Marching Orders: The Untold Story of How the American Breaking of the Japanese Secret Codes Led to the Defeat of Nazi Germany and Japan

by Bruce Lee

What the experts point out is that in 1941 the Navy was listening for the wrong information. Warnings sent by London to Washington were turned into two different messages by the Navy Department and sent to Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor on December 3, 1941. These messages were explicit. One said that “highly reliable information” said that urgent instructions had been sent to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts around the world to destroy most of their codes and ciphers. The second message sent Kimmel on December 3 could

be considered a breach in security. This message referred to “Circular Twenty Four Forty Four from Tokyo [on] one December,” indicating clearly that either Washington or London was breaking the Japanese codes. The message also said that Tokyo was ordering its embassies and consulates in various capitals around the world to immediately destroy their codes and more importantly their Purple code machines. Kimmel was also told that British Admiralty in London reported that the Japanese embassy in London had already complied with Tokyo’s request to destroy its Purple machine. (It was this vital information that Kimmel failed to pass on to Gen. Walter Short, who bore the joint responsibility for defending Pearl Harbor.)2

For the Allies, this news about the V-2 rocket could not be worse. British defenses have been mobilized to defend against the V-1, which can be shot down by antiaircraft guns or fighters. The V-2 appears to be a true ballistic missile, however, and there is no conventional defense against a rocket that falls without warning from a great height. Now one can appreciate how the work of British rocket expert Standish Masterman, as described earlier, rounded out the picture for Allied intelligence. (The British accounts of Masterman’s exploits do not mention the role played by the Diplomatic Summaries in alerting Allied intelligence about the V-2.)

The same day’s Magic carries a “Special Supplement” about German intelligence in Berlin sending “agents, radio equipment and other material” on a German ship from Europe to Argentina. The plan had been uncovered the previous February when a number of German agents in Argentina were arrested. Early this past May, however, the ship made landfall on the Argentine coast near Mar del Plata, some 250 miles south of Buenos Aires, where two agents and their equipment were put ashore. Another such voyage is being scheduled for the end of August. This marks the beginning of the Allied watch on the flight of German officials and Nazi gold to Argentina as the defeat of Germany becomes more and more apparent.

According to the analysts, the Japanese made several attempts to negotiate peace with Chungking during 1940 and 1941. These efforts failed, largely because the Japanese were unwilling to give a definite commitment about withdrawing their troops from China. In January 1942, the Japanese cabinet decided not to deal directly with Chiang Kai-shek, “fearing that he would only seize on any Japanese [initiatives] as a sign of weakness.” Nevertheless, Japanese Army officers in China continued for some time to initiate more than a score of peace feelers, and the Foreign Office clearly hoped that a peace could be arranged. In May 1944, Shigemitsu asked Ambassador Sato in Moscow whether there was any chance of Japan’s “using Russia as a means of bringing our war in China to a conclusion (MS 31 May 1944).”

In September 1944, Japan still finds herself mired in a war with China—a nation too large for her to conquer, occupy or pacify. The Japanese Supreme Council for the Direction of the War understands that the war is not going in Japan’s favor. So the question now will be how can Japan keep China under control in the postwar years so that China does not threaten Japan. At the same time, the Diplomatic Summaries prove that Japan will want the Americans and British blocked from gaining any greater influence in postwar East Asia.

Oshima reports that at this point he asks when this major offensive will be launched. “At the beginning of November,” replies Hitler. “We will be aided in holding off the enemy during September and October by the comparatively rainy weather, which will restrict the enemy’s employment of their superior airpower.”

The conversation continues and Oshima sums up his impression for Tokyo saying that “Hitler’s decision to conduct a general mobilization and then to launch a great offensive on the Western Front with troops drawn from all possible areas is, in my opinion, the correct step for Germany to take in the present situation. Furthermore, if Japan can bring about a German-Russian peace before the time set for such an offensive, Germany would without a doubt be able to achieve a decisive and imposing victory on the Western Front.”

