More on this book
Community
Kindle Notes & Highlights
Read between
May 11 - August 26, 2020
Remember that the Brier score measures the gap between forecasts and reality, where 2.0 is the result if your forecasts are the perfect opposite of reality, 0.5 is what you would get by random guessing, and 0 is the center of the bull’s-eye.
Students who started off with a string of hits had a higher opinion of their skill and thought they would shine again. Langer called this the “illusion of control,” but it is also an “illusion of prediction.”
Even a dart-throwing chimp will hit the occasional bull’s-eye if he throws enough darts, and anyone can easily “predict” the next stock market crash by incessantly warning that the stock market is about to crash.
Think of a lottery winner. It is fantastically unlikely that one particular ticket will win a major lottery, often one in many millions, but we don’t conclude that lottery winners are highly skilled ticket-pickers—because we know there are millions of tickets sold, which makes it highly likely that someone, somewhere, will win.
Michael Mauboussin, a global financial strategist, in his book The Success Equation. But as Mauboussin noted, there is an elegant rule of thumb that applies to athletes and CEOs, stock analysts and superforecasters. It involves “regression to the mean.”
Imagine that we knew everyone’s height and computed the correlation between the heights of fathers and sons. We would find a strong but imperfect relationship, a correlation of about 0.5, as captured by the line running through the data points in the chart below. It tells us that when the father is six feet, we should make a compromise prediction based on both the father’s height and the population average. Our best guess for the son is five feet ten. The son’s height has regressed toward the mean by two inches, halfway between the population average and the father’s height.
So for someone above or below average, we should assume their kids will move closer to the mean even if the attribute is genetically heritable
Of course it’s when you have one of those awful days that you are most likely to seek help by visiting a homeopath or some other dispenser of medical treatments unsupported by solid scientific evidence. The next day you wake up and…you feel better! The treatment works! The placebo effect may have helped, but you probably would have felt better the next day even if you had received no treatment at all—thanks to regression to the mean, a fact that won’t occur to you unless you stop and think carefully, instead of going with the tip-of-your-nose conclusion.
as Edward Lorenz showed, means even something as tiny as a butterfly’s wing flaps can make a dramatic difference to what happens.
This suggests that being recognized as “super” and placed on teams of intellectually stimulating colleagues improved their performance enough to erase the regression to the mean we would otherwise have seen.
If superforecasting is a job for three-standard-deviation MENSA-certified geniuses—the top 1%—then the vast majority of us can never qualify. So why bother trying?
So to get to the top 1%you have to be 3standard deviations away from the mean; remember standard deviation is the square root of the average of the sum of squares (squared and then square root taken to get out negative numbers) of how far individual values are from the mean
measured crystallized intelligence—knowledge—using some U.S.-centric questions like “How many Justices sit on the Supreme Court?” and more global questions like “Which nations are permanent members of the UN Security Council?”
Let’s see how I do - respectively, 9; and US, China, Russia, France, UK - believe they’re collectively referred to as the P5; I’m right!
Note: there are TEN non-permanent members of the security council, elected for 2 year terms, so there’s 15 members total at any given time
Regular forecasters scored higher on intelligence and knowledge tests than about 70% of the population. Superforecasters did better, placing higher than about 80% of the population.
Ultimately, it’s not the crunching power that counts. It’s how you use it.
The Italian American physicist Enrico Fermi—a central figure in the invention of the atomic bomb—
Fermi knew people could do much better and the key was to break down the question with more questions like “What would have to be true for this to happen?” Here, we can break the question down by asking, “What information would allow me to answer the question?”
narrow this down, Fermi would advise setting a confidence interval—a range that you are 90% sure contains the right answer.
On October 12, 2004, Yasser Arafat, the seventy-five-year-old leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, became severely ill with vomiting and abdominal pain. Over the next three weeks, his condition worsened. On October 29, he was flown to a hospital in France. He fell into a coma.
but on November 11, 2004, the man who was once a seemingly indestructible enemy of Israel was pronounced dead. What killed him was uncertain. But even before he died there was speculation that he had been poisoned. In July 2012 researchers at Switzerland’s
they had tested some of Arafat’s belongings and discovered unnaturally high levels of polonium-210. That was ominous. Polonium-210 is a radioactive element that can be deadly if ingested.
He has no expertise in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to say the least. But he didn’t need any to get off to a great start on this question. Thinking like Fermi, Bill unpacked the question by asking himself “What would it take for the answer to be yes? What would it take for it to be no?”
Cool method to answer a question - what would it take for the answer to be yes? What would it take for the answer to be no? What would have to be true?
This sort of storytelling can be very compelling, particularly when the available details are much richer than what I’ve provided here. But superforecasters wouldn’t bother with any of that, at least not at first. The first thing they would do is find out what percentage of American households own a pet.
