Free Will > Likes and Comments
Alan wrote: " I regard most of what I have read so far as incredibly theoretical and largely irrelevant, punctuated by massive doses of academic jargon, intellectual gibberish, and mathematical or computer programming esoterica..."A good summary of Professor Dennett's work! I would add "narcissistic posing."
Thanks Feliks (post 2) and Randal (post 3).Some of Dennett's later discussions are more interesting than many of the earlier chapters. For example, I just read the following in Chapter 6:
"Whereas all other living things are designed by evolution to evaluate all options relative to the summum bonum of reproductive success, we can trade that quest for any of a thousand others as readily as a chameleon can change color. Birds and fish and even other mammals are quite immune to fanaticism, an affliction of cultural infection unique to our species, but, ironically, culture makes us susceptible to such pathologies by making us open-minded about ends and means in a way no other animals are."
Daniel C. Dennett, Freedom Evolves (New York: Penguin, 2003), 179-80 (italics in original).
So, just when we are fed up with fanaticism, either local or international, we can evidently be thankful that such irrationalities are at least a product of human free will. Now, if people would only choose to base their speech and actions on their rational faculties instead of their subrational emotions, all would be well. Needless to say, I'm not holding my breath to see such a superlative exercise of free will.
4/29/2018 Note:
I have just finished my second reading of Daniel Dennett's book Freedom Evolves and have reviewed it here. This review corrects my misimpression after my first reading that Dennett somehow supports a concept of free will in opposition to scientific determinism. He does not.
I don't know..some of these quotes from Dennett seem rather 'helicopter-view'; detached; remote. Viewed from a telescope. Macro-scale. Does he offer concrete examples? I can name one: there's homosexuality in the animal world for instance. Not something which leads inevitably to the best option for reproduction. Then again, there are the lemmings and their mad rush to the sea; deliberate/inscrutable beachings by whales.. perplexing, human-like behavior in dogs and horses..
Feliks wrote: "I don't know..some of these quotes from Dennett seem rather 'helicopter-view'; detached; remote. Viewed from a telescope. Macro-scale. Does he offer concrete examples? I can name one: there's homos..."Feliks, you may be right that Dennett, who is a philosophy professor and not a biologist, may be somewhat inaccurate about the nonhuman animal world. They may have more freedom than what Dennett thinks. I did, however, find an earlier remark that Dennett made about domesticated animals of interest:
"For instance, the brains of domesticated animals are significantly smaller than the brains of their nearest wild kin, and this is not just a by-product of selection for large muscle mass in animals raised for food. Domesticated animals can afford to be stupid and still have lots of offspring, for they have in effect outsourced many of their cognitive subtasks to another species, us, on which they have become parasitic."
Dennett, Freedom Evolves, 163-64.
I laughed when I read this. My wife and I have a cat, and this perfectly describes the relationship between us and the cat. We are the servants (host), and the cat is the parasite. The cat is very bossy when it comes time for her dinner.
As for lemmings, the truth is apparently more nuanced than what you, I, and probably most of us were taught. Per the Wikipedia article,
"Lemmings have become the subject of a widely popular misconception that they commit mass suicide when they migrate, by jumping off cliffs. It is in fact not a mass suicide but the result of their migratory behavior. Driven by strong biological urges, some species of lemmings may migrate in large groups when population density becomes too great. Lemmings can swim and may choose to cross a body of water in search of a new habitat. In such cases, many may drown if the body of water is so wide as to stretch their physical capability to the limit. This fact, combined with the unexplained fluctuations in the population of Norwegian lemmings, gave rise to the misconception."
But you may be correct that Dennett is too simplistic in his biological discussions. I do think, however, that his general remarks about the greater freedom of human beings are "on point" (as I used to say when I was a lawyer). However, as Horatio said to Hamlet, "There needs no ghost, my lord, come from the grave / To tell us this." Aristotle said much the same thing over two millennia ago, even without the benefit of an understanding of evolution.
Heh heh. Thank ye for the skinny on lemmings. Still, it's something which
should
be true (and probably is, somewhere else, if any of us had time to hunt for further examples). Squid for instance--voluntary mass deaths there, as I recall..You're an informed gentleman, that's for sure....uh oh! Just saw this: former lawyer? That says much. There are no 'former' lawyers in the same way there are no 'former' marines. :)
Here's my favorite lawyer joke:"Honey, have you seen the newspaper this morning? I can't seem to find it.."
