Marching Orders: The Untold Story of How the American Breaking of the Japanese Secret Codes Led to the Defeat of Nazi Germany and Japan

by Bruce Lee

In other words, the commander in the field is being ordered to deal with the Ultra representative, who, by himself, will represent the most authoritative and secret intelligence source available. As we will see, it will take considerable time before the American commanders comprehend Ultra, let alone use it properly. Too many American Ultra officers in the field, who are supposed to have secure vans and trailers, equipped with safes and guards, will find themselves in drafty, rain-wet tents without any relief, support or security. If the British had been aware that this would be the way the Americans will treat the security of Ultra, they would quite rightly have tried to close down the American involvement in the war’s greatest secret. It is only by the grace of God that no German commando-type attack ever reached an American Army headquarters and the Ultra tent during the course of the war.

The postwar critique of MIS operations will say that experience proved that these men “had to have imagination coupled with analytical, judicial, and unbiased minds. Intellectual ability was more prerequisite than any experience, military or otherwise.”4 This most likely is the reason that none of these special people stayed on in the military after the war. According to the history of 3-US, on the whole Colonel Taylor spends “most of his time in problems outside the scope of the section. The person in charge was his deputy.” Four officers service Washington, two on military matters, two on air. (The Army critique of 3-US,

produced after the war, notes officially that one of the failures of 3-US is to cope with naval matters; fortunately, as we know, Colonel McCormack will remedy that in Washington.) Two other officers will handle all of the Japanese diplomatic traffic, with two civilians serving in secretarial capacity.

It is important to remember that the primary function of 3-US is to select military and air items from CX/MSS for transmittal to Washington. Little or no guidance in what to select is given by Washington, which wants to receive “all desired intelligence.” The principles of selection are never formalized or reduced to paper. From the outset a green staff at 3-US selects material for a green staff in Washington. That it all succeeds is thanks to “the unbelievable patience and interest and wisdom of key [British] people in Hut [3].”

Naturally, Washington’s interest is on strategic, rather than tactical, intelligence. Thus, 3-US will send major order-of-battle items, all messages throwing light on future operations by the Axis partners, on manpower, politics and policy. And from the start 3-US sends “Flivo reports” from the front lines and significant tactical items, including police, Abwehr, diplomatic, low-grade military and air force items deemed to be of military significance. By the spring of 1944, when the primary concern of Washington and London is OVERLORD, every

item relating to the Western Front is cabled to Washington, while the secondary information is sent by pouch (first by ship...

By the summer of 1944, Washington will be able to cope with all the product produced by 3-US, and G-2 is put on a par with the ministries in London. At last, Washington is getting a copy of every teleprint and report circulated in Britain. (This practice ends the heavy burden on 3-US for telling the British ministries which items are being sent to America, since G-2 is now getting everything.) It is interesting to note that it is not until America has been in the war for two and a half years that Washington is reading all the same ma...

Even so, the “C” series of messages receives special attention until the end of the war. Every item sent to Washington will have to be cleared by Group Captain Jones, and many items are not forwarded. Those that are sent, marked Eyes Only, go only to Marshall, the G-2 (Strong, who is replaced by Bissell) and the Special Security Officer, (former colonel) now Brigadie...

added to the distribution list, and he will prepare this extraordinarily sensitive informatio...

For the historian, the Army’s penchant for compartmentalizing everything is frustrating. Mentioned earlier is the “Bay” system that 3-US concocted. Originally, the Bays derived from three main sources, BJs, SJAs and JMAs. The BJ series included all diplomatic traffic and those of the military attachés; the series averages about fifty messages a day, only one of which “would prove Bayworthy.” The SJAs consisted of messages sent by the Japanese naval attachés

in Berlin and Venice, plus messages other officials send via that link. It produces about five messages a day, from which four or five signals a week are prepared and sent G-2. According to the official operations report, “Allied intelligence benefited considerably by the fact that both the Japanese Naval Attachés who served in Berlin during this period were men of exceptional competence.” They produce comprehensible and accurate descriptions of technical equipment, and “their occasional ventures into German strategy and defense were of a considerably higher order than ordinarily encountered in the attaché field.” The JMAs are messages from other Japanese military attachés around the world. Fifty or sixty of these messages are broken every day. The primary value of these messages is the material on the Allied order of battle, which proves most helpful to Allied countermeasures. It was from this source that the Allies receive the report of the military attaché in France after he accompanies his ambassador on a tour of coastal defenses.

