On Galen Strawson’s Criticism of Narrativity

“The greatest hazard of all, losing one's self, can occur very quietly in the world, as if it were nothing at all.  No other loss can occur so quietly; any other loss - an arm, a leg, five dollars, a wife, etc. - is sure to be noticed.”  Søren Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death



     Picture by José Roosevelt1. Introduction
This paper challenges Galen Strawson’s proposed distinction between two ways of experiencing the self: the Synchronic and the Diachronic. While the Diachronic experiences his self as existing in the past, present and future, for the Synchronic the self is fully in the present. According to Strawson, a Diachronic view of the self is an essential ingredient of adopting a Narrative attitude towards one’s self. By contrast, a Synchronic or Episodic personality has no need for defining one’s self through narrative. I will argue that this distinction is in tension with our ordinary concepts of self and identity. These concepts have essential connections with the commitments and self-constituting decisions we make. We usually define ourselves in terms of what we care about or what we take to be important and Narrativity is just our way of keeping track of these crucial commitments (MacIntyre, 1981; Taylor 1989; Frankfurt 1998; McAdams 2001). These conceptual connections become prominent when we consider widespread phenomena like losing one’s self or going through an identity crisis. I will argue that the Narrativity view of the self, the view criticized by Strawson, has the conceptual resources to accurately describe and explain these phenomena. By contrast, Strawson’s proposed distinction is in direct conflict with these significant psychological facts and cannot account for our intuitions regarding them. In the next section I will present Strawson’s characterization of the distinction between the Synchronic and the Diachronic and his arguments against the Narrativity view of the self. In the third section I will reject the distinction and argue in support of the Narrativity view. Then, in section four, I will explore some connections between adopting a Narrative view of the self and having a good, happy life.
2. Strawson’s criticism
In his paper “Against Narrativity” (2008) Galen Strawson argues against the idea that we do or should experience our selves as a narrative. First, he criticizes the psychological thesis that we do experience our selves as a narrative and, secondly, he rejects the ethical or normative thesis that thinking of our lives as narrative “is essential to living well, to true or full personhood.” (Strawson 2008, p. 189) Strawson draws the distinction between two psychological types: the Diachronic and the Synchronic. The Diachronic experiences his self in a different way from the Synchronic. He thinks of himself as something that was there in the further past and will be there in the further future. In contrast, the Synchronic does not think of himself as something that was there in the remote past and will be there in the future (Strawson, 2008, p. 190) Although an Episodic is able to remember his past experiences and plan for his future, he has limited interest in these temporal dimensions because he experiences himself as present. An Episodic is aware that his childhood memories are of himself in the sense that he is the same human being as he was in the past. However, this does not imply that he is the same person, or that the way he experiences his self now involves anything about the past. The Diachronic type, given its concern for past and future, is more inclined to adopting a Narrative outlook towards his life. Narrativity involves telling a story or giving an account of one’s life. In contrast, Strawson takes himself to be an Episodic: “I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future” (Strawson 2008, p. 194) Strawson stresses that the Episodic form of experiencing one’s self does not imply that one is not informed by one’s past and not responsible for it. To make this point vivid he uses an analogy between psychological or ethical development, on the one hand, and musical development, on the other. “The past can be alive in the present simply in so far as it has helped to shape the way one is in the present, just as musicians’ playing can incorporate and body forth their past practice without being mediated by any explicit memory of it.” (Strawson, 2008, p. 193) The supporters of the ethical Narrativity thesis argue that taking a narrative stance towards our lives is crucial for having good lives. In reply, Strawson claims that “those who think this way are motivated by a sense of their own importance or significance that is absent in other human beings.” (Strawson, 2008, p. 196) He argues that other types of ethical personality are not interested in questions of the unity of their lives, but rather they are only concerned with the present “It is just that what I care about, in so far as I care about myself and my life, is how I am now. The way I am now is profoundly shaped by my past, but it is only the present shaping consequences of the past that matter, not the past as such.”(Strawson, 2008, p. 198) On this point Strawson strongly agrees with Earl of Shaftesbury who writes: “The metaphysicians … affirm that if memory be taken away, the self is lost. [But] what matter for memory? What have I to do with the past? If, whilst I am, I am as I should be, what do I care more? And thus let me lose self every hour, and be twenty successive selves, ‘tis all one to me; so long as I lose not my opinion (i.e. my overall outlook, my character, my moral identity). If I carry that with me ‘tis I, all is well… The now, the now. Mind this, in this is all” (Shaftesbury 1698 – 1712, p. 136-137). To sum up, Strawson argues that both the psychological Narrativity thesis and the ethical Narrativity thesis are false. They are based on hasty generalization from one psychological type of ethical personality to all types of personalities. Strawson argues that there are normal people living fulfilling, ethical lives who do not experience their selves in narrative terms and who should not do it either. For these types of people adopting a narrative outlook would be dangerous and unhealthy, and such an outlook should not by any means be forced on them.   

