Algeria Votes

In a primer written before yesterday’s election, Hicham Yezza outlined the state of play:

Of course, rather than a credible contest pitting six viable pretenders, the 2014 elections were always destined to be a popular referendum on the past record – and future legacy – of the one candidate many have already accepted as the inevitable winner, presidential incumbent Abdelaziz Bouteflika. In power since his election to a first term in 1999, and already the country’s longest serving leader, the 77-year-old has had a rather eventful 12 months. Having suffered a minor stroke a year ago – which consigned him to a 3-month hospital stay in Paris – he has spent much of the period since his return in June 2013 trying to shore up his position at the helm of the Algerian governing ship. Seeing him as fatally weakened, many thought the prospect of a fourth term no longer thinkable, and the outspoken nature of such scepticism presaged a palace mutiny. Instead, Bouteflika took everyone by surprise with a brutal and wide-ranging summer reshuffle at the heart of the state apparatus, chiefly an attempt to cut his key rivals within the DRS (secret services), the FLN and the army, down to size. Whatever Bouteflika’s plans for 2014 were, a side-door gentle exit was not one of them.

Nabila Ramdani provides some background on the ailing president, who local media have declared the winner before the vote count is even finished:

Bouteflika is by no means a Gaddafi, Ben Ali or Mubarak, but his decision to stand in what were described by his government as fair and free elections was unwise.

He won an unlikely 90.24% of the vote when he last stood for re-election, in 2009, and his opponents are still making accusations about vote rigging. Bouteflika’s main rival [yesterday] was the former prime minister Ali Benflis, who won just 6% of the vote five years ago. Little wonder that many Benflis supporters called for a boycott this time around and an abstention rate of up to 80% was forecast.

Bouteflika’s record of national service is unquestionable but he has always placed security above democratic and economic progress.

Michael Robbins explains why Bouteflika’s regime has actually become more popular in recent years:

The most recent Arab Barometer survey, carried out from March through April 2013, reveals that opinion about the government has improved dramatically since its nadir in the months after the Arab Spring. Although the majority of Algerians remain dissatisfied with conditions in their country, their discontent has diminished. Four in 10 rate the government’s performance as good or very good, a 30-point increase over 2011. About three in 10 have favorable views of the government’s performance on narrowing the income gap (27 percent) and creating jobs (31 percent) up 17 points and 16 points respectively. The overall rate of satisfaction with the economic situation has also risen dramatically to 66 percent – more than double that of 2011. Increased happiness was not limited to the economy – 32 percent say the state of democracy and human rights is good or very good – a four fold increase from 2011.

What accounts for these dramatic shifts? First, the Algerian regime took modest steps following the Arab Spring to address some of the problems facing ordinary Algerians. In early 2011 the regime gave public servants a 34 percent raise and boosted subsidies for basic commodities. The regime also lifted the long-standing state of emergency law, in effect for nearly two decades, and passed a set of modest reforms including new laws governing the media and political parties.

But Amel Boubekeur argues that its grip is much more tenuous than it looks:

The leadership’s focus on retaining power has produced countless problems. Growing street protests and rising inner-regime conflicts are compelling Algeria’s rulers to redistribute power yet again in order to stay in place. The sense of crisis is compounded by an imminent generational shift. Bouteflika is too sick to finish his potential fourth mandate. Gaid Salah, the army chief-of-staff, and Tewfik Mediene, the head of the intelligence services, the Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité (DRS), are 78 and 74, respectively. Whether the transition to come is conducted under the guidance of the army or negotiated with demonstrators, the image of stability Algerian rulers have tried to convey to the international community for so many years can no longer be regarded as a given.

Mehdi Lazar and Sidi-Mohammed Nehad focus on Algeria’s regional significance:

The condition of this North African pivot-state is essential for Europe: Algiers is the third largest energy supplier to the EU, while its population of 38 million inhabitants, its anti-terrorism security expertise and the size of its armed forces (130,000 men) make their security capabilities necessary to the stability of the Sahel zone.

Moreover, with a gross domestic product (GDP) of 208 million dollars in 2013, Algeria remains the largest regional economy. Algeria was the least affected by the wave of the Arab Spring despite negative societal indicators. This situation contrasts with that of Tunisia or Egypt, notably due to the political impact of the major redistribution of wealth gained from oil revenues, but also due to the people’s fear of a return to a decade of stagnation.

However, rapidly dwindling exchange reserves since 2011 and the lack of vision with regard to energy policy over several years is enough to make anyone fear a return to the gas and oil circumstances that landed Algeria in its period of greatest national trauma.