So it may be better not to concern yourself with individual details and more focus in the macro trends first - to determine how statistically likely something is - don’t get pulled into the storytelling
It’s natural to be drawn to the inside view. It’s usually concrete and filled with engaging detail we can use to craft a story about what’s going on. The outside view is typically abstract, bare, and doesn’t lend itself so readily to storytelling.
If Bill Flack were asked whether, in the next twelve months, there would be an armed clash between China and Vietnam over some border dispute, he wouldn’t immediately delve into the particulars of that border dispute and the current state of China-Vietnam relations. He would instead look at how often there have been armed clashes in the past. “Say we get hostile conduct between China and Vietnam every five years,” Bill says. “I’ll use a five-year recurrence model to predict the future.” In any given year, then, the outside view would suggest to Bill there is a 20% chance of a clash. Having
...more
After all, you could dive into the inside view and draw conclusions, then turn to the outside view. Wouldn’t that work as well? Unfortunately, no, it probably wouldn’t. The reason is a basic psychological concept called anchoring. When we make estimates, we tend to start with some number and adjust. The number we start with is called the anchor. It’s important because we typically underadjust, which means a bad anchor can easily produce a bad estimate. And it’s astonishingly easy to settle on a bad anchor.
So a forecaster who starts by diving into the inside view risks being swayed by a number that may have little or no meaning. But if she starts with the outside view, her analysis will begin with an anchor that is meaningful. And a better anchor is a distinct advantage.
A good exploration of the inside view does not involve wandering around, soaking up any and all information and hoping that insight somehow emerges. It is targeted and purposeful: it is an investigation, not an amble.
Start with the first hypothesis: Israel poisoned Yasser Arafat with polonium. What would it take for that to be true? 1. Israel had, or could obtain, polonium. 2. Israel wanted Arafat dead badly enough to take a big risk. 3. Israel had the ability to poison Arafat with polonium. Each of these elements could then be researched—looking for evidence pro and con—to get a sense of how likely they are to be true, and therefore how likely the hypothesis is to be true.
Break each hypothesis down to its constituent elements - and then research how likely those elements are to be true
First, he found a list of Islamist terror attacks on Wikipedia. Then he counted the number of attacks in the specified countries over the previous five years. There were six. “So I calculate the base rate as 1.2/year,” he wrote in the GJP forum.
When Bill Flack makes a judgment, he often explains his thinking to his teammates, as David Rogg did, and he asks them to critique it. In part, he does that because he hopes they’ll spot flaws and offer their own perspectives. But writing his judgment down is also a way of distancing himself from it, so he can step back and scrutinize it: “It’s an auto-feedback thing,” he says. “Do I agree with this? Are there holes in this? Should I be looking for something else to fill this in? Would I be convinced by this if I were somebody else?”
Researchers have found that merely asking people to assume their initial judgment is wrong, to seriously consider why that might be, and then make another judgment, produces a second estimate which, when combined with the first, improves accuracy almost as much as getting a second estimate from another person.
Assuming I’m wrong for the sake of exploring WHY that might be - and then later producing a second estimate
There is an even simpler way of getting another perspective on a question: tweak its wording. Imagine a question like “Will the South African government grant the Dalai Lama a visa within six months?”
To check that tendency, turn the question on its head and ask, “Will the South African government deny the Dalai Lama for six months?” That tiny wording change encourages you to lean in the opposite direction and look for reasons why it would deny the visa—a desire not to anger its biggest trading partner being a rather big one.
An element of personality is also likely involved. In personality psychology, one of the “Big Five” traits is “openness to experience,” which has various dimensions, including preference for variety and intellectual curiosity. It’s unmistakable in many superforecasters.
For superforecasters, beliefs are hypotheses to be tested, not treasures to be guarded.
As the scientist and science fiction writer Arthur C. Clarke famously observed, “Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.”
Monte Carlo model
Monte Carlo methods, or Monte Carlo experiments, are a broad class of computational algorithms that rely on repeated random sampling to obtain numerical results. The underlying concept is to use randomness to solve problems that might be deterministic in principle - so its an algorithm to help you make a prediction
Monte Carlo models.
A smart executive will not expect universal agreement, and will treat its appearance as a warning flag that groupthink has taken hold.
It was “the wisdom of the crowd,” gift wrapped. All he had to do was synthesize the judgments. A simple averaging would be a good start. Or he could do a weighted averaging—so that those whose judgment he most respects get more say in the collective conclusion.
This would have been an example of Dalio’s meritocratic or believability weighted decision making systems
1713 publication of Jakob Bernoulli’s Ars Conjectandi—before the best minds started to think seriously about probability.
Why is a decline from 5% to 0% so much more valuable than a decline from 10% to 5%? Because it delivers more than a 5% reduction in risk. It delivers certainty.