Oshima then begins to cover the flanks of his conclusions saying that “the German leaders are not at present prepared to seek such a peace.” As for the big attack, “such an offensive will not be an easy matter at all.” Because Hitler seemed apprehensive on a number of points,

Oshima ends his message to Tokyo by saying: “It is difficult to form an exact estimate of the probable success o...

For Oshima is talking about two attacks. The first is a counterattack by Army Group G under Gen. Blaskowitz that is aimed at stopping and destroying the tankers in Patton’s Third Army and the combined forces in Devers’s Sixth Army Group. Without fuel and ammunition, which will have to be diverted to Montgomery, Blaskowitz’s attack will succeed. And if Montgomery fails in his attack—and he will fail, leaving his flanks exposed—then Eisenhower can foresee German Army Group G wheeling north and west to trap vast amounts of Allied soldiers and supplies.

But this does not take into consideration the problems facing the Supreme Commander. First, there are the logistical problems mentioned earlier. The Allied forces have outrun their supply lines. Second, Field Marshal Montgomery picks this time to say he can see the imminent collapse of Germany and he demands to be allowed to make a thrust for Berlin at the expense of all the other Allied units. Third, Magic informs Eisenhower that Hitler has just told Ambassador Oshima that he intends to counterattack in the south with Army Group G. Fourth. With supplies at a desperately low ebb, can the Allies support a thrust by Montgomery and defend against an attack by Army Group G? Fifth, the Magic Summaries clearly show that Germany will not at this time seek a peace with Russia. Lastly, the Magic Summaries indicate that both the Germans and the Japanese are preparing to fight to the

bitter end. There will not be a negotiated surrender. Nazism will be destroyed only by force of arms. Unconditional surrender will only be enforced providing the last German guerrilla unit is wiped out.

The conversation between the German ambassador and the Premier ends with Koiso saying: “If we are able to check the virus of Bolshevism now, we shall be able to destroy it for the sake of everlasting world peace, and I am grateful to Chancellor Hitler for his determination to stamp out Bolshevism. However, I fear that Americanism also is aiming to destroy the ‘morale’ [he uses the English word] of the human race and the principles by which all the peoples of the world can win a place for themselves. Therefore, the spread of Americanism must be absolutely checked.… Now I should like to know whether the German people have any thought of joining the Anglo-American camp and making Russia a common enemy.” To this Stahmer replies: “Neither the German people nor the German government has any such thought.… I am certain that Germany will not consider any peace which compromises her honor or threatens her existence.”

Sato happily concludes his message to Tokyo, saying: “I was unable to notice anything in Molotov’s attitude to indicate that Russia will take advantage of Japan’s present plight and apply pressure on her in concert with England and America.” There is only one mention of Operation MARKET GARDEN in the Magic Summaries. On September 18, Oshima informs Tokyo that von Steengracht has told him that Allied airborne troops have been dropped in Holland.31 According to the German under secretary, “the landings took place chiefly in the Arnhem area. We are endeavoring to wipe out the airborne forces with our troops in that area, but I am unable to say anything at all as to future prospects.”

“The object of our further advance will be to destroy all power of resistance in Germany,” the report says in paragraph eleven. “This will entail the seizure of the most profitable objectives in Germany and the destruction of the remaining enemy forces which will presumably stand in defense of these objectives.… In addition to the above factors consideration must be given to the political importance of Berlin and to a lesser extent of Munich. Furthermore, strategically it is important to occupy Hamburg-Kiel and Nürnberg-Munich areas, to divide such enemy forces as remain in Scandinavia and in Italy and the Balkans from those in Western Germany.” In ending, the report states: “It is concluded that Berlin is the single most important objective.”

