examples are the best teachers, but it is certainly a misfortune if a cloud of theoretical prejudices comes between, for even the sunbeam is
refracted and tinted by the clouds.
night puts an end to pursuit,
In a lost battle the power of an Army is broken, the moral to a greater degree than the physical.
we now keep in view especially the night attack of an army, it follows that sufficient motives for it can seldom occur, and that they fall under one or other of the following classes.
But in all these cases there is still the condition that the enemy’s army is under our eyes, and protected by no advance-guard.
there is nothing now
but habituation to War which can give one Army a decided superiority over another. The nearer we approach to a state of equality in all these things, the more decisive becomes the relation in point of numbers.
The combat is of two kinds, which are essentially different; the destructive principle of fire, and the hand to hand or personal combat.
Frederick the Great adopted this means in the later period of the Seven Years’ War.
Buonaparte is an example of this.
in the order of battle the Army always became a closed inseparable whole. If such an Army was divided in the middle, it was like an earthworm cut in two: the wings had still life and the power of motion, but they had lost their natural functions.
