Guarding Hitler: The Secret World of the Führer

by Mark Felton

The second group in opposition to Hitler could be broadly labelled ‘The Left’. Socialists and Communists hated Hitler and the Nazis, and knew what would happen to them if Hitler ever gained power. But the Left was remarkably disorganised. The Socialists clung on to a belief in the democratic process and viewed political assassination as anathema, a position also later adopted during the war by the Western Allies until quite late in the conflict. The Communists took their orders from Moscow, which directed their best efforts against their ideological cousins the Socialists rather than against the Nazis. In spite of the political situation, some on the Left did manage to make attempts on Hitler’s life.

Hitler stated in 1934 that he ‘did not tolerate a car manufactured by other companies in his escort and entourage,’ a ringing endorsement of what was now called Mercedes-Benz (though not something they like to highlight today). Between 1929 and 1942 Mercedes-Benz delivered a total of forty-four cars to the Reich Chancellery, the majority during the Nazi period.

brand loyalty

But the security features on the cars were only as good as the security protocols that governed the cars’ use. Hitler consistently toured around in armoured limousines with the top down. Although the side windows were rolled up, he was vulnerable to either a rifleman shooting from higher up (as in the case of John F. Kennedy in Dallas in 1963) or from a tossed grenade or bomb.

The main problem was that the plan came too late. SOE lacked intelligence about Hitler’s routine until after D-Day when they captured a few low-ranking former guards who had been returned to active service. By the time SOE had managed to thrash out an assassination plan, Hitler had managed to frustrate them by moving away from the target area.

After the war had began, and following Bormann’s stringent efforts to beef up security around the Berghof and prevent day trippers and hikers from getting anywhere near the place, any real threat of assassination had to come from insiders. Hitler was to face some serious attempts by members of his own armed forces to kill him whilst he was at home on his mountain. The resolve of his opponents to carry out their plans was severely tested by Hitler’s formidable security apparatus. Killing Hitler soon became virtually a suicide mission for the few people who were prepared to act.

None of the plots against Hitler ever originated from the RSD, SS-Begleitkommando or the Wehrmacht’s FBB. Hitler’s valets received regular target practice sessions with the RSD. Although the valets, cooks and bodyguards that served Hitler were the best placed to kill him, none ever attempted it. The motivation was simply not there. Hitler made sure that his servants were well looked after. When they married he sent substantial personal wedding gifts. At Christmas he was generous to both the men and to their families. On his birthday Hitler would invite all of his servants along with their spouses and children to take coffee and cake with him. Hitler talked to everyone, making even the lowliest servant feel appreciated. ‘He cultivated their loyalty and love.’4 He was, in many respects, an ideal boss.

Von Kluge was fully aware of what many of his subordinate officers were up to, led by his own Operations Officer, Generalmajor Henning von Treskow. Hitler visited Smolensk to discuss the forthcoming offensive at Kursk with Kluge and other army commanders. Hitler was, in effect, unknowingly entering the belly of the beast when he entered Army Group Centre. It was probably the most dangerous location that the Führer visited, where he would find himself surrounded by dozens of officers who would not have thought twice about putting a bullet between his eyes. As we have seen, one officer did object to such a move – von Kluge. The original plan had been to shoot Hitler dead while he was taking luncheon with the headquarters officers. When Kluge was informed of this plan he was outraged: ‘One could not just shoot the man at his meal.’5 Also Kluge and other senior officers were afraid of getting caught in the crossfire during the inevitable shoot out with Hitler’s SS bodyguards; and the conspirators were averse to risking their commanding general’s life, as he would be needed in the post-Nazi government.

Throughout the war the British and Americans never seriously targeted Hitler’s numerous military headquarters for destruction; that was, somewhat ironically, until the final days of the war. The reason was not that they did not know where these complexes were located – on the contrary, the British, Americans and the Soviets had detailed information about the Obersalzberg, the Reich Chancellery in Berlin and the Wolf’s Lair in East Prussia. The reason was that such a strike was viewed to be counter-productive to the Allied cause. The same reason was given for cancelling Operation Foxley, the British plan to use a sniper to shoot Hitler during one of his daily walks at the Obersalzberg. The reasoning was that if the Allies had bombed Hitler out of his home, they would simply have bound him further to the German people, who were suffering greatly under the Allied aerial onslaught. If Hitler was killed in an air raid the Allies feared that they would have made him a martyr. The same outcome would have been likely from shooting him using a concealed sniper. ‘Hitler and his like can only be irrevocably discredited if he is at the helm when the final collapse comes,’21 read one American report on the subject. There was also the compelling argument put forward by many Allied assessments that Hitler’s bungling attempts at grand strategy were actually aiding the Allied cause and shortening the war. If Hitler was removed, the German General Staff may have run the war considerably mor...

The search for Martin Bormann, considered to have been the most senior Nazi to have escaped capture and/or trial in 1945, continued for decades despite Axmann’s insistence that Bormann and Dr Stumpfegger had died during the escape from the Führerbunker. Digs were made for Bormann’s body in Paraguay in March 1964 and Berlin in July 1964 without result. The same year the West German government offered a 100,000 Mark reward for information leading to Bormann’s capture, but it remained unclaimed. In 1965 a retired postal worker named Albert Krumnow came forward to claim that on 8 May 1945, or thereabouts, he and his colleagues had been ordered by the Soviets to bury two bodies near the Lehrter Station in the exact same location as that reported by Artur Axmann. Krumnow claimed that one body was dressed in a Wehrmacht uniform – indeed Bormann had changed into nondescript dress for the breakout – while the other was an SS doctor. Krumnow stated that they found a paybook on the SS officer’s body identifying it as Ludwig Stumpfegger’s. When they gave the document to the Soviets, they destroyed it. Then, in 1972 workmen found two skeletons only 12 metres from where Krumnow stated that he had buried two bodies in May 1945. Using dental records reconstructed in Soviet captivity from memory in 1945 by SS-Brigadeführer Dr Hugo Blaschke, Hitler’s dentist, the smaller skeleton was identified as Bormann’s. The skeleton also had a damaged collarbone consistent with a 1939 riding accident s...