"--Why, yes dear. It's either (a) in the magazine rack next to my easy chair; (b) on the mantelpiece where I sometimes leave it; or (c) I don't know"
Feliks wrote: "There are no 'former' lawyers"After practicing law for more than three decades, I went on permanent retirement status with the bars of the states in which I was licensed in order to focus on my own research and writing. I could not legally practice law again unless I took and passed a new bar exam, which at my age I will never do. Being a litigation lawyer was fun in many ways, but what I am doing now is much more fulfilling. So, yes, I am a "former" lawyer, though I often call upon my legal knowledge in my study and writing on history, constitutional law, political science, and philosophy. If I had remained a licensed lawyer after my 2012 retirement from law practice, I would have had to continue to take required Continuing Legal Education (CLE) courses, which would have cost me time and money. There was no point in doing that, since I never intended to practice law again.
Many lawyers I have known hate lawyer jokes. I love them. They are often accurate, at least with regard to a subset of the lawyer class.
Here is an article on beached whales. There is always a reason, but we can't always figure out what it is. That doesn't mean that they are committing suicide:http://www.scientificamerican.com/art...
Here is the best excerpt:
What causes whales to beach themselves?
I often use the analogy of a car crash, because a lot of things can go wrong but you get the same result. Statistically, we are only able to determine the cause of a stranding in about 50 percent of all cases worldwide. In some cases it is obvious, like a ship strike leaving an animal in poor condition. In the northeastern United States pneumonia is a common cause of stranding. We see other diseases and trauma, such as shark attack on whales or dolphins or attacks by members of the same species. Poisonous "red tides" will also affect marine mammals. Some strandings have been speculated to be related to anomalies in the magnetic field.
Military sonar has been implicated in the mass stranding of beaked whales.
Well done, but the point is, there are examples of idiosyncrasy and mania in the animal world as well as ours. You can find cruelty there, as well as humor and play.
I would say that "idiosyncrasy and mania" are different than fanaticism. It depends on how you define them.Of course there are homosexual apes. Bonobo females are famous for their face-to-face fun, and at least one all-male troupe of lowland gorillas practiced it. In the absence of females... In the bonobo case, that is how they do social bonding. Female bonobos are dominant to males. Sex plays a huge role in bonding for them, and they don't care what sex or what age is involved. Darn hippies!
As for mania in animals, wouldn't that be due to disease? Male chimpanzees practice a sort of maniacal "rain dance" during thunderstorms by running down hills dragging and flailing huge branches, but that is mostly male dominance display and maybe rudimentary culture, since not all groups do it.
Human fanaticism seems to be caused more by group identity and mob psychology. It is enhanced by our extreme sociality, which is more highly developed than any other big-brained creatures.
Of course, I haven't read Dennett's book yet, so maybe I should stay out of this discussion.
Well, I haven't read him either. Your examples were well-taken. I was merely demurring from his seemingly absolute, positive, and unequivocal-sounding statements. He seemed too sure of himself, even in these brief quotes selected by the OP. I'm all for generalizations but Dennett seems to thrive on them, if I can trust my ears...
I briefly discuss Stephen Hawking's lecture "Is Everything Determined?" here. As explained in that review, I will elaborate more fully in a paper I am preparing on Hawking's views regarding determinism versus free will.
MJD wrote: "I found the book Free Will by Sam Harris to be a good short read on the subject."For a talk by Sam Harris on the subject, here is a link:
http://v.youku.com/v_show/id_XMjg4MDg...
(NOTE: Sam Harris begins to talk about Dennett's view at the 34 minute mark in the video)
MJD wrote: "MJD wrote: "I found the book Free Will by Sam Harris to be a good short read on the subject."For a talk by Sam Harris on the subject, here is a link:..."
Thank you for reminding me that I have intended to read Harris's Free Will for some time. I've now downloaded it on my Kindle and will read it soon.
I reviewed his book The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values here. As I stated in the review, I agree with Harris on some things and disagree with or question him on others, including the subject of free will. But I'll have to read his book devoted to that subject.