3. The Psychological Thesis
In this section I will challenge Strawson’s distinction between Synchronic and Diachronic and I will argue in support of the psychological Narrativity Thesis. My challenge is based on folk-psychological descriptions of the related phenomena of having lost one’s self and having found one’s self. I suggest that a criterion of adequacy of accounts of the self or personal identity is whether they have the resources to account for widespread phenomena like losing one’s self or going through an identity crisis. The concepts of self and identity are closely related with the ideas of losing one’s identity or not knowing who one is. In other words, a self is something which can be lost and then regained; one’s identity is something which may be in crisis. Thus, a view of the self should have the conceptual resources to illuminate these central uses of the concept and to explain the phenomena they are meant to describe. I will argue that Strawson’s description of the Synchronic or Episodic psychological type is based on a misconstrual of the ordinary concept of the self and cannot make room for the conceptual possibility of describing such common realities like having an identity crisis. On the other hand, the Narrative view of the self has the conceptual resources to describe and illuminate these significant experiences.  At different points in our lives we have the sense that we don’t know who we are anymore, that we have lost our identity, and this feeling is accompanied by a sense of anxiety and alienation. To take a concrete example, let’s suppose John decides to study psychology and dreams of discovering the hidden mechanisms of our minds and make contributions comparable to those of Sigmund Freud or Carl Gustav Jung. After finishing his undergraduate and graduate studies John already has a few papers published and starts working for a private clinic. John discovers that he enjoys having money and buys a new car and a new apartment. Then, he meets the girl of his dreams, gets married and has children. He has many patients and gradually becomes swamped with work. He applies standard therapeutic techniques and he tells himself he will soon invent new, better ones. However, working with patients and meeting the commitments of family life becomes so overwhelming that he barely has time for research and publishing. One day, when in his mid-thirties, John reads a biography of Jung and learns that the great psychologist had made his major contributions while in his late thirties. John feels a pang of anxiety. His modest contributions are no match for those of the famous theoretician. Something in his life did not go well; at some point he must have made a wrong turn. He suddenly feels alienated from his job and thinks that he lost his way. Something essential has been forgotten. John cannot recognize himself in the life he currently lives. It suddenly appears empty, devoid of meaning and purpose. After a few weeks of intense deliberation John decides to resign his job, get a divorce and buy a cabin up in the mountains where he can intensely psychoanalyze himself and make momentous psychological discoveries. This new-found meaning and purpose fills him with intense happiness.   This familiar type of case points to some important features of our ordinary concepts of self and identity. These features are emphasized, in one form or another, by defenders of the Narrativty view of the self, both philosophers and psychologists (MacIntyre, 1981; Taylor, 1989; McAdams 2001; Schectmann 1997). Having a self or identity involves the possibility of going through an identity crisis. An identity crisis means that the person does not know who he is and what to do; the agent is essentially disoriented. Solving an identity crisis involves making a decision, undertaking a commitment or taking a stand on a crucial issue (Taylor 1989, p. 27-28; MacIntyre 1981, p. 203-204). The idea of losing one’s self essentially implies that the agent knew who he was at some point in the past and now has lost that knowledge. Put differently, the agent was himself in the past and now no longer is. So, in a sense, one would place one’s self in the past rather than the present, which no longer reflects one’ self. In addition, the ideas of decision and commitment imply not only that one’s present self cares about one’s future self, but also that one’s present self is one’s future self. For the commitment to be effective one ought to presuppose that one is oneself in the future. One does not make a commitment in front of someone else but in front of one’s self. One does not know what to do in the future and one decides regarding one’s future, not someone else’s. This conceptual remarks show that one’s present and future are essential in constituting one’s identity. When one is disoriented and alienated we say that one has lost one’s way. This spatial metaphor implies that one has to retrace one’s steps and find one’s way again. In other words, one needs to search into one’s past in order to know what to do in the future, how to get to one’s destination. I think the psychological phenomenon of losing one’s self described above and the conceptual connections involved in its description pose a difficulty for Strawson’s proposed distinction between Episodics and Diachronics. The problem is: how can Episodics experience the anxiety produced by an identity crisis? First, there is a conceptual aspect to this difficulty. Second, the phenomenon also calls into question one of he key differences between the Synchronic and Diachronic; the idea that the Synchonic has limited interest in his past and limited concern for the future. With regards to the conceptual issue, it seems that the very idea of an Episodic psychological type is in tension with our ordinary concepts of self or identity. Losing one’s self implies