The Handbook of Jungian Psychology: Theory, Practice and Applications

by Renos K. Papadopoulos

and ‘Neurosis is teleologically oriented’ (Jun...

CW 7 Two essays in analytical psychology. en esta misma cita Jung otorga a Adler el credito por establecer la funcion teleologica de la neurosis

He maintained that science at large was adopting teleological principles in approaching its subject matters.

Also, he declared boldly that ‘Life is teleology par excellence; it is a system of directed aims which seek to fulil themselves. The end of every process is its goal’ (Jung 1934b: par. 798).

Jung’s use of teleology could be categorised into the following four types:

• therapeutic ...

• methodological teleology

• human teleology

• natural teleology

All four types of teleological understanding have strong implications for Jung’s epistemological approach in so far as they suggest an impossibility of complete knowledge in a definitive way, as knowledge is related to a future purpose and goal. This means that, in effect, Jung’s epistemological teleology locates knowledge in the very process of generating itself.

Thus, it could be said that the production of knowledge for Jung, especially in therapeutic contexts, involves the locating of oneself on the pathway along which teleology is unfolding as a lived experience.

Instead of focusing on a final outcome and end product or state, Jung’s teleological epistemology favours an approach that accepts, what co...

I use the word finality intentionally, in order to avoid confusion with the concept of teleology. By finality, I mean merely the immanent psychological striving for a goal. Instead of ‘striving for a goal’ one could also say ‘sense of purpose’. All psychological phenomena have some such sense of purpose inherent in them. (Jung 1916/1948: par. 456)

CW 8

It was not until the introduction of the archetype that Jung was able to furnish this elaboration.

From an epistemological point of view, Jung’s theory of archetypes introduces a complexity that enriches his earlier formulations of teleology, by offering a bridge between the personal realm and the wider collective structures. More specifically, Jung suggests that ‘Archetypes … manifest themselves only through their ability to organize images and ideas’ (Jung 1954: par. 440) and ‘consciousness … rests, as we know, on … the archetypes’ (Jung 1958: par. 656).

This means that, in addition to a reductive process of identifying the various contributing elements in a knowing process i.e., relating to personal history, interpersonal transactions and societal influences (as outlined above), the Jungian approach includes a constructive process that would take into account the archetypal organising influence.

Instead of having one single archetype organising the network of interactions, there is a cluster of archetypes (‘Network of Archetypal Images’)

the archetypal effect is not retrogressive but prospective, with teleological finality

In effect, this means that a Jungian approach would imply (however paradoxical it may sound initially) that ‘it is not only the past that shapes the present, but also the present that shapes the past’ (Papadopoulos 1996: 158) in a reciprocal manner.

Figure 1.2 depicts the linear model of causal reductive epistemology. According to this model, A leads to B and then C which means that phenomenon B is caused by phenomenon A, and C is caused by B. For example, Jung characterised Freud’s understanding of neurosis as linear: one’s own childhood (A) causes the formation of one’s personality (B) which then causes the neurotic symptoms (C).

The therapeutic direction that this model dictates would be the linear route in reverse: the therapist would need to go back to find the causes of the symptom (C) by unravelling the personality (B) which should be carried out by exploring the childhood conflicts (A).

‘When a psychological fact has to be explained, it must be remembered that psychological data necessitate a twofold point of view, namely that of causality and that of finality’ (Jung 1916/1948: par. 456), and ‘To understand the psyche causally is to understand only one half of it’ (Jung 1914: par. 398).

This epistemology of finality would be comparable to what modern systemic family therapists call ‘circular’ or ‘systemic’ epistemology’ (cf. Becvar and Becvar 2002; Keeney 1983; Papadopoulos 1996, 1998).

Another important implication of this new epistemology is that all three positions (A, B and C) do not exist in isolation but are also affected by the activation of archetypal constellations

The therapeutic approach in circular epistemologies is not based on the attempt to trace ‘the cause’ or ‘causes’ but to connect meaningfully with the contextual patterns within which they are located. Jung referred to the ‘sense of purpose’ rather than clear explanation when he was addressing these relations and clarified that one cannot analyse, translate or interpret the archetype or its influence on the person (in a reductive way) but one has to relate and connect with it (in a constructive, purposive and teleological way):

Hence the ‘explanation’ should always be such that the functional significance of the archetype remains unimpaired, so that an adequate and meaningful connection between the conscious mind and the archetype is assured. (Jung 1940: par. 271)

CW 9i

traditional distinction between understanding (Verstehen) and explanation (Erklären) in social sciences (cf. Jaspers 1923/1963; von Wright 1971), i.e., between comprehension/understanding, and logical/rational explanation, and opted for the former

this meaning would not be a type of meaning that would be bestowed by means of external logical definition or explanation (cf. Mathers 2001).

Finally, Jung clarifies that his preferred relationship between the archetype and the ‘conscious mind’ should be that of a ‘meaningful connection’.

it is now possible to appreciate that what he wants to clearly convey is that the unique engagement (between the knowing subject and the archetype) is not a set of clearly defined logical statements but a living experience that has a purpose and finality, beyond causal-reductive and linear epistemologies.