3/18/2020 Note: See post 19, below.
Alan wrote: "MJD wrote: "MJD wrote: "I found the book Free Will by Sam Harris to be a good short read on the subject."For a talk by Sam Harris on the subject, her..."
Look forward to seeing what you think.
On the subject of free will, Alan, I think you mis-characterize St, Augustine's position on free will.You must be thinking of his Anti-Pelagian writings like On Free Will and Grace, but he did also write On Free Choice of the Will, and as far as Erasmus versus Luther, I think Erasmus thought he was upholding an orthodox Augustinian position.
I'm not prepared to give an account of A's position on free will, but I will quote from something I was reading just the other day:
https://archive.org/stream/fathersoft...
Moreover, so far
from the truth is this statement that the birth of Christ was
determined by the course of the stars that anyone who really
believes in Christ is convinced that no man is born in this
62 SAINT AUGUSTINE
fashion. Let deluded men say what their ignorance fabricates
about the birth of men; let them deny the free will by which
they sin and invent the existence of a driving force by which
they defend their sins; let them attempt to trace to the
heavens the vicious traits which cause them to be scorned
even on earth by their fellow men, and let them untruthfully
say that these traits originate in the heavens. Let each one
who is so minded not only see how his own life will have to
be regulated but let him consider how his household is going
to be ruled, since, by subscribing to these opinions, he is not
permitted to punish his own servants who do wrong in his
house without first being obliged to blaspheme his gods re-
splendent in the heavens. Nevertheless, these persons, in spite
of their own senseless conjectures and in spite of their books,
which, far from being prophetic, are definitely false, cannot
believe that Christ's birth was determined by any astrological
decree, because the Magi saw the star in the East only after
Christ was born.
(Hope it's not too off topic)
I think that the proposition that people do not have free will (i.e. that people are machines whose outputs in words and deeds are necessitated by inputs of genetics and environmental factors) has pragmatic applications.For example, even is Sam Harris' arguments for the non-existence of free will as a concept fall flat, I think that Sam Harris' arguments for the pragmatic application the proposition of the non-existence of free will are valuable (like how such a thought process could lead to a less vindictive criminal justice system, in which the goal is not to "punish" but rather to act as deterrent or remove those people from society that for whatever reason cannot be deterred).
Furthermore, I do not think that one needs to reject the concept of free will entirely to reap the pragmatic benefits of such a proposition. I think that considering that genetic and environmental factors play a large part, if not a complete part, in shaping how people behave can lead to tangible benefits (like how you could take some mean thing someone said to you less personal, helping your mental health and discouraging you from attacking them in turn, by reminding yourself that your attacker could be suffering from a wide range of genetic and environmental factors that they have no control over that largely led them to attack you).
As a result of prescheduled commitments, I will probably be unable to respond to the comments of Chris and MJD (or other comments in this or another topic) for a day or two.
Alan wrote: "As a result of prescheduled commitments, I will probably be unable to respond to the comments of Chris and MJD (or other comments in this or another topic) for a day or two."No need to hurry. I sincerely look forward to your thoughts when you have the time.
Christopher wrote (post 20): "On the subject of free will, Alan, I think you mis-characterize St, Augustine's position on free will.You must be thinking of his Anti-Pelagian writings like On Free Will and Grace, but he did also write On Free Choice of the Will, and as far as Erasmus versus Luther, I think Erasmus thought he was upholding an orthodox Augustinian position."
Chris, I must admit that I am not an expert on Augustine: I am more of an expert on Luther and Calvin. That might have something to do with the fact that I was raised a Lutheran, whereas I gather that you are (or were raised) a Roman Catholic. Additionally, in preparing my book on Roger Williams, I researched and quoted the writings of Luther and Calvin on such issues, whereas I have read little of Augustine except his City of God, and that was more than fifty years ago.