that one does not experience one’s self as present or given. Conceptually, it involves the notion that one existed at a moment in the past and one has lost himself or has lost his way. Thus, one is no longer in the present. But being Synchronic means that one experiences one’s self as present. In consequence, if we accept the existence of a Synchronic psychological type we became unable to coherently describe widespread phenomena like going through an identity crisis. Arguing that the Synchonic type does not actually go through identity crises would be missing the point. The criticism is that once one has a self or identity it should be at least logically or conceptually possible that one goes through a crisis. This is perfectly compatible with the existence of people who do not in fact have such an experience. However, a view of the self should make room for the logical possibility of losing one’s self and one’s knowledge of one’s self. Turning to the second point, it was indicated that on Strawson’s view the Synchronic has limited interest in his past and limited concern for his future. However, the possibility of losing one’s self uncovers a different reality. When one goes through an identity crisis one feels alienated from one’s present life and experiences a lack of purpose. One’s past becomes central for one’s identity because this is where one is; since one has lost one’s self.  Thus, in this case, if one cares about one’s self, one cares about one’s past. In addition, one does not care about one’s past as it is in the present, as Strawson suggests. By definition, losing one’s self means that one has lost something important along the way, that one is no longer in the present. In other words, one is interested in one’s past as past, not in one’s past as it is experienced in the present. As Charles Taylor emphasizes, one needs to do work of retrieval and retracing one’s steps and crucial decisions. (Taylor 1989, p. 27-28) But this work of retrieval and self-searching is essential because the individual no longer has a sense of purpose or direction. And this sense of purpose is crucial because the agent cares about his future; he cares about his life having meaning and direction. In the example above, John cares about doing groundbreaking research in psychology. This is what gives him direction and purpose. This is why he feels anxiety when he compares his modest achievements with those of famous psychologists. In consequence, John engages in soul-searching and, implicitly, becomes concerned with his past and future selves. His past and future matter to him. In other words, one can try to find one’s self only if one thinks that one existed in the past and that one will exist in the future. Once we appreciate these phenomena and the conceptual connections they uncover, we can see that someone with a Synchronic outlook cannot experience an identity crisis because they have limited interest in their past and future. But this is not an additional difference between the Synchronic and the Diachronic, but rather it shows that the Synchronic type is a philosopher’s fiction. Having a self implies the possibility of going through an identity crisis which, in turn, logically demands that the person cares deeply about her past and future. As indicated in the previous section, Strawson relies on the analogy between psychological development and musical development to characterize the Synchronic’s relation with his past: the past is implicitly absorbed in the present in the way a musicians’ hours of practice are implicit in the quality of his performance. Similarly, as the quote from Earl of Shaftesbury reveals, one’s moral personality is fully in the present as long as ‘I am as I should be’. That is, as long as “I lose not my opinion (i.e. my overall outlook, my character, my moral identity).” (Shaftesbury 1698 – 1712, p. 136-137) However, this characterization hinges on the fact that the person’s moral commitments are not lost or forgotten, that they are fully present. But what if the agent loses track of her moral identity? What if the person faces a terrible moral conflict and they do not feel that they are as they should be? Isn’t that the time when the past and one’s memories become important as a guide to the future? The time when the agent ought to engage in lucid deliberation and focus on one’s past and one’s development? It becomes clear that Strawson does not consider the possibility of going through identity crisis, and, as suggested above, it is this possibility that reveals the temporal, Diachronic dimension of our experience of the self. In reply, Strawson might argue that what really distinguishes the Synchronic from the Diachronic is that the Synchronic does not experience his self as being in the remote future or the remote past, while the Diachronic does. However, this criterion must be put in conjunction with the limited concern criterion because it does not carry too much weight on its own. For instance, someone might have a lot of concern for his nearfuture but not for his remote future. He might have well-defined goals regarding his career but no precise retirement plans. With regards to his career he may have a strong Narrative outlook; he may explicitly concerned about the shape of the story of his professional life and about projecting a certain image, being a leader, and role model. Clearly, Strawson will not accept that this person qualifies as a Synchronic on his account. Moreover, we can imagine that the agent has no definite idea of what retirement will be like and whether he himself will be there or whether he will be like a different person. After all, if the agent defines himself in terms of his career then, once his career is over, he will find other things to care about and identify himself with. In other words, he will be like a new, different person. Similarly, a