Jung used frequently the term pattern in relation to archetypes when he was referring to them as connected to ‘patterns of behaviour’.

he argued that the archetype acts in a similar way as it triggers off thoughts, ideas, images, feelings etc., i.e., a series of psychological (in parallel to the biological) elements of human functioning (e.g., Jung 1954: par. 398).

with the introduction of archetypes, the Jungian epistemology could be considered as ‘epistemological contextualism’. Epistemological contextualism asserts that whatever we know is contingent on its context and therefore different contexts set different epistemic standards and conditions (e.g., Annis 1978; Cohen 1998; Sosa and Kim 2000a; Williams 2001).

Gregory Bateson (1904–1980), the English anthropologist and social scientist (who is also one of the founders of systemic epistemology and family therapy)

I think that Descartes’ first epistemological steps – the separation of ‘mind’ from ‘matter’ and the cogito – established bad premises, perhaps ultimately lethal premises, for Epistemology, and I believe that Jung’s statement of connection between Pleroma and Creatura is a much healthier first step. Jung’s epistemology starts from comparison of difference – not from matter. So I will deine Epistemology as the science that studies the process of knowing – the interaction of the capacity to respond to differences, on the one hand, with the material world in which those differences somehow originate, on the other. We are concerned then with an interface between Pleroma and Creatura. (Bateson and Bateson 1987: 18)

This ‘larger Mind’ (with capital M!) would indeed correspond to the Jungian collective unconscious and the epistemological implication would be that the knowing subject is part of a wider knowledge pool with which the individual is in interaction with.

Jung’s Socratic ignorance and Gnostic knowledge

The last facet of Jung’s epistemology that this chapter will examine is a duality of Jung’s own approach to epistemological openness.

two opposing epistemologies which Jung, wittingly or unwittingly, actually espoused. The first of those is closer to what could be called ‘Socratic ignorance’, while the second is essentially a ‘Gnostic epistemology’.

Jung stands clearly against any oversweeping statements of the ‘nothing but’ kind, and in the true spirit of Socratic ignorance makes such statements as ‘Stereotyped interpretation of dream-motifs is to be avoided … Even if one has great experience in these matters, one is again and again obliged, before each dream, to admit to one’s ignorance and, renouncing all preconceived ideas, to prepare for something entirely unexpected’ (Jung 1948: para. 543)

(Jung 1948: para. 543)

CW 8. sobre la naturaleza de los suenos

not to impose pre-packaged theoretical formulations onto a situation but, instead, retain an openness to examine the uniqueness of each given circumstance.

Socratic ignorance can be understood in two ways. The first refers to Socrates’ stance not to possess any wisdom but his only wisdom consisted of his awareness of his own ignorance.

The second way of understanding the Socratic ignorance is in terms of the way he applied it in his conversations with others.

By asserting his own ignorance of the subject, Socrates frees himself and his interlocutor to investigate and explore the various underlying assumptions as well as dimensions of the phenomena they were discussing.

to draw out of a person, to facilitate the birth of the knowledge about a certain topic, hence his method was termed ‘maieutic’ (maia, in Greek, being a midwife).

There are striking similarities between the Socratic maieutics and the Jungian approach which did not elude Jung (e.g., Jung 1913: par. 519, 1943: par. 26, 1912: par. 437).

estas referencias de Jung a la mayeutica socratica como un equivalente a su metodo son importantes de cara al curso introductorio

In addition to adopting a ‘Socratic-ignorance’ approach in his analytical clinical work, Jung’s insistence that, above all, he was an ‘empiricist’ and ‘phenomenologist’ in his wider researches points to the same epistemological openness.

‘a source that would seem to be above suspicion. “Facts first and theories later is the keynote of Jung’s work. He is an empiricist first and last.” This view meets with my approval’ (Jung 1952a: par. 1502).

CW 18 Religion and Psychology: a reply to Martin Buber

Although I have often been called a philosopher, I am an empiricist and adhere as such to the phenomenological standpoint. I trust that it does not conflict with the principles of scientific empiricism if one occasionally makes certain reflections which go beyond a mere accumulation and classification of experience. As a matter of fact I believe that experience is not even possible without reflection, because ‘experience’ is a process of assimilation without which there could be no understanding. As this statement indicates, I approach psychological matters from a scientific and not from a philosophical standpoint. In as much as religion has a very important psychological aspect, I deal with it from a purely empirical point of view, that is, I restrict myself to the observation of phenomena and I eschew any metaphysical or philosophical considerations. I do not deny the validity of these other considerations but I cannot claim to be competent to apply them correctly. (Jung 1938/1940: par. 2)

CW 11 Psychology and Religion

What has not been examined often is Jung’s opposite epistemological stance that he also followed, evidently without him being aware of its antithetical direction; this was termed ‘Gnostic epistemology’ (Papadopoulos 1997).