Back in the late 1990s, however, I read some writings and biographical accounts of Pelagius and how he was declared a heretic by Augustine as a result of the former's support of free will. Of course, neither Pelagius nor any reputable theologian or philosopher advocated astrology. But the excerpt from Augustine you quoted seems to support a notion of free will toward the end of the quotation. So how do we reconcile this apparent inconsistency in Augustine's writings and actions? Perhaps the answer is contained in the following excerpt from Richard Marius's Martin Luther: The Christian Between God and Death (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), 197:
"In his most predestinarian mode, late in life when he battled the Pelagians, who championed free will, Augustine held that we lack any power to turn to God unless God first enters our souls and calls him to himself. God elects us; then we have faith. In Augustine's view, the only free will humanity possessed outside grace was freedom to sin. [Endnote omitted.] Faith came to the believer as an act of mercy, and only by faith alone could anyone be saved. Small wonder that the great early twentieth-century Catholic debunker of Luther's story, Heinrich Denifle, wrote with biting scorn that Luther's supposed 'discovery' was old Catholic doctrine . . . ." (Italics in the original.)
The foregoing description of Augustinian predestinarianism is identical with Luther's and Calvin's view of that doctrine. See Martin Luther, “Preface to Romans” (1522), in Martin Luther: Selections from His Writings, ed. John Dillenberger (New York: Anchor Books, 1962), 32; John Calvin, "Articles concerning Predestination," in Calvin: Theological Treatises, trans. and ed. J. K. S. Reid (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1954), 179. For further discussion (including relevant quotations from Luther and Calvin), see Alan E. Johnson, The First American Founder: Roger Williams and Freedom of Conscience (Pittsburgh: Philosophia, 2015) 527n38 (note 38 to Appendix B in the Kindle edition, Kindle loc. 8747-59).
Although the source and date of your quotation are not clear, you also referenced Augustine's On Free Choice of the Will. Per Wikipedia, "On Free Choice of the Will) is a book by Augustine of Hippo about the freedom of will. Young Augustine wrote it in three volumes, one 387–389 in Rome, after his baptism, and the other two between 391 and 395, after his priestly ordination in Africa." Augustine did not die until 430. Accordingly, that work represents his early views and not his later predestinarian views.
August 12, 2021 Note: For my final account regarding the theological arguments of Augustine, Luther, Calvin, and Hobbes against free will, see my essay “Theological Arguments against Free Will” here . This paper is an excerpt from my book Free Will and Human Life (Pittsburgh: Philosophia, 2021).
MJD wrote (post 21): "even i[f] Sam Harris' arguments for the non-existence of free will as a concept fall flat, I think that Sam Harris' arguments for the pragmatic application [of] the proposition of the non-existence of free will are valuable (like how such a thought process could lead to a less vindictive criminal justice system, in which the goal is not to "punish" but rather to act as deterrent or remove those people from society that for whatever reason cannot be deterred)."This gets into complicated questions of political and legal philosophy. Although I sympathize with your desire for a more rational approach to criminal justice (as have a few others over the centuries), legal systems everywhere (or at least almost everywhere) are, and have been, based on a concept of retribution as well as rehabilitation. In Hobbesian and Lockean terms, the individual gives up an individual right to retribution in exchange for the state taking over that function. The alternative, in Hobbes's formulation, is a war of all against all. This notion, wrongheaded though it may be, seems deeply rooted in the human psyche. One might hope that progress could be made toward a more humane criminal justice system, but human behavior (nature?) and history suggest it would be a tough slog. In any event, I don't think that determinism, scientific or theological, would help much in such an endeavor: the premise that human beings are mechanistic automatons with predetermined and inescapable behaviors (whether preordained by God or preordained by the scientific laws of causation) tends to excuse not only the acts of alleged criminals but also the vindictive responses of the accusers and their governmental criminal justice systems. In the end, nobody is responsible, and chance—or what passes for chance—reigns supreme.
MJD wrote (post 21): "I think that considering that genetic and environmental factors play a large part, if not a complete part, in shaping how people behave can lead to tangible benefits (like how you could take some mean thing someone said to you less personal, helping your mental health and discouraging you from attacking them in turn, by reminding yourself that your attacker could be suffering from a wide range of genetic and environmental factors that they have no control over that largely led them to attack you)."
I tend to agree with the proposition that genetic and environmental factors often play a role in shaping how people behave. I doubt, however, that genetic and environmental factors play "a complete part" in shaping how people behave, except in extreme cases (psychopaths with physically defective brains, people with brain tumors, and the like). My reservation with regard to normal cases is based on, say, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and not on religion as we know it.
