Free Will vs. Determinism in Two Pages

The Determinist Argument  – (in its most simple form)

Actions are caused.
Caused actions aren’t free.
Actions aren’t free.

Response 1 – Libertarianism  – some actions aren’t casually determined. Below are four arguments in defense of libertarianism and responses to those arguments.

Argument from experience (we know we have free will)

Response – But that doesn’t mean we have it. Consider Delgado’s experiment. He tweaks your brain causing you act, but you think you freely did that thing.
Universe is indeterministic – (not everything is predictable at the quantum level) Response – At micro level, the level of subatomic particles, this is true; but at the macro level, the level of your brain, this appears irrelevant.
We can’t predict our own acts (actions aren’t predictable in principle and thus free.)

Response – Still, an ideal observer your actions, and predictable, for determinism to be true, means predictable by an ideal observer.
Argument from accountability (we are accountable, and that implies free will.)

Response – But how do we know our belief in accountability is justified? Just because we find it “natural” to believe in accountability doesn’t mean we should.

But can libertarianism explain anything about behaviors? Can it say something about how we act other than to say determinism is false? Can it offer a positive account of how we supposedly choose? It seems not. Libertarianism can’t explain how we make decisions without resorting to ghostly souls within, or by having faith that cause and effect doesn’t effect our brains. This doesn’t seem like much of an alternative to determinism.

Response 2 – Compatibilism – Freedom doesn’t mean actions are uncaused, but that actions are uncoerced; freedom isn’t actions without causes, but actions caused by individuals. So actions can be caused and still free says the compatibilist.

To better understand this consider that  uncaused actions would be random, but random actions aren’t free actions. So free will requires that actions are caused! A person’s character, desires, thoughts, and intentions cause behavior. And the fact that we can predict someone’s behavior doesn’t mean they aren’t free. Just because we can predict what people will do doesn’t mean they didn’t choose to act freely.

Problem with Compatibilism

Compatibilists say that we are free if our actions are uncoerced. But are actions ever uncoerced?  It seems not, since character, desires, thoughts, intentions, preferences, wants, desires, etc. are all caused by forces beyond our control.

Ethics and free will – what are the implication of all this for ethics?

Deliberation – We still have goals—and take pleasure in achieving and pursuing them—even if we know we have them because of genes and environment. So it still makes sense to strive for things, and it still makes sense to deliberate.

Good and Bad – We can still think of some actions or people as good or bad. We can still say that torture is bad and medical care for children is good. Even if we know why someone does the bad (good) things they do, the things they do are still bad (good).

Responsibility – But without free will we aren’t responsible for our actions. Is that right? Here we have two options, In reply we could say:

1) Without free will one is not responsible – So let’s find out what’s wrong/right with people so that we can really make them, and the world, better. Or we could say:

2) Without free will one is responsible – We might say that one is blameworthy if they have no excuses,  or praiseworthy if they have no credit-eliminating conditions.

Conclusion – Consider that since none of us set our initial conditions—our genome or environment—aren’t there always excuses or credit-eliminating conditions to appeal to? And if we say that people aren’t free but responsible, doesn’t the word “responsible” means something different than it usually does? If the answer to both questions is yes, then we probably should conclude that people, in large part, don’t ultimately control either their thoughts or actions.

(This entry relied heavily on James and Stuart Rachels’ book: Problems from Philosophy.)