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They quarrelled because each thought that his knowledge was the only true and complete knowledge and should be accepted unconditionally.
as each of them realised
They quarrel because they do not bear in mind that each account is true only from its own standpoint, and is subject to cettain conditions. They fail to realise, therefore, that the different views may be true like the different descriptions of the elephant. In view of these facts, the Jainas
Somehow, the jug exists',
It is the view that every ordinary judgment (passed by imperfect minds like ours) holds good only of the particular aspect of the object judged and of the point of view from which the judgment is passed.
The only thing that the jainas dislike in other thinkers is the dogmatic claim of each that he alone is in the right.
Against such a fallacy of philosophical speculation a protest has been raised recently in America by the Neo-realists who have called it the fallacy of exclusive particularity.
somehow the jug is red'
somehow S is and also is not P' (syāt asti canāsti ca).
somehow S is indescribable'
It is true that a pragmatic logician, like Schiller, also recognises the truth that no judgment is true or false without particular reference to its context and purpose. Even a so-called self-evident judgment, like 'A square is not a circle', or 'Two and two are four', is true only in a specific sense, according to Schiller. This is a striking point of resemblance.
Another misunderstanding often found is the interpretation of the Jaina word 'Syāt' as 'may be'. This would impart a sceptical or agnostic form to the Jaina theory, and make it look like the view of the Greek sceptic Pyrrho who also recommended the qualification of every judgment with a phrase like 'may be'.
The negative characters which determine the man consist of what he is not.
But when, moreover, the element of time is taken into consideration, and it is remembered that the object takes on new characters with the change of time, the object is found really to possess infinite characters
We have just seen that objects have many characters.
Change is true of the substance in one respect (syāt), whereas permanence is true in another respect (syāt). The contradiction vanishes when we remember that each predication is relative and not absolute, as taught by sy
No moral life would be possible then, because a momentary person could not attempt to attain any end. The work
would be enjoyed by the person succeeding him. (d) Consequently there would be no moral law; the
consequences of one's own action would be lost to him (kṛta praṇāśa) and the consequences of another man...
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body (kāya), possessing extension.
Non-living substances possessing extension are dharma, adharma, ākāśa and Pudgala.
how a soul can possess both consciousness and extension—qualities which are
consciousness is the exclusive quality of the soul.