At one extreme, Jesus said, "Judge not that ye be not judged" (an example of religion as we do not know it). At the other, Ayn Rand wrote, "Judge, and be prepared to be judged." With a nod to Aristotle and Confucius, might there not be a Golden Mean between these two extremes?
I recently read What Is Man? by Mark Twain, and I think that it had a lot to offer on this topic.The book is formatted like a dialogue of Plato's. There is a old man who tries to convince a young man that an individual is a slave to either internal mechanisms (one's genetic disposition to do and not do certain things) and outside influences (our environment).
The old man's point is that all thoughts and actions can be explained away as outputs from the inputs of nature and nurture. Sometimes he seems to be stretching in order to fit things into his hypothesis, but overall I think the old man does a good job in arguing his position.
"Judge not that ye be not judged"Falling more towards the Randian side (but not indicative of the author's personal opinion, its just a fiction story after all) is Franz Kafka's famous tale, 'In the Penal Colony'.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/In_the_...
I cite it because in this case I rather suppose the sentiment of Jesus to be less than apt. In society today, in permissive / loose standards of popular culture, many people seem uncomfortable and alarmed and apprehensive about the concept of judgement. They shrink from it, they resent it, they are horrified by it. They insist judgement not be applied to them or any of their decisions or choices.
I disagree with this. I think we should embrace more judgement and not be discouraged at all by Jesus' warning us that we ourselves might be judged. That's what Kafka explores in this short story. Everyone should be judged and this uniformity, this consistency, is what redeems the system as being fair. Or at least, pursuing fairness.
Knowing that judgement awaits everyone sooner or later (either here, or perhaps in the afterlife or merely at the hands of fate if nothing else?) and not being afraid of our dispensation provides a kind of solace to those who must serve as judges. Delivering justice can be a horrible task (in the Kafka tale, it is meted out with a fiendish type of tattooing device) and the climax of the story centers on a judge who hurls himself onto it to receive the torture even though he himself has committed no legal crime.
MJD wrote (post 26): "I recently read What Is Man? by Mark Twain, and I think that it had a lot to offer on this topic.The book is formatted like a dialogue of Plato's. There is a old man ..."
I had partially read Mark Twain's What is Man? some time ago but forgot that it addressed issues of free will and determinism. I have now added it to my Free Will reading list and will look at it again in the near future.
I am currently reading Robert Kane's The Significance of Free Will, which, so far, is excellent, and The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, which Kane edited and which contains essays from all different perspectives on free will and determinism. I also have many additional philosophical and scholarly books and essays on these issues, and it will likely take me a few months to read them all.
Alan wrote: "MJD wrote (post 26): "I recently read What Is Man? by Mark Twain, and I think that it had a lot to offer on this topic.The book is formatted like a dialogue of Plato'..."
What book would you recommend at this time which you think gives a good case for free will?
MJD wrote: "What book would you recommend at this time which you think gives a good case for free will?"I'm just getting started on my reading in this area. As I mentioned in post 28, Kane's The Significance of Free Will appears to be very good, but I'm only on chapter 3. I'm reading it slowly and carefully to be sure I understand it.
Addendum to my post 30:I have now read about 75% of Robert Kane's The Significance of Free Will. It is much more academic and difficult to read than I originally anticipated. I have just finished Alfred R. Mele's Free: Why Science Hasn't Disproven Free Will, which I have briefly reviewed here. This book is probably the best general introduction, written for the nontechnical general reader, to free will issues. I also have some academic books by Professor Mele on free will, which I will reading soon.
Just saw a notice that an upcoming Philosophy Talk program (on NPR) is going to discuss the topic "Neuroscience and Free Will," with Daniel Dennett as guest.The program is scheduled for the week of May 20; it airs on different days in different cities. Schedule information may be available at the Philosophy Talk website.
