Kindle Notes & Highlights
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July 22, 2018
Psychology, like every empirical science, cannot get along without auxiliary concepts, hypotheses, and models. But the theologian as well as the philosopher is apt to make the mistake of taking them for metaphysical postulates. The atom of which the physicist speaks is not an hypostasis, it is a model. Similarly my concept of archetype or of psychic energy is only an auxiliary idea which can be exchanged at any time for a better formula. (Jung 1952c: par. 460)
This sounds a fine expression of epistemological openness; however, as we know, neither Jung nor any Jungian author has ever exchanged the theory of archetypes with a ‘better formula’ and archetypes are not treaded as models but very much as actual hypostatic entities.
In the very same paragraph, Jung states categorically that ‘In reality, … individuation is an expression of that biological process … by which every living thing becomes what it was destined to become from the beginning’ (Jung 1952c: par. 460). There is no hypothetical openn...
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Within the space of two paragraphs he advocates epistemological openness, accepting his theories as working hypotheses and then, he moves to profess his definitive ‘knowledge’ of phenomena which in a tautological fashion confirm his theories. It is this kind of epistemology that was termed ‘Gnostic epistemology’ (Papadopoulos 1997);
Dehing, pointing to ‘an internal contradiction in Jung’s approach’, argues that ‘the agnostic empiricist every now and then turns into a prophet. Most of the time Jung’s opinions are formulated as hypotheses, but sometimes they become hypostases’ (Dehing 1990: 393).
The romantic idea of the Gnostic rebels who were against the establishment is only one side of the Gnostic tradition and this is the one that has been favoured by Jung and Jungians. Yet, there are other more unhelpful sides to Gnosticism that have not been taken into consideration seriously, as yet, by Jungian authors.
In the clinical context, the opposite to Jung’s Socratic ignorance, i.e., his Gnostic epistemology, produces the Jung that, by virtue of feeling justified that he is in touch with the psyche, knows what is good for his clients and prescribes specific actions for them, a practice which is totally opposite to his Socratic openness. For example, Jung was also known to have been quite explicitly prescriptive to his analysands, telling them what specific actions and directions to take in their lives (e.g., Jung, MDR, pp. 156f).
In so far as epistemology studies the ways we formulate what and how we know, it should be indispensable for a proper study of psychotherapeutic approaches. Jung’s ambivalent stance towards philosophy seems to have prevented him from acknowledging fully the implications of his own epistemological sensitivity.
Like all great pioneers, Jung succumbed to the intoxication of his own discoveries and it was only human that there was also a streak in him that wanted to stick to his own theories and propagate them further with the fervour of a zealot.
it is important to appreciate that there are two Jungs, so to speak – the one with an open epistemology and Socratic ignorance who was constructionist and relational, and the other Jung who, following Gnostic epistemology, was, in fact, essentialist and universalist.
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The concept of a mind, or spirit or ‘will’ outside of, and beyond, the everyday ‘conscious’ mentality of human beings seems – as far as we can tell – to have existed across cultures and throughout human history.
In other eras, the degree to which this ‘mind’ resided in powerful others such as gods, animals, elements like the wind and rivers, or a single God, was emphasised much more than the modern idea that this was an aspect of the minds of human beings themselves.
The way that serious attention was paid to dreams seems to be clear evidence of humankind’s respect for, and interest i...
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But we know from anthropological investigations that the conceptual separation between a conscious and an unconscious mind (as we divide them now), is not necessarily the form of understanding shared by humans living ...
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