An Introduction to Indian Philosophy

by Satischandra Chatterjee

It admits two ultimate realities, namely, puruṣa and prakṛti, which are independent of each other in respect of their existence.

The puruṣa is an intelligent principle, of which consciousness (caitanya) is not an attribute, but the very essence. It is the self which is quite distinct from the body, the senses and the mind (manas).

Prakṛti is the ultimate cause of the world. It is an eternal unconscious principle (jada) which is always changing and has no other end than the satisfaction of the selves.

But they are not qualities or attributes in any sense.

The existence of the guṇas is inferred from the qualties of pleasure, pain and indifference which we find in all the things of the world.

The effect is the manifested condition of the cause, e.g. oil as an effect manifests what is already contained in the seeds.

Therefore, prakṛti or pradhāna which is their ultimate cause must have the three elements of sattva, rajas and tamas which respectively possess the natures of pleasure, pain and indifference, and cause manifestation, activity

it to action. The course of evolution is as follows: from prakṛti arises the great germ of this vast universe which is called, therefore, the great one (mahat). The

It represents the awakening of nature from her cosmic slumber and the first appearance of thought; and, therefore, it is also called the Intellect (buddhi).

'I and mine' (abhimāna). Owing

(j

(karmendriya)

(m...

Thus we have altogether twenty-five principles in the S

The puruṣa or the self is neither the cause (prakṛti) nor the effect (vikṛti) of anything.

Although the self is in itself free and immortal, yet such is the influence of avidyā or ignorance that it confuses itself with the body, the senses and the mind (manas).

This is the state of liberation or freedom from suffering which has been variously described as mukti, apavarga, kaivalya, etc. It

prakṛti is the adequate cause of the world as a whole.

and the fifth levels are called ekāgra and niruddha. The one is a state of concentration of the mind on some object of contemplation. The other is the cessation of even the act or function of contemplation.

These are: yama or restraint, niyama or moral culture, āsana or posture, prāṇāyāma or breath-control, pratyāhāra or withdrawal of the senses, dhāraṇā or attention, dhyāna or meditation and samādhi or concentration.

Prāṇāyāma or breath-control is regulated inhalation, exhalation and retention of breath. Pratyāhāra or sense-control consists in withdrawing the senses from their objects. Dhāraṇā or attention is fixing the mind on some intra-organic

organic or extra-organic objects like the nose-tip or the moon. Dhyāna or meditation is the steady contemplation of the object without any break. Samādhi or concentration is that state in which the contemplative consciousness is lost in the contemplated object and has no awareness of itself.

He who has omniscience is God.

be true and we accept it without further argument. If there is any cause for doubt, then knowledge does not arise at all, because belief is absent.

One school of the Mīmāṁsā founded by Prabhākara admits five different sources of knowledge (pramāṇas), namely, perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), comparison (upamana), testimony (śabda) and postulation (arthāpatti). The

non-cognition (anupalabdhi).

The Mīmāṁsā also admits that when any man performs any ritual, there arises in his soul a potency (apūrva) which produces in future the fruit of the action at an opportune moment. On account of this potency generated in the soul by rites performed here, one can enjoy their fruits hereafter.

All objects of the universe, animate and inanimate, men and gods, are poetically conceived here as parts of that Person.

All is God (sarvam khalu idam Brahma).

Thus God appears as qualified (saguṇa) by many qualities. God in this aspect is called by Śaṅkara Saguṇa Brahman or Ī

finite ego (aham).

it is Nirguṇa Brahman.

No attachment, no illusion can affect his wisdom. The soul then being free from the illusory ideas that divided it from God, is free from all misery. As God is Bliss, so also is the liberated soul.

But it does not become identical with God, as the finite can never become infinite.

'Cārvāka' was even originally a common descriptive name given to a materialist, either because he preached the doctrine of 'eat, drink and be merry'

Bṛhaspati as the founder of materialism.

The word used for materialism is also lokāyatamata, i.e., the view of common people. A materialist is accordingly called also lok

Epistemology, Metaphysics and Ethics.

The Cārvāka holds that perception is the only pramāṇa or dependable source of knowledge.

The Cārvāka would further point out that a causal or any other invariable relation cannot be established merely by repeated perception of two things occurring together.

Philosophy, as critical speculation, claims to live chiefly on free thought and the more it can satisfy the sceptic, the sounder can it hope to be. By questioning the soundness of popular notions, the sceptic sets new problems, by the solution of which philosophy becomes richer.

dogmatism

The Cārvāka view that no inference can yield certain knowledge is the view of many contemporary Western thinkers like the pragmatists and logical positivists.

There is evidence that the materialists devoted themselves also to the pursuit of more refined pleasures by cultivating, for example, the fine arts, the number of which is as large as sixty-four

(catuḥ-ṣaṣṭi-kalāḥ), according to Vātsyāyana, a recognised hedonist and author of the famous Kāma-s

hed...

Some Cārvākas, we are told, regard the king as God.

The element of refinement in his hedonism consists in his emphasis on self-control (brahmacarya) and spiritual discipline (dharma), as well as urbanity (nāgarikavṛtti), without which human enjoyment of pleasure is reduced to the level of beastly enjoyment.

So the only reasonable conclusion is that any source of knowledge, be it perception or inference or testimony, should be regarded as valid in so far as it yields a knowledge that does not prove misleading.

harmony (saṁvāda) of knowledge with the practical consequences to which it leads. Moreover, when the Cārvāka denies