Robert wrote (#267 in the Government and the Economy topic): "An emergent example is the theory of "eliminativism" that reduces us to neurology and claims that everything in our consciousness is totally illusory. . . . (I don't know if scientific tests have been developed for this theory; it may still be more philosophical speculation than science.)"I am reading several books—written by neuroscientists, philosophy professors, cognitive psychologists, and others—on this issue and will devote much of chapter 1 of my forthcoming Reason and Human Ethics to it. It is the major question addressed in the book I am currently reading: Terrence W. Deacon, Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter, Kindle ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 2013). Deacon is a professor of biological anthropology and neuroscience and the chair of anthropology at the University of California, Berkeley. He constructs a very detailed and complex scientific argument rejecting both eliminativism and "the ghost in the machine" (as they say). He proceeds very methodically, step by step, in this book, as though it were a textbook. I am having to draw on my limited educational background in the physical and biological sciences (more than fifty years ago in high school and introductory college courses) to understand the book. Of course, much has been learned since that time, and Deacon covers every relevant scientific development and theory of the last several decades. I am learning a great deal but, at page 276 of 546 pages (not counting front and back matter), have still not reached his precise argument on this question. I also have several other books (both scientific and philosophical) arguing all sides of this issue. It ultimately has to do with the question of free will versus determinism, which is the subject I will be addressing in chapter 1 of my forthcoming book.
Following up on my review of Daniel Dennett's Freedom Evolves, see Galen Strawson's essay on Dennett's views here. Galen Strawson is a professor of philosophy at The University of Texas at Austin.
In the course of an extensive discussion of the Bible, Spinoza makes a remark that stands out like a sore thumb in its context: "To Prophets, furthermore, who believed that human beings act from free choice and their own power, God was revealed as indifferent to and unaware of future human actions." Benedict Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, trans. Martin D. Yaffe (Indianapolis: Focus, 2004), 20 (2.5.7). I am currently reading this Yaffe translation of the Theologico-Political Treatise. (I read the R. H. M. Elwes translation in 1967.)I am not prepared right now to take a position on whether or not Spinoza believed in free will. I will have to finish rereading the Theologico-Political Treatise as well as read his Ethics before attempting to answer that question. However, the above quotation from the Theologico-Political Treatise is in marked contrast to the predestinarian scriptural interpretations of such commentators as Augustine of Hippo, Martin Luther, and John Calvin. See Jesse Couenhoven, Predestination: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: T&T Clark, 2018), which I am also currently reading.
Free will has been attacked for millennia from two major sources: (1) theological determinism (or predestination), and (2) scientific (or causal) determinism. Strict theological determinism is quite similar to scientific determinism, except that theological determination is based on theism, whereas scientific determinism is based on nature.
Chapter 1 of my forthcoming book Reason and Human Ethics will discuss these issues in depth, which is why I am currently studying them. If there is no free will, then ethics is a pointless topic.
Although I generally oppose discussing theological issues in this forum, I permit it when directly related to an issue of political philosophy or ethics. Such is the case with the question of predestination, as it has a direct impact on ethics in general and free will in particular. I have, accordingly, read and reviewed Jesse Couenhoven's book Predestination: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: T&T Clark, 2018) here.
Addendum to my preceding post: See also the comments that follow my above-linked review of Couenhoven's book.
Predestination worked ideologically among those who construed economic success as evidence of being among the "elect," that is, among those predestined for heaven.See the classic study: Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905).
Jon asks, "are you saying that many men assumed the position of success because of the fact that they were elect?" I think it was the other way around: the economic success was evidence of being among the "elect." In any case, I said "ideological," not "theological." There is a difference. Ideology is concerned with the genesis of ideas and typically ideological analysis looks for this genesis in socioeconomic motivations. If you believed in predestination, it is plausible that you would be interested in finding ways to convince yourself that you were among the "elect." It is a long time since I read the Weber book but as I recall he considers Protestantism in general and Calvinism in particular. You might want to consult his book to see where you think he goes wrong. My memory is that, broadly speaking, Weber is concerned with finding the origins of what came to be known as the "work ethic." Weber was a sociologist not a theologian.
Re posts 39-41:My book The First American Founder: Roger Williams and Freedom of Conscience (Philosophia, 2015) discusses several of these and related topics within the context of seventeenth-century New England theocracy, seventeenth-century Rhode Island, and sixteenth-century Geneva theocracy (substantially controlled by John Calvin). See, for example, the following discussions:
• Page 88-89 (Chapter 3): A discussion of General Baptists (who rejected predestination) versus Particular Baptists (who accepted predestinarian) in Rhode Island. Rhode Island founder Roger Williams, despite his unwavering commitment to separation of church and state and freedom of conscience, appeared to believe in predestination throughout his life, though he refused to judge which individuals constituted the elect, saying that only God could know. As Williams (who was an ordained minister) matured, he became less interested in doctrine and more interested in Jesus's ethical teachings.
