Nehru's 97 Major Blunders

by Rajnikant Puranik

A telling example of the consequences of the iniquitous Article 35A is the plight of about 200 Valmiki families brought to J&K as ‘Safai Karamcharis’ (Sanitary workers) in the 1950s on the promise of grant of PRC. However, even after many decades PRCs have not been granted to them, and to their children. Many, who have since acquired required educational qualifications, can’t apply for government jobs in the absence of PRC. They can vote for the Lok Sabha elections but not for J&K legislature, or for the local bodies. Their colony has not been regularised. Another painful example is that of about two lakh Hindu-Sikh refugees who migrated to J&K from West Pakistan in 1947 after Partition—none has received PRC, and they can neither acquire immovable property in J&K, nor avail of educational and other facilities in J&K, nor get government jobs! They are Indian nationals, but not citizens of the J&K state. Their cry for justice has gone unheard for decades. The worst thing about the Article was that although passed on 14 May 1954, it was made applicable retrospectively from 14 May 1944, well before independence! Hindus from Pakistan entered Jammu in 1947 after partition, and were thus handicapped, thanks to this Article—demonstrates how insensitive Nehru was to their plight. Had they been Muslims Nehru’s stand would have been different and accommodating—like it was in case of the Muslims from East Bengal. It is high time this iniquitous Article 35A is dumped along with the Art...

Sheikh Abdullah’s father was Sheikh Mohammed Ibrahim, a middle class manufacturer and trader of shawls. Sheikh Abdullah’s grandfather was a Hindu Kashmiri Pandit by the name of Ragho Ram Koul, who was converted to Islam in 1890 and was named Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, the name his grandson took. Sheikh Abdullah married Akbar Jahan in 1933. She was daughter of Michael Harry Nedou and his Kashmiri wife. Michael owned a hotel at the tourist resort of Gulmarg—his father was a European proprietor of a chain of hotels in India including Nedous Hotel in Srinagar.

The Muslim Conference founded by Sheikh Abdullah was reportedly communal: some say that he later changed its name to National Conference only for tactical reasons. Sheikh Abdullah was a protagonist of Kashmiri nationalism linked to Islam; and his role model was Dr Mohammad Iqbal, a scion of another Kashmiri Pundit convert to Islam—like himself—who propounded the ideology of Pakistan way back in 1930.

Sheikh Abdullah had launched the ‘Quit Kashmir’ agitation against the Maharajah in May 1946 leading to his arrest. The agitation, felt most Congress leaders, was opportunist and malevolent, and driven by selfish consideration of self-promotion—after all, Maharaja was not an outsider like the British. Sheikh Abdullah indulged in such acts knowing he would receive tacit support of Nehru. Although Sheikh Abdullah had tried to project his fight against the Maharaja as a fight against the feudal order, and a fight for the people of J&K—something the gullible, socialist Nehru believed—in reality his purpose was communal, to get Muslim support, and grab power.

Sheikh Abdullah had endeared himself to Nehru—who had called him ‘my blood-brother’—and others by projecting an anti-feudal, democratic, leftist, pro-India, pro-Congress, and above all, a secular image: perhaps to get Maharaja Hari Singh out of the way, and then to sit in his place; for his later actions belied that image, and disappointed and shocked Nehru. S. Gopal, Nehru’s biographer, had written that Nehru regarded Abdullah as ‘an old friend and colleague and blood-brother’. Nehru held Abdullah beyond suspicion, and trusted him fully. For Nehru, Abdullah was Kashmir, and Kashmir was Abdullah!{BK/372} To have reposed such blind faith in Sheikh Abdullah and in his capability to deliver, grossly overestimating his popularity and remaining innocently unsuspicious of his intentions, even to the extent of being unfair, unjust and insulting to the Maharaja and non-Muslim Kashmiris, reflected negatively on the expected leadership qualities from Nehru.

Sheikh Abdullah was made ‘Head of the Emergency Administration’ in J&K on 30 October 1947 by Maharaja Hari Singh at the instance of Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi. He took oath as Prime Minister of Kashmir on 17 March 1948. He was accused of rigging elections to the Constituent Assembly in 1951. He was dismissed as Prime Minister on 8 August 1953, and was arrested and later jailed for eleven years upon being accused of conspiracy against the State in what came to be known as the ‘Kashmir Conspiracy Case’. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed was appointed in his place—it was he who had arrested Sheikh Abdullah.

