Sinnott-Armstrong on the Irresistible Impulse Rule

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (a possible case of nominative determinism), holds forth on the morality of the Irresistible Impulse Rule, in this study:

“Insanity Defenses,” Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Ken Levy, in Oxford Handbook on the Philosophy of the Criminal Law, p. 299, John Deigh & David Dolinko, eds., Oxford University Press, 2011. It says:

“We explicate and evaluate arguments both for and against the insanity defense itself, different versions of the insanity defense (M’Naghten, Model Penal Code, and Durham (or Product)), the Irresistible Impulse rule, and various reform proposals.”

BONUS: A while ago, we looked at another of his many morality papers.