• Pages 95-100 (Chapter 3): The Antinomian crisis in Massachusetts Bay. Although the magistrates in Massachusetts Bay believed in predestination, they thought they could recognize the "Visible Saints," i.e. the elect, by their demeanor and external moral standing. Anne Hutchinson and other "Antinomians" (meaning "against law") objected to this departure from strict predestinarianism, thereby incurring the wrath of the religious and governmental authorities, who tolerated no dissent from their official theocratic views. The Massachusetts General Court tried and convicted Hutchinson and her allies and sentenced them to banishment.
• Pages 319-26 (Appendix B): These pages describe the evolution of a theocratic constitution in seventeenth-century Massachusetts Bay. The magistrates were chosen in a quasi-democratic system in which only members of an officially recognized church could vote. By 1636, however, to become a church member one had to prove membership in the Visible Elect, i.e., that the applicant was one of those predestined by God for salvation. Such recognition was reserved for only a small proportion of the populace. Moreover, only male church members constituting the Visible Elect could legally vote and hold office. This amounted to about one-fifth of the population. Thus, the result of these constitutional changes was the transformation, in the words of an eminent historian (Edmund S. Morgan), of "the republican government of the charter into a sort of religious soviet." The resulting Massachusetts Bay theocratic regime banished religious dissenters, imprisoned and whipped Baptists, and whipped, hanged, and otherwise persecuted Quakers.
• Pages 326-33 (Appendix B): John Calvin and his allies established a theocratic government in sixteenth-century Geneva in which Calvin became the official chief religious minister. In this position, Calvin largely controlled governmental developments, especially developments related to the established church. Calvin had a distinguished scholar, Servetus, burned at the stake for disagreeing with Calvin's officially promulgated doctrines. Calvin's regime also persecuted other individuals who disagreed with the predestinarian views contained in his Institutes of the Christian Religion, which the government adopted as its official religious scripture.
I read Max Weber's The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism in college and reread it a couple of years ago. Bob Wess provides an accurate summary of it in his posts 39 and 41.
The aspect of free-will I might say I'm interested in is the perception of freedom. Are our choices any different based on whether we simply believe we are free to choose? Are our responsibilities different if this perception of free will is present? And what if the perception is either a partial perception or an incorrect perception? Just musing aloud here. Rhetorical pondering.
Jon wrote: "Alan, I’m interested in reading your book as I’m an avid fan of church history and American history. I presume it’s not a church history focused book, but I’m still interested in reading it! I presume it’s not a church history focused book, but I’m still interested in reading it! Do you have an official release date yet?"The book was published in 2015. It can be ordered in either paperback or Kindle ebook editions from Amazon.com here. For the table of contents and excerpts, use the "Look Inside" feature on the Amazon page. Errata and Supplemental Comments are posted here.
In looking at your Goodreads profile yesterday, it occurred to me that you might find this book of interest. It discusses American and English history, religious history, and ethical and political philosophy. Most of all, it explains in detail the remarkable life and work of Roger Williams, whom I call "the first American Founder." Although I don't personally share his religious views, Williams is one of my all-time heroes. As Hamlet said of his father, "He was a man, take him for all in all: / I shall not look upon his like againe." (William Shakespeare, Hamlet, 1:2:376-77, in The Norton Facsimile: The First Folio of Shakespeare, 2nd ed., ed. Charlton Hinman and Peter W. M. Blayney [New York: W. W. Norton, 1996]), 763.)
Feliks wrote (#43): "The aspect of free-will I might say I'm interested in is the perception of freedom. Are our choices any different based on whether we simply believe we are free to choose? Are our responsibilities different if this perception of free will is present? And what if the perception is either a partial perception or an incorrect perception? Just musing aloud here. Rhetorical pondering."I don't think of free will that way at all. To my mind, it either exists or it doesn't exist. Whether people believe or don't believe that it exists does not interest me and is not something I have even thought about.