Sheikh Abdullah was released on 8 April 1964. Nehru passed away on 27 May 1964. Sheikh Abdullah was later interned from 1965 to 1968. He was exiled from Kashmir in 1971 for 18 months. Consequent to the Indira-Sheikh accord of 1974, he became the Chief Minister of J&K and remained in that position till his death in 1982.

When Abdullah launched the ‘abusive and mischievous’{BK/375} Quit Kashmir agitation against the Maharajah in May 1946 leading to his arrest (Blunder#27), Nehru decided to go to the Valley in June 1946 to free Abdullah. Though prohibited to enter the State, Nehru decided to defy the ban. He proclaimed that he wanted to take on the autocratic and the feudal rule that prevailed in Kashmir. Autocratic and feudal rule prevailed in the other 547 Princely States too that ultimately merged with India: Did Nehru go to any of those 547 states to similarly protest—especially the recalcitrant Nizam-ruled state of Hyderabad, where Hindus had been brutally at the receiving end of the Razakars? Nehru did not seem to realise that the support of the princes and their collaboration would be indispensable in the coming months for persuading them to accede to India. To take on the Maharaja at that stage, and that too as Congress president, was politically wise. Sardar Patel and others tried to dissuade him, yet he went.

Most undiplomatically, even Gandhi, when he went for his only visit to Kashmir in 1947, pointedly rejected the hospitality of the Maharaja, and remained the guest of the National Conference of Abdullah. Rebuffed thus by Gandhi, having been consistently rubbed the wrong way by Nehru, and experiencing the hostility of Nehru towards him over the last many months, and watching the commitment being shown to his arch enemy, Abdullah, why Hari Singh, anybody in his place—Nehru himself, were he in Maharaja's shoes—would have hesitated to accede to India. Hari Singh realised he would have no future with Nehru and Gandhi at the helm.

If Nehru had dealt with Hari Singh wisely looking to the political options, like Sardar Patel had done in respect of all the other 547 Princely States, had Nehru not allowed his personal bias to dominate, had Nehru accommodated Maharaja suitably, had Nehru convinced him that his interests would be suitably protected if he joined India, Hari Singh may not have dithered and would have signed the Instrument of Accession well before 15 August 1947; and J&K would never have been an issue!

The tormentors of the Kashmiri Pandits (KPs) have been Kashmiri Pandits themselves—Kashmiri-Pandit-Converts like Sheikh Abdullah, or Kashmiri-Pandits like Nehru who created the Kashmir problem in the first place; and then, rather than solving it, made it more complicated, and almost insolvable.

Nehru threatening his own people! And, not for any wrong committed by them. But to undemocratically force them to back a person [Sheikh Abdullah] who turned out to be a bigot, and an anti-national. Half a million Kashmiri Pandits would, some forty-five years later, pay for Nehru’s sins, and be ethnically cleansed out of Kashmir—their home for thousands of years.

Check out this quote.

Sheikh Abdullah himself was a Kashmiri Pandit convert. The second-generation-convert Sir Allama Muhammad Iqbal, one of the main promoters of the idea of Pakistan, had a major influence on Jinnah in gradually turning him from a liberal, advocating Hindu-Muslim unity, into a bigot.

Those who drove out the Kashmiri Pandits from the valley also happen to be Kashmiri-Pandit-Converts. Fundamentalist Islam is supremacist, intolerant, inhuman, and cruel like the ISIS.

