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Kindle Notes & Highlights
by
Roger Fisher
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October 14 - December 3, 2019
Then someone discovered that the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) had developed a model for the economics of deep-seabed mining. This model, gradually accepted by the parties as objective, provided a way of evaluating the impact of any fee proposal on the economics of mining. When the Indian representative asked about the effect of his proposal, he was shown how the tremendous fee he proposed—payable five years before the mine would generate any revenue—would make it virtually impossible for a company to mine. Impressed, he announced that he would reconsider his position. On the
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At a minimum, objective criteria need to be independent of each side’s will. Ideally, to assure a wise agreement, objective criteria should be not only independent of will but also both legitimate and practical.
Objective criteria should apply, at least in theory, to both sides.
You can thus use the test of reciprocal application to tell you whether a proposed criterion is fair and independent of either party’s will.
To produce an outcome independent of will, you can use either fair standards for the substantive question or fair procedures for resolving the conflicting interests. Consider, for example, the age-old way to divide a piece of cake between two children: one cuts and the other chooses. Neither can complain about an unfair division.
As you consider procedural solutions, look at other basic means of settling differences: taking turns, drawing lots, letting someone else decide, and so on.
Drawing lots, flipping a coin, and other forms of chance have an inherent fairness. The results may be unequal, but each side had an equal opportunity.
Frame each issue as a joint search for objective criteria.
Reason and be open to reason as to which standards are most appropriate and how they should be applied.
Never yield to pressure, only t...
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Frame each issue as a joint search for objective criteria.
“Look, you want a high price and I want a low one. Let’s figure out what a fair price would be. What objective standards might be most relevant?” You and the other side may have conflicting interests, but the two of you now have a shared goal: to determine a fair price.
Ask “What’s your theory?” If the seller starts by giving you a position, such as “The price is $255,000,” ask for the theory behind that price: “How did you arrive at that figure?” Treat the problem as though the seller too is looking for a fair price based on objective criteria.
Each standard the other side proposes becomes a lever you can then use to persuade them. Your case will have more impact if it is presented in terms of their criteria, and they will find it difficult to resist applying their criteria to the problem.
“You say Mr. Jones sold the house next door for $260,000. Your theory is that this house should be sold for what comparable houses in the neighborhood are going for, am I right? In that case, let’s look at what the house on the corner of Ellsworth and Oxford and the one at Broadway and Dana were sold for.”
One standard of legitimacy does not preclude the existence of others.
What the other side believes to be fair may not be what you believe to be fair.
you should be willing to respond to reasons for applying another standard or for applying a standard differently.
When each party is advancing a different standard, look for an objective basis for deciding between them, such as which standard has been used by the parties in the past or which standard is more widely applied.
Agree on someone you both regard as fair and give him or her a list of the proposed criteria. Ask the person to decide which are the fairest or most appropriate for your situation. Since objective criteria are supposed to be legitimate and because legitimacy implies acceptance by a great many people, this is a fair thing to ask. You are not asking the third party to settle your substantive dispute—just to give you advice on what standard to use in settling it.
A principled negotiator is open to reasoned persuasion on the merits; a positional bargainer is not.
It is the combination of openness to reason with insistence on a solution based on objective criteria that makes principled negotiation so persuasive and so effective at getting the other side to play.
Pressure can take many forms: a bribe, a threat, a manipulative appeal to trust, or a simple refusal to budge. In all these cases, the principled response is the same: invite them to state their reasoning, suggest objective criteria you think apply, and refuse to budge except on this basis. Never yield to pressure, only to principle.
A refusal to yield except in response to sound reasons is an easier position to defend—publicly and privately—than is a refusal to yield combined with a refusal to advance sound reasons.
One who insists that negotiation be based on the merits can bring others around to playing that game, since that becomes the only way to advance their substantive interests.
principled negotiation allows you to hold your own and still be fair.
Negotiators commonly try to protect themselves against such an outcome by establishing in advance the worst acceptable outcome—their “bottom line.”
It limits the authority of a lawyer, broker, or other agent. “Get the best price you can, but you are not authorized to sell for less than $260,000,” you might say.
If you insist on a bottom line, you are not likely to explore an imaginative solution like this. A bottom line—by its very nature rigid—is almost certain to be too rigid.
In short, while adopting a bottom line may protect you from accepting a very bad agreement, it may keep you both from inventing and from agreeing to a solution it would be wise to accept. An arbitrarily selected figure is no measure of what you should accept.
The reason you negotiate is to produce something better than the results you can obtain without negotiating.
What is your BATNA—your Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement?
If you have not thought carefully about what you will do if you fail to reach an agreement, you are negotiating with your eyes closed.
it is useful to identify one far from perfect agreement that is better than your BATNA. Before accepting any agreement worse than this trip-wire package, you should take a break and reexamine the situation.
In fact, the relative negotiating power of two parties depends primarily upon how attractive to each is the option of not reaching agreement.
Think how the talk about salary would go. Now contrast that with how you would feel walking in with two other job offers. How would that salary negotiation proceed? The difference is power.
The relative negotiating power of a large industry and a small town trying to raise taxes on a factory is determined not by the relative size of their respective budgets, or their political clout, but by each side’s best alternative.
Develop your BATNA. Vigorous exploration of what you will do if you do not reach agreement can greatly strengthen your hand.
Attractive alternatives are not just sitting there waiting for you; you usually have to develop them.
Generating possible BATNAs requires three distinct operations: (1) inventing a list of actions you might conceivably take if no agreement is reached; (2) improving some of the more promising ideas and converting them into practical alternatives; an...
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Knowing what you are going to do if the negotiation does not lead to agreement will give you additional confidence in the negotiating process. It is easier to break off negotiations if you know where you’re going. The greater your willingness to break off negotiations, the more forcefully you can present your interests and the basis on which you believe an agreement should be reached.
The desirability of disclosing your BATNA to the other side depends upon your assessment of the other side’s thinking. If your BATNA is extremely attractive—if you have another customer waiting in the next room—it is in your interest to let the other side know. If they think you lack a good alternative when in fact you have one, then you should almost certainly let them know. However, if your best alternative to a negotiated agreement is worse for you than they think, disclosing it will weaken rather than strengthen your hand.
Consider the other side’s BATNA. You should also think about the alternatives to a negotiated agreement available to the other side. The more you can learn of their alternatives, the better prepared you are for negotiation. Knowing their alternatives, you ...
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If the other side has big guns, you do not want to turn a negotiation into a gunfight. The stronger they appear in terms of physical or economic power, the more you benefit by negotiating on the merits.
The more easily and happily you can walk away from a negotiation, the greater your capacity to affect its outcome.
Developing your BATNA is perhaps the most effective course of action you can take in dealing with a seemingly more powerful negotiator.
Rejecting their position only locks them in. Defending your proposal only locks you in.
Do not push back. When they assert their positions, do not reject them. When they attack your ideas, don’t defend them. When they attack you, don’t counterattack.
Break the vicious cycle by refusing to react. Instead of pushing back, sidestep their attack and deflect it against the problem. As in the Oriental martial arts of judo and jujitsu, avoid pitting your strength against theirs directly; instead, use your skill to step aside and turn their strength to your ends.
Typically their “attack” will consist of three maneuvers: asserting their position forcefully, attacking your ideas, and attacking you.