Fair enough. Its just a stray thought of mine; and the only thing I currently have to contribute to the thread. I recall though, that the sensibility of freedom (whether or not we possess it) underpins a key conclusion arrived at by Kantian ethics. But it could also be said to be a component of phenomenology (and we don't travel there in this group anymore). Let it remain a sleeping dog.
Anyway Alan, I must say it is a rare man who cites the Act, edition, page number, date, and publisher when borrowing a quote of Shakespeare's (!) Good grief! ha
Feliks wrote: "Anyway Alan, I must say it is a rare man who cites the Act, edition, page number, date, and publisher when borrowing a quote of Shakespeare's (!) Good grief! ha"I gave a detailed citation, because this edition is an exact facsimile of the 1623 First Folio (the first printed edition of Shakespeare's collected writings). This is a wonderful thing. Shakespeare died in 1616, and his friends published it a few years later. It was in this edition that Ben Jonson, his friend and literary rival, wrote of him: "He was not of an age, but for all time!"
I have posted a paper titled "Determinism vs. Free Will vs. Compatibilism: A Preliminary Bibliographic Outline" here.
Addendum to my preceding post:I have updated the above-referenced outline by adding the following to III.B.7: Henry P. Stapp, Quantum Theory and Free Will: How Mental Intentions Translate into Bodily Actions (Cham, SZ: Springer, 2017).
Do/Can Computers Have Free Will?Many science fiction books, movies, and television programs present scenarios in which computers start acting like human beings and try to take over the world. Such plots seem to assume that computers have some sort of free will for which humans failed to account when programming them.
I am currently reading a fascinating book by neuroscientist William R. Klemm on consciousness and free will. I will probably review the book when I am finished reading it. In the meantime, however, I cannot resist quoting what he says about computers and free will:
However, it is a fair challenge to ask, “Computers process information. Why don’t they have free will?” Here are my answers:William R. Klemm, Making a Scientific Case for Conscious Agency and Free Will (Cambridge, MA: Elsevier, Academic Press, 2016), 20-21, Kindle ed.
• Computers are not conscious of what they do.
• Computers process information digitally. Computations in the brain are analog.
• The number of brain processing computational elements far exceeds what is possible in computers, having 86 billion neurons, each with 100–1000 synaptic contacts, embedded in neural circuits that flexibly adjust their mutual functional connectivities. A given neuron may have multiple functions and be functionally recruited into multiple circuitry. Brains can even change their “hardwiring” by up/down regulation of synapses and in some regions by birthing new neurons and circuit wiring.
• Computers have far less degrees of freedom and flexibility than brain and thus have less capacity for self-adjusting their processing operations.
• Unlike brains, computers cannot do anything they have not been programmed to do.
• A computer has limited ability to self-organize its processing algorithms.
• Computers have no consciousness and thus much less awareness of the feedback from their own processing and executive control ways to consider choice options and adjustments.
• Unlike the stereotyped processing of computers, brains do not process rigidly because brains have self-organizing capabilities that process information in ways that can be new and not predetermined.
• The pervasive nonlinearity of brains enables emergent properties that are greater than the sum of the parts.
Addendum to Posts 49 and 50, supra:I have further updated here the bibliographic outline on free will by adding the following reference in Section III.B:
• William (W. R.) Klemm, Making a Scientific Case for Conscious Agency and Free Will (Cambridge, MA: Elsevier, Academic Press, 2016).
(edited 2/25/2019; see post 71, infra, regarding further updates)
March 22, 2020 NOTE:
I accidentally deleted today the text of my initial post in this topic, and I cannot recreate it. Although I probably composed it in a Word document, I cannot find the Word document in question. Perhaps I didn’t save it. The post set forth some of my initial impressions of Daniel Dennett’s Freedom Evolves. I had not finished the book at the time I wrote the post. I later reviewed it here.
The topic Human Ethics: Basis, Principles, Applications also contains several comments regarding free will.
This topic began as a discussion of the ethical implications of free will. Starting at post 336 below, I expanded the topic to include also a discussion of the political dimensions of free will. Accordingly, at that time (March 22, 2020), I moved this “Free Will” topic from the “Ethics” folder to the “Both Political Philosophy and Ethics” folder.