Rinchin was a Buddhist from Ladakh. Hinduism (Shaivism) was then the dominant religion in Kashmir. Islam was on the fringe, and was at the time being propagated by Saiyyid Bilal Shah, popular as Bulbul Shah. After Sahadev fled and Dulacha left, Sahadev’s Army Chief, Ramchandra, occupied the throne of Kashmir. But Rinchin, who had a key post in Sahadev’s administration, plotted and eliminated Ramchandra, and sat in his place in 1320 CE. To pacify the public provoked by the misdeed, Rinchin married Kotarani, daughter of Ramchandra. At Kotarani’s behest, discarding Buddhism, Rinchin adopted Shaivism to become acceptable to the public. But the Kashmiri Pandits refused to accept him in their fold, saying that his conversion was not feasible—a legend says they couldn’t decide which caste to put him in. As a reaction to the rebuff, and at the instance of Shah Mir, Rinchin then approached Bulbul Shah, who converted him to Islam, and gave him the name Sultan Malik Sadruddin. Rinchin later built a mosque called the Bodro Masjid, venerated both by the Ladakh Buddhists and the Kashmiri Muslims. With the king converted to Islam, many others followed. And thus Islam spread in the Kashmir Valley. This is how Pandits scored a self-goal. So, in a way, the Kashmiri Pandits have themselves to blame for inadvertently giving a push to the Islamisation of the Valley, though it was the later state-backed campaign—through preaching, patronage, incentives, torture and forced conversions—that redu...

Without the concurrence of Sardar, and without even the courtesy of informing him, Nehru appointed N Gopalaswami Ayyangar, a former Dewan of J&K and a constitutional expert, as a Cabinet Minister without portfolio, to assist him (Nehru) in handling Kashmir. It was this Gopalaswami who had very badly messed up India’s case in the UN later (Blunder#22). Sardar became aware of Gopalaswami’s role indirectly when he [Gopalaswami] issued a note in connection with J&K, without consulting Sardar.

Junagadh was a Princely State whose area was about 3,337 square miles, and it was ruled by Nawab Sir Mahabatkhan Rasulkhanji (or Nawab Mahatab Khan III) at the time of independence in 1947. There are many stories of the eccentricity of the Nawab and of his love for dogs, including his expenditure of £21,000 on the wedding of two of his dogs{Tunz/216}

“At the end of September [1947], the Indian government decided that a show of force was unavoidable. Sardar Patel pointed out that by sending its armed personnel into Babariawad, Junagadh had committed an act of war against India. The princely state which had acceded to India had a right to expect that India would protect them against aggression. A weak posture would undermine India’s standing with the Princely States and would have repercussions in Hyderabad, where the Nizam was holding out against accession.

Sardar was really a Sardar—he lived up to his title! Without Sardar, one does not know what other Kashmir-like states or additional Pakistans would have been created—especially, if Mountbatten and Nehru had a free run. If Sardar Patel had not taken the action that he did in Junagadh, and allowed the status quo—its accession to Pakistan on 15 August 1947—to continue, India would have faced difficult situation in Hyderabad.

A plebiscite was held in Junagadh by India. At the instance of Sardar Patel, it was conducted not by the UN, but by an Indian ICS officer, CB Nagarkar, on 20 February 1948, in which 99%—all but 91 persons—voted to join India. Sardar was not gullible like Nehru to allow himself to be made a fool of by letting Mountbatten have his way, refer the matter to the UN—which Mountbatten had suggested for Junagadh too—and allow domestic matters to be internationalised, and be exploited by Pakistan and the UK.

after the announcement of the 3-June-1947 Plan or the Mountbatten Plan of the partition of India, Nizam declared on 12 June 1947 that he would neither join India nor Pakistan, but would remain independent. He wanted to secure the Dominion Status for his State from the British, like the one proposed for partitioned India and Pakistan, although the same was not allowed for any Princely State.

A fanatical Muslim organisation, Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen, headed by one Kasim Razvi had been fomenting trouble. They came to be known as the Razakars. At the instance of Kasim Razvi, Nizam appointed Mir Laik Ali as Prime Minister and president of his Executive Council. Laik Ali was a Hyderabadi businessman, who had also been a representative of Pakistan at the UN till September 1947. With this the Hyderabad Government came virtually under Razvi, who later met Sardar Patel and VP Menon in Delhi to tell that Hyderabad would never surrender its independence, and that Hindus were happy under Nizam; but if India insisted on a plebiscite, it is the sword which would decide the final result. Razvi further told Sardar Patel, “We shall fight and die to the last men,” to which Patel responded, “How can I stop you from committing suicide?”{RG/476}

