Nehru's 97 Major Blunders

by Rajnikant Puranik

Panchsheel is actually a most eloquent example of the naivety of the Indian diplomacy and a shining example of what an international agreement should NOT be! Yet, upon criticism of the Panchsheel in parliament, Nehru had brazenly stated that in the realm of foreign affairs he could never take so much credit as for the India-China settlement over Tibet!

Nehru failed to negotiate with China on a peaceful settlement of borders, so vital to India's security. Doing so was not difficult considering that China at that time was not strong, had numerous external and internal problems to contend with, and was therefore willing for a “give and take”, particularly ‘Aksai Chin—McMahon Line swap’: recognition of McMahon Line by China in return for India's recognition of China's claim on Aksai Chin, with minor adjustments.

Aksai Chin was in physical possession of China, and they had built a highway there in the 1950s joining Tibet with Xinjiang [Sinkiang], there being no other land-route to connect the two. Aksai Chin was uninhabited, barren and of no strategic or economic importance for India; and considering India had no legally sound claim on it (please see the history below), there was little point, and indeed unwise, for Nehru to act adamant on it, especially when China was prepared for a quid pro quo on the McMahon Line in the northeast. General Thimayya had himself stated in 1959 that Aksai Chin was of no strategic significance for India.

The Convention proposed granting China control over Inner Tibet while recognizing the autonomy of Outer Tibet under the Dalai Lama's rule. Outer Tibet comprised Western and Central Tibet including Lhasa, Chamdo and Shigatse, and areas skirting the British-India frontier; while Inner Tibet included Amdo and part of Kham. Both China and Britain were to respect the territorial integrity of Tibet, and abstain from interference in the administration of Outer Tibet. Further Outer Tibet could not be converted into a province of China. The border between northeast India and Tibet was also discussed and finalised between Tibet and British-India during the Convention—it came to be known as the McMahon Line. China was not invited to the discussions on the McMahon Line because it was a boundary settlement between Tibet and India, and not between China and India. It was not a secret negotiation, and China knew about it—and raised no objections.

The McMahon Line was a thick red-line drawn on a double-page map, hence it is inaccurate and susceptible to alternate interpretations and disputes. As proper follow-up protocols that should have used cartographic techniques to identify the location of the agreed line on the ground through a joint survey were not taken up, the line remained inexact, leaving scope for controversial claims. The Indian maps showed it as a dashed/broken-line till 1954 to indicate it was roughly defined but not yet demarcated, that is, marked on the ground consequent to a ground survey. However, after July 1954, the Indian maps began showing it as a solid line indicating it was well-demarcated—at the instance of Nehru! Through the McMahon Line, McMahon had effectively advanced the borders of British-India further north and added 50,000 odd square miles of territory that was till then administered by Tibet, including Tawang, that had the famous Tibetan-Buddhist monastery. Tawang was on the trade-route and British desired control over it. Though reluctant, Tibet agreed to the give-away as a bargain for its rights on the Outer Tibet.

India effectively did a self-goal through its Tibet policy—Dalai Lama rightly pointed out that to deny the sovereign status of Tibet when the McMahon Line was agreed to in 1914 was to deny the validity of the McMahon Line itself.

India should not have allowed Tibet, which was a buffer with China, to disappear as an independent nation. That blunder (Blunder#33) having been done, the following sensible steps should have been taken: Step-1: Both India and China should have taken stock of the fact of unsettled borders, and let the public in both the countries know of the same, lest there be any wrong impression, false propaganda, and unwarranted politics. Step-2: A team comprising experts from both the countries should have done ground survey and should have tried to define the boundaries. Step-3: Those areas that the expert-team failed to resolve could have been left for further discussions at a higher level, where they could have been resolved in a spirit of give and take. But, were the above sensible steps taken? Unfortunately, no! Contrary to expectations, one is shocked to learn that while China was agreeable for these sensible steps, India was not! Nehru had other ideas—odd, brazen and unreasonable!!

historically, China had not agreed to any border with India and signed any boundary agreement, except for the borders with Sikkim.

The stand of the Peoples Republic of China from 1949 onwards was that they wanted to remove the blot of the British imperialist humiliation China had suffered with regard to the borders and on other matters, and rather than accepting the unjust and illegal British-drawn borders, they desired discussions, negotiations and a joint ground survey to settle the borders in a just and mutually acceptable manner in the spirit of give and take, and not with a view to grab area they were not entitled to. They also wanted to dispense with the British-given names, and give the boundaries new Indian–Chinese names. Chinese communists, having just ascended the power in 1949, desired a settled border, especially because they already had several severe headaches—internal troubles, Korea, Taiwan, Tibet and a belligerent US—and didn’t want to add to them.