“With respect to the decision to divide Germany on nationalistic lines, I had known for a long time the way political thought was leaning and I was not astonished. Naturally, I always knew that decisions between governments would have to be taken on a tripartite basis, and the suggestions I advanced had no implication of making Great Britain and the United States political partners vis-à-vis the third member of the triumvirate. My thoughts were restricted to the military problem; that is the use of armed forces for carrying out the decisions of

the government. I felt that on the western boundary of the Russian area we should use the same system in the control of military forces that brought about victory. All this had been presented many times to my superiors, and since they have decided otherwise, this is the last time my own ideas on the subject will be expressed. I assume that at an appropriate time he will communicate to me something of your ideas as to the forces and commanders for which you will have immediate need in the Japanese War after we have finished this job. I will be prepared to give you, whenever you may desire, my opinions as to the qualifications of the senior officers that will be available and for which you have needs as division, corps, army and even group commanders. This will likewise apply to the air side. “I must confess that post-armistice matters do not occupy any great share of my thoughts. We still have a long ways to go here because the intention of the enemy, which I think is becoming obvious, to continue the most bitter kind of resistance up to the point of practical extermination of the last of his armed forces. Thereafter, we may be faced with some kind of guerilla problem.”

Kimmel and his fleet intelligence officer, Capt. Edwin T. Layton, also failed to pass on to the Army at Pearl Harbor another warning from the British in Asia on December 3 that America was about to be attacked. During his investigation into what caused the disaster at Pearl Harbor, Henry Clausen gathered another two hundred intelligence messages the British in Asia sent the Navy at Pearl Harbor. These were not forwarded to Washington prior to the Japanese attack. Clausen collected them for his report to Secretary of War Stimson. The Republicans on the Pearl Harbor Committee tried to keep Clausen’s report to Stimson under wraps. When Clausen finally testified before the committee, his statements sent shock waves through the hearings and changed the course of the committee’s findings. It determined that both the commanders of the Army and the Navy failed in their mutually dependent duties to defend Pearl Harbor. More importantly, the committee found great fault with Army and Navy intelligence. It also accepted the Clausen hypothesis that the entire system for the collection, coordination and evaluation of intelligence was flawed. Clausen was the first to testify publicly about the need for a centralized cryptologic structure, and his report to Stimson, critical of the cryptological process as it existed in 1941, helped lead to the creation of a certified cryptologic structure (i.e., the NSA) after the war.

The author wishes to point out that the Army must bear an equal share of the blame for the disaster at Pearl Harbor. Not only did General Short fail to coordinate plans for defending the fleet while it was in the anchorage, which he was ordered to do with the Navy, it appears that Short was unfit for a potential combat command. The responsibility for appointing Short can be attributed to Marshall. Other errors can also be traced to Marshall’s desk. But Marshall did warn Short in writing on several occasions to be alert against a surprise enemy air attack. Short failed to follow these, and other, orders. As stated earlier in this work, the author concurs with the concept that the entire system of intelligence failed in 1941, and this was the primary cause of Pearl Harbor.

According to David Eisenhower, General Bradley “suspected that the point in initiating the maneuver [MARKET GARDEN] was not to end the war but ‘to force Eisenhower’s hand on the [control of] the U.S. First Army.’” (p. 442) But “if Eisenhower refused MARKET GARDEN and its promise of Berlin, history might never forgive him.” Thus Eisenhower approved “an operation that probably neither man wanted, [which] was very likely to go forward at the risk of annihilating the airborne units and postponing necessary projects elsewhere.”

Since the British are responsible for the western and northern flanks of the Allied advance, Montgomery is ordered to do what he should have done earlier: clear the Scheldt waterway and open the port of Antwerp. He gives this task to the Canadian First Army. It involves bitter fighting. The Canadians suffer heavy casualties and succeed in their mission. But because large and complex minefields must be cleared, and the fighting is so bitter, it is not until November 26 that the first Allied merchant vessels can unload in Antwerp.

“However,” he says, “as a result of the favorable turn which public opinion both at home and abroad (particularly in the U.S.) has taken toward the Communists, they now feel their strength and are stubbornly refusing to compromise on domestic issues. They are maintaining their local political and military autonomy and at the same time are planning to participate in the Chungking government.”

To put it bluntly: Hitler is casting Vlassov adrift. Branded as mercenaries and without a country, Vlassov and his men will be doomed when the war ends.