In his speeches in March 1948 and later, Kasim Razvi exhorted the Muslims “to march forward with Koran in one hand and a sword in the other to hound out the enemy.” He declared that “the 45 million Muslims in India would be our fifth columnists in any showdown”{BK2/138}. Razvi challenged that “if the Indian Union attempted to enter Hyderabad, it would find nothing but the bones and ashes of 15 million Hindus residing in the State.”{BK/408}. He boasted on 12 April 1948 that “the day is not far off when the waves of bay of Bengal would be washing the feet of our Sovereign”{BK/409}; and that he would “hoist the Asaf Jahi flag on the Red Fort in India”. Razakars continued their criminal anti-Hindu activities.{BK/409}

At the suggestion of his British and Muslim advisers, the Nizam had planned out several ways to strengthen his position: acquiring port facilities at Goa from Portugal; getting approval for a rail-corridor from Hyderabad to Goa; taking mine-leases in mineral-rich Bastar; readying more air-fields; acquiring weapons; recruiting more Muslims in the army; recruiting British soldiers; getting Muslims from other states to move into Hyderabad state; converting Dalits to Islam; unleashing militia comprising local Muslims, Pathans and Arabs to intimidate non-Muslims; scaring away Hindus out of Hyderabad state; and so on. Mir Laik Ali had bluffed and boasted: “If the Union Government takes any action against Hyderabad, a hundred thousand men are ready to join our army. We also have a hundred bombers in Saudi Arabia ready to bomb Bombay.”{URL16}

While Mountbatten had nothing to say on the grossly unethical, illegal and even barbarous acts of Pakistani raiders in J&K, and of Razakars in Hyderabad; he was liberal in his moral lectures to India, and wanted India “to adopt ethical and correct behaviour towards Hyderabad, and to act in such a way as could be defended before the bar of world opinion.”{BK2/129}

Nehru never showed similar indulgence towards the Maharaja of Kashmir. Indeed, he was unreasonably hostile to the Maharaja of Kashmir, unnecessarily friendly and brotherly towards Sheikh Abdullah; but indulgent towards the Nizam under whose regime the innocent Hindus were being terrorised by the Razakars and Muslim militias.

Despite Sardar’s objections, a Standstill (status quo) Agreement was signed between India and Hyderabad in November 1947 for a year. In the subsequent months, Hyderabad loaned rupees twenty crores to Pakistan, placed orders for arms elsewhere, and stepped up its nefarious, anti-Hindu activities through Razakars.

One JV Joshi, in his letter of resignation from the Nizam’s Executive Council, wrote that law and order had completely broken down in many districts and that the Nizam’s Police—comprising almost exclusively of Muslims—was colluding with the Razakars in loot, arson and murder of Hindus, and molestation and rape of their females. He stated having himself witnessed such scenes and even scenes where Brahmins were killed and their eyes gouged out. It was estimated that besides the Hyderabad State forces of over 40,000, there were about 2,00,000 Razakars with small arms, and a number of Pathans lately imported. It became morally difficult for India to remain a mute witness to the mayhem, that turned worse by August 1948.

Nehru was so opposed to the use of force against Hyderabad that after Patel got the same approved by the cabinet Nehru called his cabinet colleague Dr Shyama Prasad Mukherjee and remonstrated with him for supporting Patel on the issue, and warned him [being a Bengali] that India’s action would lead to retaliation by Pakistan, which was likely to invade West Bengal, and bomb Calcutta. Unexpected by Nehru, Mukherjee nonchalantly responded that the people of Bengal and Calcutta had enough patriotism to suffer and sacrifice for the national cause, and would be overjoyed when they learn that General JN Chaudhuri, a Bengali, had conquered Hyderabad!

Sardar Patel had fixed the zero hour for the Army to move into Hyderabad twice, and twice he had to postpone it under intense political pressure from Nehru and Rajaji [C.R.]. When the zero hour was fixed the third time by Patel, again it was sought to be cancelled in response to the appeal of the Nizam to Rajaji. Nehru and Rajaji instead directed VP Menon and HM Patel to draft suitable reply to Nizam on his appeal. Nehru and Rajaji didn’t realise that the Nizam was all along buying time to strengthen himself, and not to reach any amicable settlement. By then Sardar had had enough of Hamlet Nehru.