China finalised with Myanmar (Burma) in 1960—the new Burma-China border is roughly along the McMahon Line, with certain adjustments accepted by both the sides. China also settled its boundaries amicably through negotiations with Nepal and Pakistan, and signed boundary agreements. India remained the only exception.

The Indian Ambassador to China KM Panikkar had advised: “[If] China raises the issue [of the McMahon Line], we can plainly refuse to reopen the question and take our stand that the Prime minister took [in his public statement], that the territory on this side of the McMahon Line is ours, and that there is nothing to discuss about it.”{Max/77}

“India reiterated that her boundaries with China could not be a matter of negotiation, claiming that they stood defined ‘without the necessity of further or formal delimitation’. China replied that ‘this attitude…of refusing to negotiate and trying to impose a unilaterally claimed alignment on China is in actuality refusal to settle the boundary question’; and she warned that while India maintained that position and kept up her ‘unreasonable tangling’, China would ‘absolutely not retreat an inch’ from her own stand. That China was equably and equitably settling her boundaries with her neighbours tended to throw an adverse light on India’s position. Peking prodded at that sore point: ‘Since the Burmese and Nepalese Governments can settle their boundary questions with China in a friendly way through negotiations and since the Government of Pakistan has also agreed…to negotiate a boundary settlement, why is it that the Indian Government cannot negotiate and settle its boundary question…’”{Max/214}

For over a decade since the independence, Nehru talked with Zhou Enlai on everything under the Sun except the boundary issues. Records quoted in various books on the subject show that Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai did raise the boundary matter with Nehru several times, but India soft-peddled or avoided the issue. China was also not insistent. No objections or protests from the Chinese were taken to mean their acquiescence to our position. So, as a “strategy”, India maintained silence, kept mum on the issue.

Zhou found Nehru’s adamant stand on Aksai Chin inexplicable and unexpected for several reasons: (a)India had never occupied or ruled or set its foot in Aksai Chin; (b)in the opinion of China, India had no valid and legal ground to lay claim on it; (c)it was barren and nothing grew there; and (d)it was of no strategic or economic importance for India.

Apparently, the ‘wise’ and the ‘self-proclaimed-expert-in-international-affairs’ Nehru thought that by being assertive about what India had unilaterally decided were its boundaries, the ‘not-so-wise’ China would ultimately buckle and agree to India’s unilateral claims! It didn’t matter that India had no undisputed maps and mutually-agreed documents to back up its assertiveness. Nehru’s assertiveness and adamance were misplaced—he should have shown that while dealing with the Tibet issue

Again and again, military men have seen themselves hurled into war by the ambition, passions and blunders of civilian governments, almost wholly uninformed as to the limits of their military potential and almost recklessly indifferent to the military requirements of the war they let loose. —Alfred Vagts, ‘The History of Militarism’{Max/289}

Check out this quote.

India and China had a record going back thousands of years for never having fought a war between them. Nehru, through his unwise and ill-considered policies, broke that record, though unwillingly. Nehru’s ‘forward policy’ and his failure in settling the borders resulted in India-China war and its consequent human and financial loss, besides loss of face for India and Indians before the international community. Here, we are talking of what India could control, not what China had in mind.

It was not just one Himalayan blunder, but like the Himalayan range, a range of blunders by Nehru over a fifteen-year period since independence across domains—External Security, Defence, Foreign Policy, and so on—that led to the disaster that shamed India and the Indians before the world.

Blunder-1. Allowing Tibet to be annexed by China, and recognising China’s claim over Tibet. This allowed Tibet-India borders to become China-India borders, bringing with them all the associated problems (Blunder#33 above). Blunder-2. Not settling the border-issue with China, and being inflexible about it. (Blunder#35) Blunder-3. Signing Panchsheel agreement with China in 1954 without first settling the borders. (Blunder#34) Blunder-4. Change of Indian maps unilaterally after July 1954 without mutual discussions with the other party—China. (Blunder#35) Blunder-5. Nehru’s refusal to consider the proposal of the Chinese delegation in 1960 of East-West give-and-take swap on the McMahon Line and Aksai Chin. (Blunder#35) Blunder-6. Ill-conceived, non-forward-looking Forward Policy of establishing indefensible border posts in disputed areas, provoking China, or giving China the excuse to attack. (Details further down) Blunder-7. Absurd assumption on the part of Nehru and his close group that China would not attack even if India established certain posts in the disputed areas. (Details further down) Blunder-8. Leaving the forward posts grossly under-manned and under-armed, with inadequate logistics in place. (Details further down) Blunder-9. Politicisation of the army high command. Favouritism. Putting in place sycophants and submissive officers at top positions who would kowtow to political bosses. Eventually, some of these chosen submissive officers co...