Thus, in mid-October 1944, Tokyo produces the first intelligence that there might be guerrilla warfare in Germany after a surrender is negotiated. It is also the second indication that the Germans might gather for a final stand in the so-called National Redoubt.

Should they give up the harbors along the coast? Or should they “sacrifice some forces and keep the enemy from using the ports for a certain length of time. The latter course was chosen, and although our manpower losses have been considerable, we have effectively checked the enemy’s strategy.”

The envelopment of the Ruhr from the north by the British Twenty-first Army Group is “the main effort of the present phase of operations.” The American Twelfth Army Group is to continue its thrust “so far as its current resources permit towards Cologne and Bonn.” They should be ready to seize any favorable opportunity of crossing the Rhine and attacking the Ruhr from the south when the maintenance situation permits. The remainder of the Twelfth Army Group (i.e., Patton’s Third Army) is to take no more aggressive action than is permitted by the “maintenance situation after the full requirements of the main effort have been met.” The Sixth Army Group is to continue operations with the capture of Mülhausen and Strasbourg. This should contain enemy forces and so assist the northern thrust.

The papers do not acknowledge the right of postwar U.S. occupation forces “to make use of other ports and lines of transportation and supply than those through Bremen and Bremerhaven.” It had been contemplated that the Americans would also be able to use the full port facilities of Rotterdam and Antwerp. But nothing has come of this. What McCloy wants is a guarantee, not yet given by the British, that American occupation forces can receive adequate supplies in a timely fashion. What is surprising is that Washington is suddenly starting to worry about future British cooperation.

“The United States has insisted, in the name of democracy, that Chungking negotiate with the Chinese Communists, and this has deepened the skepticism of Chungking toward the Americans. There is absolutely no possibility of mutual collaboration between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists.”

“The points on which agreements were reached in Moscow are as follows: Finland, Norway, Rumania, Hungary and Yugoslavia are to be in Russia’s sphere of influence. The foreign relations of Greece are to be directed by Great Britain so that the British may preserve prestige.” Oshima goes on to say that Albania will be “included in the British sphere of influence, but the decision as to her boundaries is to be delayed until after the war.” As for Iran, England “has agreed to an expansion of Russia’s sphere of influence,” and England will pressure the Iranians to grant oil concessions to Russia. Problems about the Dardanelles are postponed until after the war. And Stalin firmly refuses to grant Siberian air bases to England and America.

What the Germans don’t know is that on October 18, the principal Allied diplomats, Molotov, Eden and Cordell Hull, agree that none of them will consider any separate peace negotiations with Germany. Furthermore, 5 million tons of supplies will be sent Russia by America in the coming months. Norway will not be in the Russian sphere. But Rumania and Bulgaria will be. Hungary is supposed to be under equal Soviet and Western controls. Most important: Stalin confirms to Churchill that Russia will declare war on Japan after Germany is defeated.

The delicate language in which this report is phrased for Marshall indicates a serious breach of security has occurred and its source located. According to the analysts: “Early in October, the Japanese heard that, in President Roosevelt’s view, Russia would launch an offensive against Manchukuo within a month if Germany were to collapse. According to the report

received, President Roosevelt had so told ‘a certain Senator close to him’; the Senator relayed the information to Finnish Minister Procope before he left the United States; Procope got word to the Finnish Minister in Sofia; the minister gave the story to a correspondent of the Japanese newspaper Asahi; the correspondent duly informed the Japanese Military Attaché in Sofia, and the Attaché reported the matter.” The next day, the Magic Summary reveals that the Germans have acquired samples of the American miracle drug penicillin from Spain.12 This past May, the Japanese military attaché in Berlin advised Tokyo that German laboratories were “unable to achieve the excellent results announced by American scientists (MS 19 May 1944).” The acquiring of the wonder drug is accomplished by J. F. Bernhardt, the head of a German-controlled firm operating in Spain called Sofindus. The analysts in Washington note they have found out that Bernhardt has long been smuggling wolfram and other vital supplies from Spain to Germany. He also has excellent relations with important Spanish officials. Since July, American manufacturers have been allowed to make regular air shipments of penicillin to Spanish consignees approved by the Combined Blockade Committee in London. The analysts note that according to the Foreign Economic Administration the only Spanish

consignees to receive a shipment of penicillin to date are a Dr. Remigra Romero a...