The operations commenced on 13 September 1948, and after about four days of operations lasting 108 hours{VPM1/256}, the Hyderabad Army surrendered, with Major-General El Edroos, commander of the Hyderabad Army, asking his troops to yield; and Major-General JN Chaudhuri entered Hyderabad city on 18 September 1948, taking charge as Military Governor. His administration continued till December 1949. Kasim Razvi was arrested on 19 September 1948.

In the 8th century, Tibetan King Trisong Dentsen had defeated China, which was forced to pay an annual tribute to Tibet. To put an end to mutual fighting, China and Tibet signed a treaty in 783 CE where boundaries were confirmed, and each country promised to respect the territorial sovereignty of the other. This fact is engraved on the stone monument at the entrance of the Jokhang temple, which still stands today. The engraving is both in Chinese and in Tibetan.

Nehru allowed Tibet, our peaceful neighbour and a buffer between us and China, to be erased as a nation, without even recording a protest in the UN, thereby making our northern borders insecure, and putting a question mark on the future of the water resources that originate in Tibet.

Tibetans requested the Government of India to raise the Tibet issue in the UN. But, India was not willing to do so, lest China should feel antagonised! What to speak of helping our neighbour who had appealed to us for help, we shamelessly advised the victim to seek peaceful settlement with the aggressor China. Even worse, when through others, the Tibet’s appeal came up on 23 November 1950 for discussions in the UN General Assembly, we opposed the discussions on a very flimsy ground—that India had received a note from China that the matter would be resolved peacefully!

With no one to sponsor the Tibetan appeal, possibility of some joint action was discussed by the Commonwealth delegation to the UN. In the meeting, the Indian representative advised that India did not wish to raise the Tibetan issue in the UNSC, nor did India favour its inclusion in the UN General Assembly agenda!

Nehru referred to the UN what India should never have referred—the J&K issue, it being India’s internal matter. But, Nehru refused to refer a matter to the UN that India should certainly have referred—Tibet, despite its criticality both to India’s external security, and to the survival of a peaceful neighbour. When Nehru should not have acted, he did act; and when he should have acted, he didn’t! Both, his action and his inaction, led to disastrous consequences for India.

India was in desperate need of a Sardar Patel to drive its strategic thinking. Nehru, by stating on 1 November 1950 in an interview to the Unites Press that “India has neither the resources nor the inclination to send armed assistance to Tibet”{Arpi/374} and that “We can’t save Tibet” seemed to wash his hands off the whole affair so critical to India’s security, and seemed to suggest that other than armed intervention, which India didn’t wish to undertake, there was nothing India could do—when there was much that India could have very well done, other than its own armed intervention!

Britain rightly realised that Tibet as a buffer was vital to the security of British-India, particularly northern India. However, Britain did not wish to take the trouble of converting Tibet into a protectorate like Sikkim—it did not consider it financially worthwhile to commit resources for the purpose. Britain wanted Tibet to be neither under Russia nor under China. Autonomous or independent Tibet was the best bet to ensure security of northern India, and therefore the strategy was to ensure it remained so. Towards this end, the British took tremendous physical risks in surveying the border areas and sending missions through the difficult terrain to Tibet, spent considerable sum, did meticulous planning through the decades, arranged conventions, signed agreements, adjusted borders to make northern India as secure as possible—even engaged in “cartographic aggression”. Trained Indian surveyor-spies, disguised as pilgrims or traders, counted their strides on their travels across Tibet, took readings at night, and measured the longitude, latitude and altitude of Lhasa and other places.

It can be said that from the Tibetan angle it was their misfortune India gained independence from the British in 1947. Had that independence been delayed, and had the British been still ruling India at the time of the Chinese aggression of Tibet in 1950, Britain would certainly not have just watched helpless—it would have ensured the Chinese were thrown out of Tibet. Alternately, it can be said that it was Tibet’s misfortune that Nehru was then at the helm in India. Had it been Sardar Patel, or some other Patel-like leader, China would not have got the walk-over.