The first thing is to complain that Section C is not serving the Army properly, which is done in this official report, which says Section C “had not, however, done much with the information which might more properly have been its province.… It was not giving adequate training to those going overseas.… Nor did it yet influence the appreciations issued by the chiefs of theater branches of MIS.” This implied criticism of McCormack is outrageous. When one considers McCormack’s original brief from Secretary Stimson that an outsider, a civilian, is to correct the Army’s intelligence deficiencies that caused Pearl Harbor and get the Army’s signals intelligence on the proper track, to say nothing about how the Army bureaucracy fought McCormack while he is achieving the goals demanded by Stimson and Marshall, the former Wall Street lawyer

should be receiving plaudits instead of criticism. This is what was meant earlier in the book, when McCormack is faulted for giving up his civilian status: by accepting military rank there is no way he can win if he gets in a dispute with the military bureaucrats.

Two complete sets of the Daily European Summary with an elaborate card index. Two complete sets of the Ultra signals received from GC&CS (a single set is retained by the European Order of Battle Section.) Temporary working maps showing various kinds of information—very detailed ground and air order of battle for a particular sector or area; divisional, corps, army and army-group boundaries; rail and road nets; airfield service ability; jet

aircraft bases under construction; V-weapon sites; serviceable bridges over rivers; etc. Detailed running lists of information on units of particular and temporary importance (e.g., divisions of the Sixth Panzer Army in the winter of 1944–45, German Air Force jet units, etc.).

But far more important to Marshall—and the planners at COSSAC/SHAEF—is the fact that the Germans still believe the beaches of Normandy are not the primary landing sites for an Allied invasion when, in truth, that is where the Allies intend to attack. With this assurance, Allied planners can concentrate on continuing the series of superb intelligence deceptions that have fooled the Germans to date and will do so in the future. (So much has been written about these deceptions they will not be described here.) But how comforting it is to know that the wool one is pulling over the enemy’s eyes is truly blinding him.

The Japanese military attaché is also reporting to Tokyo that the Luftwaffe is developing a new fighter plane, the Messerschmitt 309. (The first hint about this plane’s conception was given eleven months earlier, in the Magic Summary of January 24, 1943.) Although the plans have not yet been perfected, the attaché now recommends that experimental models be purchased by the Japanese Air Force. Tokyo replies by ordering the plans to be purchased and sent via submarine to meet the “present pressing need for a new fighter plane.”

The next day, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu comments on Japan’s production problems. Apparently Oshima has made some comment in a previous message that wasn’t intercepted, but it provoked this reply: “We realize how vitally important it is to increase our shipping. We are haunted by the number of ships we have lost.” He then reassures Oshima, saying: “… So far as ships and planes are concerned, we can wage successful war this year and next.”20 On December 10, the Magic specialists decode a nine-page section of Oshima’s report of November 10 in which he describes in considerable detail the organization of the German defenses in France and the Low Countries. The analysts in Washington point out that Oshima’s data on the disposition of troops, the responsibilities of commanders and the systems of fortifications is reliable. They say: “In general, the Ambassador’s information confirms intelligence obtained from other sources.”21 Nothing could be more welcome than having reports from the field confirmed at such a high level.

The bottom line is that in 1943, Japan will have a surplus of some 3,785,000 metric tons of rice. This means that if Japan has a poor growing year and no imports at all, she can carry on with this surplus for one year. With “normal domestic crops and no imports at all, she could keep going for about two years. With normal domestic crops and normal imports from Formosa (but with no other imports at all), Japan could continue for more than three years.” It is obvious that Japan cannot be allowed the luxury of fighting on through 1946 with ample supplies of rice. Even without imports she can fight and maintain her civilian population through 1945. American submarines must further intensify their efforts to destroy the Japanese merchant fleet.

Fortunately, Tokyo relays an earlier message the next day. Shigemitsu clarifies his earlier statement to Oshima about the status of Japanese shipping and how effective the American submarine campaign has been. The welcome news for Washington is contained in the words: “Unfortunately, present ship losses offset production, but we are firmly confident that by

next March, at the latest, we can overcome this crisis and that ship construction will then b...

The first German jet aircraft shot down was on October 6, 1944, when planes in the Royal Canadian Air Force spotted a jet cruising below them and destroyed it. On December 24, 1944, sixteen German jets made the first jet-bomber attack against Liège, then attacked railway yards in the

Ardennes during the Battle of the Bulge. By March 1945 jet aircraft show up regularly in all German flights.