Diachronic does not necessarily have to experience his self as having been there in the further past, in his childhood, let’s say. The fact is that we normally start spinning life-stories and making projects when we are teenagers. At least in our Western culture, that is the time when we have to take a stand and answer some questions regarding who we are and what we care about. But then that is where we start our quest and caring about our selves just means caring about the quest, a quest which may have nothing to do with one’s childhood. However, this does not take away from the fact that one who does not identify himself with his childhood self may be a strong Diachronic. To sum up, I think that Strawson must rely on the limited interestcriterion when drawing the distinction between the Synchronic and the Diachronic type. The Episodic, as opposed to the Diachronic, has no special concern for his past or future and experiences his self as given in the present. But my argument above, based on the concepts of losing one’s self and going through an identity crises, shows that caring about our self implies caring about our projects and commitments which necessarily go beyond the present and extend into our past and future. So far, I have shown that phenomena like going through an identity crisis reveal that we are Diachronic in our experience of our selves; that, to the degree that we care about ourselves, we also care about our past and future. However, this conclusion is not enough to support the Narrativity view of the self. As Strawson points out, Diachronicity does not, in and of itself, imply Narrativity. Being Diachronic means experiencing one’s self as existing in the past and future. In addition, Narrativity involves telling a storyor giving an account of one’s life (Strawson 2008, p. 201). This account captures key events of the past and also offers a way of approaching the future. In response, I maintain that once we grasp the intrinsic link between having a self and the possibility of losing one’s self, it becomes clear that Diachronicity must involve undertaking a Narrative outlook. Losing one’s self necessarily involves an interest in our past and future. We perceive it as a gap between our commitments and values and our present lives. I suggest that any attempt to fill that gap must take the form of an account or a narrative of key events of one’s life. As Taylor suggestively puts it: “Our lives are in the space of questions which only a coherent narrative can answer. In order to have a sense of who we are, we have to have a notion of how we have became, and where we are going” (Taylor, 1989, p. 47) In the example used above, John perceives a gap between his commitment to becoming a famous psychologist and his present life. This sense of alienation leads him to question whether achieving his dream is still important to him, or whether, in the meantime, having a family-life became more important. In effect, he will either renew his initial commitment or dedicate himself to family-life and forget about his previous ambitions. Following Taylor, I suggest that answering these crucial questions must take the form of giving an account or telling a story. Thus, John may say to himself: “I thought that being a famous researcher was important for me but then I met Sally and discovered the power of love”, or, “At the very beginning I wanted to be a famous researcher but then I got sidetracked by family-life and lost my focus. However, now I found my way again”. This shows that in order to move on John must give an account or explanation of what happened to him; he must structure his experience in the form of a meaningful story. Either way the main events which occurred in his life will be assigned a new meaning and significance relative to his decision. This new account will also dictate the meaning of John’s projected future; it will give him a sense of direction and purpose. The events of the future will become interpretable by reference to this projected goal. To sum up, I suggest that highlighting the intrinsic connection between having an identity crisis and trying to find answers to crucial questions in the form of an account of one’s experience shows that Diachronicity must involve Narrativity; that is, caring about one’s past and future demands offering an account of one’s life. These remarks also reveal that, in direct contrast to Strawson’s account, the Narrativity view of the self has the conceptual resources to describe and illuminate phenomena like losing one’s self and going through an identity crisis. Having an identity, on Taylor’s view, is having settled answersto questions regarding what is important to one. For instance, by describing myself as a Christian or a communist I situate myself with respect to certain values or commitments. These values offer a sense of direction and purpose. An identity crisis occurs when one either loses track of those commitments or finds one’s own life to be in tension with them. This experience is accompanied by feelings of disorientation and confusion. The agent needs to find his way again. This involves reexamining the initial questions, reopening those issues, and engaging in lucid deliberation and introspection with respect to them. The agent has to determine whether his crisis was triggered by his losing sight of his own values or by the fact that those values no longer capture what he really cares about. Either way, the process of introspection will result into an account of what happened to the agent, of why and how he has lost his way. For instance, the Christian may blame Satan for implanting the seeds of doubt into his mind and the communist may try to explain his social apathy by reference to the power of the capitalist system to tranquilize its members by creating false consciousness. This account will include answers to what the agent takes to be central questions regarding his own life (e.g. whether to worship God, whether to be a social activist) and thus offer new meaning and purpose.   