China could have been prevented from taking over Tibet by bringing about international pressure. China was in a vulnerable position in 1950: it was fully committed in Korea and was by no means secure in its hold over the mainland. There would have been wide international support for the cause of Tibet, if India, the nation which had inherited from British-India the treaty with Tibet, and which was directly affected, had taken the initiative. The world opinion was strongly against the Chinese aggression, and all the countries were looking to India, the most affected country, to take the lead.

“Having maintained complete independence of China since 1912, Tibet has a strong claim to be regarded as an independent state. But it is for India to take a lead in this matter. If India decides to support independence of Tibet as a buffer state between itself and China, Britain and USA will do well to extend formal diplomatic recognition to it.”{URL61}{URL62}

“The Americans were keen to support Tibet’s claim to sovereignty but needed support from India (or possibly Nepal) to solidify the claim. But the proto-communist Nehru (who believed, in his simple heart, that communism was the wave of the future, and the forces of history would inevitably lead to the triumph of communism) contemptuously brushed off the American offer of support. Nehru told his cabinet that it was not possible for India to help Tibet fend off the well-armed PLA (but he did not address the question of whether American support could have augmented the military potential of a combined effort).”{PB}

“Much has been made of Nehru’s blunder in Kashmir, but it pales in comparison with his folly in Tibet. As a result of this monumental failure of vision—and nerve—India soon came to be treated as a third rate power, acquiring ‘parity’ with Pakistan...”{URL43}

Even if India did not have the military strength to confront and prevent China, there were so many other steps that India could have taken: express disapproval; provide moral support to Tibet; lodge protest in the UN; mobilise world opinion against Chinese action; grant recognition to Tibet as an independent nation; persuade other nations to also do so; demand plebiscite in Tibet to ascertain the opinion of the public—China had agreed for a plebiscite in Mongolia, that led to its independence; work towards ensuring complete independence for Tibet through peaceful means. Even if the final favourable outcome took decades it didn’t matter—at least there would have been hope. Had India taken the initiative many nations would have supported India. In fact, many did pass resolution in favour of Tibet in the UN later, which India, the affected country, did not support!

Reportedly, Nehru tried to rationalise India’s inaction on various pretexts, the most bizarre among them being that Tibetan society was backward and feudal, and that reforms were bound to upset the ruling elite, and so on.

Crazy, perplexing and inexplicable! What does Nehru’s logic lead to? It is all right for a country that is backward and feudal to be taken over by another country if that would help it progress! By that logic, the USA could have colonised most of Asia and Africa that was backward and feudal—including India, which also fell in that category—and Nehru would have been fine with that! And, how was the brutal communism of China superior to Buddhist feudalism!!

Despite what China did to Tibet, India signed the ‘Panchsheel Agreement’ with China on 29 April 1954. The agreement itself was titled “Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India” thus acknowledging Tibet as a part of China. India gained nothing through the Agreement, and all benefits accrued to China. Chinese leaders must have been laughing at the naivete of the Indian leadership.

Girija Shankar Bajpai of the External Affairs Ministry had advised on settlement of the borders prior to the signing of Panchsheel, but his suggestion was ignored by all the three concerned: KM Panikkar, Krishna Menon, and Nehru.

Acharya Kripalani had said on the floor of the Parliament in 1954: “Recently we have entered into a treaty with China [Panchsheel]. I feel that China, after it had gone Communist, committed an act of aggression against Tibet. The plea is that China had an ancient right of suzerainty. This right was out of date, old and antiquated. It was never exercised in fact. It had lapsed by the flux of time. Even if it had not lapsed, it is not right in these days of democracy by which our Communist friends swear, by which the Chinese swear, to talk of this ancient suzerainty and exercise it in new form in a country which had and has nothing to do with China... England went to war with Germany not because Germany had invaded England, but because it had invaded Poland and Belgium…”{AS/137}

“India, step by step, renounced the hard-won special position in Tibet which Britain had bequeathed to her, and she accepted Chinese suzerainty in principle and Chinese sovereignty in fact. Nehru dismissed the notion of Tibet as a buffer state—‘A buffer between whom?’—and described India’s previous special position there as an outmoded relic of imperialism. India’s renunciation was sealed in a series of Sino-Indian agreements, the most important being the Agreement on Trade and… signed in 1954 [Panchsheel]…”{Croc/74-75}