To the Americans, it appears that Berlin is already so badly battered that it may well be losing its military importance. Especially if various branches of the German government are forced to locate elsewhere around Germany. Thus Oshima’s message is the forerunner for a mythical concept that Hitler and his most fanatical followers will, as a final resort, withdraw into the mountains of Bavaria, to a so-called National Redoubt, where they will fight to the last man. This myth will have an incredible impact on how Eisenhower and Marshall will conduct the final days of the European conflict.

The most interesting part of the circular is the final section, which briefly surveys current Soviet relations with Japan. Shigemitsu says that Japanese Soviet relations “are based on the need for maintaining neutrality. It has generally been possible to maintain fairly harmonious relations. The signing of the Provisional Fishing Agreement last March was proof of the fact.” Tokyo notes that Russians are still refusing to give the Americans access to airfields in Siberia from which they can bomb Japan. This means “the cautious Russians will, at least for the moment, devote themselves to the war against Germany and … avoid getting involved in Far Eastern problems.”

This indication of how the Japanese government venerates the Emperor is a perfect example of the problems that will be caused by the Allies’ determination that Japan must accept “unconditional surrender” at the war’s end. Westerners wouldn’t think twice about “enshrining” President Roosevelt’s diplomatic portrait or that of the King of England. But if the Japanese are willing to worship a portrait of the Emperor, how vehemently will they defend the prerogatives of their ruling monarch when the time comes to negotiate a peace treaty? To an American politician, this question is pointless; to the American military, it represents the history of Japan’s militaristic government and its policies of military aggression. In the end this will cost Japan dearly.

As late as last July, German agents were reporting that a new Argentine government was trying to create an anti-U.S. bloc of South American countries, consisting of Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay and Peru. If these countries did not fall in line with Argentine thinking, the Argentinean government would then supplant the recalcitrant governments with “more cooperative regimes.” Indeed, German agents participated in planning to overthrow the Bolivian government during the past summer and fall.4

The note says: “The word ‘Magic’ is now fairly widely used to designate intelligence obtained from radio intercept sources. It does not provide more security than other descriptive words such as ‘intercept,’ ‘cryptanalysis’ and ‘code.’ Accordingly, it is requested that all persons concerned be instructed to refrain from using the word ‘Magic’ in telephone conversations or other conversations or communications in which such other descriptive words would not be used.”

The analysts note for Marshall that Franz von Papen told the Japanese ambassador to Turkey that Roosevelt is the one man the Germans don’t want to see reelected, because “it would ruin us.”

On another subject, three days later, a fifty-plus-page report crosses Marshall’s desk revealing that Japanese merchant shipping losses are so bad that Japan is trying to build small blast furnaces throughout China so that Tokyo can receive more pig iron from the territories she occupies.

Hitler continues, saying: “I had to take those men from the Eastern Front, and you can well understand what a drastic step that was. Moreover, we have had to prepare on an even vaster scale for an immediate invasion in the West.

“Depending on what the enemy does, we may have to retire from [sic] a line running south from Lake Peipus in the north, and from the Dnieper bend in the south, but we will hold the Crimea. I think the Red Army’s drive has been blunted, and I am confident that we will run into no military crisis in the East. Moreover, I want you to know that I do not intend to stay on the defensive there forever. Once I get a chance, I am going to attack the Red Army again.

“Now as for the question of the second front, no matter when it comes, or at what point, I have made adequate preparations to meet it. In Finland we have seven divisions; in Norway, twelve; in Denmark, six; in France and the Low Countries, sixty-two.” Once again, the analysts break into Hitler’s words pointing out that the Fuehrer’s figures for

Finland, Denmark and Norway “are in accord with collateral evidence.” However, the analysts question Hitler’s figures for France and the Low Countries. They believe his figures include occupational troops, not purely front-line troops. If this is true...

“Besides, don’t forget our coming retaliation against England. We are going to do it principally with rocket guns. Everything is now ready, and

practice shows that they are extremely effective. Now take this line running to the Birmingham area; that is a good place to start. [Oshima interpolates that Hitler specified a line on a map.] I cannot tell you just when we will begin, but we are really going to do something to the British Isles. We also have ready two thousand schnell [fast] bombers, and last night we carried out our first real bombing of London. With all these various [word missing], I believe we can gradually regain the initiative and, seizing our opportunities, turn once again against Russia.

“Let me tell you what I think of the partisans in the Balkans. Tito’s followers have received lots of help from England, America and Russia and are now a rather powerful force. We are trying to quell them, and we have sent relatively superior troops to that area, but the geography is so bad that we can only get at them when we find some of them massed in a favo...