Towards the end of his paper, Strawson concedes that “If I were charged to make my self-understanding explicit, I might well illustrate my view by reference to things I (Galen Strawson) have done, but it certainly would not follow that I had a Diachronic outlook, still less a Narrative one” (Strawson, p. 206) That is, although Strawson would explain who he is by reference to what Galen Strawson as a human being did in the past, it does not follow that the present Galen Strawson experiences one’s self as being in the past. But I think this claim is in direct contrast to our pre-theoretical intuitions. When someone gives an account of who they are we assume that the person in their account is who they are. If someone in their thirties says “After graduating university I decided to become an academic”, the hearer assumes that the ‘I’ refers to the speaker’s self. If the speaker adds the qualification “…but that’s only Galen Strawson the human being, not really myself”, the hearer is inclined to understand this as a departure of the speaker’s present self from their past self. That is, as an expression of change of commitments and values. Neither one of theses natural interpretations is consistent with Strawson’s suggestion. If one is charged with making one’s self-understanding explicit, it is presupposed that there is continuity between the person indicated in the story and the person telling the story. The account, after all, is supposed to explain who the person is, their sense of self, what makes them who they are. I think this intuition is clearly captured by the idea of commitment. When someone tells us who they are, they speak of their crucial commitments and values. When they refer to what they did in the past, the actions denoted are supposed to express what they cared about, what defined them. If they explicitly distinguish between their past self and their present self then those commitments are no longer in force and no longer express their self-understanding. Thus, in contrast to what Strawson suggests, the fact that we explain our selves to others by offering an account of our lives shows that we experience ourselves as being there in the past and that we still subscribe to the commitments captured in our story; it indicates that we are essentially Diachronic and Narrative. In conclusion, I claim that Strawson’s notion of a Synchronic or Episodic psychological type – as someone who experiences their self as fully present and has limited concern for their past and future – is a philosopher’s fiction. This theoretical construction is in conflict with our ordinary concepts of self and identity as things which can be lost during an identity crisis, and can be subsequently rediscovered or reinvented; as things which give our lives meaning and purpose. By contrast, I argued that the Narrativity view of the self has the conceptual resources to capture and illuminate the relations between our notions of self and identity and the connected concepts of undertaking self-constituting commitments, self-searching and self-finding, and the ideal of having a meaningful, purposeful life. I think this shows that instead of positing different personality types, we can distinguish different degrees of Diachronicity and Narrativity. People may care more or less about their past and future. Their commitments may be more or less explicit and they may be more or less aware of them. However, as long as they are functioning agents they must be oriented towards what they think is important and worthwhile, in a space of crucial questions with settled answers.  
4. The Ethical Thesis
In this section I turn to the second thesis rejected by Strawson, the ethical or normative thesis. This thesis states that thinking of our lives as narrative “is essential to living well, to true or full personhood.” (Strawson 2008, p. 189) I think the defenders of the psychological Narrativity view should be careful when specifying its normative import because a descriptive requirement has no normative implications. If we actually do have a Narrative outlook then the norm that we ought to have one is pointless. It is a norm which cannot be broken because it is conceptually impossible for us, as agents, not to have a Narrative attitude
5. Conclusion
I have argued that Strawson’s criticism of the Narrativity view of the self misses its target. Stawson constructs a straw man in the sense that he does not clearly articulate the main intuition which animates the Narrative view. Champions of the Narrative account like Charles Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre and Harry Frankfurt base it on the idea that we define ourselves in terms of what we care about, in terms of our projects and ideals. Given this investment we see our lives in narrative form, a narrative which tracks our success or failure in achieving our goals. This narrative may be more or less explicit, but losing it results in a sense of disorientation and alienation. At that point one needs to take a stand and retrieve and reconsider one’s valuative framework. In this context, one’s past and future became of essential importance for one, given that the decision to take a stand is based on one’s profound desire to be in control of one’s life and give it meaning and purpose. The concept of a Synchronic or Episodic personality does not make justice to the idea that when we care about ourselves we care about the values and commitments we identify with and, in consequence, about whether our lives reflect those commitments. Having this care presupposes that one experiences one’s self in the present, past and future.   

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