Sato analyzes the speech as being “the pledge of a firm union between England, America and Russia in the pursuit of their war against Germany.” However, he fails to comprehend the real significance of the message: Stalin is publicly signaling that he will soon turn against Japan.

This forty-four-page report clearly demonstrates what went wrong, saying: “There were several factors which tended to downplay intelligence indicators, creating a mind-set among senior U.S. commanders which lessened their concern for a German counteroffensive. They … are summarized here— “U.S. emphasis on offensive rather than defensive operations; “U.S. conclusion that the enemy was geared to stopping an Allied attack against the Ruhr/Cologne complex and that the Germans were most likely to attack when the Allies crossed the Roer River; “U.S. belief that von Rundstedt rather than Hitler was controlling German strategy in the West; “U.S. view that Germany’s lack of fuel would cause an enemy offensive to fail, and;

“U.S. conviction that any attack the enemy might be capable of mounting would only lead to quicker German defeat.”

The report acknowledges that Allied aerial reconnaissance during November “constructed an imposing picture of the German buildup in the north,” including large night movements and daytime enemy columns on the roads. And while the front facing the American VIII Corps was quiet, units of the 4th, 28th, and 106th Divisions reported in the last days before the offensive “increased vehicular activity, the fact that a woman escapee claimed that the woods were jammed with equipment,16 and four prisoners of war in U.S. hands reported that fresh troops were arriving for a big attack around 16 or 17 December, certainly before Christmas. However, only one piece of this information, that about increased vehicular traffic, reached Twelfth Army Group Headquarters in time.”

One of the problems at this point in the war is that the Allies have enjoyed for several years, as Mr. Winterbotham puts it, having “the enemy’s intentions handed to them on a plate, [and they] had come to rely on Ultra [Magic] to such an extent that when it gave no positive indication of the coming counterattack, all other indications were not taken seriously enough.”18 Winterbotham points out that there was a lack of high-grade Ultra before the attack. However, he also claims there was “logistical Ultra” that was not properly analyzed.

The analysts in Washington summarize the report for Marshall: Hitler is reported as believing that Germany cannot win by defense alone. He is also opposed to a war of attrition. There has been no change in his intention to undertake a large-scale offensive as soon as possible. No definite time or “method” has been decided on; the offensive will probably be in the West, but Germany may be forced to concentrate large forces in the East. The analysts also note that Ribbentrop claims Germany’s oil position is improved. Sufficient oil for large-scale operations is assured. All this information should have sounded a large warning bell at SHAEF.

“No,” says Ribbentrop. “… At the moment I can unfortunately tell you nothing.… I believe that Germany’s plans, as in the past, are based primarily on an offensive in the West, although the time, method, etc., cannot now be precisely determined. However, depending on the enemy’s intentions, a situation may be created where we Germans, who are operating on interior lines, may have to concentrate large forces in the East.” (Emphasis added.)

Oshima then adds up the problems facing Germany, then the elements favoring the Germans. They are: “(a) The crack German divisions used in the West this summer are now resting and refitting in the rear; (b) the Volksgrenadier divisions are expected to receive further equipment while the Volkssturm will be trained and equipped; (c) some of the new planes can be used to support ground operations; and (d) Germany is expected to begin more intensive submarine warfare which may interfere with enemy supply lines. “In the long run, Germany’s leaders, confronted with the fact that the battle lines have contracted virtually to the prewar boundaries of Germany (with the exception of Norway), will have no choice but to open a road of blood in one direction or the other. The chance may come after the enemy’s overhasty [current] offensive has been repulsed.”

As mentioned earlier, this is the same error American intelligence made before Pearl Harbor. In 1941, Washington believed it would receive via the Winds Code and the Purple intercepts the information about when the Japanese would attack. Just as we expected Japan would attack somewhere around December 7, 1941, we also knew in late 1944 that Hitler would go on the offensive somewhere. Yet on both occasions we were badly surprised.