“Now you want to know about the submarine war. Well, the plane detectors [radar on antisubmarine aircraft] of the enemy are so superior that we have had to absorb a lot of punishment from them, but we are now working on the following measures: (a) the use of magnetic mines; (b) increasing the speed of submarines; (c) improving our antiaircraft

weapons; and (d) methods of disrupting the enemy’s detectors. We are not ready yet. But by early summer we will have solved the matter, and then we will reopen the submarine war.”

In order of analytical importance they are: 1. The subject of retaliation against England. The total bomber strength of the German Air Force is only 1,980 planes, of which only 1,542 are operational. Hitler’s figures are wrong. Therefore he is attaching great importance to his new “rocket guns.” 2. Hitler’s continuing plan “to paralyze Russia by force of arms.” There will be no “political measures.” 3. On the subject of Germany’s inability to send enough reserves to the Eastern Front to hold the Dnieper Line, the analysts point out that Hitler is willing to sacrifice this and other parts of Russia because “we can run no risks in the West.”

4. On the second front: Hitler believes the Allies will land, and that they will establish a bridgehead. But that will be all they can accomplish, because “I will stop, absolutely, any real second front.”

“However,” he says, “as a result of studying the problem, and because of recommendations which have been made by Marshal Rommel, the Germans have now decided that the coastal lines must be held at all cost and that the enemy must not be permitted to set foot on the Continent.… The changes in defense plans are the result of the German experience in Sicily, Salerno and Nettuno. In Rommel’s opinion it was bad strategy to allow the enemy to land because (1) after the British and American forces had obtained a bridgehead, the Germans did not quickly move into action against them, and (2) with superiority in the air, the enemy makes it a rule to pound the rear of the defending forces and that makes impossible a defense in which small units hold the front lines and a large reserve in the rear is used for counterattacks.… It is also considered that it would be very unwise, from a political point of view, to allow the enemy to set foot on the Continent.”

The earlier message quotes Marshal Rundstedt’s Chief of Staff [what an incredible source!] as follows: ‘The essence of the German plan of defense for Holland, Belgium and France can be summed up in these words—hold on to the beaches. The strategy now is to destroy the enemy landing forces before they ever reach the beaches, or if they do manage to land, to destroy them in areas as close to the coast as possible.’

“The German Army has recently begun the construction of obstacles in the water in order to strengthen the defenses of the coast. The obstacles consist of (a) contact mines attached to the ends of rods driven into the sea bottom, and (b) underwater barriers made by setting sharp-pointed iron poles into concrete blocks and planting the latter on the sea bottom. “Large numbers of both types of obstacles are installed in the critical areas, extending for a distance

of one hundred to two hundred meters offshore. Landing craft are either destroyed by the mines or sunk because of the holes torn in their hulls.”

“There are no indications that the enemy will attempt to land in the Balkans. Landings in Norway or in the Iberian Peninsula would be politically important for the enemy, but would be of very small value from a military point of view. The terrain of the Belgian and Dutch coast not only makes landings difficult, but does not permit the use of a large number of troops.

“Mediterranean Coast East of the Rhone [River]. It is possible that along the coast east of the Rhone the enemy will confine their attempts to commando landings——[several words missing]. However, if the enemy should occupy Marseille and Toulon, they would gain a marked political advantage. In view of the possibility that the Allies may try to land at the mouth of the Rhone and capture Marseille, the Germans are now making every effort to strengthen defenses in that area. In both Marseille and Toulon, they are rushing work to strengthen installations built by the French army, and at Marseille a submarine base is being constructed. “In addition, fortifications and other defense installations have been built wherever necessary along the entire coast from Menton to Marseille. Tank barriers of reinforced concrete have been constructed throughout that area, and at such points as Nice, St.-Raphaël and Antibes, where the enemy is expected to attempt landings, strong defense works have been constructed. Preparations are also being made for an extensive defense in depth, utilizing topography and natural positions. At all important communications points antiaircraft emplacements are being located.”

What this means to the analysts is that it appears all the Allied deception plans—Operation WADHAM, a fake plan for the invasion of Brittany in 1943; the deception plan for FORTITUDE SOUTH (an invasion in the Pas-de-Calais region by the fictitious First Army Group); the deception plan FORTIFIED NORTH (the invasion of Norway by the fictitious “Skye Force” of the Fourth Army)—all seem to have had the desired effect on the enemy. The Germans are still confused as to exactly where OVERLORD will take place, and

they are committing masses of men and material in the wrong places.

Despite an all-out effort, the German Air Force has been unable to cope with the enemy’s attacks. I, therefore, earnestly beg you to work in close collaboration with the military and naval authorities, in order that we can make our own preparations with the same degree of thoroughness as we exhibited at the time of our attack on Hawaii.”