Neptune's Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal

by James D. Hornfischer

“No small share of the blame for this delay,” the commander continued, “which prolonged by nearly twenty-four hours the period when the ships lay in these dangerous waters, would seem to rest with the Marine Corps personnel and organization. The Marine Corps Pioneers, whose function it was to unload the boats and keep the beach clear, were far too few in numbers.” An officer from the transport Barnett described men “lounging around under the palm trees eating coconuts, lying down shooting coconuts from the trees; also playing around and paddling about in rubber boats. All of these men were Marines that should have been unloading boats.”

It has been said that an army is as brave as its privates and as good as its generals. In a navy, the dynamics are different. On a ship bound for battle, admirals and seamen alike stand equally exposed to the hazards of combat. Admirals must have the same degree of physical courage. “The ship and crew members will go where he directs them—discipline and training will guarantee that—but his is the choice of the hazard that all will incur,” a naval strategist wrote.

When it was all said and done at Guadalcanal, three sailors would die at sea for every infantryman who fell ashore.

At the end of 1942, the United States would field nearly 25 percent more combat troops in the Pacific than it did in England and North Africa, 464,000 to 378,000.

“This Bureau concurs with the opinion of the Convening Authority and the Judge Advocate General that the death of Captain Bode occurred as a direct consequence of a severe mental illness characterized by depression, and accordingly is of the opinion that it should be considered not the result of his own misconduct.” A notation at the end of his personnel file indicates, apropos of nothing in particular, “Not a war casualty.”

The war’s psychological casualties, from Robert Ghormley to Howard Bode to Alleta Sullivan and on through the years, would never be counted.

Admiral Halsey drew a convincing parallel. “If our surface forces in this epic battle had been routed our land forces on Guadalcanal would have been in the same position as our forces in the Philippines were at the beginning of the war. Archie Vandegrift would have undoubtedly taken to the hills. Those who had fallen into the hands of the Japanese would have received the same horrible mistreatment our prisoners did on all occasions. Archie Vandegrift would have been the ‘Skinny’ Wainwright of Guadalcanal, and the Bataan Death March would have been repeated.”