Unlike Pearl Harbor, however, the Allies turn the Battle of the Bulge into a great victory. The Germans inflict more than fifty thousand Allied casualties in killed, wounded and missing. However, the Germans suffer seventy thousand casualties of a similar nature. They also lose another fifty thousand troops as prisoners of war. In terms of material, the Germans lose six hundred tanks, sixteen hundred airplanes, and countless vehicles. According to a top commander in the German Air Force, the “Luftwaffe” received its death blow in the Ardennes.… It was decimated while in transfer, on the ground, in large air battles, especially during Christmas, and was finally destroyed.”

But it is the Russians who truly reap the benefits. In his attack Hitler committed too much of his mobile reserves in order to achieve a breakthrough and reach Antwerp. (It is interesting to note how both Eisenhower and Hitler recognized the need to possess Antwerp.) No sooner had the German attack been broken in the West, then, on January 12, 1945, five Russian army groups crush the unsupported German lines in the East and begin a massive advance toward the Oder River and Berlin.

The deal will be that the Americans will be allowed to completely control the Bremen and Bremerhaven enclave, including military government, although it will be considered a subdistrict of the larger, British-controlled area.27 The Americans will also enjoy free transit of goods and material on the basis “the British interest in possible movement through the American zone to Austria” is so evident that the interests of both nations in these matters are mutually recognized.

What Marshall is saying between the lines is that the war in Europe must be ended quickly because the timetable for ending the war with Japan is being interfered with.

The idea behind any supporting attack is to make the enemy “disperse his strength and permit us the use of all possible crossings” so the Allies can put enough force in western Germany “to complete the conquest.” The Supreme Commander emphasizes that in all his conversations with CIGS and others, he has always shown his intent as being: “(1) to concentrate [his forces] north of the Ruhr and (2) to launch a supporting attack with troops that were available after the complete satisfaction of the requirements of the main attack from such locality as study and continuous examination would indicate to be best.” Various conditions, such as the Germans flooding the ground west of the Roer dams (which they will later do), the strength of enemy forces, will influence the latter point.

Speaking as a faithful servant, Eisenhower then says that should the Combined Chiefs of Staff decide the location for the main attack on Germany, he can “accept such a decision loyally and as always do my utmost to carry it out.” He stresses again that only a firmly situated flank on an easily defended line will prevent more Allied troops being immobilized than can be afforded. He concludes by stressing once again that “the Ruhr is the logical dividing line,” a belief that he has arrived at by reducing “my own nationalistic tendencies” and ignoring “the personal ambitions of any individuals.” This clever and politically correct analysis will turn Marshall more than ever into Eisenhower’s advocate when the Combined Chiefs of Staff meet to discuss the invasion of Germany. Not only is the mood in the Pentagon somewhat anti-British at the moment, because of the way Britain haggled over the zones of occupation, but it is becoming apparent to the Americans that while they are supplying the majority of the troops, guns, trucks, ships, aircraft, needed to win the war, the British political agenda for postwar Europe, the Balkans, Greece, India and the Far East differs from that of the Americans. The dislike of British foreign policy is particularly evident in the U.S. Army and the Navy. So when it comes to playing king

of the mountain among the Combined Chiefs, Marshall is not going to be denied. Eisenhower will be given a free hand. The second message is Eisenhower’s long, personal review of the campaign in Europe to date, plus an outline for future plans.31 He begins by emphasizing that all of the planners, British and American, have agreed that when the invasion of Germany becomes possible, it should be by the north flank based on studies of the terrain, “our own lines of communications and location of important geographical objectives.” This general operation was “outlined by my staff and approved by me” long before D day and was confirmed by all as the “principles before the invasion.” Plans were upset, however, by the initial rush through France. The speed of the advance prevented all the troops that were then north of the Paris-Bonn line of advance from being thrust into the attack. Several difficulties had to be faced. Maintenance of armored vehicles was one. The drive against a demoralized enemy gave Montgomery some hope of gaining a br...